OE COMMUNIQUÉ

Emphasis on the Total Force:

Active Army, National Guard, & Army Reserve

Meyer Sends

SUBJECT: OE Annual Command Summary

I have been given an overview of your OE Command Summary sub-missions, and I am encouraged by the increased emphasis and positive shift in focus given your OE programs. Many of the uses are innovative and address the complex issues which face the Army. We plan to prepare a summary of this information and provide it to you so you can compare your own applications of OE with applications in other commands. Although I am aware that not all of our Army leaders believe in OE and hence do not yet fully exploit the OE concept, I am impressed that our commanders are providing an atmosphere which supports our OESOs and nourishes their efforts. I am particularly impressed with those of you who are broadening the range of OE applications to help manage organizational change and solve key Army problems. The OE program provides a valuable resource and I am pleased to see the progress being made in its use.

GENERAL EDWARD C. MEYER
Chief of Staff, Army
January, 1981

The above comments are the text of a recent message sent by the Chief of Staff of the Army to all Major Army Commanders on 6 January 1981.

COL William L. Golden
Commander/Commandant

SGM John Cato, Jr. ·
Command Sergeant Major

LTC Ronald L. Sheffield
Directorate of Operations and Support

LTC Gerald D. Pike
Directorate of Concepts Development

Dr. Mel R. Spehn
Directorate of Training Developments

LTC William R. Fisher
Directorate of Training

LTC Thomas K. Forsythe
Directorate of Evaluation

MAJ Paul J. Rock
Editor

Mr. Robert B. Britsch
Production Assistant

Mr. Coy J. Brown
Visual Information Specialist

ABOUT THE COVER

This issue of the OE Communique highlights the fact that Organizational Effectiveness techniques and methods are not restricted in their application to only the active Army. The Army Reserves and the Army National Guard are both vigorously and enthusiastically engaged in the application of OE practices to the complex issues that confront these vital components of the Total Force Concept. OE is tailor-made for assisting with the development of goals and plans to integrate the resources of all Army components into a strong and viable national defense.

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Commandant's Comments

COL William L. Golden

Senior Leader/Manager Readership

A recent general officer visitor to OECS noted that senior managers are generally too busy to wade through a whole magazine but will take the time to read something tabbed, noted or identified by someone on his staff. Use the buck slip on this issue's cover to start your practice of getting appropriate articles to the attention of the preeminent leader in your headquarters or command.

MACOM Commanders Write About OE

In this issue are comments from the Chief of Staff of the Army, and letters from the Commanders of Training and Doctrine Command and Forces Command on the use of OE. Each is very positive on the benefits to be realized through the use of OE as an additional management tool. Note that each also mentions the potentially greater impact of the business of OE when OE Management Consultants work at the higher levels and on broader issues.

OE Management Consultant

The evolution in the orientation of OE toward significantly higher levels and general management issues has resulted in more frequent use of the term "OE Management Consultant" or "Consultant" in lieu of OESO and OENCO. I consider this change to be fortunate in that it reflects the kind of work in which today's OE trained people should be engaged. It is also in consonance with the fact that officer, NCO and DA Civilian students at OECS are now training side by side under the same curriculum and will be working as co-consultants in the field. I personally en-courage the use of "Management Consultant" and future issues of the Communique will reflect that encouragement.

OE Managers' Course

The OE Managers Course (OEMC) is the 3½ day course conducted by OECS to provide supervisors of OE Management Consultants an opportunity to learn more about OE, about the consultant, and about what that consultant should be doing. If you are confused, the course-was originally called the Key Managers' Course (KMC) and recently the Program Managers' Course. OEMC is the name now and consultants should encourage their managers to attend.

There Are Still A Few Out There

That's Incredible!! Today's mission-oriented and executive level image of Organizational Effectiveness was recently tarnished by an early vintage 5Z who was seen conducting a workshop wearing beads and cut-off blue jeans. Should you en-counter a similar carry-over from OE's former life, I hope you will take either official or personal corrective action. □

ATPL-HO   13 November 1980

SUBJECT: Organizational Effectiveness (OE) Evaluation

Commanders, TRADOC Installations
Commanders, USA Training Centers
Commanders, ROTC Regions
Commanders, TRADOC Analytic, Test & Experimental Activities
Commandants, TRADOC Service Schools

1. The intent of Organizational Effectiveness (OE) is to help mission accomplishment through the application of OE technology to organizational work. TRADOC Regulation 600-1, Organizational Effectiveness Plan for TRADOC (Fy 80-86), emphasizes the need for OE activities to support the TRADOC mission and to focus on commander's requirements, key TRADOC issues, the total Army concept, and combat applications. Specifically, it calls for an OE evaluation system that ensures OE is responding to Army needs.

2. In September, the TRADOC staff requested installation input to the Organizational Effectiveness (OE) Command Summary (FY 80), which addresses the progress made by OE. From your responses, the following points can be made:
   - There are significant benefits for TRADOC from the OE program
   - OE is being used in TRADOC as a management resource.
   - The trends for OE in TRADOC are in consonance with TRADOC Reg 600-1.
   - Past experience and service school instruction are effectively raising the level of OE acceptance.
   - Increasing benefits are being found from OE within command groups at installation, brigade, and battalion levels.
   - As the operating level of OE users increases, so does the likelihood of OE contributing to the broad complex issues facing the Army of tomorrow.
   - Many reported benefits, though presently intangible, addressed the quality of organizational life.
   - Where organizational performance standards existed, OE contribution was most measurable.
   - Hard evaluation data, though limited, is increasing.
   - Developmental work is underway that will aid commanders and OESOs in their evaluation efforts.

3. Some installations are using our OE assets in the broader systems concept and are gradually weaning themselves from the purely behavioral orientation that was previously emphasized. This shift is applauded and encouraged.

4. The Army Chief of Staff's White Paper and TRADOC Goals provide challenges for all of us. The feasibility of effectively organizing and operating to enhance our capability of meeting these challenges is indicated above. I invite you to investigate the use of your organizational effectiveness assets and to stretch your innovativeness in handling the myriad of challenges facing the TRADOC today and in the future.

> **DONN A. STARRY**
> General, United States Army
> Commanding

AFCG   24 June 1980

SUBJECT: Organizational Effectiveness (OE) in FORSCOM

Commanders, CONUSA
Commanders, FORSCOM Installations
Commanders, FORSCOM Major Troop Units on non-FORSCOM Installations

1. It isn't necessary for me to underline the need for maximum utilization of our limited and valuable personnel/material resources. All of you are critically aware of the crunch we face with diminishing allocations. Add to that the disruption of unit integrity from personnel turbulence and it becomes clear that unit efficiency is a driving force for survival.

2. The use of Organizational Effectiveness (OE) techniques can provide a most important edge in assisting us to accomplish organizational objectives. OE can, does, and will assist in improving the Army. FORSCOM has been using OE successfully; in fact, we are leading the Army in productive use of OE. I want us to continue to do so.

3. Having firmly established OE as a viable process at battalion level and below during the past three years now allows us to focus on major issues having a command-wide perspective. Typical kinds of command-wide applications include:

    a. Clarifying organizational values, goals, missions, objectives, and individual performance objectives. (I have found the open systems planning technique particularly helpful.)

    b. Improving organization-wide planning processes.

    c. Providing expertise on organizational design and redesign decisions which include assistance with implementing and managing these processes.

    d. Providing expertise on managing major organizational change, e.g., new OER, equipment modernization, policy changes, and reorganizations.

    e. Assisting in the improvement of resource allocation procedures and decisions to achieve command-wide goals.

    f. Providing support for critical organizational transitions in order to sustain and improve readiness and performance.

    g. Attaining unit training objectives more quickly, e.g., BTMS.

    h. Improving the recruiting and retention of military personnel.

    i. Providing expertise to improve the functioning of systems that cross organizational boundaries, e.g., integration of Reserve Components.

    OE used with the above major issues will help us close the gap between where we are now and where we have to be.

5. I know that OE Is productive. Let's not get overly concerned about the evaluation of our OE processes. There are dangers with micro-evaluation of OE work. One danger is the establishment of measurement criteria which end up as goals for the OE users — that can deflect energies toward accomplishing mission objectives. Send me a letter annually on how you are using OE and that will suffice for my evaluation requirement.

                            R.M. SHOEMAKER
                            General, U.S. Army
                            Commanding

CF:
HQDA, ATTN: DAPE-HRL
COMMANDERS
  TRADOC
  USAREUR
  USA OEC&S

Dear Editor:

The Spring Issue of the *OE Communique* has been forwarded to my new location. Wow! A Beautiful job — I'm impressed. Keep it up.

Two items specifically interested me: Bishop's *"OE '80 (New York)"*, and the Hawks' *OE '80 San Diego"*. Interestingly, several of us in Europe attended OE '80 (London), which had a decidedly different flavor due, at least in part, to the international setting, presenters and participants. However, the Summary/Conclusion by Tom and Marsha Hawks is still appropriate and I wish to emphasize that.

The quality of skill training, the experience level, and the intervention technologies evidenced among OECS graduates "demonstrates . . . a manner to be envied by our civilian counterparts."

Though talking about *the need to move beyond the "people sphere"*, the major presentations in London were, in fact, in that arena. I think that short-sighted in industry and academia and see the move into other "spheres" as a real testing ground for OE in the Army and as a follow-on, education of our civilian colleagues.

Keep up the good work.

BILLY W. LIBBY
Chaplain (COL), USA
Director, Religious Resource Center
USAREUR

Dear Editor:

The following is an open letter to our fellow Infantry OESOs and to the staff and faculty of OECS.

O.K. guys, it's happened to us for the fifth time this year. This time we invoked the Infantry School's policy of non attribution and fixed our Bayonets. "What happened?" you ask. We conducted our fifth advance course titled, "The Leader and the OESO."

We all remember the irreverent attitude we had in IOAC. We are not concerned with that. Fortunately, we are *full time OESOs* here at the Infantry Center and *not* instructors, for as instructors, we would probably not attempt to defend OE as a practice and policy within the Infantry. We know OE works. We trust the process. Our purpose in writing is *to share some Infantry feedback on some "OESOs'" performances in the field* and to proactively build our

active defense.

- To the OESO who spent four days on RE-FORGER in a company commander's track and whose only input to the commander was "ask your troops how they feel about what we've been doing."

- To the OESO who decided to feedback a battalion four step when the battalion commander client was not present.

- To the OESO who lacked the front loading skills to convince the commander to implement a feedback session.

- To the OESOs who failed to protect unit specific (subordinate units) data from release to a client.

- To the OESO who did not conduct operations because "The computer time was a problem."

- To the OESOs who continue to conduct motor pool operations when the environment of the Division is destroying the morale, attitude, and retention of the units.

- To those Infantry officer OESOs who dwell in the sub-system of personnel (touchy-feely) and lack the guts to deal with missions and operations.

Thanks guys! This feedback is not from us or our OE staff at the Infantry Center. This feedback is from Infantry captains, your former clients, and subordinates of your clients. *If you see yourself here, clean up your act or get out of the business.* The comments of advance course students must be taken with a degree of reservation; however, after hearing five classes full of complaints, we are wondering what's going on. The Infantry value system is a unique animal — we (Infantry OESOs) need to adopt a more pragmatic approach to our clients' needs.

We expect all sorts of disowning behavior concerning this letter; however, in closing, we'll let you deal with the most prevalent comment we hear — "I wonder what value you guys are? It's been my experience that you don't help us at all."

STEPHEN A CARBONETTI
Major, Infantry
OE Chief, Ft. Benning, GA

MATTHEW D. ROBERTS
Captain, Infantry
OE Officer, Ft. Benning, GA

Updates

USAOECS

Operations and Support Directorate

Issuance of Pilot Program OENCO's Credit for the 16-Week Course. Each member of the two pilot OENCO classes were mailed a 30 October letter stating the requirments to be accomplished so that a sixteen-week course certificate may be awarded to each qualified individual. These requirements are:

- Conduct a 4-Step OE operation under the direct supervision of an OE Management Consultant (MC)* or OE Program Management Officer.
- Submit a copy of a case study to OECS.
- Conduct an LMDC or LMDTC.
- Be recommended by a MC/Program Management Officer.

Suspense on accomplishment of these actions was NLT 31 December 1980. If you did not receive your letter, contact LTC Sheffield, O & S Directorate, OECS, telephone extension 5919.

Graduation of MC Class 4-80. Class 4-80 graduated 12 December 1980. With the 33 MCs in that class, OECS has graduated 142 MCs in its four classes of 1980.

Outside Requests to Attend OESO Course. OECS has received four recent requests from outside of the Department of the Army to attend the OE Management Consultant Course. These have come from

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OE Management Consultant. The use of the term "OE Management Consultant", or "MC", rather than "OESO" or "OENCO" helps to convey to the potential user the management aspect of OE work and the continuing change of central focus of OE. The term "OE Management Consultant", "MC", or "consultant" will be used more frequently in all OECS communications and publications henceforth.

personnel from the country of Sweden, the Bureau of Land Management, the Department of Education, and the Office of Personnel Management. All actions are still in the planning stage and subject to DA approval.

OESO/OENCO (MC) Classes in CY 1981. TRADOC has recently approved five OESO/OENCO (MC) classes for CY 1981. Classes 1 and 1A are scheduled to begin 8 January and 5 February, respectively. Class 1 will be very close to the maximum of 54 and 1A is filling up fast. More information will be forthcoming on dates and student fill.

The OESO and OENCO courses will be integrated into one MC course of 16 weeks in length.

American Council on Education. OECS received a request from the American Council on Education for evaluation of LMDTC. The visit was originally scheduled for 17 November, but has been postponed. A new date has not been set. The results of the evaluation will be forthcoming.

New Personnel in O & S. Major Pat Longan, an OESO (MC) at Ft. Polk, has replaced Major Ron Smith as Operations Officer. Major Smith is going to be an advisor at Whitehand AFB, Missouri.

Assignment to Faculty. OECS is continually searching for staff and faculty members. If you desire to come to OECS, please contact LTC Sheffield at Autovon 929-5919.

Training Developments Directorate

Competency Based Training. Concurrently with the survey determining the competencies displayed by field OESOs (MCs), Training Developments Directorate's Task Analysis Division conducted visits to USN Training Centers and the USN Personnel and Research Development Center responsible for competency based training and its evaluation.

The purpose of these visits was to determine the advantages and disadvantages and to identify limitations and problems involved in competency based task analysis techniques and competency based training. In order to avoid several difficulties encountered by USN training developers, OECS Task Analysis Division held extensive conferences with trainers of USN NCOs, Senior NCOs, Company Grade and Field Grade tracks of competency based management and leadership training at three training sites. The reactions of MACOM commanders were identified at appropriate command briefings and, in late 1980, Dr. Ferrier, from the TD staff, completed the two week Leadership Management Education Training (LMET) course for Divisional Officers.

LTC Ron Tumelson and SFC Dick Belasto, from the Curriculum Development Division, attended Competency Based Training Workshops and Seminars at the Training 80 Conference in New York in December.

DTD will continue to conduct extensive review and analyses of the strengths and weaknesses of the competency approach to training development. Field MCs interested in learning about competency based training may wish to refer to two articles in *Training and Development Journal*, Dec. 1980, Vol 34(12) and the cover-featured article in *Psychology Today*, Jan 1981, Vol. 15, No. 1.

Evaluation Directorate

LTC Tom Forsythe assumed the position of Director of Evaluation in October, 1980, following his graduation from Class 3-80.

This Directorate has assumed the sponsorship of the ongoing OE Management Information study. Thus far the research effort has investigated the possibilities of an automated central survey data based system and a case study data based system.

The Directorate has been reorganized into the Internal and External Divisions. The Internal Division, with MAJ Warren Klein as its Chief, will be responsible for providing evaluation support for the *internal activities of the USAOECS,* while the External Division, headed by CPT Ed Mitchell, will be concerned with *evaluation activities outside the Center and School.*

Internal Evaluation. New evaluation instruments for Class 1-81 have been completed which will provide a more streamlined go-no o evaluation of students attending the course. Case studies and evaluation data from Class 4-80 are being analyzed at this time. Also being completed is the 1980 End of Year Report which will provide noteable trends over the past academic year. Trends which may have some impact upon the OE community as a whole will be reported in the next issue of the Communique. Considerable effort is being devoted to the design of evaluation instruments for possible usage under the competency based training which is being studied at this time.

External Evaluation. With the introduction and emphasis of Results Oriented OE in 1980, we were pleased to note a *significant increase* in the documented OE results recently submitted to DA by the MACOMs in their Annual Command Summary for FY 80. The TRADOC Commander was particularly complimentary in a letter to his command regarding their OE evaluation efforts in the past fiscal year. The next external evaluation field visits are being planned for the months of January through March. Specific information will be provided by message traffic.

Training Directorate

OE Management Consultant Course. During 1981 Five 16 Week OE Management Consultant Courses will be conducted at OECS. Classes will include officers, NCOs and civilians. We are also planning on full classes in 1981. Of special interest is the development and implementation of a competency model for the course. An outline of this subject area and behaviors to be trained is provided below. We hope this model will assist in guiding our curriculum development in the future.

OE Managers Course. The OECS OE Managers Course was conducted in Germany on 12-16 January 1981 and will be again in San Diego, CA on 9-13 March 1981. The goal of this program is to conduct at least three (3) courses per year and at locations that will assist managers in attending the course either on the east or west coast or in Europe. The OE managers course conducted at Williamsburg, Virginia in November 1980 was a great success. The curriculum for the course provides useful

OE Management Consultant Competencies Recommended for Selection and Training
16 Week OE Management Consultant Course

Competency Clusters	Selection	Training
1. Functional Knowledge:		a. Knowledge of organization effectiveness theory b. Knowledge of the user system as an organization
2. Strong Self-Concept:	a. Self-confidence b. Low fear of rejection	d. Perceptual objectivity e. Accepts responsibility for failure
3. Professional Self-Image:		a. Sees self as substantive expert b. Understands and works to overcome the limits of own expertise
4. Develops Common Understanding:		a. Concern for clarity b. Values user input
5. Personal Influence:		c. Creates positive image d. Uses metaphors and analogies
6. Diagnostic Skills:	d. Rapid pattern recognition	a. Obtains multiple perspectives on situations/ problems c. Uses metaphors and analogies
7. Problem-Solving Skills:	a. Cause-and-reflect thinking b. Identifies key themes in data	c. Identifies and uses influence patterns d. Accurately gauges the reactions of others
8. Tactical Flexibility:		a. Assumes and differentiates among multiple roles c. Takes advantage of opportunities d. Problem-focused adaptation of techniques and procedures
9. Results Orientation:		a. Concern for measurable outcomes b. Time consciousness

information for managers of OE programs and techniques on providing support for OE management consultants. For information on this program call MAJ Edwards autovon 929-4021.

Leadership and Management Development Trainers Course (LMD-TC). The Training Directorate will offer eight (8) LMDTC courses in 1981. If you want to host an LMDTC or plan to send people to the courses contact LTC Arnold or SFC Pierre autovon 929-3519.

Curriculum Up-Date. In addition to the competency model the course has undergone some changes. Of special note is the addition of more facilitation skills training and workshop design planning. We also have added more system theory to include socio-technical techniques, complex systems and consultant style inventories. There is growing interest in obtaining a survey that will interface with current Army computer programs. The ability to assess an organization using surveys and interviews remains a critical step in the curriculum. We have had good feedback on the case study format. We are now writing the case studies to address more complex systems and provide the students with role players that have had experience in Army units simulating current Army problems. We have also added more workshops that include: conflict management, meeting management, re-enlistment, stress and action planning. Lastly, the FTX still remains the most effective training program in the course. We are planning to take teams to Alaska, Hawaii and major headquarters within the USA. If you would like to host an FTX team give MAJ Macaluso a call at 939-4021.

Concepts Development Directorate

The Concepts & Studies group has a new member, **SSG Wayne Reed.** SSG Reed is responsible for gathering information on Quality Circles. He has attended the Quality Circle facilitator training and is now the OECS point of contact for anyone desiring information on this method. He is currently completing an introductory article for the next *OE Communique*. Detailed information will be disseminated to the field Management Consultants (MCs) after test programs have been implemented and evaluated. Any MCs desiring information on Quality Circles should contact SSG Reed and he will send what information/materials he has available at this time.

CPT Olson wishes to thank all of the management consultants, raters and OE users who particiapted in the Future Assignment and Utilization of OE Asset survey. The responses were coded and are presently being analyzed. The results will be made available to the field as soon as they are completed.

The response to the "Review of Literature" form (OECS Form 82) has been minimal. Our attempt to establish an annotated OE reference index is dependent on your imput. If you have not received sample forms or have any questions, please contact CPT Olson.

SFC Konarik and **CPT Olson** developed a Performance Management Dialogue Workshop for GS 13-15s. This workshop provided the participants with the essential skills to conduct a performance management dialogue with their subordinates. This is an essential element of the new Civil Service Reform Act. SFC Konarik and CPT Olsen are presently redesigning and expanding the workshop to encompass all phases of the evaluation system — identifying critical job elements, establishing performance standards, and participating in the performance dialogue.

The first CD Delphi is proceeding quite well. Information has been collected about 1) the major components of a complex system, and 2) skills needed for an OE management consultant to be effective in a complex system. The Delphi results, in many ways an extension of the OE competencies being worked on by all OECS directorates, are in the process of being assessed. The next Delphi round should take place early in 1981.

The second phase of the Living Systems Theory research project, jointly funded by ARI and the Army Training Board, is nearing completion. This major research project

used the Living Systems Theory Model, developed by Dr. James G. Miller, to identify indices of organizational effectiveness within 35 active duty battalions. Although many of the findings are still tentative, preliminary indications are that this research will be of significant value to commanders and MCs working in line units. The Research Division is currently working with the researchers assigned to the project to identify potential areas of OE interface. In the future, look for the MC to become increasingly involved in helping commanders address issues identified through the Living Systems Theory assessment. The next edition of the *Communique* will include an article which overviews the Living Systems Theory, discusses some of the research findings and proposes a more active role for the MC in the ongoing Living Systems Theory research effort.

OECS' portion of the Human Research Ned (HRN) requirements for FY 82 have en completed and recommended topics warded to TRADOC for review. This year OECS' HRN topics emphasized the development of theories and approaches which will complement the emerging role of the management consultant within large, complex systems.

OECS will continue to be involved in the planning of future OE research activities through involvement in the OE Research Management Committee (RMC). Membership on the RMC includes representatives from DA, ARI, the National Guard Bureau and the larger MACOMs, with the Director of Concepts Development at OECS serving as the chairman. The recently approved SOP and pending charter of the RMC stipulate that the committee will meet in order to review and prioritize all OE-related HRNs once they become available from the MACOMs. The resulting recommendations will then be forwarded to ARI for appropriate action and followup. Because of the RMC's broad membership base, it is believed that the resulting research planning guidance will help secure research support which is consistent with the directions outlined in the DA and MACOM OE 3-10 Year Plans.

CPT Bill Barko, with assistance from **LTC Jerry Pike, CPT Bruce Donlin** and **MSG Peter Bartlett**, designed and implemented the OECS Long-Range Organizational (Strategic) Planning Conference 8-11 December 1980. This conference was attended by 20 commanders/key managers and their management consultants. **Dr. Peter Vaill**, former Dean of the School of Business at George Washington University and one of the world's leading consultants in the area of organizational strategic planning, was the key presenter. The primary objective of this conference was to provide commanders/key managers and their management consultants with the knowledge and capability to initiate, organize and conduct a workable, strategic planning process for the effective management of any Army organization.

LTC Pike has completed a draft strategic planning model. This model integrates several current theories and ideas. It is based on the conduct of two recent top team strategic planning operations, and provides hands-on techniques for the design and implementation of a strategic planning two-day conference. It is currently being staffed with military and academic practitioners and will be published in the next issue of the *OE Communique*.

External Operations Division: Lessons Learned and Prospects for the Future

The intent of the following is to bring the field up to date on EOD operations over the past year and a half; to recap some of the major lessons learned in consulting at some very high levels within the Army's structure; and to clarify the procedures for obtaining consulting support from the External Operations Division. **Major Michael Rodier, Captain Randy Duke,** and **Lieutenant Colonel James Looram** were the *original members of the cell* when it was formed a year and a half ago to provide external consulting service to the field. The EOD's original purpose, which remains true today, was *to develop and test new concepts for managing and consulting in complex systems through consulting with major client systems.*

The first year saw the EOD dealing almost exclusively with high level general officer commands. Some of these included the

Commanding General, First U.S. Army; Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Readiness Command; Commanding General, U.S. Army Logistics Center; Commanding General, Combined Arms Development Activity; Deputy Commander, Command and General Staff College; and TRADOC Chief of Staff.

As a result of the consulting experiences, the conclusion was formed that many parts of the simple four-step consulting process of assessment, planning, implementation, and follow-up break down quite rapidly. When consulting in a complex system, the client/consultant relationship is quite different, and survey/interview-based assessments are replaced with more expert-based diagnoses using proscriptive models of what a healthy organization should look like. Group process oriented implementations such as team building, role clarification, conflict management, leadership and communication skill training become less important. **Efforts at environmental mapping, open systems planning, organizational design, and mapping political power structures become more appropriate.**

Based on their field experience and some excellent professional development at Columbia University's Executive Program in OD and HRM, the members of the EOD have developed a consulting process that differs substantially from the four-step process taught in the basic course. This process is elaborated upon in greater detail in another article in this issue, entitled "Consulting in Complex Organizations." This new consulting process has been presented to major OE conventions in the field. This fall, presentations were made at the U.S. Army Europe meeting in Koblenz; the Forces Command meeting in Atlanta; the DARCOM meeting in Charleston; and the OD Network meeting in San Francisco. It is now being presented by a member of the EOD at every OE Project Manager Course that OECS conducts. It has been well received by OE Management Consultants who have been operating in complex (although not necessarily large) organizations.

Now that a basic, complex system consulting process has been developed, field tested, and disseminated to the field, EOD is presently focusing on further developing three aspects of that concept:

- Designing the strategic planning process.

- Developing procedures to do organizational design.

- Developing procedures to continue the change momentum once strategic planning has been completed.

Present operations include the Defense Language Institute, the Portland Engineer District, Readiness Region III, and the Army Materiel Center. **With the departure of Randy Duke to civilian life, Bob Goodfellow and Major Bill Langford, both respected trainers, have joined the team.**

As you develop the need for assistance, please do not hesitate to call and discuss it with the EOD. The consulting calendar is normally filled 45-60 days in advance, but there are exceptions. The Commandant's decision to support an operation is normally based on the *nature of the issue being addressed, the extent to which it will contribute to a better understanding of the OE process, and the source of the funding.*

The principal focus continues to be in developing concepts which will assist MCs to consult in complex systems. These are not necessarily *large* systems, but they **are** *complex* systems. In most cases, EOD works with the local MC in direct support of the operation. On rare occasions, work will be done in an organization that does not have an MC if adequate follow-up arrangements can be made.

Since EOD is the clearing house for all requests for outside assistance, *any request should be sent directly to the attention of the division.* When calling, use the Autovon numbers, 929-7886 or 929-7108. If one of the EOD staff is not available or if you would like the help of a specific faculty member, the request may be staffed through the other directorates for assistance. The majority of these consulting operations are funded by the requesting unit. Some operations, however, are funded by OECS if the circumstances warrant it.

Give us a call if you would like to talk!

OECS Long-Range Organizational (Strategic) Planning Conference

A long-range planning conference was conducted at OECS 8-11 December 1980. The conference was sponsored by OECS and was designed and planned by the staff of the Concepts Development Directorate with support from all directorates. It was attended by 20 key managers accompanied by their OE management consultants (MCs). Four general officers were in attendance. Participants came from such organizations as: HQDA, HQ TRADOC, HQ FORSCOM, HSC, Office of the Adjutant General State of Maryland, Office of the Adjutant General State of Wisconsin, JFK CEMMA, USALOGCEN, 1st US Army, 6th US Army, III Corps, 18th Airborne Corps, Ordnance Center & School, Readiness Group Atlanta, Madigan Army Medical Center and 13th Support Command.

The primary objective of the conference was to provide commanders/key managers and their MCs with the knowledge and capability to initiate, organize and conduct a workable, long range organizational (strategic) planning process for effective management of any Army organization. Additional learning objectives were:

1) to provide an understanding of the nature and importance of strategic planning,

2) to provide understanding of how to organize for the strategic planning process,

3) to recognize key considerations in doing planning,

4) to identify methods of implementing strategic plans,

5) to understand and utilize methods to evaluate and recognize your system while doing strategic planning,

6) to understand methods to strengthen the consultant/commander relationship in strategic planning,

7) to understand and utilize methods to assess the broader environment and its impact on the strategic planning process,

8) to develop methods to evaluate the readiness of your organization to conduct strategic planning.

Peter Vaill, PhD, former dean of the School of Government and Business, George Washington University, was the key presenter. Dr. Vaill is a leading authority on strategic planning, has published extensively on the subject and has successfully applied strategic planning theory in a variety of public and private organizations. Dr. Reuben Harris, Associate Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, presented some ideas from his book on managing the organizational transition state. The final day of the conference was facilitated by LTC Jim Looram, MAJ Mike Rodier and MAJ Bill Langford of OECS' External Operations Division. They provided information on the methods of implementing strategic planning in Army organizations.

The Conference window schedule is summarized by this diagram:

DIAGRAM

DATE	SUBJECT	PRESENTER
Mon 8 Dec		
1800-1820	Conference Introduction	COL Golden
1820-1900	The Nature of Strategic Planning	Dr. Vaill
Tues 9 Dec		
0800-1130	Evaluating Your Present Organization Mission and Environment	Dr. Vaill
1300-1700	Evaluating Your Organization's Future Mission and Environment	Dr. Vaill
2000-2130	High Performing Systems (Presentation Video-taped)	Dr. Vaill
DATE	**SUBJECT**	**PRESENTER**
Wed 10 Dec		
0800-1130	Establishing Experimental Objectives	Dr. Vaill
1300-1400	Identifying Organizational Behaviors Needed to Reach Objectives	Dr. Vaill
1400-1530	Managing the Transition State	Dr. Harris
1530-1700	Open Dialogue Between Drs. Vaill/ Harris and Participants	Dr. Vaill Dr. Harris
Thurs 11 Dec		
0800-1500	Establishing Methods to Implement Strategic Plans	LTC Looram MAJ Rodier MAJ Langford

A significant aspect of this conference was to provide time for the management consultant and his/her user or perspective user to review the possible uses of the strategic planning process for specific issues or concerns that had been identified prior to the conference. Many participants left the conference with not only a working knowledge of the strategic planning process but also, with the beginnings of a strategic organizational change plan that could be used upon return to their organizations.

The major highlight of the conference was Dr. Vaill's presentation entitled *"Toward a Behavioral Description of High Performing Systems."* A high performing system was identified as a system where men and women, utilizing some collection of technologies, are performing against some pre-defined goals or standards in a way which would be described as "excellent," or "outstanding," or "high performing." Dr. Vaill shared his views on some events that might be observed in such systems. His presentation was video-taped and a copy can be obtained by sending a blank tape to the OECS library and requesting a copy. All other materials and handouts need *copyright clearances* before they can be made available to MCs who did not attend the conference.

LTC Jerry Pike, Chief of Concepts Development Directorate *has completed the development of a strategic planning model.* The model integrates much of the material presented during the conference and provides a method for conducting a strategic planning conference. It is based on two strategic planning operations that have recently been conducted by internal MCs. It is currently being distributed to participants of the OECS conference and will be printed in its entirety in the next issue of the *Communique.*

Preliminary evaluation data indicates strong support for the use of strategic planning concepts and technologies among commanders and key managers. Prior to the conclusion of the conference, Dr. Vaill stated, "I know of no *Fortune 500* organization that has the capability to put on such a conference." Hopefully, this conference and future conferences sponsored by OECS can provide MCs the tools and hands-on techniques to work successfully in large, complex organizations. □

A Communique Chaplet – To some of the unseen staff of OECS, who, in addition to their normal duties, lend of their time and talents to the production of our many publications. From left to right: Ms. Perna Green (Supply Officer); Ms. Gail Riley (Word Processing); Ms. Colma Roan (Secretary, Training Dev.); Ms. Jannie Moore (Word Processing); and our Admin Officer Paul Neumann.

Correction

Our apologies to the folks at Fort Huachuca who were not included in our state-side OE Management Consultant roster published in the last issue.

Captain John P. Cavanaugh Autovon 879-6576
Mr. Norman L. Warren .. Autovon 879-6576
Mr. Gordon H. Lewis .... Autovon 879-6576

A reminder to all OESOs (MCs). The Leadership and Management Development Course (L&MDC) has been dropped from the FTX. Students will only consult during the FTX. Those desiring to teach the L&MDC at the local level should submit a request to attend a Leadership and Management Development Trainers Course (L&MDTC).

We trained hard - but it seemed that every time we were beginning to form up into teams, we would be reorganized. I was to learn later in life that we tend to meet any new situation by reorganization, and a wonderful method it can be for creating the illusion of progress while producing confusion, inefficiency and demoralization.

– Petronius Arbiter

OE Forum

Organizational Effectiveness in the USAR

MAJ Frank A. Baldwin, Jr.
OESO, Ft. Gillem, Georgia

This article is designed to provide newly trained Organizational Effectiveness Staff Officers (OESOs) assigned to Readiness Regions an overview of the USAR Environment which should facilitate their transition into the new assignment. The first part of the discussion will focus on the USAR Environment; specifically, those elements which the OESO must consider when he is on the job. Subsequently, the techniques which have been found useful in marketing OE in the USAR will be outlined.

ADAPTING TO THE USAR ENVIRONMENT

The most critical element in the USAR is *Time*. Where the active component has approximately 241 duty days a year to train, the reserve components have only 38 duty days available to accomplish the same training. It is essential that OESOs be aware of the criticality of time and how it impacts on USAR units.

Generally, USAR units meet and train two days per month. To the OESO, this results in a month delay before any organization can be revisted, either to obtain more information or to interact with the organization or its commander in any way.

A dynamic that should be recognized with this situation is that although one month elapses for the OESO in an organization (normally the Readiness Group), it is actually the next duty day for USAR members. Generally, noticeable change in the USAR organization does not occur in the time elapsed. USAR units strive to accomplish in two days what their active counterparts accomplish in a month; consequently, as the time for training, administration, supply, etc, is reduced, so is the time USAR commanders can devote to OE, regardless of how eager the commanders

are to obtain and support an OE effort. It is imperative then that the limited time allocated for OE in a unit be used in the most efficient manner — every minute must be productive! The degree of success largely depends on the quality of the preplanning and on the ability of the OESO to redirect the OE effort on the spot, if necessary.

If an OE effort involves the "four step process", assessment of USAR organizations can be a particularly difficult task to accomplish in the available time. In addition to being difficult for an OESO to "cover the ground" in two days, the assessment phase is further complicated by having to work around a unit's ongoing training schedules. A very effective way to accomplish an assessment is first to do extensive prework with the full-time members of the unit. Since USAR organizations normally have some full-time personnel, a great many organizational questions can be resolved beforehand. This prework and planning can be followed by administration of the General Organizational Questionnaire (GOQ) at a weekend drill. I have found commanders to be very receptive to the GOQ and willing to set aside the relatively short time required to administer the GOQ to all members of the organization. During the following month the OESO can

analyze the GOQ, identify the areas and groups which indicate concerns, and focus interviews or observation time on those areas during the following drill. Using this technique, the assessment is done rapidly, accurately, with maximum participation by unit members, and in the shortest time.

The criticality of time can sometimes be alleviated by doing prework, initial interviews or follow-up with the commanders and/or key staff members during their "non-duty days". This entails contacting personnel when they are at their civilian jobs or at home. This may or may not be sensitive to those concerned and should be approached cautiously and only after obtaining permission to do so from the individuals concerned.

The second critical element in the USAR environment is the wide variety of types of units in any area or under a single headquarters. The units within any geographical area cannot be categorized and are not organized into "neat" battalion or brigade structures. For example, it is possible to encounter units with headquarters in one state and the major part of subordinate personnel in another state. The result is an organization without a responsive command structure at the location where the troops area. It is also possible to encounter units with their higher headquarters in another Readiness Group's area. Other organizations may drill on the same day and in the same city, but its personnel may work at several locations (example: hospital with personnel reporting to different hospitals for duty). Consequently, OESOs can expect clients to range from an OIC (*Not* Cdr) of 400 people, to Company Commanders without responsive higher headquarters, to other OESOs who are trying to work a project with a part of the unit in your area of responsibility.

The third criteria element in the USAR environment is the OESO's relationship with active Army personnel assigned to the Readiness Group. It is important to develop a supportive base at your Group Chief level as you will have to work jointly with others in the units you support. The most important groups with whom OESOs work jointly are the Branch Assistance Teams (BATS). These groups of Officers and NCOs are the active Army Assistors to specific

USAR units. They are assigned to the Readiness Group to assist the units in achieving and maintaining high levels of combat readiness. The BATS can be of tremendous assistance to the OESO in that (1) they can provide extensive background information about personalities and units and (2) they can open doors to many USAR organizations. The OESO in-turn, reciprocates to the BATS by contributing to the improved combat readiness of the USAR organizations. The BATS are assigned to the Readiness Group Hq; however, they travel extensively throughout the Group's area of responsibility and can assist in prework, marketing OE, obtaining information, and/or making OESOs aware of potential clients. Keep in mind that a potential client may be hundreds of miles away, travel is costly and the BATS can help by doing some of the leg work. Many USAR units, especially the larger elements, have active Army members assigned as "Advisors". Establish a relationship with these "key links" to USAR units. OE in the USAR is a team effort and OESOs work hand-in-hand with unit Assistors and Advisors for the same objectives. OE can be perceived as "threatening" by other Group members, especially when "confidentiality and anonymity" are involved. OESOs may be resented by other members of the Readiness Group, especially if the Assistors are not included in the OE effort. Although this can be an obstacle, most USAR commanders consider Active Army Assistors key members of their USAR organizations and they will not hesitate in including the assistors in the OE effort. Although OESOs must retain the clients prerogative in the area of confidentiality and anonymity it can be truthfully stated that in the majority of cases, assistors will be a major source of information for the OESO and will work hand-in-hand with the OESO in planning and executing interventions with the client's hearty support.

OE IS MOST WELCOME

One of the most pleasant surprises I had upon arriving at this assignment was discovering how receptive senior officers of the USAR are to Organizational Effectiveness. The majority of the senior officers of the

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USAR I have worked with have either personally used OD consultants in their civilian jobs or if not, are very familiar with consultant services in other organizations. As a whole, USAR commanders are not hesistant to utilize OE technology in their units; in fact, I have found most USAR commanders *eager* to use OE.

Working with the USAR is an extremely rewarding experience — the USAR has a dynamic environment and is comprised of professional soldiers, genuinely motivated in being part of the total Army team and attaining the goal of being ready for mobilization. By adapting to the USAR environment through optimum use of time, meticulous pre-planning, and recognizing the unique dynamics of a USAR organization, OE contributes significantly to the combat readiness of the USAR. □

Major Frank A. Baldwin, Jr., *is currently the OESO at Readiness Group Atlanta, Fort Gillem, Georgia. A graduate of Texas A&M University, Major Baldwin has served in various troop and staff assignments with the 23d Infantry Division, Vietnam; the 2d Armored Division, Ft. Hood, Texas; and the 193d Infantry Brigade (Panama).*

Army Organizational Effectiveness and Navy Organizational Development: A Comparison and Contrast

Dr. Steve W. Ferrier
USAOECS, Ft. Ord, California

ABSTRACT

This paper briefly describes the US Army's application of Organizational Development through its organizational effectiveness management consultants and the US Navy's implementation of organizational development through its Human Resource Management Centers. After defining each service's program, and their method of direction, the author identifies converging trends in the selection of OD and OE consultants, the OD/OE basic methodology used by each service, the use of generated OD/OE data and the goals of the programs. The paper reviews these similarities and concludes with a discussion of differences in levels and issues addressed by the two programs.

INTRODUCTION

"With over 1000 people involved full time in OD, the military probably has the largest OD program in existence. The size, scope, and possibly even the survival of military OD might be interpreted as an indirect measure of the success of the programs."[1]

Although the Army adopted Organizational Development (OD) over 5 years ago and the Navy introduced OD slightly earlier, commanders still raise numerous questions beginning with "What is the program?" After this and similar questions on the nature of each "program" have been answered, the service member often asks "Does our program differ from other military OD?" This paper briefly defines both the Army Organizational Effectiveness (OE) and Navy Organizational Development (OD) programs, and after determining similarities and differences, identifies

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[1] *Umstot, Denis D. "Organizational Development Technology and the Military A Surprising Merger",* Academy of Management Review *1980 VOL 5 (2), 189-201.*

trends in training methodologies, and personnel applications of the two programs.[2]

DEFINITIONS:

Army regulations define Organizational Effectiveness (OE) as "The systematic military application of selected management and behavioral science skills and methods to improve how the total organization functions to accomplish assigned missions and increase combat readiness. It is applicable to organizational processes (including training in interpersonal skills) and when applied by a commander within the organization, is tailored to the unique needs of the organization and normally implemented with the assistance of an Organizational Effectiveness Management Consultant."

Navy: The Organizational Development (OD) effort in the Navy as implemented through regional Human Resource Management Centers is currently called "Data Guided Development" and relies upon data feedback change strategy. It is primarily aimed at the development of individual units; uses external consultants as the principal agents of change; emphasizes short and medium term changes, as well as long term payoffs; and strives toward a goal of increased organizational effectiveness.* For example one major Naval Human Resource Management Center briefs that its mission is "To assist commanding officers in improving organizational effectiveness through enhanced leadership and management."

Direction

Army: Organizational Effectiveness (OE) is managed by commanders and managers at a variety of levels throughout the Army — the Army General Staff, Army Group HQ, Corps HQ, major command headquarters, large installations, service schools, divisions, overseas Military Community HQ's separate brigades, and selected activities. Commanders at these levels are authorized the capability of providing OE consulting within their organizations. However, the actual use of the consultants by subordinate elements of the organization is voluntary, with OE operations strictly between the commander and the consultant. (The OE Center and School, Ft Ord, CA, provides OE familiarization training for program managers at regional sites.)

Navy: The Organizational Development (OD) program is under the direction and control of the Navy's senior line managers. The Navy has four regionally situated HRM consulting centers reporting directly to various fleet commanders-in-chief, with a fifth center located in Washington, D.C. to serve selected shore-based activities. The program is primarily command directed for Navy units, with fleet commanders responsible for Navy OD under their commands. Under current consideration is a proposal for the HRM cycle to be voluntary for fleet units; shore units are already voluntary clients. Much of the Navy effort (approximately 75%) results from client commands being scheduled by higher authority but it would be inappropriate to describe the program as mandatory. The client command does have the prerogative to terminate and often has for reasons of Op-necessity. The remaining energies expended result from direct requests (walk-in) for specific services. The latter are local command generated and strictly voluntary.

Personnel

Army: Until 1979, Organizational Effectiveness consultants had been almost all officers, in grades 0-3 and 0-4, with a few 0-5s. As of 1 January 1979, the Army had trained approximately 500 consultants, of which fewer than ten were senior noncommissioned officers. In 1979, two pilot courses for NCOs graduated 97 students. The OE consultants attend a 16-week training course at the United States Army Organizational Effectiveness Center and

School (OECS) located at Fort Ord, California. Upon successful completion of the course, officers are awarded a special skill identifier and are usually assigned as an Organizational Effectiveness Management Consultant to any of a number of positions Army-wide.

The consultant normally can expect to work in that capacity for approximately 1-½ to 3 years, at which time the officer is usually assigned to a branch-related duty. For a significant percentage of OE consultants their branch reentry assignment is one which often maximizes use of OE related skills. Repetitive consulting tours of duty are possible.

Following an evaluation of the utilization and effectiveness of the graduates of the two pilot NCO courses, the Department of Army has approved the continued training of NCOs in a joint OE Management Consultant course which will be 16 weeks for all students. The Army, in accordance with the emphasis placed on developing the total Army, has assigned an increasingly large proportion of OE Consultant training slots to the Reserve components.

Navy: Organizational Development consultants number approximately 500, with 300 enlisted E-5 to E-9, 164 officers from Ensign to Captain, and 50 civilians. Naval OD consultants attend a 12-week course of instruction at the Human Resource Management School located at Memphis Naval Air Station, Tennessee. The consultants' normal duty tour is for a 2-3 year period followed by reassignment to regular fleet duty in their warfare or occupational speciality. Following successful consulting duty, the officers are given an organizational coding to indicate their expertise. This coding enhances the possibility of subsequent assignments in human resources management areas. Enlisted personnel receive their classification code upon graduation from training.

Methodologies

Army: Originally Organizational Effectiveness operations were conducted using the four-step process of assessment, planning, implementation, and evaluation/follow-up. Recently OE Management Consultants have found that this four step process is modified significantly for OE operations in large or complex military organizations. The assessment phase includes observations, interviews (both individual and group), various instruments (most notably the General Organizational Questionnaire, derived from the human resource management (HRM) survey developed jointly by the Navy and the Institute of Social Research), and analyses of historical documents pertaining to the organization.

Although there are typical assessment designs, no set design is required. The expectations, limitations, and techniques for the operation are mutually contracted between the commander and the consultant.

The planning phase occurs once the assessment data has been reduced and fed back to the commander. This is a joint effort between the commander and the consultant, with all decisions for implementation made by the commander. This phase is extremely critical to the success of the overall intervention.

Implementation follows the planning phase. Typical implementations might include workshops and various consulting services tailored to meet the needs of the organization. These services are normally provided in the work environment. An increasing proportion of OE management consultants are now working at the division or equivalent, or higher organizational level and consequently must demonstrate a functional knowledge of the systemics of a large or complex system and modify this and the other phases as appropriate.*

The OE operation is evaluated and, if necessary, followed up some months after the conclusion of the implementation. A separate formal evaluation step is often not reached because the consultant provides continuous feedback and evaluation data to the commander throughout the operation.

It should be emphasized that the commander has the option to terminate the operation at any time, since OE is truly voluntary.

Army personnel are often prepared for use of OE and introduced to the goals and functions of the program in their basic or

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* See article by LTC Looram, et. al., in this issue.

advanced career courses or in their completion of the OECS designed Leadership and Management Development Course (LMDC). The LMDC trains critical OE related skills and encourages acceptance of OE.

Navy: Organizational development for each client system in the Navy follows the same basic sequence in a nine step cycle: Introductory activities; data gathering; analysis; feedback and diagnosis; planning; HRM availability period; unit action; continuing assistance and follow up. Data gathering is accomplished primarily, but not exclusively, by administering the human resource management (HRM) survey originally developed jointly by the Institute of Social Research and the Navy. This survey has been used Navy-wide, in over 2600 Navy commands. Results of the survey are analyzed, summarized, and briefed back to the client. Data interpretations, client felt needs, and consultant perceptions lead to formulation of the remaining activities of the cycle. Other data gathering devices besides the survey include interviewing, observation, and questionnaires.

The operation is normally conducted during a unit's scheduled five-day human resource availability period, and most often consists of workshops and consulting services tailored to the individual command's identified needs. These activities are usually provided at a regional consulting center for selected members of the client organization.

Unless the OD effort is terminated because of operational commitments, an evaluation will usually be conducted with the client organization approximately eight to ten months after the five day availability period. A second survey may be administered at this time to identify changes. Additionally, the client may request and contract for further consulting services, or terminate the operation at his discretion.

Just as the Army originally used a Leadership Management Development Course (LMDC) to support the institutionalization of the OE program through related skills training of leaders and managers, the Navy complements the organizational competence orientation of HRMC efforts with the development of individual competencies using its 2 week rank and assignment specific Leadership and Management Education Training (LMET) course.

Data Applications

Army: All data obtained or generated within an organization during an OE operation belongs to the user. Results of the operation may not be reported to the user's commander, nor to anyone in the chain-of-command. The consultant may discuss general trends with commanders outside the user organization, but will not identify specific issues with specific organizations or individuals. No normative data are maintained; therefore, one organization cannot be compared to another, nor can there be Army-wide comparisons. (In order to provide data to demonstrate the efficency of the program, studies to examine the feasibility of introducing an Army-wide case study and OE operational data bank are underway.)

Navy: OD survey data are maintained and the aggregate data of subordinate elements may be made available without unit identification to higher commanders in the chain-of-command. Selected organizational samples are input to the Naval Personnel Research and Development Center, Point Loma, San Diego for determination of normative data, which can be used by client organizations for comparison purposes. Communications at the consultant/client level are always considered privileged information.

Similarities

Although both programs are relatively new, they have passed through the teething problems stage with the Navy program having been established slightly earlier than the Army program. Both programs have essentially the same goal, that of increasing the effectiveness of organizations. Each service trains its own consultants in what appear to be similar consulting techniques. Consultants in both services perform their OD/OE duties for a specified period of time and then are rotated back into their basic occupational speciality. Although the terminology employed may occasionally differ, the basic methodologies used by each service are essentially the

same. OD/OE operations are tailored for the needs of individual units in both services. A similar diagnostic instrument is used by each service — the General Organizational Questionnaire for the Army, and the Human Resource Management survey for the Navy. Each service has a Leadership and Management Training Course designed to complement the organizational competency orientation of the OE/OD effort.

Differences

Originally, a glaring difference in the two programs was that the use of OE in the Army was always voluntary, while OD was, and remains, occasionally mandatory for Navy units. Recently there has been a firm trend towards voluntary participation by Naval units. All operational units are required to be scheduled for an HRAV but once scheduled, may opt for a full intervention, literally nothing, or anything in between. Any size unit may avail itself of the services offered. For example HRMC San Diego has worked with staffs as small as 15 persons and commands as large as carriers with 2,500 (air wing not included). The Army OE program is more decentralized with units down to, and including, separate brigades having their own OE management consultant and being responsible for their own OE efforts. The Navy OD program is controlled by senior line managers, but operates out of regionally situated centers and detachments with independent duty specialists also assigned to some large commands and staff level duty.

At present the majority of Army OE consultants are officer (approximately 20% NCO and 10% civilian), while Navy consultants are approximately divided between officers (30%), senior enlisted grades (60%), and civilians (10%). Army consultants are awarded a special skill identifier denoting their consulting expertise upon completion of a 16-week training course. Navy officer consultants are awarded a special coding for their expertise only after completing a successful tour of duty as a consultant, while enlisted personnel are coded after training.

The Army relies upon a combination of interviews, observations, various instruments (frequently the General Organiza-tional Questionnaire), and historical documents for its assessment phase. More critical to the Navy's data gathering phase is the human resource management survey, which is the primary instrument used in all OD efforts, although increasing use is also made of interviews, observations, and questionnaires. The Navy maintains survey data and has computed normative data for comparison purposes. As of January 1981, the Army maintains no survey data and has no normative data although contracts have been let to examine the feasibility of developing a case study and OE data bank. It should be noted that the HRM survey is occasionally not used in OD efforts with Navy commands.

Summary and Current Developments

The Army OE program and the Navy OD program have similar names, definitions and goals, initially train their consultants in a similar manner, provide essentially identical further professional development training *but offer different levels of consulting services and often address different issues.* Originally, the two programs differed markedly. While Army OE has been voluntary for the user, OD was originally mandatory for Navy units. The Navy program was based primarily, though not exclusively, on survey data. Normative data is made available to client commands, but according to one large HRM Center, "Is now seldom used as a determining factor in decision making. Decisions are normally based on the raw data." The Army maintains no such normative data at present and surveys are not critical to the OE effort. Approximately two-thirds of the Navy consultants are enlisted personnel while the Army has trained relatively few enlisted members to be consultants.

1981 will see an increase in the trend towards similar operating methodologies. The Army will graduate a significant number of NCOs (as many as 100) and continue examining the feasibility of setting up a case study and OE operation data bank. The Navy will find an increasing proportion of its clients are voluntary and that its consultants make greater use of their interviewing and process observation skills as they deal with larger commands.

Within the past year each service has introduced an annual 6-10 day advanced course for enhancing the skills of its experienced field practitioners. (*Coincidentially both of these courses are given only in the Monterey, California area*). However, examination of the content of the Army's OE Enhanced Skills course (See Report in *Communique* (Summer/Fall) 3-80, page 19) illustrates the Army programs' increasing emphasis on large organization operations which require applications such as organizational design, strategic planning and sociotechnical systems. Army OE is continuing to move away from the HRM field and is increasing its emphasis on general management consulting. The Navy's OD however, continues to emphasize it's Equal Opportunity operations, substance abuse reduction, and other HRM activities.

Denis D. Umstot, in his article "Organization Development Technology and the Military: A surprising Merger?", emphasizes a belief that successful institutionalization of OD requires that it be tailored to the needs of manager and employees. He singles out the Army program with its decentralized, flexible approach as possibly offering the most potential in this regard. Since he completed the research for his article, the Navy program has converged towards that of the Army to the extent to which they meet this criterion for success. If his assessment of the criteria for success is valid, then it would appear that OD will be of increasing value to meeting the military's goals.

Although there is presently a paucity of unequivocal empirical data to demonstrate success objectively, endorsements from a wide range of flag officers in very disparate commands indicate that military OE/OD consultants continue to be successful in improving organizational climate, operational readiness, and mission accomplishment. The Army has recently completed a preliminary cost benefit analysis of its OE program. Analyses of this type will continue and will be used to provide objective proof of the success of the program. Other evidence of this success is indicated by the increased willingness of higher level commanders of more complex systems to utilize the military consultant. Attendees, both military and civilian, at national and regional OD conferences demonstrate great interest and trust in the presentations and experience of military presenters, and there is a growing awareness that the quantity and quality of this experience is placing the military among the pace setters of the OD community. □

Dr. Steve Ferrier *is a graduate of the regular officer program of the Royal Australian Naval College, the British Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, U.K., and the U.S Navy's Leadership and Management Education Training Course, Coronado, San Diego. His civilian education includes doctorate and masters' degrees from Harvard University and graduate degrees from Ohio University and Boston State College. His doctoral dissertation involved the measurement and analysis of attitude changes brought about by college level classes. His undergraduate work was completed at Universite Laval, Quebec, and Wayne State College, Nebraska. Major concentrations include Counseling Psychology, Organizational Development, Mathematics, and Language Education. He presently is an active member of the 143d Evacuation Hospital of the California Army National Guard and has consulting experience with the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, Australian Navy, and the Veteran's Administration. Dr. Ferrier joined the OECS faculty in late 1977 where he works primarily in the Task Analysis Division of the Training Developments Directorate.*

Organizational Effectiveness in the National Guard

LTC MICHAEL B. HALUS
National Guard Bureau
Washington, DC

What is the Guard's OE Program?

How long has it been operational?

How is it organized?

What has it been doing?

How much does it cost?

The following information answers these questions and provides an overview of the program.

INTRODUCTION

The OE Program was formalized in May 1977 when an OE Branch was established in the National Guard Bureau's (NGB) Office of Human Resources. In August of that year, HQDA tasked the NGB with responsibility for the specific tailoring of policy and for planning, implementing and managing OE in the Army National Guard. In September 1977, then MG Weber, Chief, NGB, requested the President of the Adjutants General Association to establish a committee to assist in developing a plan for bringing OE into the Guard. After a series of information briefings to key National Guard personnel, the National Guard OE Planning Committee met in Monterey, CA in May 1978, and developed the program which is now being implemented. The program was then briefed to both the HQDA OE General Office Steering Committee and the Adjutants General Association Meetings.

THE NATIONAL GUARD

The size of the National Guard surprises many people. The Army National Guard contains 8 Divisions; 18 Separate Brigades; 4 Roundout Brigades; and has approximately one half of the Army's Armored Cavalry Regiments, Infantry Battalions, Armored Battalions, and Field Artillery Battalions. In all, there are over 370,000 peacetime personnel in 3,379 units located in over 2,600 communities. The Air National Guard consists of approximately 97,000 personnel organized into 91 flying units and 231 specialized support units. In the event of mobilization the gaining commands of Air Guard units are the Military Airlift Command, Tactical Air Command, Strategic Air Command, Pacific Air Forces, and Air Force Communications Command. The units and personnel are housed at 89 Air National Guard bases, (69 of which are on civilian airports), and 82 non-flying bases throughout the country.

ESTABLISHMENT OF REGIONAL CENTERS

Based upon the National Guard OE Planning Committee's recommendations, OE Regional Centers were established in May 1980 at Portland, OR; Little Rock, AR;

and Edgewood, MD. (For geographical area of responsibility, see the map in Figure 1). Each center has six Army National Guard (ARNG) Organizational Effectiveness Staff Officers (OESO) and an ARNG administrative NCO. (For a listing, see Figure 2, the National Guard OE Roster). The senior OESO at each center is a lieutenant colonel. After the establishment of the Regional Centers, the first major effort was to brief the State Adjutants General about the OE Program, and how the OESOs could help National Guard organizations. Many of the briefings resulted in requests for assistance at the State Headquarters level. Information about the OE support available was disseminated within the States and was followed by requests for assistance. The preponderance of the work to date has been at State HQ and battalion level.

There are several unique aspects to the Guard's OE Program. The Regional Centers provide OE support to both Army and Air National Guard units within their geographic areas of responsibility. A desirable evolution of the current program is to have Air National Guard OESOs assigned to the Regional Centers to provide better OE coverage to the Air Guard units.

The regional concept provides flexibility in providing OE support. The six OESOs at each center can team up in various ways to meet the needs of a particular OE operation. They can tailor their operations internally, work with OESOs assigned to the Army Readiness and Mobilization Regions, Readiness Groups, or active Army installations, thus furthering the Total Army concept. There have been several occasions when OESOs from Readiness Groups have worked with the National Guard OESOs in both Guard and active Army units.

The OESOs in the Regional Centers are *external* OESOs. Therefore, their work requires significant travel. Indications to date are that 50-80% of their time is spent on TDY away from their Regional Center conducting briefings and OE operations. As a result of this, they are skillful at planning multi-purpose trips, i.e., combining briefings and aspects of several operations during one TDY trip. Since they work with units which drill on weekends and full-time personnel who work Monday through Friday (some ARNG units work Tuesday thru Saturday), they can accomplish their tasks with minimum down time. A negative aspect of this extensive TDY is the amount of time away from their families and friends.

Figure 1

NGB-OE OFFICE

National Guard Bureau
ATTN: NGB-HRO
Washington, DC 20310

Commercial telephone: 202 756-1041/1042
AUTOVON: 289-1041/1042

	Class
LTC Michael B. Halus, Chief	4-79
LTC Wallace C. Davis	2-80
MAJ Cruz M. Sedillo, II	1-79

OE REGIONAL CENTERS

OE Regional Center, Eastern
NGB-OAC Bldg E-4430
Aberdeen Proving Grounds, MD 21010

Commercial telephone: 301 671-3408/3112
AUTOVON: 584-3408/3112

	Class
LTC Raymond Engstrand, Chief	1-80
MAJ Robert F. Butehorn	1-80
MAJ Darry Eggleston	1-80
CPT Peter W. J. Onoszko	1-80
CPT James M. Stark	4-80
CPT Mary Mudd	1-80

OE Regional Center, Central
Camp Robinson
North Little Rock, AR 72118

Commercial telephone: 501 758-4053 ext. 8407/8408
AUTOVON: 731-8407/8408

	Class
LTC Stanley Wade, Chief	1-80
MAJ Ralph B. Kelly	1-80
MAJ William C. Turk	3-80
MAJ Dennis F. Wampler	1-80
CPT William A. Stull	1-80
CPT Bruce M. Wood	1-80

OE Regional Center, Western
Portland Air National Guard Facility
Portland, OR 97218

Commercial telephone: 503 288-5611
AUTOVON: 891-1701 ext. 395-8

	Class
LTC James P. Halliday, Chief	1-80
LTC Gilbert Gallego	1-80
MAJ Clifford M. Deaner, Jr.	1-80
MAJ Donald Kozacek	1-80
CPT Lionel J. Sands	1-80
CPT William C. White	3-80

State of Hawaii
Department of Defense
OTAG
3949 Diamond Head Road
Honolulu, HI 96816

	Class
LT Walter Y. Kinoshita	3-80

Figure 2

There is a significant budget required to support these OE operations. Not only are there the pay, allowances, travel, and per diem for the OESOs, but there are additional amounts budgeted to fund these same categories of expenses for selected Guard personnel to be placed on active duty for OE operations. For example, if an operation were being conducted with a brigade headquarters, funds are provided for an extra weekend drill for key personnel. Thus, the OE operation can take place without impinging upon either critical training time or the States' limited funds. Professional development is considered very important and $1500 per OESO is presently budgeted to pay tuition for appropriate civilian courses. The National Guard Organizational Effectiveness budget for FY 81 is approximately $1.5 million.

Another unique aspect, not only for the National Guard but also the USAR, is the relatively low turnover of key personnel in units. When an OE operation takes place in a National Guard unit, the results are

likely to remain a much longer period of time when compared with operations conducted in active Army units. It is not uncommon to find numerous personnel who have been assigned to a State headquarters for over 10 years.

SUPPORT FOR NATIONAL GUARD UNITS OUTSIDE CONUS

OE support will be provided by internal ARNG OESOs sent to OECS on TDY and return basis. In FY 80, a Hawaii ARNG officer attended class and returned to Hawaii. Funds are expected to be sufficient in FY 81 to send personnel from Alaska and Puerto Rico. The need for an internal OESO for the Virgin Islands is currently being considered.

PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

Responsibility for management of the OE Program and OE consulting within the National Guard Bureau rests with the Bureau's Office of Human Resources located at Falls Church, VA. There are three OESOs assigned to this office who perform these tasks. The initial focus was necessarily on program management, however, there are now extensive OE activities ongoing within the Bureau. The entire program enjoys the strong support of LTG Weber, Chief, National Guard Bureau.

FUTURE

The future of the OE Program in the National Guard depends largely upon how well the OESOs can assist the commanders. The initial results after establishment of the Regional Centers forecast a positive trend, indicating a healthy OE Program will continue for the foreseeable future. □

LTC Mike Halus *has been Chief, Organizational Effectiveness, National Guard Bureau, since 15 May 1979, and is responsible for implementing the OE program in the National Guard. He was commissioned as a Field Artillery officer in 1959 upon graduation as a distinguished military graduate from Indiana University's ROTC program. He served two tours in Europe and three in the Orient in varied units ranging from a Howitzer battery in an Armored Cavalry Squadron to a Plans Officer in a joint headquarters. He has a Master's degree in Human Relations and Interpersonal Communications from Kansas University which he obtained while an instructor with the USA Command and General Staff College. He served as an Infantry Battalion Advisor in Vietnam, Artillery Battalion S-3, Infantry Brigade S-3, in Korea and prior to joining the NGB was an action officer for three years in HQDA DCSOPS.*

To Win the First Battle, Use Combat Related OE

CPT(P) Ed Mitchell
USAOECS

Captain Mitchell *was commissioned in 1970 following graduation from West Point. He also graduated from the Armor Advance Course and OECS. His overseas tours were in Alaska and Korea. He holds an MS degree from the Naval Post Graduate School in Operations Research/ Systems Analysis (ORSA). Captain Mitchell is currently the Chief of the External Division in the OECS Evaluation Directorate.*

Over the last two years, I have been intimately involved in studying and improving OE. During this period, I have asked many OESOs two questions:

- How will OE be used in Combat?

- Where would you work, as an OESO, if a war started today?

The responses I have received have influenced me to conclude that the Army has no systemic concept for how or where an OESO/OENCO will be employed in war time or within the present unit training process. Therefore, I would like to surface three "Big Picture" ideas around using OE in combat or in preparing for combat.

The first idea is that an OE Combat Doctrine needs to explain when OE is used, what are the outcome benefits for combat units, and what type of activities the OESO will perform. Figure 1 reflects some basic answers to these doctrine concerns.

Figure 1
A BASIC DOCTRINE

When Used	Unit Outcomes	OESO/NCO Activities
Prior to Combat	Accomplish quality ground combat training (ARTEP, gunnery, and maintenance training)	1. Battle Staff Assessment 2. Training and maintenance schedule and/or goal planning 3. Team building (in and between units to include round-out and National Guard units)
Movement to Combat	Accomplish rapid and orderly movements (Emergency deployment, road and air convoy, training and execution)	1. Conduct division coordination workshops 2. Develop movement feedback processes for Division C.G., ADC(M), G-3, & Bde/B Cdrs 3. Support coordination and feedback process during emergency deployment exercises and during actual war movements
During Combat	Defeat the enemy, remain alive, conserve material and equipment resources	1. Gather lessons learned, immediately as a *line* unit finishes a battle 2. Gather lessons learned on battle staff functioning, during battle 3. Transmit lessons learned to C.G., Key commanders, and to units going into battle
After Combat	Establish functional, effective units	1. Execute battlefield team-building 2. Assist in unit redesign, reorganization

The second "Big Picture" idea deals with the specific activity of an OESO during combat. And it is based on the following assumptions:

#1. American forces will fight a conventional war in Europe or the middle East.

#2. The US Army will be outnumbered both in terms of equipment and personnel.

#3. The enemy will have some technological and training superiority over American forces and visa versa.

#4. The war will be extremely lethal and of a short duration, 6 months or less.

#5. The war will be won or lost based on the initial forces which are deployed in the first month of battle. Draftees and newly trained units will not enter the battle. Therefore, our forces will win based on the quality of training they had prior to war and, more importantly, on what they learn during the first battles. The force which is faster at identifying, sharing, and executing lessons learned about what is successful and what is getting people killed will have a distinct advantage over the opponent. The OESO/OENCO can fulfill the role of gathering and transmitting lessons learned. This activity would be similar to the process Gen. S.L.A. Marshal used in World War II and Korea. The OESO/OENCO would join a *front line* unit *immediately* as it finished a battle or broke contact with the enemy. Then the lessons learned would be gathered by assessing horizontally and vertically within the unit. A short report would then be carried or transmitted to the Commanding General, G-3, G-2 or units going into battle. In effect, OE personnel would help American troops become "bloodied" faster and thus hone unit killing skills.

By gathering lessons learned, Division OE personnel would be fulfilling three information processing subsystem activities as described by Living Systems Theory (LST). These three subsystem activities would be:

Subsystem	Activities
1. Internal transducer	● Gather information at the battle site
2. Decoder	● Translate information into lessons learned
3. Channel and net	● Relay lessons learned to key division personnel and units

Findings from the 1979 study of LSTs applicability to Armor battalions, revealed that effective battalions were characterized by commanders and S-3s who spent more time monitoring and supervising their units than their counterparts did in less effective Battalions. Therefore, Division OE personnel, executing the three subsystem activities would be augmenting unit abilities to monitor and supervise combat activities. Hence, American fighting units would tend to be healthier than enemy fighting units.

To accomplish these activities the OESO/OENCO must be in a position to gather key information and have access to key commanders and G-3 type personnel. Thus, in combat the OESO/OENCO needs to be assigned to the Chief of Staff of a Division and possibly under the operational control of a G-3. Furthermore, the OESO/OENCO needs a clear cut combat job description which will ensure the OE resource is not misused by a G-3. The OESO/OENCO job is to quickly and continually gather lessons learned for the C.G. and not be a extra tactical operations center (TOC) duty person. Additionally, the concept of voluntary OE will not be viable in combat. The lessons learned will be gathered from units in contact and the C.G. is the client. Therefore, the C.G. needs the critical information and must direct or have the G-3 direct the OESO into specific units. It is most likely that the anonymity of units will, by necessity or circumstances, be easily fractured.

The third idea is that during peace time the OESO/OENCO can practice and integrate OE combat activities into the present training process. Figure 2 provides an overview of the concept and Figure 3 shows specific details of the concept.

In sumary, the Army can improve its fighting capability by establishing a viable combat role for OE and by practicing that role during peace time. Integrating OE into the present ARTEP-NTC process will allow units to experience OESOs/NCOs gathering and disseminating lessons learned. And in combat this same OE effort will substantially help U.S. forces defeat any enemy.

Figure 2

Figure 3

COMBAT TRAINING SUPPORTED BY OE

STAGE 1	STAGE 2	STAGE 3
Preparation & Planning	**Execution of Training and ARTEP**	**NTC Exercise**
Div OESO/NCO works with line and G-3 to:	Div OESO/NCO:	Div OESO/NCO:
1. *Link BTMS, maintenance, and deployment planning/integration	1. Acts as a process observer of training	1. Assists with rapid deployment to NTC
2. Teambuild in and among units to include roundout and National Guard units	2. Conducts battle staff assessment	2. Assists with pre-NTC problem solving
3. Conduct goal setting, problem solving, scheduling for ARTEP** gunnery, deployments, and maintenance	3. Trains ARTEP observation teams in battle staff assessment, systems views, and feedback techniques	3. Gathers lessons learned during NTC deployment, ARTEP, and gunnery exercises
4. Increase indiv. Off/NCO counseling	4. Gathers lessons learned during ARTEP's (Corps, Div, Bde, Bn levels), gunnery, and deployment exercises	4. Facilitate unit trainers listening to lessons learned
	5. Facilitates unit trainers listening to lessons learned feedback	5 Integrate lessons learned into post-NTC training plan (return to Stage 1)
	6. Integrate lessons learned into Post ARTEP training plan (return to Stage 1)	6. NTC OESO gather and share "Battle" NTC lessons learned with senior Army Cdrs, TRADOC, and field divisions (return to Stage 1)

DIV UNITS

LESSONS LEARNED FEEDBACK

*Battalion Training Management System

**Army Training and Evaluation Program

From the Gestalt Perspective: A Tool for Increasing Individual Effectiveness

H.B. Karp

The Gestalt Approach, born in a clinical/personal growth setting, is rapidly becoming a valuable tool for increasing individual and organizational effectiveness in the workplace.

The term "Gestalt," which means "clear, emerging figure," has several features that distinguish it from other management approaches. First, it emphasizes the individual rather than the group. Gestalt assumes that if individuals are clear about what they want and understand the choices open to them, it will be easier to combine them in highly effective work groups.

A second feature is that there is no bad way to behave. Being tough is no better and no worse than being supportive. Being passive is no better or worse than being aggressive. Behavior is deemed appropriate when the individuals and the group are getting what they want in terms of personal and organizational goals.

Gestalt also assumes that everybody already knows how to be effective. The thrust is not necessarily to teach people new ways to behave but rather to help men and women become more aware of how they behave and how they may be stopping themsleves from doing what they already know how to do.

Basic to Gestalt is the belief that people can live richer, fuller lives by becoming more self-aware and self-respecting, and by taking full responsibility for their actions, including their successes. This is especially relevant to organizational goal-setting.

Figure 1 depicts an intra/interpersonal contact model known as a contact cycle. It is based on the notion that good contact is the key to accomplishing goals. In the cycle, **Awareness** leads to **Energy**; **Energy** leads to **Action**; **Action** leads to **Contact**; and **Contact** leads to **Withdrawal**, which leads to the immediate possibility of a new awareness and the beginning of a new cycle.

Figure 1

The Contact Cycle

For example, while writing this, I became aware of wanting to smoke. This awareness released some energy and I lit a cigarette. Contact occurred as I inhaled the smoke and fully experienced the accompanying sensations. I hesitated a moment in order to finish the experience; when it was completed, my awareness immediately shifted back to the writing.

This very basic model, the contact cycle, can be just as effective as a base for pursuing organizational wants. All that is needed to effect this transition is a little more definition in organizational terms:

Awareness — What do I want right now?

Energy — How much am I willing to expend in order to get it?

Action — What options, in terms of specific actions, are available to me?

Contact — How will I know I am taking the right steps?

Withdrawal — Give it time to work.

H.B. Karp, an organizational psychologist and Gestalt therapist, heads his own management consulting firm, Personal Growth Systems.

AWARENESS

All plans, goals, and objectives, although cast in the future, are really experienced in terms of what we want right *now*. For example, a newly hired manager, who has a commitment to a career in business, wants to be a top-level executive right now. This, of course, isn't feasible, so the manager begins to chart a career path to reach that objective.

The essence of effective goal setting is to be clear and concise about what you want — it's your best chance of getting it.

One way managers stop themselves from getting what they want is by not giving themselves permission to want whatever it is. While many, if not all of us, are answerable to others for our actions, none of us is answerable to another living soul for what we want.

Another way managers often stop themselves from setting clear goals is by qualifying them. For example, if a manager says to himself, "What I want is a 20 percent raise, but they probably won't give it to me, so I'll only ask for 10 percent," or "What I want are three more people, but they'll probably think I'm unrealistic, so I'll only ask for two," the manager, *not* the other party, is setting the limits. Assume that you have an absolute right to want whatever you want and to want all of it. If fate or organizational forces decree otherwise, at least you won't have conspired against your own interests.

ENERGY

How often have you looked back on a goal not accomplished or a project that just seemed to run out of steam and said to yourself, "It seemed like a good idea at the time." It probably was a good idea at the time, and probably still is. But you may have underestimated the energy and the resources needed to insure its successful completion. A person often starts a new project in a burst of wild enthusiasm, only to pull up short at the end.

The "wisdom of the long-distance runner" can be helpful. Once the goal is clear, the next step is to consider is, "What am I willing to give up or to expend to get it?" These costs must be fully committed and carefully measured. They set the boundaries or parameters and are one good measure of the success of the final outcome — that is, "Now that I have it, was it worth it?"

Energy sources — the "costs" - are the forces in the system that are necessary to attain goals. Five such costs must be considered:

Time. When viewed as a specific resource, time becomes a critical factor in any effort to reach organizational goals. A new goal will often have to be accomplished within present time constraints. Thus, two questions must be addressed:

First, how are you using your time right now? In other words, what can you finish quickly? What projects are you spending too much time on? What work can you presently delegate to free up some time?

Second, how much time is needed to attain the goal?

Human resources. What impact do others within the organization have on the attainment of the goal? Human resources can be divided into two categories: potential support forces and potential blocking forces.

In terms of supportive forces, questions to anticipate are: "Who do I need to accomplish this?" "How much support is available to me right now?"

In terms of potential blocking forces, the relevant questions are: "Who else will this affect?" "How is it likely to affect them?" "Who is likely to block or resist this?" "Is there some way I can neutralize or even use their resistance?" The manager should meet any resistance internally.

Material resources. These include the inventory, equipment, and facilities required to attain the goal. Some pertinent questions to consider are: What do you need? Where do you need it? That is, do you require a particular location such as a plant site, off-plant site, or any other special accommodations? Also consider how much material and how many locations you will need.

Next, determine whether existing material resources can be used, whether another department or plant's resources can be tapped, or whether it will be necessary to order any or all of the inventory and equipment you need. Can existing space be

used to carry out the project, or will new accomodations have to be built, borrowed, or leased? A thorough analysis of what you have and will need will help you to plan in a cost-effective manner.

Monetary resources. Perhaps the most obvious of the five energy sources is the budget. It raises several quesitons. First, how much will it cost to attain the goal? Minimum costs? Maximum costs? Next, is there an existing budget to cover this? If not, can I include it in my next budget? Third, where are the hidden costs — such as overtime for needed personnel, overhead? What other dollar sources are available to me? For example, can I use part of another department's unused budget?

Personal energy. Since the objective is your own, your energy and commitment are going to be highly relevant factors. Some issues to address beforehand are: How much of my time and energy am I willing to devote to this goal? What other things in my life will I have to devote less time and energy to? If I pursue this goal, will that prevent me from doing something else equally or more important?

Each of the five costs requires a real choice, and although they are all important, personal energy is the most important. One Gestalt concept is that "all power resides in conscious choice." There is also the notion that people should be able to operate from their range of effectiveness. This range of effectiveness, or in Gestalt terminology, "sub-boundary," is represented as two points between two polarities and permits a "capacity for" in either direction. In Figure 2, between the extremes of *tyrannical autocracy* on one hand and purely supportive democracy on the other, there is a range of values (between the vertical lines) and congruent behaviors that "fits" for me.

At one end I am willing to be clear and verbally demanding with my subordinates, but never personally abusive. At the other, I support subordinates participating on key issues, but never relinquish my veto.

ACTION

When I am clear about and comfortable with my range, the present boundaries are set for authentic, effective managerial action. Taken from the other perspective, when I am clear about my outer limits — what does *not* fit for me in either direction — all the available choices about what would be appropriate are much more readily discernible and available for testing.

Take the polarity of "concern for self" at one extreme, and "concern for the organization" at the other. At one end of the continuum, I am clear about how much of my own welfare I am willing to surrender; at the other, I am clear about the extent to which I am willing to disregard the wants of others in the system. From this position, I am automatically directed to that range of actions that will provide the comfort and effectiveness I need to pursue the goal authentically. More important, it will direct me away from those actions that fall outside my range of effectiveness, that usually result in confusion, loss of confidence, guilt, or marginal effectiveness.

It is not important how wide or narrow the boundaries are. What matters is that the individual is aware of them, since they direct the individual to that range of alternatives that represents the best chance of achieving a goal. With a clear view of the *real* range of alternatives, the more choices an individual has in pursuing the goal, the more probable it is that he or she will attain it.

Here are some probes that might help define the limits of your own choices:

1. How much do I want to do myself? How much help/support do I want? (Self-

Figure 2

Range of Values

-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5

Autocracy   Democracy

initiative vs accepting help or support.)

2. How much am I willing to do? How much am I willing to let others do? (Active vs passive.)

3. What am I willing to let go? What am I unwilling to let go? (Trust vs mistrust.)

4. What will this get others? What will this cost others? (Fair vs unfair.)

5. How much fun is there in this? How much boredom can I tolerate? (Pleasure vs pain.)

While the above is not an exhaustive list, it illustrates the advantages of being clear about "Who I am" in terms of how to proceed. Note that the operative term in each probe is "want" or "willing," not "need" or "should."

CONTACT

Contact is the natural result of a smooth and complete flow from **Awareness** to **Energy** to **Action** to **Contact**. The phrase, "It feels right to me," is truly a test for fitness and is essential in determining the probable success of the endeavor. Goal setting is, by and large, an objective process that can involve logic, cognitive processes, external measures, and data. On the other hand, as the words, "I want" are introduced, we are dealing totally with the subjective. It doesn't matter how objective the goal sounds: "I want productivity increased by 23 percent" is just as subjective as "I want you to be more open and more supportive of me."

Gestalt doesn't favor any one human characteristic over another. Rather, its purpose is to clarify the many specific dimensions that make up the individual so that they can be integrated. The statement "That just doesn't feel right to me" provides as much valid and important information as the statement "The solution is incorrect." It doesn't matter which is better, the objective or the subjective. What matters is integrating the two in order to test the effectiveness of the approach or the action.

WITHDRAWAL

In terms of the basic contact cycle, withdrawal clearly implies that a period of time is needed for contact to be completed. In terms of the goal-setting model, withdrawal takes on a slightly different implication.

Another Gestalt maxim is pertinent: "Don't make it happen, *let* it happen." While this may appear to be an axiom advocating laziness, passivity, or a heavy reliance on faith, nothing could be further from the truth. Rather, the idea is to attend to the process of goal attainment as it progresses, and to respond appropriately, instead of trying to rush it. In other words, it is better to flow with the process than to force it.

DON'T FALL OFF THE CONTACT CYCLE

Of course, goal setting is future-oriented. But the essence of effective contact is in the present. Flowing with the present and withdrawing from the future will provide the most control over the variables that affect the outcome.

Some of the deterrents to this process are:

1. Getting locked into catastrophic expectations. For instance, a manager who is attempting to anticipate a potentially negative outcome focuses on a "what if" situation. This frequently results in a "then this will happen . . ." and so on until the manager is frightened into immobility.

As soon as a catastrophic expectation emerges, immediately fantasize what the best possible outcome would look like. This will provide the polarities and a clearer choice can be made. Incidentally, this works just as well conversely and provides a way to check for errors in judgment that might otherwise occur due to unjustified euphoria.

2. Unfinished business. The ultimate result of an incomplete contact style is unfinished business. Needs not completely met or issues not resolved to one's satisfaction are still with us. We carry them around like chains. In organizational terms they represent a serious energy drain, energy that is often needed to achieve a goal. Some solutions are:
● Check for resentments you may be holding against those whose help or support you may need, or whose help and support you have and don't need. If you can clear the air with them, then do so. If not, it will help to surface these complaints and give yourself permission to have them. After all, you have them anyway.

This process will facilitate bracketing off

the issues temporarily and setting them aside in order not to disrupt the energy for the necessary work.

• Stop interrupting yourself.

• Finish whatever major pieces of business that you can prior to pursuing the new goal.

• Allocate reasonable time for pursuing the new goal along with other needed work activities so that the new goal doesn't end up on the "back burner." The last thing you need is for this new goal to become another link in the chains you carry.

3. Inadvertently avoiding responsibility for day-to-day progress. If the contact cycle is effective as a model for goal setting, it is even more so when viewed in its original purpose as a model for interpersonal contact. We may often experience difficulty in getting the collaboration we need when we need it, or in dealing effectively with those who oppose us, simply because we don't make clear, crisp contact. A few possible solutions are:

• Deal with what is going on rather than with why it is happening.

• Stay in touch with what is happening rather than with what should be occurring.

• Be willing to say no when it's appropriate to do so.

• Focus on what is going well as much as on what is not.

• Make sure that demands made on others are reasonable and are stated clearly.

Rather than being a competitive approach to management by objectives, this model, which is geared specifically to goal setting, is compatible with any other approach. If incorporated within other approaches, it could be of great value. ☐

When you assemble a number of men to have the advantage of their joint wisdom, you inevitably assemble with those men all their prejudices, their passions, their errors of opinion, their local interests and their selfish views.

– Benjamin Franklin

Some Thoughts from an Ex-OESO

CPT Steve Hooper

CPT Steve Hooper (USAR) was commissioned from Indiana University of Pennsylvania as a Military Intelligence officer with a Counter-intelligence specialty. He receved an MA from Pepperdine University in their HRM Program and was a student in OESO Class 4-78. His last duty station was Fort Dix, New Jersey, where he served in numerous capacities, the last as an OESO. He currently works for an oil company in the Houston, Texas area.

I was an OESO for a year, have since departed from the military, and am doing OD consulting with an oil firm in the Houston, Texas area. What I've gotten from the two experiences (albeit I've only been out of the service for six months as of this writing) is a set of perspectives from an insider looking out and an outsider looking back in...with the aha! feeling of,... "hey, that would've been a good idea when I was an OESO....I would like to have tried it". So, the following is a sprinkling of ideas or thoughts that, in some cases, may be worthy of further exploration if not already attempted at your installation. In most cases, the topics are from my perceptions as a former OESO and my current role now as an OD Specialist in a progressive organization. As my current counterpart says, "It's for you to choose to use or not to use; take it or leave it".

Assessment

As an OESO, I would overly rely on interviews and surveys as assessment tools. From my vantage point as an OESO, they were both excellent mechanisms, but I have been curetly using process observations on a much more frequent basis, depending on the situation. The OESO after having gone through four months of intensive training and coupled with on-the-job-experience, is very well qualified to report behavior in lieu of always being dependent on others to report *their* perceptions of behaviors. Process observations, I have found, are not a quick and easy way to operate, but for me a greater time saver than typical interviewing techniques and have been positively received. In addition, process observations are an excellent way of helping a meeting progress to achieve the participant's desired results. In summary, process observations were not used often by me as an OESO, but I look for opportunities much more so now.

Paraprofessionals

The OECS, as part of the 3-10 Year Plan, and myself, as an OESO, had been trying to share with the rest of the organization a number of the OE/OD skills such and personal and performance counseling, stress managment, etc. Another technique was to expand upon that concept and have separate trainers, apart from OESOs, to conduct the one-week LMDCs. I'm currently experiencing an elaboration of that approach and broadened to include OD paraprofessionals. These top-notch, first line, up from the ranks supervisors *belong* to the organization (Bn sized), are trusted and accepted by them, and have a dotted line relationship to the OD staff for continuing guidance and support. The key concept here is leveraging. In lieu of always calling on people from higher positions and outside of the organization, this attempt at bringing it closer to a majority of the organization has been extremely effective in increasing productivity and all those human relations things we try to get ingrained in the organization. This is really "planting the seed" and dependent on a receptive commander to have a full or part time "trained" person to act in this capacity.

The way the skills are taught to these paraprofessionals is another unique technique. Approximately 30 days of OD training is staggered over a 90 day or more period of time. This has allowed for sink, reading, and practice time and as they experience their learnings from the "real world" environment, they have their support group to exchange further learnings and together go through at least a portion of the situational leadership model with the task revelant maturity continuum. From a humble, decentralized beginning, it's becoming more popular both within this company and sister organizations.

Management Training

Formerly, except for the LDMC, most instruction or workshops was performed by OE/OD people. Currently, in attempting to push many of the OD skills into the organization, this company has a one-week OD course that is taught almost exclusively by higher level supervisors/managers that have gone through previous courses and still work as a supervisor/manager. This differs from the paraprofessional concept that these educators would equate to Bn level commanders as models for their organizations. It gets away from the OE/OD "specialist" people to train these leaders and into role models to demonstrate their acceptance and support who deviate from thier normal job to assist on the staff of this effective supervision course once or twice a year. The focus is on surveys, instruments, and a vast array of advanced OD concepts and techniques.

The LMDC is an excellent workshop which I used any chance I could as an OESO. Currently, the company I work with has a different approach to a similar experimential workshop entitled, "Open Systems". The main objective is to give people a thorough insight into a model and a clear picture of how it can be applied and used for diagnosis. The impact of this workshop equates to that of the LMDC as far as lending itself to being a significant emotional event.

Miscellaneous

Other OD areas that I had previously not been heavily involved with but am more so now are:

- Assisting the organization in setting and negotiating goals (which the OD office also involved itself in; having distinct, specific, measurable goals to achieve during the upcoming year) via goals packages.

- Conducting various other workshops on typically an "as needed" basis, i.e., Assimilation, Organizational Self-Diagnosis, Consulting/Facilitation Skills, Assertiveness, Interpersonal Skills, and Supervisory Skills.

- Forwarding soft, anonymous trend data to those in need of knowing (through a previous, open-ended contract to do so). An extension of process observations.

- Sending reminders out to customers/clients that match their interests, i.e., forward interesting macro-systems articles to those having had a macro-systems intervention or expressed an interest in that subject. It prolongs the positive momentum that is generated from the presence of an OD change agent.

- Condensing interesting Human Resources books into one-page capsules for interested managers and supervisors (relating the essence of the book).

- Involving the organization much more so in tailoring survey or interview questions, allowing time for it to be tested and accepted by the organization prior to implementing it. (The actual journey is sometimes more important that the deivce used.)

Role of Consultants (Opinion)

I've grown tired of hearing and using the concept,..."as an OE/OD consultant my goal is to work myself out of a job". On an individual basis that approaches reality but with constant managerial turnovers and advancing state of the art, I find that untenable. Leveraging is powerful but it takes years to absorb OD concepts and techniques as a generalist. I believe in the Hawthorne effect and passing on OD guidance to enable a manager to do the same... but I see an ever present role for the OE/OD facilitator in organizational life.

In closing, these are just several of my thoughts on various subjects. In looking back, my training at OECS was much more valuable than the Master's degree I received in the same field. I was extremely fortunate to be selected to work as an OESO and hope to retain a relationship with the school and its consultants.

If you have any lingering concerns or questions, feel free to write via the editor.□

Theory and Practice

A Behavioral/Task Events Model of Ad Hoc Study/Task Force Management

Guy Defuria
Organizational Effectiveness Office Management Directorate
Office of the Chief of Staff, Army

The HQDA Organizational Effectiveness Office is providing support to a number of ad hoc study efforts. As a result of the experience gained, we are developing a model to improve the probability of a high quality product of the study effort (i.e., its conclusions and recommendations) and to assure the acceptance/implementation of these recommendations. The current state of the Behavioral/Task Events Model for Study Management is reflected in this handout. It is intended to supplement the material presented, developed, discussed at the workshop for the 1979 Brigadier General Designees. A full exposition of the model and its applicability to all levels of the Army is scheduled in the near future. Of necessity, the handout presents only the basic outline of the model.

THE PROBLEM: Ad hoc Study efforts often suffer from the following kinds of problems:

1. The Product.
- The methodology, model, etc., were inappropriate, wrong, unacceptable.
- The wrong problem was solved.
- Low quality product (conclusions/recommendations).

2. Acceptance/implementation of the study product.
- Adversary relationship exists between/among study proponents and implementers.
- Affected community rejects basic assumptions, constraints, methodology used in the study.
- "Turf" issues prevent acceptance of study recommendations.

3. Internal Study Team Problems.
- Effort poorly organized.
- Lack of clarity as to goals, objectives, products required.
- Team members lack commitment to study effort.
- Confusion as to how daily tasks contribute to goals/objectives.
- Internal conflict.
- Poor use of personnel resources.

THE SOLUTION AND ITS RATIONALE: The solution to the problems listed in paragraph 2 lies predominately in the recognition that the problems exist or potentially exist. The behavioral science technology exists to solve or substantially ameliorate the problems. The timeliness with which the problems or potential problems are recognized is crucial also. Successful study efforts depend on the existence of specific behaviors. Team members need to know clearly what the objectives of their work is. Psychology has demonstrated that unclear goals, produce confused effort, searching

Figure 1

A Model for HQDA AD Hoc Study Team Management

• Behavioral Events	Team Building	OE Participation in SAG Meeting Design	Assessment/ Resolution Study Team	OE Participation in SAG/IPR/SELCOM Meeting Design	Final Team Assessment

| • Behavioral Outcomes | • Concerns/Expectations Clarified
• Team's Mission/Objectives Clarified
• Team's Products/Processes Clarified
• Determine Team Organization
• Roles Clarified | • Major Players' Concerns/ Expectations Surfaced
• Constraints/Assumptions Surfaced/Agreed Upon
• Set Collaboratory Relationship
• Roles Clarified
• Evaluation Criteria Surfaced
• Members Get Acquainted
• Approved General Methodology | • Conflict Resolution
• Role Clarification
• Methods Evaluated
• Progress Check
• Team Effectiveness Checked
• Cancel "Trips to Abilene"
• Action Planning/Problem Solving | • Information Flow/ Integration Facilitated
• Decision Making Facilitated
• Agreements/Disagreements Surfaced | • Surface Lessons Learned
• Generalize Learnings |

• Time-Line

0	1st Month	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	6th	7th	8th	9th	10th	11th	12th Month

• Task Events	Study Team Organization	Study Plan Development	1st SAG Meeting	2nd SAG Meeting	Steering Group IPR	Draft Report Staffed	3rd SAG Brief SELCOM CSA/VCSA Brief DA/MACOM	Approved Recom- mendation Formalized

• Task Activities	• Define the Problem • Determine Methodology to Address the Problem	• Define the Base Case • Develop Alternative Concepts • Select Feasible Alternatives • Determine Criteria for Evaluating Alternatives	• Select Preferred Alternatives(s) • Draft Final Report	• Establish Implementation Office

Study Sponsor

- Selects Study Director
- Promulgates Task Document
- Chairs SAG & Steering Group
- Determines SAG & Steering Group Representation

Study Advisory Group (SAG)

- Addresses Study Team
- Representation from interested agencies/ commands, etc., at Middle Management level

Tasks

Steering Group

- Decision Making Body
- Representation same as SAG except at Top Management level

STUDY GROUP

- Lead by Study Director
- Produces/defends study recommendations
- Representation determined by Study Director
- Produces the Study

Advises

Makes Judgements

External Players

- HQDA Agencies
- MACOMS
- Office of the Secretary of the Army
- Office of the Secretary of Defense
- Congress
- Others?

Major Influence on Acceptance of Study Product

Figure 2

Major Players Who Determine Quality of the Product and Its Acceptance or Rejection

behavior, "false starts"—in a phrase "slippage of gears." Role confusion can result in interpersonal conflict, poor integration of individual's work, things "falling between the cracks." etc. Recognition of the kinds of things that can go wrong within the team leads to that body of behavioral outcomes usually subsumed under the name of Team Building. Team Building by making the team more efficient/effective tends to solve the product problems. The list of behavioral outcomes expected from Team Building is shown in Figure 1.

Each study effort is not limited to the people who do the study. There are many players in the Army environment with which the Study Team should interface. It is these players, external to the team itself, who have the power to undermine the acceptance/implementation of the study recommendations. These major players are shown in Figure 2. The probability of producing the kinds of behavioral outcomes desired on the part of these major players can be increased by executing the behavioral event I have called "OE participation in SAG meeting" (for want of a better name). The Study Advisory Group (SAG) is made up of representatives from all agencies, MACOMS, etc., that have an interest in the study. The first SAG meeting is the first time SAG and team members meet. At this meeting a surfacing of SAG members' concerns and expectations for the study is a behavioral outcome desired. For any single study, SAG members (who are major external players) will have things they want to see happen and things they don't want to see happen. If these things are surfaced, noted publicly, and addressed/resolved/negotiated to mutual satisfaction we can feel more confident that the concern will not torpedo the study recommendations when we seek final approval. The lesson here is that concerns surfaced and resolved indicate a willingness on the part of the study team to meet the needs of the external major players. Dealing with the concern by both parties gets the major external player ego involved in the study effort. If the major players have been honest in surfacing their concerns early in the study (remember the 1st SAG occurs at the beginning of the study) and the team has addressed/negotiated a solution, the concern can not be used to jeopardize the study at its completion. Addressing major player concerns is a way of disarming potential criticism of the study. If major players' concerns were sincerely solicited early in the study and resolved, they can not be used to criticize the study. There is also little probability that major players will raise concerns at the end of the study that they did not at the time of first solicitation because to do so would be to admit less than full sincerity. A posting on newsprint at the SAG meeting (publication of concerns) and minutes of the SAG meeting distributed to all interested parties keeps everyone honest. There are a number of other behavioral outcomes that are desired of the external major players. These will be discussed in the workshop.

THE BEHAVIORAL/TASK EVENTS MODEL: Figure 1 shows the relationship between the study task events and the behavioral events/outcomes upon which success often depends. A 12 month study is depicted on the time line. Below the line are the task events and activities that occur in the typical study conducted at HQDA. Above the line are the behavioral events and outcomes—these support and increase the probability of success for those events shown below the line.

The model depicted here for the most part uses behavioral approaches taught to all of the Army's Organizational Effectiveness Staff Officers (OESOs). Its value lies in the systematic approach it takes to address tasks and behaviors that occur over the entire life of a study effort. We believe it is applicable at all levels of the Army—the only things that would change would be the names of the players. □

I'm working to improve my methods and every hour I save is an hour added to my life. – Ayn Rand.

Troubleshooting Difficulties in Implementation

Alan E. Ruşh

On a daily basis executives find problems, solve problems, and implement solutions. There is a growing recognition that the first and last of these three steps have been understudied and underemphasized in management education and management practice. In a recent study involving 70 governors, senators, and Fortune 500 CEOs I found that even in critical top management problems, incomplete problem findings and underestimation of difficulties in implementation were both associated with what the executives themselves considered as ineffectiveness.

This paper presents some practical guidelines to assist executives in troubleshooting implementation difficulties, either in anticipation of a future action plan or in salvaging an existing one. The guidelines were developed from the work of several current scholars and from observations and evidence gathered from my own research.

Assumptions About the Needs of Executives

When something important is not working, an executive needs to find out why and take the appropriate corrective steps. No general answers can be given for why any specific action plan is not being implemented. However, this is not a serious drawback, because the most useful way to assist an executive in gaining control over implementation is to provide a way to sharpen the diagnosis of difficulties.

I assume that every executive will build his own mental picture or map of why his action plan is not working, and then based on this picture he will take what he sees as the appropriate corrective steps. If this assumption is correct, then there are two ways this paper can help him. The first is to provide him with diagnostic assistance, by suggesting the kinds of considerations, variables, or questions he can use in building his mental picture. The second is to provide suggestions for corrective steps, based on the diagnostic considerations.

This paper's framework for diagnosing implementation difficulties leads the executive to consider four general sources of difficulties. Specific questions within each source direct the executive's attention toward the necessary corrective steps. The framework and the questions are conceptually simple, but their application to actual situations can be as simple or as sophisticated as the executive requires.

Framework for Diagnosing Difficulties in Implementation

Figure 1 shows four potential sources of implementation difficulty. The first two sources are primarily technical or rational involving: (1) The analysis of the ends, and (2) the analysis of the means. The two remaining sources deal with the more political matters of (3) analyzing opposition, and (4) analyzing management signals.

Figure 1 also contains a flow diagram of the overall diagnostic question for each potential source of difficulty. First, one asks, "Are the ends easily misunderstood by significant others?" If the answer is yes, then the difficulty of implementation is greater. Second, one asks, "Even if the ends are understandable, do the means have to be created to produce the ends?" If yes, the

Figure 1

SOURCES OF IMPLEMENTATION DIFFICULTY

Source of Difficulty	Diagnostic Considerations		Implementation
TECHNICAL			I M P L E M E N T A T I O N I S M O R E D I F F I C U L T
ENDS	Are the ends readily misunderstood by significant others?	if Yes	
MEANS	Do the means have to be created to produce the ends?	if Yes	
POLITICAL			
OPPOSITION	Is opposition likely?	if Yes	
MANAGEMENT SIGNALS	Is the strength or coherence of management signals being reduced?	if Yes	

implementation will be more difficult. Third, one asks, "Even if the desired ends are understandable to others and if the means exist to achieve those ends, is opposition likely?" If the answer is yes, then there is greater difficulty in implementation. And fourth, one asks, "Is the strength or the coherence of management signals about the action plan being reduced by any known circumstances?" If yes, then greater difficulty in implementation is predicted. These four questions are cumulative, and whenever the executive's own judgement indicates more yes answers, then more difficulty in implementation is predicted and greater attention should be given to discerning the details of why the obstacles exist and what can be done to overcome them.

Specific Questions for Diagnosing Sources of Implementation Difficulty

Figure 2 contains a summary of the specific questions recommended for diagnosing each of the four potential sources of implementation difficulty. These questions and their action implications are now discussed.

Analysis of Ends: If the desired ends (goals, objectives, outcomes, etc.) for an action plan are easily misunderstood by significant others, then the executive must probe more deeply for why this is so. Basically he must find out whether the nature of the ends, or the way they are being developed, is obstructing implementation.

Figure 2

Specific Questions for Diagnosing Implementation Difficulties

1. Analysis of the Ends:

   a. Are the ends misunderstandable to reasonable, and probably supportive others?

   b. Do the ends contain both what must be achieved and what must be avoided?

   c. Is it appropriate for ends to be clear at this time?

2. Analysis of Means:

   a. Do the means exist to acheive the desired ends? (Is there a technology, a technique, a known method anywhere to reach the ends?)

   b. Do those who must use the means have the knowledge, skill and motivation to apply the means?

   c. Do those who use the means have the access, resources, management skill, and higher level management support to adopt or learn the required means?

   d. Do the resources, management skill, and management support exist to develop or invent the means?

3. Analysis of Opposition:

   a. Will pursuit of the ends or use of the means threaten the careers of any significant others?

   b. Are any significant others likely to be dissatisfied by some aspect of the ends or means?

   c. Does the opposition possess significant resources and are they organized to use them?

   d. Among the significant others what is the percentage who are uncommitted versus those who are opposed or supporting?

   e. What resources does management possess to neutralize the opposed or to mobilize the uncommitted?

4. Analysis of Management Signals:

   a. Has anything planned or unplanned initiated actions in others either for or against management's intentions?

   b. Are management's messages organized into either an implicit or explicit process of adoption?

   c. Is the strength of management's signal to proceed either lost in a flood of other signals or reduced by equivocal actions of management?

   d. Is the coherence of management's signal scrambled by conflicting signals?

   e. Is the signal being jammed so hard by management that the force is generating opposition?

First, one must ask, "given a reasonable and probably supportive individual, are the ends misunderstandable to him, even when he has no incentive to do so?" If yes, then assuming that the ends are not illconceived, a difficulty lies within the nature of the ends. Consider the goal of adding 10% to a firm's market share versus the goal of detente. Certainly detente is much more likely to be misunderstood, because it is less quantifiable, less tangible, more value laden, etc. Pursuit of ends which are by their nature more subjective will be harder to implement, and the executive will have to spend a much greater amount of time in developing and circulating the rationale for such an end as well as circulating the operational meaning of the desired end. Usually this does not mean reiterating whatever has already been said about the goal, but rather it means finding out how to rephrase the operational meaning and the rationale in terms more recognizable to significant others.

The second question one must ask to prove why ends are problematic for implementation is, "do the ends contain what must be avoided as well as what must be achieved?" If a reasonable individual would probably support the ends, but he is doubtful about doing so without a better knowledge of how other competing goals will be affected, then implementation will be more difficult. There are two aspects involved with satisfactory coverage of "what must be avoided." First is the straightforward coverage of the constraints involved in reaching the desired end (e.g., cost, time). Second and most important is the more subtle coverage of emotionally charged obstacles which are rarely stated by significant others, but which nevertheless form the basis for quiet reluctance about supporting the ends.

The best corrective action for the executive is to ask a few significant actors privately, "what must we avoid in pursuing this goal." The executive will usually be unaware of the specific things which will be stated in response to this simple question. Most of them will be items of personal and political reluctance which very few people are likely to put on record. But having gathered these items, the executive can usually establish qualifying phrases in the statement of the ends, or modify the means, and thereby assure others about those unspoken matters. The executive usually does not publically refer to the specific items mentioned in response to "what we must avoid," but rather he refers to the qualified meaning of the goals, or to the qualified conditions under which the goal will be pursued, etc.

The third question one asks in the analysis of ends is whether it is appropriate for ends to be clear at the given time. Virtually all managers sense that it is sometimes appropriate for ends to be unannounced, sometimes appropriate for them to be general, and sometimes appropriate for them to be specific.* Implementation difficulty will be increased if the ends are either too general or too specific in terms of the timing for action on the matter at hand.

One need not be overly precise about the content of the exact sequence involved in formulating specific goals. What is more important for implementation purposes is that the executive have an implicit sense of timing in moving from general to specific goals. Consider the following steps involved in moving from the initial recognition that "something must be done" to eventually doing something specific.

- External Pressure
- Opportunity
- Identifying problems
- Identifying possible ends
- Specifying ends/means alternatives
- Choosing ends
- Promulgating ends
- Setting accountability

Relative to these steps, attempting to state clear and specific ends too early, or adhering to general ends for too long, will impede the technical development necessary for significant others to comprehend the problem and then focus on the solution. The managers corrective action involves getting back into phase with significant others in terms of a set of steps for developing desired ends, even if the manager has a relatively clear idea of what the specific goals should be right from the start.

*See James Quinn's excellent coverage of these conditions in "Strategic Goals: Process and Politics" Sloan Management Review, Fall 1977.

Analysis of Means: To the greater extent that the means to achieve the desired ends must be created or developed, then implementation will be more difficult. The maximum difficulty exists if research and development must be done to invent the means. To probe how the conditions surrounding the means contribute to implementation difficulty, one first asks, "does a means (technology, method, etc.) exist anywhere?" If the means exists, then one asks whether those who must use it have the knowledge, skill, and motivation to apply the means. If the key actors must either learn or adapt an existing means, then one asks whether the access, the resources, the management skill, and the upper management support is being provided to allow the mastery of the means. Finally, if the means do not exist and must be developed, then one asks whether the resources, the management skill, and the management support is being furnished to create the possibility that means can be invented. Most of the management's corrective actions for these conditions are straightforward, but it is important to note the necessity to inquire systematically about the requirements to bring the means into actual existance, recognizing that often several different means are needed for one action plan, and each means may have different requirements to bring it on line.

Analysis of Opposition: All managers know that to get things done, they must work through others who are organziationally below, above, beside, or removed from them. Significant others are those key actors, either as single individuals, or as entire blocks, who must be influenced because of their impact on the contemplated action plan. Usually the impact is in one of three ways: (1) they must approve of the action plan or at least will not interfere with it; (2) they must actively support the plan and perhaps even provide personal initiative to make it work; and (3) they oppose the action plan and their opposition must be contained, reduced, or neutralized.

In considering the analysis of ends and the analysis of means, the focus was on the technical obstacles that could obstruct key actors who would be favorably disposed toward the action plan. Now we consider the inescapable fact of managerial life that action plans may threaten, offend, or sometimes bore significant others and because of this, implementation may be obstructed.

If the executive believes that important opposition is likely, then he must probe in greater detail by first asking whether the pursuit of the ends or the use of the means will threaten the careers of any significant others. Career threat, career uncertainty, or loss of self-esteem are likely to be strong. Short of this type of severe oposition, one must ask whether some key actors will be dissatisfied by some specific aspect of either the ends or the means.

And finally, one asks whether the opponents have significant resources and especially if they are organized to use these resources, then opposition will probably be stronger.

These first three questions assist in diagnosing the strength and location of opposition. But having this information the executive must then ask a question far more important than the first three. He asks, "Among these significant others who can affect implementation of the action plan, who is still uncommitted?" The importance of this question rests on the view that effective top managers rarely force action plans through, rather they develop support from some key actions and operate in areas in which other key actors are comparatively indifferent.*

This view suggests that the corrective steps the executive takes are first to establish his knowledge of who opposes, why, and how strongly. Second, establish who is uncommitted. The the executive expends his power in the most thrifty way possible by first removing as many of the dissatisifiers from the action plan as possible. This increases the possibility that some opponents will join the ranks of the uncommitted, that is, they will become comparatively indifferent and at least not obstruct the plan. If this step will not allow implementation to proceed then the executive asks what resources he has to mobilize the uncommitted or neutralize the

*See H. Edward Wrapp's article, "Good Managers Don't Make Policy Decisions," Harvard Business Review, September-October 1967 for a full explanation of this view.

opposition. First, he will gain the endorsement of the uncommitted, then only if the opponents can't be defused, he will take steps to neutralize the opposition.

In my research, I found no effectively handled problem situations in which the executive began by moving against the oposition. On the contrary, the first steps are to learn exactly why reasonable individuals would oppose the plans, second remove the elements of opposition if possible, third mobilize the uncommitted, and last if necessary, move against opponents. Focusing on neutralizing opponents first occupies too much of the executive's attention with the result that he overlooks ways to prevent the birth of opposition and ways to mobilize the uncommitted. It is a natural instinct that once one locks horns, then one does not notice the rest of the environment until the fight is over. But effective executives are not easily engaged; they assure that allies are kept, that uncommitteds are attended to, and that opponents are given the opportunity to become indifferent before they do battle with opponents. By following this procedure the executive is protecting his power base, broadening it as much as possible, and being economical in spending his force. Moreover, if he does not have to move against opponents, his homework is done, and his allies are prepared.

Analysis of Management Signals: To analyze management signals, for implementation difficulty, the exectuive first asks, "Has anything planned or unplanned initiated actions in others either for or against management's intentions?" This question gets the executive focused on the perceived world of the significant others and on the context in which the significant others will receive management signals. The notion here is that the manager has limited control and access to the attention of significant others. Because of this he must find out what signals they are, in fact, hearing or perceiving about his action plan, whether he intended to send the signals or not. Moreover, the executive must recognize that at best he can only occasionally channel the attention of others in the ongoing stream of operating problems, unplanned events, crises, etc. that characterize their world. The corrective steps for the manager to get

signal obstructions to implementation removed consist of finding out what others are actually hearing and then using all the unexpected and usual operating conditions with only sparsely added planned events to put his message across. Finding out what others are hearing requires getting first hand information, usually in fact to face, one to one, conversations. Putting the management message across calls for moderately redirecting existing events and only occasionally upstaging the main message.

In considering when and how to upstage the main message, one asks, "Are management's messages organized into either an implicit or explicit process of adoption?" Most managers recognize that even under the most favorable conditions, there is a process of adoption which requires time for the message to take effect. For the purposes of implementation one need not be precise about the phases of this process, but it is necessary for the manager to recognize that early messages must generate *awareness* of a problem condition, later messages keep significant others *informed* so they can become *comfortable* with the problem and its potential solutions, still later messages will *pinpoint* more precisely the desired ends and means, and then eventually messages will signal *rewards and penalties* for performance.

The manager's corrective action step consists of getting his messages into step with significant others, not all of whom may be in the same phase of the adoption process. The best way for the executive to get back on track is to analyze backwards by asking himself whether each adoption phase has been met or not, and then design steps to accomplish each phase. Since almost all implementation plans contain deadlines, one must always plan backwards to assure that the up front spadework is done soon enough to allow the adoption process to work.

Even given a process of adoption, one must ask, "Is the strength of management's signal getting lost in a flood of other signals or reduced by equivocal actions of management?" Because access to the attention of significant others is limited, one cannot be signaling high priority for everything; if the signals are undifferentiated in the minds of

the significant others, then implementation will be more difficult. The manager's corrective action consists of making a conscious choice to reject some action plans and send signals on the others. Notice is not recommended to keep them all and prioritize them, rather it is necessary to consciously reject the lower priority ones.

A further probe of signals consists of asking, "Is the coherence of management's signal scrambled by other conflicting signals?" Not only can other signals drown out the signal of interest, but other signals can scramble the primary one in two ways. First, the other signals can contradict the primary one. The manager's action is either to eliminate the contradiction for the sake of consistency or to incorporate the management of contradiction as part of the desired ends. Either way the manager needs feedback from trusted others to monitor these corrections.

The second way the signal coherence can be reduced is when intentionally or inadvertently other managers or significant others are sending conflicting signals. Cor-

recting this condition may be a matter of increasing coordination, conducting team building, or sanctioning others. If the managers in question are senior or lateral to the principal, then one reconciles signals with them as if they were dissatisfied opponents.

The final diagnostic consideration consists of asking, "Is the signal being jammed so hard by management that the force is generating opposition?" Managing a process of adoption really does not require jamming the signal. The manager concerns himself with timely messages not hard hitting ones; he concerns himself with leverage at the given phase of the adoption process, not with decibels. The corrective action is to focus on the process of adotion. The image the executive seeks is not a piledriver, which eventually creates resistance, but rather a snowplow which removes obstacles as it goes. Again, it is suggested that obstacles to implementation are rarely rammed through, they are strategically removed. □

*You must make a habit of thinking in terms of a definite objective. – **John H. Patterson***

Consulting in Complex Organizations

LTC James Looram, Ph.D.
MAJ Michael Rodier
Jerry Eppler, Ph.D.
Randy Duke

The experiences described and concepts developed in this discussion are the result of our consulting activities as members of the U.S. Army Organizational Effectiveness Center and School, Ft. Ord, California. Our particular responsibilities have been to provide planning/consulting services to OD consultants in external Army organizations, act as an OD concept "clearing house", field test current OD theories and then develop resulting concepts/training programs for the Army OD community.

In this article we will: 1) define a complex organization, 2) discuss complex organization assessment, 3) describe the consulting process we have developed for complex systems and 4) examine the application of this process to specific complex organizations within the Army. We believe that the principles discussed are applicable in both military and civilian organizations. It is also our contention that OD consulting in complex organizations is an evolutionary field and that our understanding of this process will continue to expand with experience.

COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS DEFINED

One clear distinction we have been able to make is that "large" organizations are not necessarily complex — and "small" organizations are not necessarily simple. Our consulting experience has caused us to essentially agree with Richard Beckhard's[1] analysis that complex organizations are those which have (1) essentially independent sub-systems within them, (2) multiple simultaneous missions, (3) many permeable boundaries necessitated by the complex environments they must respond to, (4) sophisticated technologies requiring highly skilled internal experts or "gurus" (i.e. EDP specialists), (5) low structures as a result of essentially independent sub-systems and the lateralization of power. The subsystems of such complex organizations have different time perspectives, different tasks, operate independently and tend to diffuse the impact of decisions made at the top of the organization. Examples of such systems we have consulted with include the US Army Logistics Center, First US Army Headquarters, US Army Command and General Staff College and the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (Initial Entry Training). Basically, a complex organization is one which is by definition almost out of control — and it is certainly beyond the ability of one person to effectively manage.

ASSESSING COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS

Organizational Health. We contend that the ultimate aim of any organization is to survive. Russell Ackoff [2], in describing our Systems Age, noted that as the rate and magnitude of change increases in our culture, the more effectively an organization adapts and changes in response to its complex environment, the greater its chances of survival. The critical question, for these complex organizations enmeshed in an increasingly complex environment is "How can it best learn and adapt?". Our assessment approach is designed to evaluate how effective the complex organization is in this survival attempt. Based on assessment questions developed by Harry Levinson[3], Peter Vaill[4] and Living Systems theory[5], we have established the following criteria against which we measure the relative "health" of a complex system:

1) The environment is scanned for opportunities and threats — as necessary and at the appropriate levels.

2) Organizational goals are effectively established and managed. This requires that

goals are clear, understood, prioritized, and aligned with the individual goals of organizational members.

3) The organizational structure optimizes the potential for goal attainment and adaptability.

4) Information flows efficiently upward, downward and laterally.

5) There exist effective problem-solving mechanisms within the organization to resolve current and anticipated difficulties.

6) Power is distributed so that organizational decision-making and operation effeciency are optimized.

7) An effective process exists within the organization to monitor current activities and adapt to future changes.

General Orientations

In short, the complex organization requires processes which allow it to effectively deal with a wide variety of challenges. In using this assessment framework in complex Army organizations, we have found organizations to have one of the three following general orientations.

Short Term Fix — "crisis management". In this category there is low participation in decision-making, the executive is the focus of power and sets the organizational goals, priorities shift rapidly and unilaterally, the focus is on solving immediate problems and there is no effective mechanism to sustain change. The result of this orientation is a limited organizational ability to plan effectively for the future or sustain change effort once the executive leaves.

Narrow-Focus/Long Term Fix — In this category there is an effort to establish processes to deal with specific issues on a long term basis. One such activity in the military is to establish a strategic planning body. When this process is used, decision-making participation is expanded to include members of the "top team" and technical experts as required. This group becomes the focus of power and sets the organizational goals; priorities shift more slowly and attempts are made to achieve consensus in decision-making. Immediate operational problems are solved in the more traditional fashion — but future problems are anticipated and planned for. The top team sustains applicable change efforts by developing a method to bring the new executive on board with them once the current executive leaves.

Healthy Complex Organization — This category reflects the ideal complex organization. As we will discuss later, we have consulted in only one organization which appears to be approaching this state. The complex organizations in this category meet all the health criteria listed above; the environment is scanned at the interface points, goals at all levels, the organizational structure is designed to optimize task accomplishment, information flows effeciently, there exist problem-solving mechanisms for addressing difficult issues, power bases are optimized and a process to monitor/adapt to changes is established. In the following discussion on our consulting process in complex organizations, we will outline the strategies and consulting techniques we utilize to move an organization from a short-term fix or narrow-focus long-term fix category into the category of organizational health.

THE CONSULTING PROCESS IN COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS

Consultant-Client Relationship.

A key ingredient in the analysis of our consulting process is an examination of how we view the consultant-client relationship in a complex organization. To begin with, the executive of the organization is not our client — this individual is the entry point into the complex system. Because complex systems change into a healthy organizational category requires 2-5 years (our best guess based on current experience) — the rapid turnover military executive is in reality "temporary hire" in the system. (This is particularly true of Army general officers because of assignment policies.) As a result, our executive-consultant relationship need not be personally close and we focus on the *organization* as the client. When consulting in such a complex organization, we have found that the executive need not "own" the intervention; but he must, at a minimum,

sanction it. As illustrated below, it is the system which must "own" the change effort.

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                Short Term Change                              Complex System Change
        ┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
        │   Ownership ──────────────────────────────────────────────► Sanction      │
        │                        Executive/Manager                                  │
        ├──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
        │                            System                                         │
        │   Sanction ───────────────────────────────────────────────► Ownership     │
        └──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
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
Next we need to examine the executive who requests and must sanction our consulting efforts. Henry Mitzberg[6] identifies a number of characteristics found at this chief executive level; there is little systematic planning, there exists a present time orientation (ready, fire, aim), this executive has a nine minutes attention span, focuses on visible structured tasks, makes many decisions intuitively and, lastly, the executive "knows that he doesn't know, but thinks he must pretend he knows." Much of our consulting experiences in complex Army organizations support this description. Working with this type of executive has required that we assume an "expert" OD consultant role. By "expert" role we mean that we diagnose the organization and prescribe solutions. Our credentials have been readily accepted — we have been innocent until proven guilty. We conduct the assessment (examining the organizational processes discussed) in order to make an expert diagnosis — to discover the *real* problems, which may or may not be the present problems the executive originally wanted us to resolve. We then bring our special OD technologies to bear in solving the complex organizations *actual* coping process problems.

Establishing Organizational Direction

Based upon the diagnostic assessment, we develop consulting activities which will increase the relative health of the complex organization. Our initial activity is to achieve organizational direction if this process is deficient. Environment scanning and goal setting procedures are developed as required to establish necessary organizational direction.

Environmental Scanning: We focus the executive on the environmental scanning requirements of the organization. Using open systems planning, strategic planning or any other "futures" orientation, we help the client system clarify over-all initial activities at First US Army Headquarters and the US Army Environmental Hygiene Agency.

Goal Setting: The goal setting process is our preferred second step in the consulting activity. In it, the organizational hierarchy applies the environmental scanning and desired future state decisions to more concrete goal setting — and subsequent objective setting. The focus of these activities is on clarifying goals that the entire organization can begin moving towards. This was the initial OD Intervention at the Command and General Staff College.

Developing Change Strategies

Once organizational direction has been achieved, we develop the necessary subsequent change strategies. We have determined that for change to occur, 1) motivation must be generated, 2) power bases need to be encouraged to support the changes and 3) effective problem-solving mechanisms must be developed to convert organizational goals into more concrete action plans.

Generating Motivation: Because of the lethargic nature of a complex system, generating motivation to change the status quo has been critical to the success of our OD efforts. Another way to state the problem is that few organizational members care where the top wants them to go - or even see the need. For our change efforts to begin, Nadler suggests[7] the following needed to be present:

• **Dissatisfaction with the present.** This was clearly the motives for our OD involvement at the Logistics Center.

• **Willingness to participate.** The top had to be willing to expand the number of organizational members involved in the change effort. This generated increased ownership by organizational members, increased information flow and allowed delegation of problem resolution to the level closest to the problem.

• **Rewards for new behavior.** A reward system was established where possible to increase the desire of organizational members to institute and continue the complex system change. At the Logistics Center the rewards for the top echelon were increased time to devote to other efforts and decreased intra-organizational conflict.

• **Time and opportunity to disengage from the present.** The organizational hierarchy had to make the decision to devote high quality resources (time, personnel, money) to disengage from day to day activities and focus exclusively on the complex systems change effort. This requires extensive planning and continued monitoring. We conducted off-site seminars whenever possible (US Army Logistics Center, and the US Army Environmental Hygiene Agency).

Co-opting Power: Due to the structure of a complex system, there exists within it a number of separate power bases. For our interventions, effective consulting required that we identify these bases of power and then strategize dealing with them. Using the stakeholder concept[8], individuals who could make decisions, block decisions or who were significant to the change effort (had the ability to provide critical information or responsible for implementation) were accounted for. At the Logistics Center, they were included in the planning process; in the Initial Entry Program, Beckhard's[9] political mapping was used. In our political mapping, various power bases were identified as being able to (1) Stop, (2) Let, (3) Help or (4) Make the change occur. Once the current orientations of these bases were identified, strategies were developed for moving them to the necessary future state.

Problem Solving: Central to the change efforts we were involved in was the development of organizational problem-solving skills. At the Logistics Center, meeting facilitators and mid-level managers were trained in the Interaction Method for meeting management and problem-solving (Doyle and Strauss). This particular technique also increased horizontal integration and information-sharing at a number of organizational levels.

Stabilizing Organizational Changes

Structural Modifications: By definition, systemic change is long lasting and seems to require 2-5 years for stabilization. Stabilizing the various change efforts we

Priority	Force	Group	Stop	Let	Help	Make
1.		a. Old Drill Sgts	X————————————————→ O			
		b. New Drill Sgts				XO
		c. Cadre	X————→ O			
		d. Officers	X————→ O			
		e. Post Agencies		XO		

Reference: Beckhard, Harris   X=Present State   O=Desired Future State

have been managing has required modification of the organizational structure. This has been accomplished formally through redesign, or informally through the establishment of collateral organizations (similar to those of GM's QWL program)[10]. This was done at the Logistics Center. Of critical importance to stabilizing the change effort has been the use of control groups.

Control Groups: One area where we have had considerable activity is in the formulation and operation of control teams to manage the OD effort. These control groups include the client, internal OD consultants, external OD consultants, a consultant team (may include only a portion of the above), a control team to manage the specifics of the change (at the Logistics Center this included the internal consultant, facilitators, client, and selected Directors) and technical experts (ADP, etc.). The functions of this control team were to (1) control each step, (2) create problem-solving groups, (3) manage the overall

transition and (4) provide for transferring OD skills to appropriate organizational members (Plan obsolescence for the OD consultant).

Other Techniques: Other necessary stabilization activities we have utilized include (1) expanding the organizational decision-making base, (2) developing internal reward systems and (3) inviting the informal power structure into the change effort.

CONSULTING ACTIVITIES IN COMPLEX ARMY ORGANIZATIONS

We have cited various specific examples of our consulting activities in the preceeding text. The following matrix identifies our consulting inverventions in each of our client complex Army organizations. These interventions were initiated in the process spheres indicated because (1) the executive sanctioned the activity and (2) our assessment diagnosis indicated a deficiency in that particular coping/learning process.

COPING PROCESS						
Organization	Environmental Scanning	Goal Setting	Generating Motivation	CoOpting Power	Problem-Solving	Stabilizing
US Army Logistics Center	Performance Management Conference	Prioritize Survey Issues	Follow-up Survey with No Change	Use of Board of Directors	Assigned Problem Solving Groups	Permanent Problem Solving Groups
1st US Army	Open Systems Planning	Open Systems Planning	Participation of Staff & Cdrs	Included Cdrs	Conducted by Staff Sections	Management by OSP Goals
Command and General Staff College	Interviews with External Agencies	Data Analysis	Data Feedback to Instructors	Included Key Instructors	Responsibility Charting	New Roles for Cdr & Deputy
Training and Doctrine Cmd (Initial Entry Training)	External Teams Assessed Environment	Initial Meeting of Cdrs	Survey Feedback to Cdrs	Political Mapping	Delphi Creative Problem Solving	Centralize the Structure

CONCLUSION

Using this approach to consulting in complex organizations we have been able to:

(1) diagnose an organization's relative "health" in terms of its learning/coping processes,

(2) prescribe specific remedial interventions where deficiencies are evident and

(3) evaluate our OD activities. Using this consulting scheme, the US Army Logistics Center currently appears to be moving from

LTC James Looram *has been on the faculty at OECS since January 1977. After graduation from Class 1-77, he performed duties as platform instructor in every portion of the sixteen-week OESO course for two years. Subsequent to this, he was assigned as Director of Training for the Center. He is presently Chief of the External Operations Division which provides consulting services to general officer clients in the field on request. He holds a PhD degree in organizational behavior from New York University and has completed post doctoral work in the Columbia University Executive Program in advanced OD and HRM. LTC Looram's professional focus for the past two years has been the application of OE to large, complex macro systems. He has conducted OE operations at company, battalion, brigade, division, installation, MACOM, DA levels, and unified command levels.*

MAJ Michael Rodier *has been on the faculty at OECS since July 1978. Since that time he has been assigned to two duties. First, he was a member and later Chief of the IET Task Force whose task was to describe an ideal climate for socializing recruits into the Army. Presently, he is a member of the External Operations Division, Concepts Development Directorate, which provides consulting services to complex systems clients in the Army. He is a graduate of CGSC, has an MA in business administration and has completed the Columbia University Executive Program in advanced OD and HRM. MAJ Rodier's professional focus for the past two years has been the application of OE to complex systems and strategic planning. He has consulted at battalion, service school, sister service, MACOM, DA and unified CMD levels.*

Dr. Jerry Eppler *has been the Director of the Counseling and Human Development Center and taught at the University of Puget Sound. He also served as Assistant Dean, Arizona State University. He has instructed as an adjunct professor for University of California, Santa Barbara, Pepperdine University, and several other universities. He has acted as consultant to the Logistics Center for the U.S. Army and 6th Army Headquarters, Weyerhauser Corporation, the Seattle Public School System, Arizona State Employment Service, and several others. He is currently teaching in the Individual Skills Division for OECS.*

John R. (Randy) Duke *is currently an Organizational Effectiveness Staff Specialist at the U.S. Army Finance and Accounting Center, Ft. Benjamin Harrison, Indiana. He spent 11 years in the active Army, the last three of those as an instructor and project officer at the Organizational Effectiveness Center and School, Ft. Ord, California. He has a masters degree in counseling psychology from Chapman College in California.*

short-term fix category into a healthy complex organization.

In summary, it is important to reiterate that our approach to complex systems change remains evolutionary. We do know that the utilization of these consulting processes and this conceptual framework has proved extremely useful so far in planning our OD intervention strategies with complex US Army organizations — and we believe that they have applications for other organizations as well. □

FOOTNOTES

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10. "The Parallel Organization Structure at General Motors ... An interview with Howard C. Carlson", *Personnel*, September-October, 1978.

Plan ahead: It wasn't raining when Noah built the ark. – Richard Cushing.

The Tip of an Iceberg: Initiating Change in a Complex System

MAJ Ford McLain
Mr. Kai-Peter G. Koenig

Major McLain *was commissioned in Armor from OCS in 1967. He has served as tank battalion S3 and Executive Officer, Brigade S1 and S4 and has commanded two tank companies. He has also served as Assistant PMS at the University of California, Berkeley, has a BBA in Personnel Management, a MEd in Psychological Counseling, and is presently assigned to Ft. Hood, Texas, as an OESO.*

Mr. Kai-Peter G. Koenig *is presently working in the Organizational Effectiveness Division at Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC), Washington, D.C. He has a B.S. in Social Work and a EdM and Certificate of Advanced Graduate Studies in Human Resource Management. Prior to accepting the OESO position at WRAMC, Mr. Koenig worked in the alcoholism field for fifteen years as counselor, trainer, and program coordinator.*

Introduction

During an Organizational Effectiveness operation at a major FORSCOM installation, OESOs received as a client the local medical facility. This hospital was rapidly identified as a complex/macro system.[1] The purpose of this article is to describe the experience and share the insight gained while operating in this distinctly different environment, and, in so doing, provide information which can help other OESOs to decide at which point to break from the smaller/ micro systems approach and deal with long range change.

Background

Short term/quick fix OE operations had been conducted within the past six months with minor impact on the total system. The hospital is composed of several essentially independent sub-systems which further complicate the multiple power structures at work in the organization. All of the technical complexities of a large hospital of the

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[1] *As defined at the US Army Organizational Effectiveness Center and School, complex systems possess the following characteristics: Independent sub-systems; Multiple simultaneous missions; Complex environment; Sophisticated technology; No structured clarity; and Multiple power structures.*

1980s are present, to include the added dimension of construction of a new physical facility now approximately 60 percent complete.

The hospital commander's invitation for OESOs to enter the organization was open-ended. During the initial interview no specific areas of concern were surfaced. The commander's expectations of the OESOs were limited, based on prior exposure to limited/micro interventions. The concept of a complex systems approach was not addressed by the OESOs at this meeting. A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was written and agreed upon by the commander. To this point, the OESOs were thinking in terms of the four step process applicable to smaller, less complex organizations.

In discussion with Dr. Jerry Eppler, who is a member of the staff of the Organizational Effectiveness Center and School and is experienced with interventions, the OESOs began to perceive the organization from the complex/macro systems level. Dr. Eppler recommended several readings to assist them with their enlightenment in this arena, but emphasized that the entire area of OE in complex organizations is new and encouraged a creative approach based

on the limited research available. This caused the OESOs some concern and ultimately demanded a dichotomous effort as requests for short term interventions presented themselves. Two transition workshops and a meeting management intervention were conducted. These will not be discussed here; however, they did impact somewhat on the macro effort insofar as they raised the expectations of organization members and contributed significantly to the credibility of the OESOs.

Assessment

A General Organization Questionnaire (GOQ) had been administered a year before which produced few, if any, areas of major concern. Time allocated for the operation, size, and complexity of the organization did not lend themselves to administering another GOQ. The information expected to be gained by so doing was not considered commensurate with the effort it would have demanded. The following sources were used to conduct the assessment:

- Individual interviews
- Observations
- Results of recent Annual General Inspection (AGI)
- One year old GOQ data
- Review of patient complaints

As assessment progressed, the implications of OE operations in complex systems became more evident. Prior OE efforts were virtually unheard of by many members of the organization. Their impact on selected individuals was noted; however, the total system reflected no discernible change. This does not imply that there is no place for smaller, unrelated OE operations in complex systems; however, they must be recognized for what they are as they relate to the complex system — *short term fixes with only local/sub-systems impact*. On the other hand, one physician with some tenure in the organization revealed that the minor OE operations of which he had peripheral knowledge (to include questionnaires and interviews) had raised expectations among he and his co-workers that changes were forthcoming. The lack of observable action or feedback at his level had created considerable frustration. The lesson learned here

is, regardless of the type or complexity of the operation, the commander must close the loop by rendering feedback to organization members.

The results of the assessment were presented to the commander. The purpose, mission, and goals of the organization were basically clear and understood by organization members. Six themes/areas of concern were discussed, with direct quotes from anonymous interviewees to reinforce each. The themes were discussed and prioritized by the commander. Here it should be noted that the commander relied considerably on the "expertise" of the OESOs. Three of the themes were identified as possessing the common element of role uncertainty at varying levels and degrees of impact. Of critical importance is that at this meeting the OESOs began to expose the commander to concepts of organizational effectiveness in complex organizations, future thinking, and long range change. This was done through a series of progressive actions as follows:

1. A complex organization was defined.

2. The hospital was described in terms of the definition.

3. Long term change was discussed as it might apply to the specific themes presented.

4. The commander was asked to read, at his leisure, an article describing consulting in complex organizations.

The outcomes of the meeting were; first, to conduct short range implementations in the areas of transition and meeting management, and, secondly, the commander mandated the OESOs to develop the concept of a long term operation to address role clarification at the complex system level. To accomplish the latter, he authorized continued assessment and planned for another meeting the following week.

To this point, what was different about this operation?

- OESOs have begun to realize that they are standing on the tip of a gigantic ice berg. The demands of short term interventions would be more than enough to occupy them full time. The thought of initiating an operation which could last

months, or, more likely, years is awesome and demands a realignment of thinking.

- The complexity of the organization and the implications of "multiple power structures as a result of essentially independent sub-systems and lateralization of power" demand that the OESOs consider the "organization" as the client, and the commander as a primary point of contact. This is essential in order to recognize that in a complex organization no single individual has all the power and for significant, planned, long term change to be affected, *all* sources of power must be motivated and incorporated into the action.

- In OE operations within less complex organizations, emphasis is placed on ownership of the problem. In a complex organization, ownership is rare and not essential. On the other hand, legitimization of the operation to address the problem and identification of appropriate key personnel to sanction it are extremely important. Without this, the program might not reach throughout the organization, or may die in its infancy.

Implementation

Within the body of what might be termed a complex intervention, there will most likely be a series of related smaller interventions directed at a planned change or improvement at the complex level. During this operation, the next meeting with the commander was seen as one of those key smaller interventions. The OESOs realized that it was imperative that the commander understand the concept of long term change in a complex system and the investment it would mean for the organization in time and effort. Furthermore, he would need to recognize that the plan itself would be the result of organization action, and not an OESO product. The OESOs resolved, therefore, to present to the commander "a plan to develop a role clarification program for the entire hospital". The meeting with the commander followed these phases:

1. Discussion of complex interventions — assuming the commander had read the aforementioned article.

2. Discussion of the merits of role clarification throughout the hospital as a means of addressing major concerns surfaced during assessment.

3. Presentation of a conceptual framework for a successful plan to address major concerns vis-a-vis role clarification which would contain these necessary elements:
   - Address an established need.
   - Involve key individuals.
   - Be flexible.
   - Provide self-sufficiency for the hospital.
   - Insure legitimization of the program.
   - Provide for on-going evaluation.

4. OESO recommendations for development of the concept toward a plan:
   - Raise the level of concern/dissatisfaction with present of key individuals by sharing with them the assessment data.
   - Motivate them to lend their support to development of the program.
   - OESO briefing by key personnel and facilitation of discussion to accomplish, in part, the above recommendations.

At the meeting with the commander, the OESOs were very pleased with his supportive attitude and rapid grasp of the complex system information. Sherwood and Glidewell's "Pinch Model" was used to illustrate the impact of role definition and planned renegotiation on organizations with parallels drawn to show the impact of successful role clarification throughout the hospital. The outline for the plan was presented in general terms, emphasizing the need to involve key personnel from the outset. At the conclusion of the meeting, the commander agreed to all recommendations, and expressed his desire to brief key people as soon as possible.

Two key points should be mentioned here:

- **The commander is a point of entry in almost any organization.** In a complex organization it is important to use his formal power early — on to begin the process of motivating people with lateral or informal power. One person designated as "key" had little formal power, but represented an

important group which would be essential to informal support of the program. The commander quickly realized this and agreed to his presence at the briefing.

● **Complex organizations, by their very nature, employ the services of both internal and external "experts."** The nature of this type of organization which dilutes individual "ownership" of system-wide problems provides an atmosphere which encourages reliance on experts. Numerous times during this operation OESOs were referred to as "experts." One quote comes to mind, "Well, what do you guys recommend? You're the experts." This is a role which is not only useful, but as experienced by the authors; is essential at the complex systems level.

Key personnel (3 colonels — 06, 2 lieutenant colonels — 05, one captain — 03, and one senior NCO) were briefed in much the same manner as the commander had been. The session was opened by the commander with a succinct introduction and a subtle implication that he was sponsoring any forthcoming recommendations. The primary purpose of the meeting was to motivate key personnel, to show them a problem which had impact on them and their domains, and present them with a concept which needed their support and participation in order to succeed. Figure 1 outlines the meeting.

The outline for the plan addresses many of the key points which differ from interventions at less complex levels. The initiation step embodies the concept of OE helping an organization to help itself. This step is designed to motivate key personnel and involve them in the program in a concrete and important way. The OESOs are not doing the planning. They are however, providing a vehicle for logical and sound development of the plan by the people with the content knowledge necessary to do it. Simultaneously, they are incorporating the elements necessary to lend legitimacy, stability, motivation and direction to a plan for long term change in a complex system. Incorporated in the outline are elements which will promote self-sufficiency and gradually reduce OESO involvement. Key personnel will actually experience role clarification. This should assist them in developing guidance for the ad hoc committee or control group who will develop the plan. Immediate benefits of clarified roles of key individuals in the organization will also result.

The ad hoc committee will serve several functions. Primarily, it will lend stability and structural continuity to the on-going program. It will also free key personnel from detailed planning and tend to establish the hospital-wide role clarification program as a norm within the organization.

At the conclusion of the meeting with key personnel, the commander stated his belief in the concept and indicated his intention to develop the plan. He further requested that the OESOs brief local OE personnel to be prepared to conduct a role clarification workshop for key personnel, including himself, as soon as it could be coordinated.

Evaluation

The program for role clarification is expected to take approximately 18 months. One of the essential steps in the process is a procedure for on-going evaluation, to keep the program on target. OESOs recommended an external reassessment by local OESOs, those from Health Service Command, or from the OECS External Consulting Division, when the program is well into the execution phase.

Conclusion

Although this article does not present any new theories in complex systems interventions, it represents a situation which, heretofore, has generally not been addressed by OESOs in the field. This is, when entering an organization which proves to be a complex/macro system, at what point does the OESO make the break from the traditional smaller system approaches and begin dealing with long term change? There appears to be increasing evidence to indicate that minor interventions at the macro level are stop-gap at best and possibly harmful at their worst. Some of the techniques traditionally part of the OESO's repertoire must be modified when dealing with complex systems, and some need not be used at all.[2] In

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[2]*Consulting in Large Systems, by Looram, in the OE Communique, Spring, 1980 issue, published by USAOECS, Ft. Ord, CA.*

fact, the entire concept of operating in complex systems should become a compartment in the OESO's bag of techniques. □

Figure 1

MACRO ROLE CLARIFICATION PLAN

NATURE OF MEETING

- Brief key people on role clarification program for MEDDAC

EXPECTATIONS

- Open and honest discussion
- Questions
- Gain better understanding of commander's intention

AGENDA

- Introduction by Commander
- Summary of Assessment Data
- Discussion of concepts
- Presentation of Outline for a Plan
- Recommendations
- Commander's Comments/Conclusions

TIME: 1½ hours

SUMMARY OF ASSESSMENT DATA

- Sources of Information
  - Personal Interviews
  - Observation
  - Survey Information
  - IG Report

- Concerns
  - Understanding who does what
  - Physicians' Roles
  - Meeting
  - Use of Staff
  - Concern about understanding who does what
    — "Responsibilities on wards and clinics are not clea
    — "No written guidelines for staffing procedures."
    — "As Chief I have no control over my people!"
    — "We need a delineation of responsibilities."

  - Physicians difficult to deal with
    — "Some physicians flat refuse to do things. You can't put them in jail for 30 days or you'd lose a physician for 30 days."
    — "quit treating doctors as prima donnas in the name of recruiting and retention."
    — "Physicians go right to the Commander instead of the appropriate staff member."
    — Commander does too much of his own staff work
    — "The Commander should not be a secretary for the doctors — he should direct them to the appropriate staff agency."
    — Commander micro-manages. Memos should go to only about 5 key persons."
    — "Commander is doing CPS job."

ROLE CLARIFICATION

- Clear up misconceptions of role in organization by addressing:
  - What others think someone is responsible for and how it should be done.
  - What the person thinks his job is.
  - What the person is directed to do.
  - What he/she actually does.

COMPLEX/MACRO SYSTEMS APPROACH

- Complex organization defined — MEDDAC
  - Independent sub-systems within
  - Multiple simultaneous missions
  - Many permeable boundaries
  - Sophisticated technologies
  - Multiple power structures

FUTURE THINKING VS CRISIS MANAGEMENT

- Options
  - Short term fix
  - Narrow long term fix
  - Movement toward healthier complex organizations

ELEMENTS NECESSARY FOR SUCCESSFUL PLAN TO CLARIFY ROLES/ADDRESS STATED CONCERNS

- Established/understood need
- Involvement of key individuals
- Flexibility and self-sufficiency (MEDDAC)
- Address all echelons — top to bottom
- Legitimatize program
- Provide for on-going evaluation

OUTLINE FOR MEDDAC ROLE CLARIFICATION PLAN

- Step 1 — Initiation
- Step 2 — Preparation
- Step 3 — Execution
- Step 4 — Evaluation

OUTLINE FOR MEDDAC ROLE CLARIFICATION PLANT

STEP 1. INITIATION

- Identify key personnel
  - People who can "stop, let, help, make" change occur
- Outline benefits resulting from Role Clarification Plan
  - Time saved
  - Ambiguity reduced
  - Communications improved
  - Commander-Staff relation clarified
- Brief key personnel on concept of operation
- Conduct actual Role Clarification Workshop for key personnel. Which will:
  - Clarify actual roles of individuals at top levels within MEDDAC
  - Provide personnal insight/experience base for decision making planning.
  - Promote understanding of value of program
- Key personnel provide guidance
- Form Ad Hoc Committee/Control Group
  - Develop detailed plan based on guidance received from key personnel
  - Supervise preparation and execution

STEP 2. PREPARATION

- Train facilitators
  - L&MDC, observation, practical experience
  - Will yield MEDDAC self-sufficiency
  - Provides flexibility
  - Addresses personnel turbulence
  - Emphasizes on-going nature of Plan.
- Conduct "TYPE" Role Clarification Workshop.
  - Involves representatives from each "TYPE" role, i.e. MCs, MSCs, ANCs, EM, etc.
  - Uses HSC Reg 10-1 as base
  - Develops models to minimize conflicts over responsibilities and general duties between various "TYPES."

STEP 3. EXECUTION

- Role clarification at all levels
  - Start at top — move downward
  - Logical sequence
  - Command Emphasis
  - Include on-going feedback system

STEP 4. EVALUATION

- Planned renegotiation and evaluation to lend stability and flexibility
- Outside/external reassessment

Recommendations (In sequence)

- Key personnel attend Role Clarification Workshop
- Commander meet with key personnel to discuss their experience in terms of its appropriateness to overall MEDDAC
- Make decision whether to continue
- If "yes", key personnel work with OESO to develop GUIDANCE.

Logistics Center Command Program for Participative Management (LCPPM)

by CPT John Vazquez, LOGC
and Mr. George Long, Interaction Associates, Inc.

How the LCPPM Came To Be

In 1865 a distinguished mathematician, lecturer, and scholar chose a rather different way to bequeath to the world some profound ideas about life. One of these ideas in particular is increasingly being used by complex organizations attempting to tap the full potential of a resourceful world and its people.

From a story told to several little girls, Charles Lutwidge Dodgson, under the pen name of Lewis Carroll, wrote a book called *Alice In Wonderland*. It contains a particularly profound idea central to organizational management — and to life.

Alice says to the Cheshire Cat,

"Cheshire Puss . . . Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?"

"That depends a good deal on where you want to get to," said the Cat.

"I don't much care where," said Alice.

"Then is doesn't matter which way you go," said the Cat.

"— so long as I get somewhere," Alice added as an explanation.

"Oh, you're sure to do that" said the Cat, "if you only walk long enough."

It was also no accident, but a deliberate decision, that an organization called the U.S.A. Logistics Center, faced with the complex mission of integrating Army and Department of Defense logistics operations, plans, and concepts, would meet the same metaphorical cat. In 1978 the top managers asked, "Where do we go from here?" and began to map a course that would answer this question. In doing so, they choose an innovative approach to planning their journey.

This innovative approach is based on collaborative problem solving and planning principles and consists of a horizontal board of directors; a number of task forces with organization-wide membership, called Problem Analysis Groups, which gather data, analyze problems, and develop recommendations that will have organization-wide support; a group of specially trained managers who serve as group problem-solving facilitators; and a group of specially trained secretaries who serve as meeting recorders. During the meeting, they document the problems, analyses, and potential solutions.

The LCPPM is designed to assist the command group and total LOGC organization to improve morale and communication and to increase overall organizational productivity and effectiveness.

Program History

The effort began in October 1978, when the CG, MG Oren E. DeHaven, and the DCG, BG Kenneth A. Jolemore, requested the service of the Fort Lee Organizational Effectiveness (OE) Staff Office. In response, a team from a graduating class of the US Army OE Center and School was given the task of conducting an organizational assessment. The team used a General Organization Questionnaire (GOQ) as a means of asking LOGC personnel how they saw things. The answers were complex and covered many aspects of LOGC operations. Using this information, the command group developed actions to capitalize on strengths and to eliminate issues blocking improved effectiveness. The actions were initiated with a determination to create a more effective and efficient work environment in the LOGC.

After a year, MAJ Joe Riley was again called in from the Fort Lee OE office to readminister the GOQ. The responses indicated that some productive changes had occurred, but that people were not fully satisfied with the extent of the changes. Evaluation indicated that a "total system," rather than a "treat the symptoms", approach was needed to achieve the desired effect.

At this point MG DeHaven directed BG Jolemore to lead the LOGC top team to develop a long-range strategy to address organizational issues and to enhance managerial effectiveness. MAJ Riley was appointed process consultant for the group. From December 1979 to date, the top team designed and implemented a collaborative planning and problem-solving program. They named it the LOGC Command Program for Participative Management (LCPPM). The long-range goals of the LCPPM are to monitor the ongoing effectiveness and progress of the LOGC; to clarify its short-term priorities and long-term objectives; and to implement the necessary actions to achieve the desired results. Some work has already been done toward establishing LOGC objectives and priorities, enhancing LOGC training programs, and examining issues that affect morale. Further actions will include a detailed review of internal communications and management processes.

What Is The LCPPM?

- It is a management tool developed by the LOGC top team in response to input on LOGC issues from LOGC personnel.

- It is a supplement to the chain of command to enhance mission accomplishment and organizational effectiveness.

The purpose of the LCPPM is:

- To provide a collaborative environment to ensure that problems are defined by all viewpoints and that coordinated action is taken.

- To provide a supplemental management tool that serves as an adjunct, and not a replacement, to the chain of command.

- To provide a forum for the latest techniques in organizational effectiveness, meeting design, and problem solving.

Why Is It Different?

To supplement the LOGC OE Program, the Interaction (IA) Method of managing meetings was adopted by the LCPPM. This method establishes specific roles for personnel within meetings and provides an opportunity for active participant involvement in a collaborative setting. It allows the manager or chairperson of the meeting to play the singular role of decision maker and content expert, since the duties of guiding the meeting and taking notes are delegated to the meeting facilitator and recorder(s), respectively. Thus the manager or chairperson does not have to be both the meeting coach and referee at the same time. The group members are relieved of note taking and can pay full attention to the meeting's goals.

Who Are The Key Participants In The LCPPM?

The answer is "everybody in LOGC," but that needs to be made more specific. For example, the **Command Group** sets the broad, overall direction for the program. This group consists of the CG, DCG, Chief of Staff, CSM, and the scientific and technical advisors.

The **Top Team** consists of the CMD GP, directors, deputy directors, and selected advisors such as EEO. This group sets the specific direction of the LCPPM through periodic long-range planning and strategy meetings and empowers the board of directors to take the plans and convert them to action.

The **Board of Directors** consists of the Chief of Staff and the directors, or, in their absence, the deputy directors. This group, chaired by the Chief of Staff, meets frequently to implement actions. The Chief of Staff serves as an important link among the command group, the top team, and the board. The **Process Management Group,** a group within the board of directors, consists of the Chief of Staff, the director of operations and administration, and the OESO. This group orchestrates the command, administrative, and consulting actions that support the board of directors' decisions.


LOGC personnel from all levels in the organization can get involved in LOGC management through **Problem Analysis Groups (PAGs)** set up by the board of directors. These groups of seven to ten people have individual charters tailored to specific tasks and are designed to involve the maximum number of people from all levels of the organization in decision-making processes. The goals of the groups are to define specific problems, consider all viewpoints, and make recommendations for action to the board of directors. The first PAGs are focusing on setting priorities, defining objectives and resources, improving morale, and improving training.

Under the organizational structure diagrammed below, the viewpoints and ideas of the entire work force have a forum. The benefit to LOGC personnel is a clear channel of communication for discussing organization-wide problems and possible solutions.

This organizational effort places LOGC management on the cutting edge of organizational strategy necessary to deal with the complexities of management in the 1980s.

Participants in the Top Team Meeting

# 11, 1980
nning Session
ommand Program
e Management

Group I takes the 18-month task list and develops a milestone schedule for the next 18 months.

A strategy group will manage the milestone tasks.

ee it," General.

Group 2 takes the 1985 image task and develops a milestone chart beyond the first 18 months.

CPPM Plan

product was this 18-month detailed plan.
to fill in the specific details.

| | | | | | CY 81 OE PROGRAM MILESTONE SCHEDULE | | | | | |
MARCH	APRIL	MAY	JUNE	JULY	AUGUST	SEPTEMBER	OCTOBER	NOVEMBER	DECEMBER
Top Team ff-Site #S ( ) ew/Update Milestone Schedule ( ) IPR ( )			Pre-Interviews for Top Team Off-Site #6 ( ) BOD Build Agenda for Top Team Off-Site #6 ( )	Top Team Off-Site #6 ( ) Review/Update Milestone Schedule ( ) Obligate Remaining FY 81 Budget ( ) IPR ( )	Develop Human Research Requirements ( ) Develop FY 82 Budget ( )	GOQ ( ) Review/Update Formal Evaluation Program ( ) Plan Quarterly Obligations ( )	GOQ Analysis/Feedback ( ) Pre-Interviews for Top Team Off-Site #7 ( ) BOD Build Agenda for Top Team Off-Site #7 ( )	Top Team Off-Site #7 ( ) Review-Update Milestone Schedule ( ) IPR ( )	
IPR ( )				IPR ( )				IPR ( )	
IPR ( )				IPR ( )				IPR ( )	
IPR ( )	Update Internal Publicity Program ( )	Update External Publicity Program ( )		IPR ( )	Update Internal Publicity Program ( )	Update External Publicity Program ( )		IPR ( )	Update Internal Publicity Program ( )
IPR ( ) iberate on dditional PAGs ( )	Complete PAG 4 ( ) Complete PAG S ( )			IPR ( )				IPR ( )	
IPR ( )				IPR ( )				IPR ( )	
		LOGEX ( )			LOGEX ( )				

George Long is a former OESO (Class 3 - 77). Since joining Interaction Associates, Inc., he has worked in large organizations designing and assisting long range problem solving and planning processes. He has also conducted public seminars on meeting management, problem solving and facilitation on the east and west coasts. His recent clients have included The National Endowment for the Arts, National Science Foundation, National Institutes of Health, and the International Communications Agency (Fulbright Scholarship program).

Captain (P) Vazquez graduated from Pennsylvania State University in 1968 and received a commission in the Quartermaster Corps. His assignments have included duty with the XVIII Airborne Corps, 2d Infantry Division, Army Communications Command, and the Quartermaster School and Brigade at Fort Lee, VA. He has served overseas tours in Vietnam, Korea and Japan. He is currently assigned as the OESO FOR The US Army Logistics Center.

Role Of The OESO

As OESO, I wear several hats ... staff assistant to LOGC managers in the areas of management and group behavior ... coordinator and consultant for LCPPM activities ... coordinator and advisor for LOGC meeting facilitators and recorders ... coordinator for OE related training.

I have a goal to promote a common understanding what Organizational Effectiveness is. OE is a program designed to keep leaders abreast of advances in the field of management and behavioral science, so that they will have an opportunity to apply concepts and techniques which they may consider useful. My relationship with managers who request my service is confidential, and feedback which I solicit for them is provided anonymously. OE is not a stand-alone program which "works," or "doesn't work"-PEOPLE WORK!

My job is to coordinate a responsive program for the people of the LOGC. In the past, we have been successful in soliciting the service of quality external consultants, a trend which I hope to continue. I would like to take this opportunity to acknowledge those who have contributed to our efforts to date ...

US Army OE Center and School

LTC Jim Looram, CPT Randy Duke,
Dr. Jerry Eppler and Mr. Bob Goodfellow
(External Operations Division)

LTC Mel Jones, MAJ Dave Recter,
CPT Velma Brantley, CPT Ed Bridges,
CPT Bill Taylor and Mr. Frank Rouse
(Graduating Class Members)

Interaction Associates, Inc.

Mr. Michael Doyle, Mr. George Long, and Mr. Herman Gyr

DA OE Staff Office

LTC Frank Burns

Army Research Institute

Dr. Glenda Nogami

Fort Lee OE Staff Office

Maj Robert Dixon, MAJ Joe Riley,
CPT Harry Dinella, CPT Paul Dronka,
SSG Debbie Clemmons, and Mr. John Romaine

US Army Logistics Management Center

MAJ Don Lightman

Facilitator Service

In December 1979, twelve LOGC personnel were trained to assist managers in conducting conferences and problem-solving sessions. With a facilatator's help, the manager can be sure that many viewpoints, ideas, and needs will be expressed and considered during the meeting. The facilitator is the "neutral servant" of the group and does not take the meeting away from those responsible for achieving the meeting's objectives. Rather, he or she assists the group to find an acceptable process for achieving those objectives, and, with the group's agreement, keeps them focused on the task by alerting them to any detours they may be on. Group members are thus free to actively concentrate on the task at hand.

The facilitator helps the manager to prepare the agenda and provides logistics support and post-meeting follow-up. During the meeting, the facilitator keeps any individual from dominating the proceedings; involves all the group members in the discussion; and, using specialized training in consensus techniques, helps groups reach win/win decisions within the constraints set by the appropriate decision maker.

Recorder Service

The LCPPM has another unique service: meeting recorders. These trained personnel work with the facilitator and the group in capturing the information generated during the meeting. The "group memory" that they develop (1) frees the manager and meeting participants from taking notes; (2) allows members to actively participate; (3) gives each person's ideas legitimacy and attention; and (4) helps the group deal with considerably more information than the traditional methods allow. The recorder, like the facilitator, is a neutral assistant to the group and serves an important role in increasing meeting productivity.

The Command Group Comments
The Commander:

"We have made substantial progress in the last year. Obviously, I am interested in what General Starry and the Army believes to be important. I believe we can be prepared to show others where we are headed. We have a long way to go but this will certainly help us to get there.

To meet our goals we need the contributions of all the fine talent that makes up this organization. The LOGC is a good organization, and decisions and actions taken through the LCPPM will make it better.

We can make a great contribution to TRADOC, the Army, and the defense of the United States. What we are working on can have a lasting effect, probably over the next 50 years. I'm looking forward to what lies ahead."

The Deputy Commander:

"I was delighted to find the degree to which the LOGC is employing OE techniques. I have used OE methods extensively in my past work, and I'm enthusiastic about becoming involved in the LOGC program."

The Chief of Staff:

"I have been a part of this program since its inception. It takes time, but I am well satisfied with the progress we've made. We have already faced some tough issues and worked them out. I believe that the work of the PAGs will yield concrete results which will benefit the entire organization."

Professional Development

The following after action report is submitted in accordance with paragraph 4-5b, AR 600-76.

MSG Melton L. Brown, Organizational Effectiveness Non-Commissioned Officer (OENCO) for Giessen Military Community, APO New York, 09169, attended a professional development workshop on 9-11 October 1980.

- **Course:** Structured Experiences in Human Relations Training.

- **Sponsor:** University Associates.

- **Cost:** Approximately $300 per individual.

- **Location:** Continental Hotel, Munich, Germany.

- **Synopsis:** The structured experience went considerably beyond what was presented during my training at the Organizational Effectiveness Center and School (OECS). The workshop lasted two and one half days. During the first half of training, Dr. Jones presented a considerable amount of theory combined with practical experience (structured experience). Additionally, work groups were tasked to develop their own structured experience assisted by Dr. Jones. Obviously, this produced the most powerful learning, as it firmly ingrained the basic concepts being taught by Dr. Jones. During the teaching process, Dr. Jones clearly differentiated the steps in the adult learning model, with particular emphasis placed on separating processing from generalizations and generalizing from applicability to back home situations. This clearly demonstrated to me that in some cases, I had been combining some of the steps and consequently losing some of the structured experience.

- **Applicability:** The material was relevant to me and my organization as it has already permitted me to use the principles learned at the workshop to improve our organizational meetings based upon structure and design presented by Dr. Jones. Furthermore, I foresee continued improvement of all workshops I conduct by implementing the design principles learned from Dr. Jones. Also, I am of the opinion that this can be a good training package for Leadership and Management Development Course (LMDC) trainers, because it clearly outlines the adult learning model in terms of structured experiences and adds clarity to the whole process.

- **Recommendation:** The workshop is certainly recommended to any OESO/OENCO. The opportunity to train under Dr. Jones was not only enlightening and an all around learning experience, but a lot of fun as well.

For clarification of workshop material, I may be contacted at 0641-402-7160/6130 or by writing to Commander, Giessen Military Community Activity, ATTN: OESO, APO New York, 09169.

Sources and Resources

Lynn Herrick
USAOECS, Librarian

FEEDFORWARD

The purpose of this section of the *OE Communique* is to provide current information about resource materials of interest to practicing OESOs and OENCOs. It functions as an ongoing update for RB 26-2, OE RESOURCE BOOK, which is available on request from the Training Developments Directorate of OECS.

The first portion of this section is a listing of selected films recently added to the Training Aids Support Center (TASC) system which have potential application to OE programs. The list expands section C of the OE RESOURCE BOOK. Following the film list is a bibliography that was prepared for the OECS in December 1980. The final portion lists resources that are currently being recommended to students in the 16-week OE course during the implementation block of the course. The lists are specifically designed to augment the "Implementation" section of the OESO HANDBOOK.

Before you immerse yourself in content, however, take a moment to process the following words of wisdom:

If it ain't broke, don't fix it!

16mm FILMS AVAILABLE IN THE TASC SYSTEM
(Listed in Change 2 of DA Pamphlet 108-1)

MF 16-13035 Bridging the Gap
(Thomas Gordon illustrates the use of "I" messages in the context of Parent Effectiveness Training.)

MF 16-13036 How to Say No
(Analyzes reasons people have difficulty saying no and suggest assertiveness-based methods for dealing with inconsiderate requests.)

MF 16-13039 Men's Lives
(Sensitive documentary of the male socialization process.)

MF 61-13044 How to Manage the Boss

MF 61-13045 How to Work With Your Fellow Employees

MF 61-13046 Helping People Perform — What Managers Are Paid For

MF 61-13047 Planning and Goal Setting — Time Waste or Management Tool?

MF 61-13048 How to Take the Right Risks — Time Manager as Decision Maker

MF 61-13049 How to Make the Organization Work for You
(Series narrated by Peter Drucker which highlights management functions.)

MF 61-13054 Where are You? Where are You Going?
(Suggests techniques for conducting impartial, effective

performance appraisal inter-
views.)

**MF 61-13055 A Perfectly Normal Day —
Interruption and Crisis
Management**
(Suggestions for dealing with
typical daily problems which
may contribute to confusion
and tension on the job.)

MF 61-13056 A Team of Two
(Explains Alan Lakein's
theory on ways in which
managers and their se-
cretaries can improve job per-
formance by working to-
gether as a team.)

Organizational Effectiveness Long-Range Strategic Planning

USAOECS Library   **December 1980**

This bibliography reflects a sample of the books that are available in the Library of the
Organizational Effectiveness Center and School which deal with long-range strategic planning
and related subjects.

SYSTEMS VIEW OF ORGANIZATIONS

Carlsen, Robert D. and Lewis, James A.
*THE SYSTEMS ANALYSIS WORKBOOK: A
COMPLETE GUIDE TO PROJECT IMPLEMEN-
TATION AND CONTROL.* Prentice-Hall, c1973.
(Detailed, step-by-step guide to the analysis of both
simple and complex projects.)

Johnson, Richard A., and others.
*THE THEORY AND MANAGEMENT OF SYS-
TEMS,* 3d edition. McGraw-Hill, c 1973.
(A case study approach to the implementation of sys-
tems concepts in organizations.)

Kast, Fremont E. and Rosenzweig, James E.
*ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT; A
SYSTEMS APPROACH,* 2d edition. McGraw-Hill,
c1974.
(Basis for the open system model of an organization
adopted by Organizational Effectiveness.)

Washburn, Barbara.
*OPEN SYSTEM ASSESSMENT FOR MANA-
GERS: DESIGN OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW.*
Organizational Renewal, 1976.
(An instrument for assessing a manager's effective-
ness from an open system viewpoint.)

Weinberg, Gerald M.
*AN INTRODUCTION TO GENERAL SYSTEMS
THINKING.* Wiley, c1975. (Wholistic introduction
to the concept of systems in general.)

CHANGES STRATEGIES (Including ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT)

Beckhard, Richard.
*ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT:
STRATEGIES AND MODELS.* Addison-Wesley,
c1967.
(Classic work on the underlying theories and stan-
dard practices of OD.)

Bennis, Warren G., and others, editors.
THE PLANTING OF CHANGE, 3d edition. Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, c1976.
(Collection of writings on various aspects of planned
change and its effects on society.

French, Wendell L. and Bell, Cecil H.
*ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT: BEHAV-
IORAL SCIENCE INTERVENTIONS FOR OR-
GANIZATION IMPROVEMENT,* 2d edition.
Prentice-Hall, c1978. (Practical handbook of OD
strategies.)

Colembiewski, Robert T. and Eddy, William B.,
editors.
*ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT IN PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION. Part I: ORGANIZATION
DEVELOPMENT PROPERTIES AND PUBLIC
SECTOR FEATURES: Part II. PUBLIC SECTOR
APPLICATIONS OF ORGANIZATION DEVEL-
OPMENT TECHNOLOGY.* Marcel Dekker, c1976.
(Two collections of writings which deal with the spe-
cial considerations of OD in the public sector.)

Lippitt, Gordon L.
*VISUALIZING CHANGE: MODEL BUILDING
AND THE CHANGE PROCESS.* University As-
sociates, c1973.
(Non-mathematical models for visually representing
various aspects of planned change.)

McGill, Michael E.
*ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT FOR
OPERATING MANAGERS.* AMACOM, c1977. (A
handbook of OD technologies, including specific ad-
vantages and disadvantages, aimed at the manager
rather than the OD practitioner.)

Steele, Fritz
*CONSULTING FOR ORGANIZATION
CHANGE.* University of Massachusetts press,
c1975.
(Looks primarily at consultant and manager roles
and teamwork in a program of planned change.)

Steer, Richard M.
ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS: A BE-HAVIORAL VIEW. Goodyear, c1977.
(Presents a process model of organizational effectiveness that relates individual employee behavior to overall organizational performance.)

Watzlawick, Paul, and others
CHANGE: PRINCIPLES OF PROBLEM FOR-MULATION AND PROBLEM RESOLUTION. Norton, c1974.
(An overview of the connection between problem solving and the inevitability of change.)

Zaltman, Gerald.
STRATEGIES FOR PLANNED CHANGE. Wiley, c1977.
(Comprehensive and straight-forward introduction to the methodologies for planning and effecting change.)

SOCIOTECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Aldag, Ramon J. and Brief, Arthur P.
TASK DESIGN AND EMPLOYEE MOTIVA-TION. Scott, Foresman, c1979.
(Contends that effective job redesign can significantly improve employee motivation.)

Allen, Thomas J.
MANAGING THE FLOW OF TECHNOLOGY. MIT Press, c1977.
(A scholarly explanation of specific facets of the communication process that impact on the management technical information.)

Bowers, David G.
SYSTEMS OF ORGANIZATION: MANAGE-MENT OF THE HUMAN RESOURCE. University of Michigan Press, c1976.
(Distills the theories of Rensis Likert involving the human subsystem of an organization.)

Lawler, Edward E. and Rhode, John Grant.
INFORMATION AND CONTROL IN ORGANI-ZATIONS. Goodyear, c1976
(Links the role of information and control systems with the quality of organizational decision making.)

Pasmore, William A. and Sherwood, John J., editors.
SOCIOTECHNICAL SYSTEMS; A SOURCE-BOOK. Univeristy Associates, c1978.
(Writings by experts in the application of sociotechnical system theory to organization change.)

Schneider, Benjamin.
STAFFING ORGANIZATIONS. Goodyear, c1976.
(Incorporates staffing processes into the overall organizational and social systems in which they function.)

Swingle, Paul G.
THE MANAGEMENT OF POWER. Wiley, c1976.
(Explores the paramenters of organizational power and conflict and offers suggestions for using both constructively.)

Taylor, James C.
TECHNOLOGY AND PLANNED ORGANIZA-TIONAL CHANGE. University of Michigan, c1971.
(Results of a study on the interrelationships between technical systems and planned social change.)

U.S. Military Academy.
A STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONAL LEADER-SHIP. Stackpole, c1976.
(Collection of writings by military and civilian experts which focuses on leadership in an organizational context.)

PLANNING, PROBLEM SOLVING, DECISION MAKING

Adams, James L.
CONCEPTUAL BLOCKBUSTING: A GUIDE TO BETTER IDEAS. Freeman, c1974.
(Inspirational book about the nature of creativity and the ways in which it can be encouraged.)

Carnarius, Stan.
MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS AND SOLU-TIONS: A GUIDE TO PROBLEM SOLVING. Addison-Wesley, c1976.
(Presents problem situations in matrix format and offers specific content solutions.)

de Bono, Edward.
LATERAL THINKING FOR MANAGEMENT: A HANDBOOK OF CREATIVITY. American Management Assn., c1971.
(Presents creativity as a skill which can be learned and practiced through the use of non-linear thinking.

Delbecq, Andre L., and others.
GROUP TECHNIQUES FOR PROGRAM PLANNING: A GUIDE TO NOMINAL GROUP AND DELPHI PROCESSES. Scott, Foresman, c1975.
(A handbook for the use of group methods in the making of "judgmental decisions.")

Drucker, Peter F.
MANAGEMENT: TASKS, RESPONSIBILI-TIES, PRACTICES. Harper & Row, c1974.
(Comprehensive analysis of the functions of a manager, in which strategic planning is defined as "purposeful risk-taking.")

Hicks, Herbert G. and Powell, James Donald, editors.
MANAGEMENT, ORGANIZATIONS, AND HUMAN RESOURCES; SELECTED READINGS, 2d edition. McGraw-Hill, c1976.
(Part III includes writings on creativity, goal setting and strategic planning.)

Hughes, Charles L.
GOAL SETTING: KEY TO INDIVIDUAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS. American Management Assn., c1965.
(Contends that organizational survival depends on the setting of valid goals which integrate individual and organizational needs.0

Janis, Irving L. and Mann, Leon.
DECISIONMAKING: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT, CHOICE, AND COMMITMENT. Free Press, c1977.
(Describes decision making under stress and the effect of conflict situations on the rationality of choice.)

Kast, Fremont E. and Rosenzweig, James E.
ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT: A SYSTEMS APPROACH, 2d edition. McGraw Hill, c1974.
(Part six identifies decision making and planning as elements of the managerial subsystem.)

Kaufman, Roger.
IDENTIFYING AND SOLVING PROBLEMS; A SYSTEM APPROACH. University Associates, c1976.
(Basic introduction to problem solving as a key element in the overall planning process.)

Kepner, Charles H. and Tregoe, Benjamin B.
THE RATIONAL MANAGER: A SYSTEMATIC APPROACH TO PROBLEM SOLVING AND DISICION MAKING. Kepner-Tregoe, c1965.
(Advocates the use of three separate analytical procedures in using information to define problems and make rational decisions.)

Lyon, Herbert L., and others.
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE IN ORGANIZATIONS. Goodyear, c1976.
(Contends that decision making is the foundation of management and offers scientific methods for improving decision making.)

MacMillan, Ian C.
STRATEGY FORMULATION: POLITICAL CONCEPTS. West, c1978.
(A conceptual and practical framework for dealing with strategy from and interorganizational perspective.)

Oxenfeldt, Alfred R., and others.
A BASIC APPROACH TO EXECUTIVE DECISION MAKING. AMACOM, c1978.
(An overview of individual and group decision making processes.)

Richards, Max D.
ORGANIZATIONAL GOAL STRUCTURES. West, c1978.
(Basic text designed to help managers establish and achieve valid, realistic goals through a strategy of goal setting.)

Rothschild, William E.
PUTTING IT ALL TOGEHTER: A GUIDE TO STRATEGIC THINKING. AMACOM, c1976.
(Practical text based on the principle that strategic thinking is logical exploration and retrieval process.)

Rothschild, William E.
STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVES: SELECTION, DEVELOPMENT, AND IMPLEMENTATION.

AMACOM, c1979.
(Looks at the change process as it relates to strategic thinking over time.)

Tarr, Graham.
THE MANAGEMENT OF PROBLEM-SOLVING: POSITIVE RESULTS FROM PRODUCTIVE THINKING. Wiley, c1973.
(Provides structure and directions for using a formal problem solving group.)

PERSONAL PLANNING

Adams, John, and others.
TRANSITION: UNDERSTANDING AND MANAGING PERSONAL CHANGE. Allanheld, Osmun, c1976.
(Looks at the dynamics, experience and management of personal transitions.)

Byrd, Richard E.
A GUIDE TO PERSONAL RISK TAKING. AMACOM, c1974.
(Encouragement to expand personal and professional horizons by an increased willingness to take calculated risks.)

Kellogg, Mary Alice.
FAST TRACK: THE SUPER ACHIEVERS AND HOW THEY MAKE IT TO EARLY SUCCESS, STATUS AND POWER. McGraw-Hill, c1978.
(Discusses trends in the personality traits and the professional tactics of many who have achieved early status and success.)

Kiev, Ari.
A STRATEGY FOR HANDLING EXECUTIVE STRESS. Nelson-Hall, c1974.
(Describes sources of executive-level tension and anxiety and prescribes techniques for reducing and managing conflicts.)

Kiley, John Cantwell.
SELF-RESCUE. McGraw-Hill, 1977.
(Puts responsibility for satisfaction and success squarely on the individual.)

Lakein, Alan.
HOW TO GET CONTROL OF YOUR TIME AND YOUR LIFE. New American Library, c1973.
(Practice approaches to the effective use of time.)

Schein, Edgar H.
CAREER DYNAMICS: MATCHING INDIVIDUAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL NEEDS. Addison-Wesley, c1978.
(Takes the long view of career development as an evolutionary process, any facets of which are often unrealized.)

OE Implementation — General Information

Books on this list give overview information on implementation activities in general as well as designs for specific "standard" interventions.

(Information on specific implementations is provided in each issue of the *OE Communique.)*

Argyris, Chris
INTERVENTION THEORY AND METHOD; A BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE VIEW, c1970.

Blake, Robert R. and Mouton, Jane Srygley
CONSULTATION, c1976.

Burke, W. Warner and Hornstein, Harvey A., editors
THE SOCIAL TECHNOLOGY OF ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT, c1972.

Francis, Dave ad Woodcock, Mike
PEOPLE AT WORK: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO ORGANIZATION CHANGE, c1975.

Fordyce, Jack E. and Weil, Raymond
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1980 ANNUAL: *"Fleshing in the Experiential*
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EXCHANGE: THE ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIORAL TEACHING JOURNAL (quarterly)

Excellent resource for practical classroom activities, many of which could be adapted to workshop settings.

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Storrs, CT 05268

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TRAINING: THE MAGAZINE OF HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT (monthly)

Provides practical tips on training techniques as well as current info on useful resource materials, both printed and audio-visual.

Lakewood Publications, Incorporated
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Minneapolis, MN 55403

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Combines theory and technique into readily usable material for trainers and consultants.

American Society for Training and Development (ATD)
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
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