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1982

OE COMMUNIQUÉ

The Professional Organizational Effectiveness/Development Publication of the U.S. Army



Force Modernization

THE OE COMMUNIQUÉ ISSUE NO. 2 1982

Attendees

ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS MANAGERS COURSE 3-82

15-18 Mar 82, Williamsburg, Virginia

MG William F. Ward
77th USARCOM

MG Harvey D. Williams
Commander, ARMR III

COL James Cason
USA RG Meade

COL J. J. Connolly
ARMR V

COL James F. Curtis
USA RG Stewart

COL Arthur C. Dister
DPCA, Ft. Eustis

COL Edward Hackney
USA RG Bragg

COL Robert J. Hudak
Seneca Army Depot

COL Charles Johnson
US Military Academy

COL Ralph Kennedy
USA RG Seneca

COL George Marko
Ft. Sheridan, IL

COL Larry W. Neale
7th Sig Cmd

COL Michael J. Pepe
7th Trans. Gp.

COL Andre K. Reiser
USAMERADCOM

COL James D. Rockey
Ft. Eustis, VA

COL William Seago
18th FA Bde

COL J. Barrie Williams
XVIII ANB Corps

LTC Robert Barnhart
USA RG Douglas

LTC David J. Beyer
Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD

LTC Bennie C. Boles
Ft. Sill, OK

LTC Roland Bratisax
USA RG Lee

LTC William R. Derr
Ft. Huachuca, AZ

LTC Joseph R. Gaston
Ft. Rucker, AL

LTC Charles Gettig
USA RG Denver

LTC Fredrick Lynn Greene
Ft. Detrick, MD

LTC G.O. Helmick
USA RG Knox

LTC Thomas A. Herre
Ft. Belvoir, VA

LTC Lee London, Jr.
Ft. McClellan, AL

LTC James Lyles
20th EN Bde

LTC Billy W. May
Carlisle Barracks, PA

LTC(P) Marshall McRee
III Corps Arty

LTC Richard Myers
504th MI Gp

LTC Charles Rittman
1st Inf Div

LTC Wendel Weaver
USA RG Jackson

MAJ Richard T. Buehler
MILPERCEN

MAJ(P) H. L. Degner
USA RG McCoy

MAJ(P) T. Paul Forukawa
US Army Health Services Cmd

MAJ Robert A. Harding
MILPERCEN

LCDR Everett Johnson
US Navy

MAJ John W. Lester, Jr.
MILPERCEN

MAJ William J. Petersen
MILPERCEN

MAJ James E. Quinlan
MILPERCEN

MAJ Russell S. Thompson
MILPERCEN

CPT(P) Norita Csonka
MILPERCEN

MSG John H. Frye
MILPERCEN

William T. Grier
Letterkenny Army Depot

Wayne A. Robertson
NGB

Attendees

ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS MANAGERS COURSE (2-82)

25 - 28 January 1982, Europe

COL Brand
7th MEDCOM

COL Deberardino
HQ USAREUR

COL Denney
MILPERCEN

COL Johnson
USMCA Giessen

COL McDonald
4th TRANSCOM

COL Meloy
USMCA-Nuernberg

COL Parrish
HQ 21st SUPCOM

COL Partin
HQ V Corps

COL Rives
USMCA-Mannheim

COL Williams
USMCA-Munich

LTC Akridge
5th Sig Cmd

LTC Brayboy
7th ATC

LTC Clark
18th Engr Bde

LTC Mann
29th ASG

LTC Manning
66th MI Gp

LTC Matteson
USMCA-Heilbronn

LTC Otto
Defense Communications Agency

LTC Shoonover
US Cmd Berlin

LTC Wright
HQ 3d SUPCOM

MAJ Hall
MILPERCEN

MAJ Stanley
USA FS Augsburg



Issue No. 2 - 1982

The OE Communique

The *OE Communique* is published quarterly under the provisions of Chapter 5, AR 310-1. The Mission of the *OE Communique* is to provide state-of-the-art information on the application of the Organizational Effectiveness (OE) process in units and organizations throughout the Army. The *Communique* seeks to provide a forum for the exchange of innovations and lessons learned in the use of OE techniques and to foster the development of research and evaluation methods for determining the contributions of OE to combat readiness. The *OE Communique* endeavors to develop closer ties with all OE Consultants and to provide a supplement to their continuing training. A major objective is to provide commanders and military and civilian leaders at all levels with practical and timely information for use in initiating and sustaining OE operations.

The use of masculine pronouns to refer to both sexes has been avoided in the *OE Communique* whenever possible. An author's pronouns are used, however, when editorial changes might result in introducing unintended nuances.

Beetle Bailey cartoons are adapted and used with permission of the artist, Mort Walker.

CORRESPONDENCE

Direct correspondence with the *OE Communique* is authorized and encouraged. All enquiries, letters to the editor, manuscripts and general correspondence should be sent to: ***OE Communique,* U.S. Army Organizational Effectiveness Center and School (USAOECS), Fort Ord, CA 93941.** Telephone numbers for the *OE Communique* are: **Autovon 929-7058/7059,** or **Commercial (408) 242-7058/7059.**

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Commandant's Comments

COL William L. Golden

Force Modernization, the theme for this *Communique* issue, is the Army's toughest ***systemic*** challenge.

Three quotes, all from the same source,** seem appropriate, lest we take ourselves *too* seriously:

Beatt's Rumination #1:

Ours is the age which is proud of machines that think and suspicious of men who try to.

The Systems Paradox:

People in systems do not do what the systems say they do.

The Law of Communications:

The inevitable result of improved and enlarged communications between different levels of hierarchy is a vastly increased area of misunderstanding.

Excerpts from addresses delivered to OEMC and OECC classes are printed in this issue. MG Augerson, speaking to OECC #1-82, discusses the precedent for an OE role in combat. He addresses the very MISSION of the Total Force Army and highlights the potential value of OE Consultants as TO&E assets.

LTG Becton, speaking to OEMC #2-82, states that Commanders and OE Managers are not always using their OE Consultants to full capacity and for maximum effect. His point is well taken and reminds me of a similar statement by Jay Beecroft: "Line management has been the victim of consultants and trainers who work harder and harder at doing the wrong things better and better."

"Motor Pool OE" is fun, and, yes, our graduates are capable of doing it well, but how are you gonna keep 'em down in the motor pool after they've seen Force Modernization? (And why would you *want* to?)

The articles and interviews contained in this issue are here to give readers the "big picture" of Force Mod. The next step is for all of us to immerse ourselves at our respective levels. We need to ply our wares as "expert" consultants in the areas where the Army most needs our help.

> **Expert:** I'm inclined to award the title to those whose opinions agree with my own.
>
> ***—Malcom Forbes***

That is not what *expert* means to me; I prefer the following thought, also by Forbes:

> **Executives [Consultants] Who Get There and Stay** suggest solutions when they present the problems. Those who don't, don't.

You don't become an expert in consulting to the issues surrounding Force Modernization without immersing yourself in the realities of those complex issues.

> Idealism increases in direct proportion to one's distance from the problem.
>
> ***—John Galsworthy***

Rather, let us dive in, with our special expertise and our systems perspective:

"We need to understand the reality around us—the reality of the whole. The best social science reporting comes from journalism, not from researchers. Norman Mailer's 'Of a Fire on the Moon' is an excellent example of someone's immersing himself in and trying to understand a large complex system, rather than fragmenting it."

—Peter Vaill

A "systems" approach dictates that OE Consultants continue to focus on the implementation of ***all*** Total Army Goals. To overemphasize one at the expense of others is to take a ***sub***-systemic view, thus diluting the potential impact of OE.

The Total Army Goals are printed here to serve as a ready reminder to those of you who do not have them displayed on your wall.

Total Army Goals

The mission of the Total Army is to deter any attack upon U.S. national interests and, if deterrence fails, to engage and defeat any enemy in any environment.

★Readiness

A Total Army prepared for the "three days of war": to deter the day before war; to fight and win on the day of war; and to terminate conflict in such a manner that on the day after war, the United States and its allies have an acceptable level of security.

★Human

A Total Army composed of military and civilian professionals who loyally serve their nation in rewarding careers.

★Leadership

A Total Army whose leaders at all levels possess the highest ethical and professional standards committed to mission accomplishment and the well-being of subordinates.

★Materiel

A Total Army equipped and sustained to win any land battle.

★Future Development

A Total Army sensitive to innovative approaches to accomplish its mission.

★Strategic Deployment

A Total Army organized, manned, and equipped so as to be capable of deploying, with transportation assistance, to any part of the globe to counter a wide spectrum of threats.

★Management

A Total Army which efficiently and effectively uses the resources made available.

"Be All You Can Be; **Implementing** ***Total Army Goals"*** is the theme for the next *Communique.* Do good work, document the results of your efforts, and report your accomplishments for the benefit of all. □

**From *1001 Logical Laws*, compiled by John Peers, edited by Gordon Bennett, 1979.



Dear Captain Boice:

The management faculty at Capitol Campus are most impressed with the *OE Communique* and have requested its addition to the library. As an organizational psychology graduate at Michigan, I heartily agree. The quality is first rate.

Unfortunately, we have a problem. As far as I can tell, *OE Communique* is not indexed. This makes it difficult for our students (or any others) to access. Have you considered having your publication indexed in *Business Periodicals Index* or *Personnel Literature* (U.S. Dept. of Labor)? If not, I strongly suggest you do so. Three major benefits might accrue:

1. The cost of preparing your own index might be eliminated.

2. Military students, for example Army War College students who often use this library for management information, will find *OE Communique* indexed with other management material. Use of and reference to *OE Communique* would thus be regularized and increased.

3. The excellent work that you are doing will come to the attention of those outside the military. For example, several of our faculty now read your publication after being led to it by a professor who is a Colonel USAF reserve and our Associate Provost who is a Brigadier General in the National Guard.

Keep up the fine work.

Sincerely,

Charles Townley
Head Librarian
The Capitol Campus
Pennsylvania State University

*Thanks for the excellent suggestion! We have requested to be indexed accordingly.—**Editor***

Dear Col Golden:

We have used Implications Charting to map potential impacts of a new performance appraisal/classification system. Having used it with over 16 groups, Major to Senior Executive Service (SES) level personnel, command wide, it has proved useful to —

a. Identify "hot spots" that must be treated carefully.

b. Facilitate understanding of key players who impact the project and reduce the level of "doubting Thomases."

c. Further enhance the market value of Organizational Effectiveness to participating managers.

At times, the scoring methods were cumbersome; limiting probability/desirability might streamline this problem.

I found Implications Charting an extremely useful management tool. All Organizational Effectiveness personnel should know the technique. Please commend Mr. Goodfellow and the *Communique* for giving us one more way to grease the organizational gears.

COL Clifton R. Goodwin
Deputy Commander
Headquarters, US Army Electronics Research
and Development Command
2800 Powder Mill Road
Adelphi, MD 20783

Editor's note: For information on Implications Charting, see "Managing the Future: A Process for Dealing with the Possible," by Bob Goodfellow, *OE Communique* #4-81, pp. 22-25.

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON D.C. 20301

COMPTROLLER

Colonel William L. Golden
Commandant
US Army OE Center and School
Fort Ord, CA 93941

8 JUN 1982

Dear Colonel Golden:

To my good fortune, I have stumbled upon Issue #4-81 of OE Communique and its insert, the OE Planning Calendar. They are so stimulating and useful that I am writing to request our office be added to your distribution list, if possible. Please use the following address:

Special Projects Group
ODASD(Cost and Audit)
Room 4B-929 Pentagon
Washington DC 20301

Thanks for producing such a fine publication!

DAVID L. CLICK, COL, USA
Acting Director
For Special Projects

Coy Brown, Larry Boice, Bob Britsch, Steve Lanagan, and Jo Ann Horton

Force Modernization: An Interview with MG Richard D. Boyle

(Conducted by CPT Howard Brosseau and LTC Bob Radcliffe, TRADOC)

MG Richard D. Boyle has been the Deputy Chief of Staff for Combat Developments in TRADOC for nearly a year. He graduated from the United States Military Academy and received a PhD in nuclear physics from the University of Virginia. He has attended the Field Artillery School, the US Army Command and General Staff College, and the US Army War College. He was the Deputy Commander of the Seventh Corps and the Commander of the 56th Field Artillery Brigade in Europe, positions closely involved with force modernization in the field. In past years, he was involved in the testing and the development of nuclear weapons systems. His unit conducted the service test of the Pershing 1A system and he was closely involved with the Pershing system as it evolved from the old P1 system to the P1A and then to PII. In many positions, especially within the nuclear field, he has been closely associated with force modernization for about 16 years.

The following interview was conducted on 17 April 1982 in MG Boyle's office at TRADOC Headquarters.

Editor's note: *The questions used in this interview and in the interview with MG Anson, also in this issue, were developed by CPT Bill Barko.*

Communique: Sir, what do you see as the major challenges facing you as the TRADOC coordinator of force modernization?

MG Boyle: The biggest challenge that I see might be somewhat suprising, but it is the need to get the everyday nuts and bolts to the field. We spend billions of dollars developing new equipment, much of which is highly technical and requires a great amount of study, research, and developmental effort. Yet the force modernization process is critically dependent on getting to units such everyday items as trucks, radios, generators, and a whole variety of other equipment that is pertinent to the soldier and the soldier's organization. Also, the soldier must be trained and available at the right time. This does not necessarily involve high technology. I think we can handle high technology rather well, since many people work on it and we spend so much money for it. The important issue in modernization must be to get the necessary equipment to the soldiers, and to provide the documentation for the organization itself. This detailed nitty gritty work will bring the organization into being.

LTC Robert F. Radcliffe *is the Chief of the OE HQ TRADOC. He is responsible for management of the OE Program within TRADOC and for headquarters internal and command wide external consulting. An Aug 78 graduate of the OE Consultant Course, he has an undergraduate BS Degree from USMA and Master of Education Degree from Georgia State University.*

CPT Howie Brosseau, *a 9 October 1981 graduate of OECC, is an Organizational Effectiveness Consultant at HQ TRADOC. He has a Master of Arts Degree in Industrial/Organizational Psychology and a Bachelor of Science Degree in Physical Education.*

Communique: Would you briefly highlight how the Force Modernization process impacts in the areas of doctrine, training, structure, and equipment?

MG Boyle: We are establishing now the doctrine that will have a tremendous impact on future battlefields, particularly in the intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) areas. We haven't had the quality of IEW equipment that we will have in our Army, and doctrine within which we will operate is evolving. This is a difficult area because in most cases, we don't know all the details of this equipment. We know what we want, but don't know how it will operate, the shape it will take, how many soldiers are needed to operate it, and in some cases, all that it will do for us. All this has to be worked out. We are going to need a much newer doctrine as we approach 1986 and beyond. Of course, people in TRADOC have been working feverishly for several years to develop that doctrine and I think they have done a good job, but there is still a long way to go. Doctrinal development will continue over many years as this equipment comes into the active forces.

In the training area similar problems arise. With some complicated equipment we have only a sketchy idea of what the equipment is going to be like; therefore, we don't

yet know how we will train soldiers. We don't know how many soldiers we will need, what the training POI should have, and what the overall effect on the Army's training program will be. TRADOC is working hard on the problem, however, and in most cases has plans well in hand.

As we move this new equipment into our active units, we are also going to have to train other units, particularly in the National Guard and Reserves, on some of the displaced equipment from the active elements. In the next 10 to 15 years this process of acquiring new equipment, training the troops, and making organizations combat ready on a whole host of equipment will require tremendous energies and foresight to the extent of which we have only begun to envision.

Communique: What do you see as the impact of force modernization on the role of tomorrow's leaders?

MG Boyle: I don't believe we fully comprehend the great combat capability we are going to have in the future. We could be just in the early stages of understanding the capability of our weapons systems and our electronic warfare and intelligence equipment. We will be significantly more capable than we have ever been before. It will take, however, better training, new outlooks, and new roles for the leaders of tomorrow. Consider that, in battlefield intelligence, commanders in the past might be fed 10-20 pieces of information per hour. In the future we will handle several thousand items per hour. The leaders of these future forces will therefore have to be a lot more skilled in handling information than they are today. This will be very difficult. Of course, it's going to involve much automatic data processing equipment. The complexity of this interface between man and machine will be very difficult to overcome—probably our major challenge of the future.

Communique: From your perspective, what would you say is the most misunderstood aspect of force modernization among today's Army leaders?

MG Boyle: I think the first thing we need to do is, get everybody in tune with the Army's AirLand Battle doctrine. This is the key. I know it's been published in variety of publications, briefings, documents, etc., but I

Force Modernization: An Inside View

COL Mike McAdams

COL Michael C. McAdams is the Director of Force Development Directorate, ODCSCD, HQ TRADOC. He has commanded field artillery organizations from battery to battalion level. He is a graduate of CGSC and has been assigned to TRADOC since July 1978.

QUESTION: COL McAdams, the buzz word today in the Army seems to be *Force Modernization*. How do you define Force Modernization?

Force Modernization means different things to different people. The definition that the DA has come up with is that "Force Modernization is the developing and fielding of new equipment, materiel systems and organizations and the fieldings of displaced materiel systems together with associated and supporting equipment and associated activities." This definition is important because it is from this definition that the subordinate commands of the Army must determine their appropriate Force Modernization definition and then translate into the appropriate functions that their MACOM must accomplish. The Force Modernization definition that we in TRADOC have derived from the DA definition and are using is "The evolutionary process of upgrading the Total Force through the development of concepts, doctrine, organizations, and training in order to meet the anticipated threat through the optimum use of developing systems, technology and available force structure." I think you can see from this definition that we have very clearly slanted it to those TRADOC areas of responsibility.

QUESTION: COL McAdams, we hear much today about the *complexity* of Force Modernization. What is meant by that statement?

Well, it is certainly a very true statement. Force Modernization in the '80's and into the '90's is and will be very complex. The chief of Staff in his white paper stated that "Next to manning the force, the management of Modernization is the most complex challenge facing the Army in the 1980's". This is where almost every Army echelon is struggling, trying to determine that best management apparatus or organization to handle Force Modernization. I think it is important that we talk about what has occurred to make Force Modernization the tremendous challenge it is today. In the past years, Force Modernization in most cases was primarily the development of only a few new materiel systems, and those generally replaced another system and went into a current organization. Another way of putting it is, swapping new equipment for old equipment in existing organizations. It was a relatively smooth and simple process. But after the Viet Nam period things started picking up once again in combat developments with the developing of new materiel systems to counter the increasing Soviet threat; we are no longer dealing with just a few systems as in the past but are now faced with some 400 new systems coming into the Army's inventory in the next ten to twenty years. This immediately compounds the modernization problems, and in most cases there is synergistic effect between new systems that further aggravates the problems. Now in addition to that Force Modernization I just described of many new systems coming into the force, we have another challenge. We have recognized that there is a tremendous capability represented by these new systems and that it's equally important and essential to have modernized organizations for these new systems. We certainly want to optimize the new system capability with an organization designed to get the maximum effectiveness from that particular new system. We have this optimization occuring in the form of the new organizational design products of Army 86. For example, Division 86, the new heavy division design for the 1980's, is an organizational design capitalizing on the new weapon systems of the 1980's. So, with the current Force Modernization problem of fielding many new systems, we have added modernization of organization. In essence we have compounded our problem of modernizing in terms of both new equipment and organizations. This is the scope of the Force Modernization challenge facing the Army now.

QUESTION: What is the Army doing about it, then?

I think the key occurrence Army-wide is the recognition of this Force Modernization problem. This awareness from my perspective started about 1978 when people recognized that in just the fielding of multiple systems alone, we had to change our way of doing business. In about 1980, the new organizational design products from the Army 86 study work emerged, and it was then that all of us within the Force Modernization business started changing the manner in which we were *managing* Force Modernization. New management elements were created within DA and at various MACOMs. DA activated an Army Force Modernization Coordination Office (AFMCO) under the Director of the Army Staff Office. Their orientation was primarily on the current problems of fielding new systems. DA DCSOPS activated a Transition Planning Integration Group (TPIG) which focused its attention on developing a master transition plan for the Army. These two DA elements have more recently been merged into one element, AFMCO, under the operational control of the DA DCSOPS, USAREUR, FORSCOM and DARCOM have developed separate elements charged with managing their respective Force Modernization efforts. In TRADOC, the Force Development Directorate, ODCSCD, is responsible for Force Modernization transition planning for the Army 86 organizations. It was agreed to try to utilize within TRADOC as much of our existing processes (the TRADOC System Managers, the Integrating Centers and schools) to accomplish Force Modernization. Presently, we are reexamining this management process and looking toward maybe a single element within HQ TRADOC that would be charged with Force Modernization management for HQ TRADOC. I would suspect a need for a similar element at both the Integrating Centers and schools will be necessary. We are still uncertain what this Force Modernization element will look like and exactly what its mission will be, but that should be resolved soon. There is another positive Army ongoing effort. The VCSA tasked the Army Inspector General to look at the Army Force Modernization process and its management and to recommend fixes for solving some of today's problems. This IG inspection team, upon completion of its inspection of TRADOC, should provide some insights that will help us determine exactly what particular type Force Modernization elements we need within TRADOC. So I think overall the Army is doing a great deal toward handling the problem.

QUESTION: What is the prospectus for being able to cope with, accomplish and continue Force Modernization?

I think the biggest plus we have right now is that all people are keenly aware of the Force Modernization problem and all are doing positive things to handle it. I think that the DAIG Inspectors' findings on Force Modernization will help the Army examine itself on modernization and that we in TRADOC will be satisfied as we receive this sea of new equipment and organizations that will shortly be upon us. As you know, out at Fort Lewis, Washington, they have been looking closely in the 9th Infantry Division at equipment that we may be interested in having in our light divisions. Once we can ascertain just what *equipment* we are going to have, we must very quickly look at *how we are going to train our soldiers on that equipment* and what it will mean to the training community.

In the ***force structure area,*** there are going to be many changes. I think we know generally the shape of Heavy Division 86. The 9th Infantry Division is actively looking at the Light Division. Certainly there will be other implications in the force structure for the Airborne Division and the Air Mobile Division. You can see that in the next five years almost all the Army's organizations we have today will have to be changed to some degree, based on the Force Modernization wave that is with us now and will be with us for the next 20 years.

In the ***equipment area,*** I think most people have a pretty good insight as to what the Army is going to be like in the years ahead, but we need reevaluations over the next several years as the equipment is fielded. I think we are developing some fantastic new equipment such as the M1, M2, M3. We will have more proficient anti-tank guided missiles and better, technically superior, more combat capable helicopters The AH64 is going to be a great helicopter that will significantly improve our capabilities 24 hours a day on the next battlefield. The DA AFMCO is publishing the Army's initial Force Modernization management plan, which will help give direction to all the Army in modernizing the forces. Also the Operational Readiness Monitoring System (ORMDNS) committee, a DA General Officer group charged with monitoring the Army's readiness, has recently expanded its scope to that Force Modernization problem-solving. The continuation of the Army 86 studies with their resultant new organizational designs incorporating new systems focuses the addressing of Force Modernization by all of us in the Army. I think the 1980's will be one of the most exciting times for the Army and its people.

QUESTION: COL McAdams, are there any things that the Organizational Effectiveness folks can do to help in this process?

Yes. I think there are many things that OE can do. As a matter of fact, OE has already taken some initiatives. Recently, OECS sponsored a workshop on organizational design and redesign techniques for use in developing and designing a Force Modernization management element. **[See article by Roberts, Hungerland and Barko elsewhere in this issue—Editor]** This workshop featured a professional consultant with a strong background in working with a large industrial firms in developing management goals and translating them into a management structure and organizations. This knowledge has been useful in helping to determine what is necessary for this Force Modernization management organization. In addition, the OE personnel and their talents can be very helpful to the people today in working and managing Force Modernization. We have our OE folks here at TRADOC attend all our Force Modernization transition planning sessions and then give us recommendations on ways we might improve the effectiveness of these meetings. □

don't feel that it's thoroughly understood. The AirLand Battle doctrine puts great demands on our combined arms organizations. It's going to require efficiencies and abilities and coordination that we have never had before. We must make a quantum, jump in the job knowledge and expertise possessed by our combat leaders. If there is one thing the Army needs, it is to have all our Generals and Colonels and Majors completely in tune to the AirLand Battle and able to train their organizations and soldiers in the tactical requirements of the AirLand Battle.

Communique: So an understanding of the AirLand Battle would take care of a lot of the misunderstandings of force modernization that may be present with our Army leaders?

MG Boyle: Yes. All our modernization—the organization, the doctrine, the training and the equipment that is coming for the next several years—is geared to the AirLand Battle. Our doctrine is that we are going to have to strike deep. This will require very close association with the Air Force. The coordination between the combat units, the intelligence elements, and the maintenance and logistics structure will have to be much better than it has been in the past. We will have to be a closely knit team that is highly trained. The artillery soldier, to be up to date on TACFIRE for instance, is going to require about 18 hours a week training. This will place great demands on our units to insure that the soldiers are up to the capabilities that are inherent in our new equipment.

Communique: We have talked about the force modernization process and the various components of force modernization. What would you see as the basic integrating mechanism for handling this ongoing and apparently accelerating process?

MG Boyle: I think most organizations have force modernization directorates, divisions or staffs. The effort is led by the Army's Force Modernization Office in the Pentagon. Here in TRADOC, we have a General Officer Force Modernization Steering Committee which meets periodically. We discuss problems in doctrine, training, force structure and equipment pertinent to force modernization, and thus try to keep ahead. The key is that in TRADOC we are well integrated with the force modernization structure at DA, which controls the whole process.

Communique: Recently, major Commanders have begun calling for OE assistance in dealing with the force modernization issues within their organizations. What do you see as some possible roles for OE Consultants in support of the force modernization effort?

MG Boyle: First of all I see OE people as fulfilling the role of the honest broker. The OE has the set of impartial eyes and ears that can help us to work in a smart way.

Some of the things OE has done already have been along these lines. The OEC from Fort Knox, MAJ John Buckley, who accompanied the M-1 New Organization Training Team (NOTT) to Europe early this year, is an example. The types of things done with the NOTT before, during, and after, were valuable to the whole process. Providing support in key planning activities also fits this role. In HQ TRADOC, we have involved our OE people in a wide variety of planning activities like the GOSC, QQPRI Conferences and the like. Another principal role, I think, is as an educator or resource to help us learn better ways of doing things. The Organization Design and Redesign Conference held by OECS in February 1982 was very helpful to us in planning our own structure. These types of activities have been and will continue to be valuable.

I think OE people should get involved at all levels to the extent their own skills allow, and to the extent needed at that particular place and time. I want to emphasize that all OE activities should be aimed where they are most needed. We cannot afford the time or resources to fix things that are not broken. I know this is hard to determine sometimes, but I see it as essential to doing these things smartly.

Communique: Are there any parting thoughts that you would like to convey to the *Communique* readership?

MG Boyle: What I would convey to the Organizational Effectiveness people is my respect for what I have seen them do in different organizations. I have been associated with them in the 82nd Airborne Division, the 56th Field Artillery Brigade, VII Corps, and at TRADOC Headquarters. I have seen many instances in which they have been able to bring forth improved procedures and better environment to the organization. In several cases, the forthright approach that the OE people have taken has significantly helped units bring problems out into the open.

I would like to say, though, that success of the OE process is very much a function of the professionalism and the competency of the Organizational Effectiveness Consultants themselves. I think the OECS training produces a good product, but once they go out into a unit, the OEC's effectiveness depends on the quality and professionalism of the individuals and not just on their training background. When the individuals themselves can establish the environment in which people speak freely and say what they feel, the OE Office is very successful. When they don't establish this environment, the OE process does not work well. I leave you with the thought that it is a highly personal process. If good people keep going into the OE business, the OE process will continue to be extremely valuable to the Army. □

OECS Receives Message from TRADOC Commander

30 Jun 82
From: Commander
TRADOC
Ft. Monroe, VA

To: Commander
Organizational Effectiveness Center and School, Ft. Ord, CA

Personal for Colonel W. L. Golden from General Otis, Commander,TRADOC

Subject: Birthday Greeting

Best wishes to the Organizational Effectiveness School on its seventh birthday. The extensive demands placed upon your graduates attest to the fine quality of your instruction and the importance of the school's mission. Keep up the good work.

Organizational Effectiveness and Force Modernization

CPT William F. Barko
MAJ Elwyn V. Hopkins
(OECS)

This article is an effort to begin an outline of how OE can assist the Army's Force Modernization effort. In a very general fashion, it presents a conceptual overview of modernization and offers several approaches for OE Consultants to take in assisting the modernization effort.

Today's Army is headed through a period of intense modernization and change unparalleled in its history. This modernization effort grew out of a desire for:

> "the reversal of the shift in the military balance which has allowed the Soviets to place us in an inferior position. We must reestablish a realistic deterrent."[1]

The answer to the above problem has been "solved" and operationalized by the various "86" organizational structures—Division 86, Corps 86, etc.—and by new equipment moving out of the laboratories and off the testing grounds into active Army units. The immensity of this effort has caused senior Army leaders to stop and consider the implications of introducing over 400 new pieces of equipment and new organizational structure in the next 3 to 5 years. Their assessments reveal:

> "The magnitude of modernization facing the Army necessitates that greater emphasis be placed on 'force integration'—the development of an integrated plan for introducing on a time-phased basis, material systems, organizations (combat, support, service support), personnel, training, and doctrine into the Army."[2] Other force modernization planners have also stated:
>
> "The major problem confronting effective modernization is the lack of integration of many force modernization activities...that integration of force modernization activities could only take place after management systems were sufficiently disciplined, and in some cases, created."[3]

So the emphasis in the formulation of the problem has shifted. The solution of *modernizing* the force has shifted from updating the Army with equipment to one of *developing the capability of the Army to introduce change into itself.* This change in focus causes one to consider, what is the Army *really* trying to do? Is it trying to update (modernize) itself? Or is it trying to develop itself into an organization that can adapt to a myriad of combat situations? These are two different philosophical statements. If the Army is updating itself, then the strategy for the future is one which facilitates the arrival, entry, and use of new equipment. If the Army is trying to enhance its ability to solve operational problems presented by various combat contingencies, then the ways it goes about adapting and developing itself are targets for change efforts.

This dilemma is not a new one. Differentiation between the terms *modernization* and *development* has been previously noted. Robert P. Biller illustrated the fundamentals as follows:

> "Development is defined as that process by which the adaptation capacity of any unit is increased. The concept of development is ***process*** rather than ***content*** oriented and is on this basis to be distinguished from the concept of modernization. Development refers to the interactional process through which individuals associated in unit networks learn how to articulate and solve problems. Modernization refers to those symbols, products, and modes of life associated with modernity—primarily defined in terms of technology at this point—which a unit or its members may acquire."[4]

In short, a developmental process is one that enlarges the problem-solving routines, while modernization enlarges the available number of modern technological equipment. You do one activity to introduce new equipment into an organization, and you do other activities to increase the problem-solving capacity of the unit.

At this time it appears that the Army has more closely aligned itself with modernization. The emphasis has created *strain* and *stress* on its managerial and adaptive systems - on its problem-solving systems. As indicated in the quotes above, this is now being recognized by senior Army leaders. Unfortunately, this is about one year after the initial introduction of major new equipment into the Army inventory. What this means is that when the decisions were being made to solve the problem of readdressing the strategic power of the United States, it would appear that the Army's key problem solvers had a cognitive model of the solutions available that can be illustrated by Figure 1.



Figure 1.

This model is a graphic representation of an overemphasis on technology and organization - the potential of the system. Thus, the solutions that came out of the problem-solving process to help the Army achieve military parity were technological and organization-structural solutions. The underlying assumption of an organization with a heavy focus on system potential is "we will somehow find someone to operate or work this equipment."

As these solutions began to be operationalized and instituted in the Army, there has been a realization that we need a more balanced approach to the force capability problem. What we need is a model that not only gives an overview of the situation, but also indicates other areas where the Army can make changes to modernize itself and increase its problem-solving capacities. Such a model is proposed at Figure 2.

Figure 2.

Army Force Modernization Model



The components of this model are as follows:

System Potential - that element of the force modernization effort that represents what is possible in the Army's unit structures, technologies, hardware and tactics.

Soldier Potential - the developmental aspects of soldiers in the Army.

Leadership Potential - the possibilities that exist in the ability to get work done through people.

These three areas were chosen above other possibilities because they represent in the broadest sense what the Army is—the bringing together of unit structures, equipment, and soldiers to accomplish missions through leadership.

By representing these areas as circles and arranging them in a concentric pattern as indicated in Figure 2, seven spheres are revealed. These seven spheres become points of focus and actions in the Army's modernization program. These seven areas are shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3 shows the Army seven places where it can modernize instead of one. What is critical to this model is that today's Army must jointly consider soliders and leadership along with modernizing the technical and structural system. Hardware must not be the primary driving force in a modernization effort with soldiers and leadership always being adapted to fit the technology.

Using this model increases the adaptability of the Army. What is demonstrated is that instead of one area being isolated as the solution to solve an operational problem, changes can be introduced in other arenas to solve the same problem. In short, it gives more options for solutions. The model also shows how a change in one arena will have secondary effects in other areas. This allows the total Army to move along a balanced path of modernization, not one element being improved to the detriment of the other elements.

Figure 3.



When using this model to consider force modernization, we begin to creatively "dream up" concepts for the Army to examine and possibly develop. These are indicated in Figure 4.

Figure 4.

Possible Areas For Army to Modernize



To summarize at this point, the Army, in order to move into the future, needs to use a conceptual model that shows all the potential areas for modernization. This will allow the Army as a whole to move into a modernization effort with all parts in concert; not one part overpowering the other parts. The Army also needs to use a conceptual model that enhances its problem-solving capabilities. Such a model will show more than one solution to an operational problem.

A key point to consider for the future is how the Army can reduce the strain that is beginning to show in its problem-solving and management systems. Army force development and modernization will continue at an increasingly faster pace. This will further stress the problem-solving capacities. Effective planning and problem-solving skills will be of paramount importance to units. Today's Organizational Effectiveness consultant can play an integral role in assisting organizations in the use of new and innovative planning and problem-solving mechanisms. In general, there are several OE strategies that OEC's ought to restudy, relearn, and help their organizations to learn. These are:

(1) Increasing the capacity of your unit to solve problems. If what is happening at the higher levels is a clue to the future, then division and installation management systems will undergo increased stress and strain. This will tax the problem-solving ability of the unit.

(2) Increase the capacity of your unit to integrate activities. Galbraith, Lawrence and Lorsch describe ways to do this.

(3) Increase the capacity of your unit to view conflict as healthy and as a symptom of change. Further, increase the capacity to manage conflict (at all levels)in a constructive manner that allows the *best* solution for problems to emerge.

OE consultants at various levels can specifically assist their commands. OEC's at MACOMs and DA level can help by addressing the systematic imbalance of today's force modernization approach as discussed earlier and assist in facilitating the development of integrating mechanisms, i.e., joint command task forces or teams.[5] [6] These can assist the Army in more effectively coping with modernization, and also assist Army leaders in creating a reasonably stable environment in which subordinate tactical organizations can effectively implement new equipment, technology, organizational structures and human resource systems. For OEC's at the installation or division level, efforts can focus on assisting their commands in the resolution of problems associated with rapid, intense organizational change and development. New problem-solving and planning techniques can be introduced to assist commands in conflict reduction and quick adaptation to change.

A partial list of potential OE activities are summarized in Figure 5 below.

Here at Concepts Directorate, OECS, we are working on several projects that are designed to assist the Army and field OEC's. One project is the development of a "language" of force modernization. The end result will be a commander's guide for introducing changes of equipment and structures into units. The intent is to create a common language of force modernization that will function like the five paragraph Operations Order between various levels of command. Another project is to disseminate the learning that came out of the Organizational Design/Redesign conference that was held at OECS in February, 1982. Dr. Jayaram, in his discussions about organization design and redesign, offered some key insights and ideas about the modernization effort. Written products should be in initial form at OECS in the next few months.

Lastly, to give a specific example of one technique mentioned in Figure 5 that a divisional unit can use to insure that there is no problem in the distribution of its equipment. Such an approach is called the "creation of slack resources" which is taken from Galbraith's *Designing Complex Systems.*

When the Army contracts to build a new weapons system, a unit depends on the equipment to arrive on a given date or within a given period of time. The unit's timetable for receiving, processing, and training then hinges on the ability of a host of people to produce on time. If there is a production problem, work stoppage, strike or anything that delays the delivery of the equipment, ramifications for the receiving unit are tremendous. Training schedules must be adjusted, dead time in training is created and ultimately, readiness is affected. A system which will generally reduce the probability of lost readiness is the creation of "slack resources." In the case of new equipment, slack resources can be created by not delivering equipment to the units below division level until there is a stockpile of the equipment for several units on hand at the post. Such a stockpile will eliminate problems for subordinate units in the change of one type of equipment for another by having sufficient equipment stocks on hand that allow the unit to initiate and complete a replacement cycle without overdependence on delivery times. Thus, there is no lost time and no loss of readiness at division level. While this idea may not be the most "efficient" for transition to new equipment, it certainly is the most "effective," if combat readiness is the standard of measurement.

CONCLUSION

The main thesis of this article has been to highlight the differences between ***modernization*** and ***development.*** The Army, through its modernization program, has created a crisis in its developmental systems. That, then is the target for the OEC in the future.

There are several specific things the OEC can do. First, the realization must come to the Army that it needs an overview, a comprehensive model for force modernization. One such model is presented in Figure 2. The requirements for such a model are that it (1) provide a more balanced systemic look at the modernization process, and (2) help the Army identify other areas that need work within the modernization process. Thus, such a model helps the Army to develop by increasing its *problem-finding capacities.* Second, the OEC has some organizational capacities of his or her unit that can be assessed and improved. These are: (1) the problem-solving capacity, (2) the integration

Figure 5.

OE Activities To Support Modernization

ISSUE	OE ACTIVITIES	OEC LEVEL
1. Overemphasis on new equipment (modernization)	Education on model presented in Figure 2.	DA, MACOM
2. Lack of integration between MACOMs	Interventions to create integration mechanisms	DA, MACOM
3. Rapid changes in technology	Transition management using a systems approach* Long-range planning	Division or Installation
4. Fitting the organizational structure with new equipment capabilities	Socio-technical design/redesign	Division or Installation
5. Delays in production/distribution of new equipment	Problem-solving techniques Creation of slack resources	Division or Installation
6. Managing the change or development process	Developing and implementing change management cells	All levels down to Division/Installation

*For more details, see Richard Beckhard and Reuben T. Harris, *Organizational Transitions: Managing Complex Change.* [7]

capacity, and (3) the capacity to manage conflict constructively. Lastly, there are some specific things that various levels of OEC's can do to facilitate modernization. Thus, the charter for an OEC during the 1980's is to help the Army by focusing on its ***process*** of modernization rather than the ***content*** of modernization.

As the rate of change in our Army increases, it is imperative that commanders at all levels understand that modernization and development co-exist and are equal partners in the change of our Army. To ignore one is to create problems in the other.

Organizational effectiveness has a valid role in this modernization process. Its role can be to help the Army make modernization what it was intended to be—***a force enhancing process.***

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□

Beetle Bailey—*by Mort Walker*



Human history becomes more and more a race between education and catastrophe. **—Herbert G. Wells**

There is the danger that we may become so enthralled by machines and weapons systems that we will lose sight of the fact that the man—the individual soldier—is the supreme element in combat. **—General J. Lawton Collins**

My center is giving way, my right is in retreat; situation excellent. I shall attack!
—Marshal Ferdinand Foch

NETTs and NOTTs: A Force Modernization Overview

MAJ John Buckley (Ft. Knox)

"Our plan for the future is to use OE against the toughest problems within TRADOC, such as force modernization . . ." **—Glenn K. Otis CG, TRADOC**

PROLOGUE

Authors Note: Most everyone in the Army knows the difference between a fairy tale and a war story, well, this is *not* a fairy tale....

Once upon a time there was a starry-eyed and energetic recent graduate of the Institute of Applied Magic and Facilitation (known to unbelievers as OECS) who went about his duties at a large, unnamed TRADOC installation in the land of fast horses and pretty women (or is it the other way around?). While sitting in his bathtub on the night before Thanksgiving, he once again demonstrated the truth of Archimedes' Principle. (Archimedes' Principle, of course, states that when a solid body is totally immersed in water, the telephone rings.)

Lo and behold, on the other end of the telephone was the big (6' 5") OEC in the sky who spoke from on high (Fort Monroe). "Verily, I say unto you that force modernization is upon us. Do you believe?" "Yes, I believe," our gallant OEC replied, beginning to look like a big white prune. "Further", the big Kahuna rumbled, "I have searched hither and yon for an OEC to transmit this message to our brothers and sisters in the hinterlands. Would you, noble OEC, like to travel abroad and spread the message of force modernization?"

At this point our freezing OEC would have sold his house, his wife, his dog, and his personally autographed photo of Bill Golden in flight jacket ensemble just to be able to get out of the bathtub, which by now sported icebergs bigger than the one which sank the TITANIC. Therefore, only a chattering "Y-Y-Yes!" could escape his purple lips. Then he heard the call, *sotto voce*, over the phone, "Hey guys, we finally found a sucker to go on that trip to Germany in January!"

And that is how our hero found himself on the day after New Year's Day, on a 747 watching "Zorro, The Gay Blade" and winging towards Germany, to participate in something which later came to be known as a "pre-NOTT" trip. But more about that later. . . .

As vividly pointed out in Issue 4-81 of the *OE Communique* ("Division 86 = Transition Management" by LTC Ron Tumelson), the Army of 1990 will be significantly different from the Army of 1980. During no time in the Army's history has as much change taken place so rapidly as will occur in the next decade. Just a few major technological changes for combat units will be the introduction of the M1 Abrams Tank (which has already begun),the issuance of the M2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) to replace the venerable M113 series Armored Personnel Carrier, and the inception of a vehicle especially designed for the reconnaissance/security mission, the M3 Cavalry Fighting Vehicle (CFV).

Major organizational changes also will occur, impacting from platoon through division level. At platoon level, the tank platoon will consist of four M1 tanks (vice five in the M60-series platoon). The infantry company no longer has organic mortars or TOWS (they are now consolidated at battalion level). The divisional cavalry squadron has lost the tanks which were organic to it (and European Cavalry commanders are already pondering their critical covering force missions with reduced organic combat power). A Cavalry Brigade (Air Attack) has been added to the division, consisting of attack helicopters, combat support aviation, and air cavalry units.

The above merely highlight *some* of the many technological and organizational changes that will soon occur in the Army. To help visualize part of the Army's plan to support force modernization, it will be helpful to consider this simple change model:

[1]Richard Beckhard and Reuben Harris, *Organizational Transitions: Managing Complex Change*, pp. 16-17.

Assuming (perhaps wrongfully so) that most organizations have a fairly accurate picture of their present state, the Army, and the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in particular, which is responsible for developing operational concepts for military operations, have determined that military organizations need the most help in identifying and attaining their future state. To this end, TRADOC has decreed that there should be ***New Organization Training Teams (NOTTs)*** and ***New Equipment Training Teams (NETTs).***

Training Teams

Some Army Heavy Divisions (Tank and Mechanized Infantry) in Europe have already begun changing to Division 86 structure; the remainder of USAREUR and CONUS heavy divisions will soon follow suit. The function of the New Organization Training Team (NOTT) is to visit those organizations prior to their transitioning to Division 86 structure and instruct leaders (division staffs, brigade and battalion commanders and staff, selected company commanders) on the ramifications and implications of the new structure.

NOTT's will visit units two to six months prior to the reorganization date, and will utilize the "train the trainer" concept, leaving behind training packages which can be used to train personnel at company level—company commanders, platoon leaders, and platoon sergeants. There will be two separate but coordinated NOTT's—one based at the Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, which will consist of subject matter experts (SME's) from combat and combat support branches; the other NOTT

Major John Buckley was commissioned (2LT, Cavalry) from West Point in 1968. Four separate company commands (in Europe, VietNam and CONUS) left him with a much greater respect for healthy organizations and a lot less hair. A graduate of the Armor Officer Advanced Course, and holder of an MPA from Northern Michigan University, John was dragged, kicking and screaming, from duties as a cavalry squadron XO at Fort Hood to attend OECS in April 1981. He is currently losing what remains of his hair as the installation OEC at Fort Knox, Kentucky.

will be based at the Logistical Center, Fort Lee, and will consist of SME's from the combat service support branches.

While the NOTT specifically addresses the new structure of the organization, the New Equipment Training Team (NETT) is specifically geared to introduce the new **technology** to the organization. The NETT will introduce the new piece of equipment to the organization and train the operators of the equipment on how to properly operate and maintain it.

The arrival of the NETT is presently planned to occur exactly when the organization initially is issued the new equipment. Similar to the NOTT, SME's will be pooled to form the NETT, thus providing to the user organizations the most expert instruction available.

Obviously, the Army will specifically address two of the K&R Model's subsystems: Structure and Technology. However, no specific reference will be made by the NOTT



or NETT of the remaining subsystems of mission, personnel, and chain of command/commander.

Nor will the environment peculiar to the organization be addressed.

NOTT/NETT Issues for OECs

Local OECs should conduct a thorough assessment of transitioning units prior to the NOTT or NETT. As mentioned previously, NOTT's and NETT's address, in the main, the desired future state (Division 86 structure/technology) of the organization, touching only briefly on the Transition State and not at all on Present State. A pre-assessment by the local OEC must be accomplished to focus the commander on the Present State of his organization. Ideally, this should occur some 90-120 days prior to the arrival of the training team, to allow the commander to initiate any changes desired before the training occurs.

The Transition State is fertile ground for OE intervention. While addressing the Future State, NOTT's and NETT's ignore the critical Transition State, thus overlooking the major problem for commanders: "How do we get there from here?" A thorough plan, which includes milestones, goals, and an evaluation/monitoring system to keep the process on track are essential elements in the transition process. But perhaps even more important is insuring that a commitment to change is prevalent within the organization. [2]

Quite frankly, some commanders do not hold with all of the precepts of the Division 86 structure. For example, during the "Pre-NOTT", it was determined that one M1 tank battalion commander did not reassign all battalion mechanics to his headquarters company, but kept them organic to the tank companies. His rationale was that he'd "tried consolidating mechanics before, and it didn't work."[3]

How his battalion operates during this transition is an issue for the on-site OEC to wrestle with.

It is essential that local OECs are able to alert training teams to the environmental idiosyncrasies of their (OEC) organizations. At present, the decision whether to include an OEC on the NOTT or NETT has not been made. Nonetheless, the training teams need to be apprised of the environmental peculiarities of the organization they are servicing. Coordination between the NOTT/NETT team chief and the local OEC can save time, avoid confusion, and greatly enhance the probability of the team's meeting the using unit's needs. OECs are, or should be, uniquely able to assess and address the organizational climate and environment.

Use the OEC technical network. OECs should be adept at using the OEC network to obtain information quickly and accurately. In a fast-moving and rapidly changing situation (which force modernization is), obtaining information through chain of command channels can be a lengthy and frustrating affair. OECs should have at arm's reach a worldwide directory of OECs, if not by name, by position. Miles of red tape can be shredded by picking up the phone and calling the on-site OEC. (*OE Communique* regularly publishes lists of OECs of major commands.) Inspectors General are trained and urged to use their technical IG to IG chain; OECs have as much (if not more) need for fast, accurate information.

Local OECs must assist units in determining their future state in the personnel, mission(s), and chain of command subsystems. These subsystems will not be addressed by either the NOTT or NETT, and can easily be overlooked by commanders coping with major organizational and technological innovations.

While the "headline-maker" subsystems of structure and technology will receive direct emphasis, failure of the commander/OEC to consider the correlative subsystems will result in an organization out of synchronization, and in pain. OECs should force the commander's attention on the total system, not allowing him to proceed with blinders on.

"Bottom Line" OE

The major point to be made is that force modernization is not just in the planning stage; it is happening to us **right now.** Unfortunately, for one reason or another, most of us in the OE Community are now being forced to play "catch up ball." Somewhere in most organizations is a project officer for force modernization. Without pointing fingers, or trying to determine "who shot John", OECs should run, not walk, to this individual and offer assistance in the force modernization process.

Many of the force modernization officers, like the Maytag washer repairman, are very lonely, and will readily accept advice and/or assistance, especially from OECs, who should be in the forefront as change agents.

If OECs cannot get involved at division level, they should work toward getting in at brigade level. If not, brigade, then battalion. The important thing is — **get involved!**

Armed with some knowledge of the NOTT/NETT concept, OECs should be able to get their foot in the door of force modernization. Involvement at the grass roots level of force modernization will continue to legitimize and institutionalize OE within the Army, as well as assist commanders with a complex and weighty challenge. □

[2] Ibid., p. 57.
[3] Authors notes.

Visions of the Future

It's not enough to talk about the future...we must actually try to make clear pictures of how we want that future to be.

These ideas were generated to take the FORSCOM missions of today and see if they will hold up in the future.

- Open your mind to these new ideas.
- Let them stimulate your thinking.
- Improve upon them.
- Develop and communicate ideas that will guide your thinking into the 1990s.

This is a notional review of the items the FORSCOM commander of 1991 might be able to use to describe the Army's progress during the 1980s.

LTC Jim Channon serves as Chief, Soldier Needs, High Technology Test Bed (HTTB), 9th Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, Washington. He has an MA in Human Communication and is a graduate of the Army War College. He is a member of Delta Force; his areas of expertise include complex systems design, imagineering, systems integration, human potential, and the future.

THE 1990 ENVIRONMENT: PEOPLE

The American in 1990

Values changed throughout the eighties.

Americans were connected to over 400 international television channels by the end of the decade.

They became more concerned with the entire planet and the state of humanity in general.

The American home became an interesting mixture of nature and science. People did more business electronically in the late eighties. They came to expect the military to use technology wisely to win on the battlefield and also make a quality contribution to the state of the environment.



The Army faces a growing number of concerns for which it must provide effective solutions.

The Battlefield

From 17 dimensions in 1980 to 21 dimensions in 1990.
(New dimensions underlined)

1. The modern mechanized threat remains.
2. Strategic airlift that works.
3. Strategic sealift that works.
4. Supply lines intact.
5. Manpower pool available.
6. Industrial base (warm).
7. National public opinion.
8. Partisan guerrila threat.
9. Extended battlefield operations.
10. International public opinion.
11. Nuclear battlefield.
12. Chemical battlefield.
13. Electronic threat.
14. Terrorist threats.
15. Varied terrain.
16. Varied weather.
17. Night/Day operations.
18. Urban terrain.
19. Close air integration.
20. Strategic air assets.
21. Space based platforms.



FORCE READINESS

An Honest Readiness Plan

By 1986, FORSCOM units were following a two to three year cycle that allowed them to intelligently get a new fill of people, a new set of equipment, and then to begin a systematic readiness training cycle that eventually brought them to peak readiness on station.

A. New people fill (individual training).
B. New equipment fill (individual training).
C. Team training begins.
D. Unit training (ARTEP-EDRE).
E. NTC qualified.
F. Overseas deployment (rotation for period).
G. Contingency area 1 work.
   Contingency area 2 work.
H. Unit calibration (AGI-CMMI) 8 step cycle repeats.



PREPARING TO FIGHT

From Information to Inspiration

In the seventies, we concentrated on the details of each soldier's job...in the eighties we designed realistic challenge environments to allow the soldiers to test and correct their skills. Honest readiness!

1. The regiment puts all new soldiers through a battlefield experience course that qualifies them to be members of the unit...and powerfully impresses upon the soldiers the lethality of the battlefield and, therefore, the value of their training.

2. The drivers and mechanics have a tough qualification course with challenging obstacles and maintenance tests.

3. Units have deployability alerts that cause them to actually load-out on CX mock-ups and Ro Ro ship mock-ups.



4. Range instrumentation, lasers and TV cameras record the game of the week, as tactical units pit their skills in realistic combat scrimmage.

5. The command and control simulations center is the heart of training for the staff.

LIFE WITH THE REGIMENTS

1. Once soldiers were assigned a regiment upon entering the Army.
2. And **once** they bought a home around the **home base** of that regiment.
3. And the reserve components were **affiliated** with that regiment and had permanent access to the post and the training areas, even deploying with the regiment during rotation (for a short time).
4. And finally, the local retired community became active working members of the garrison when the troops deployed; then
5. We became a total Force family.





THE TOTAL FORCE FAMILY

The **Army** continued as the leader in programs that made a real and appreciated contribution to the nation.

1984 - The first massive forest planting exercises begin, using school children and older folks.

1985 - Canal work begins to join NW canals with Canadian canals.

1986 - Regiments in the southeast harvest **kudzu** for use as cattle feed and methane gas.

1988 - Army Posts lead the nation as energy-efficient townships.

The Regiments each sponsor a township and, using Army organization, communication and transportation assets, ECO FORCE (Ecology Force) begins on an unprecedented scale.

INTEGRATED 3-DIMENSIONAL THINKING!

1984 - FORSCOM commanders finally convinced Army that Force design must blend the needs of the total fighting system...not just fancy technology!

1. The soldier must be attracted to and be able to use the machinery.

2. The machines must be simple and rugged and do the job.

3. Simple control doctrine must guide the employment.

4. The tactics must focus on destroying the enemy's ability to prosecute the battle...not just destroy his systems.

5. The master control grid must include the Air Force systems and their integrated employment.

6. Realistic training challengenvirons must be designed right along with the weapons and doctrine.



They Are All Designed Together.

1987 - An ARI study confirmed that you can't describe a 3 or 4 dimensional battlefield in 2 dimensional word language...so officers began to study conceptual graphics in the TRADOC school system.

LEARNING TO LEVERAGE

A warfighting study done by the Brits in 1984 revealed that American officers lacked cunning.

And so there was a push by CSA/CG to teach all our officers to leverage their resources better...in other words, learn how to hit the bastards where they live.

Be ***effective,*** not ***fair***!



"expanding the airhead" CX and 141 C aircraft deliver high speed packages that get out to attrition zone at 600 mph.

this is more like soccer than football. We take advantage of our high speed technological guerilla style to hunt him in the attrition zone.





THE AIRLAND DIVISION

The design is based on the American youth's need for exciting machine to drive...but more importantly the Army finally got serious enough about the **AirLand** concept (this happened in '85) to begin to design complete tactical units around the mother ship required to deliver them to contingency areas all over the globe.

Note: When airborne desert racer was modified into light attack vehicle, the recruiters were overwhelmed with requests to be airborne dune buggy drivers.

THE AIRLAND DIVISION: THE LIGHT ATTACK VEHICLE

A Modified Desert Racer

Army Recruiting jumped when we finally had something as sexy as the AF fighter.



Rear end designed so that vehicle can be loaded vertically.

THE AIRLAND DIVISION: THE BOXHOLE

Don't Forget the Soldier



The boxhole surfaced in '84. Finally the infantry soldiers got:

a. Some protection from enemy artillery.
b. Protection from chemical attack.
c. Enough water to survive in the desert.
d. A field ambulance.
e. Storage for their mission load.
f. Protection from extreme heat and cold.
g. A quality fighting position!

Another simple, rugged and multi-purpose idea characterizing the Army's new emphasis on ***things that work.***

The logisticians loved this because they had a mobile supply container that could preposition many needed resupply items in one simple, air mobile and disposable container.

THE BOXHOLE

High Tech

The Army initially thought that high tech meant sophisticated equipment.

By 1983 it realized that high tech was really simple designs...that met a broad number of needs...that made sense logistically...that made sense to the soldier...and that made sense to the taxpayers.

The boxhole is an example of high tech. Simple but elegant in its design.



THE AIRLAND DIVISION: VEHICLES



The family of AIR/LAND vehicles

1985 - Army realizes target acquisition must accompany firepower for the complete system.

1987 - Warrant officer positions authorized for commanders and target acquisition officer jobs.

Army goes with 120 mortar for reach and illumination requirements.

Robotics. Army robotics program 1987 delivers small tank killer that watches with TV camera and then follows enemy tanks...shooting them in rear one at a time.

This airborne desert racer becomes backbone of forward elements. Uses fibre optic guided missile with 10k range against tanks. Uses viper/stinger combination against aircraft and mark 19 automatic grenade launcher against people and BMPs.

THE AIRLAND DIVISION: SOLDIERS

Soldiers' Needs

With a continuing effort the Army was able to achieve some important efficiencies in the soldiers' fighting gear during the '80s.

Beginning the decade the infantry man's load was in excess of 130 lbs; by 1990 it had been reduced to 72 lbs.

We finally realized in late 1981 that civilian industry was already making and testing some backpacking and sleeping gear that was excellent.

So instead of going through the long agonizing R&D process, the HTTB just bought some off the shelf...made a soldier-proof check and included it in the existence load for the soldier.



competitive sports manufacturers improved:
① - the harness } for the back pack
② - the frame
③ - the buckles
④ - the clip on pouches
⑤ - the sleeping gear with hi-tech materials

THE FIGHTING LOAD - 1986

Advances in materials and design helped the human engineering labs and Natick put a more compact and effective battle dress together.

But many of the advances were made by intelligently repositioning the gear for the motorized infantryman and taking ideas from our allies.

Magazines and entrenching tool with pick are repositioned to add protection for the heart area.

Attachment strip on jacket allows infantryman to tailor load.

Israeli belt loops allow pistol belt to help support weight of improved flak jacket.



THE TRAINING ENVIRONMENT

The Barracks Home

By 1987 the barracks and living quarters for soldiers were designed by several master computer models. There were five soldiers to a room and the rooms were near the unit work place.

Teaching on the sly...arcade games with the same hardware found on Army weapons were in by 1985...physical training keyed to cohesion was in by 1986 with a military olympics and PT badge. Simulators were placed all around the barracks by the late 1980s to include some good old field expedients.

Byword: KEEP EM HAPPY...KEEP EM ON BASE...KEEP EM IN THE ARMY!



THE TRAINING ENVIRONMENT

Commander's Notes - June 16, 1990

Army officers know a lot about what makes family. So why don't we coordinate all those things into one absolutely workable week? The Army ranger battalion at Ft. Lewis takes men out of their daily hide (NCOs) to run a program like this...it works!

NOTE: We need to seek out the musicians who could put a lot of values and tactics into "up to the times" music.

Find the storytellers who could develop myths and stories about soldiers who behaved just like we need them to.

Employ ceremonial designers to make all the other work stick emotionally.



Find the best Jody Cadence callers and give them intelligent material to develop into appropriate "Jody Jive"—then we can deliver good training and sing at the same time.

CONTINGENCY COMBAT: FLEXIBLE RESPONSES

1985 - Japan—Treaty violation of northern islands by Soviets. US sends planes, ships and soldiers into exercises in northern Japan. Soviets back off.

1987 - South America—Nuclear reactor is seized and terrorists demand all US interests leave the country. US strike force...makes high speed night operation that recaptures the reactor.

1989 - Small southeast African nation changes governments and threatens to blockade US ships bearing critical metals.

Special Forces assist by getting advice to the opposing political faction and assisting them back into power.



CONTINGENCY COMBAT: FLEXIBLE RESPONSES

1984 - Soviet intimidation in Iran. Solved by offering a physical line of the Earth battalion to defend the two spiritual cities of Maschad and Qom. (Refused, of course, but committing the Iranian military to action on their own behalf.)

The Russians decided not to push their luck!

1985 - An accidental satellite confrontation causes near war.

Solved when US military offers to do a joint space patrol with the Soviet military (much media coverage).



1989 - Wave-form transmissions cause actual casualties. Solved when US military and Soviet military research teams are combined...and visually reduce the tension (much camera coverage of research teams at work).

THE EVOLUTIONARY MANDATE: CONTRIBUTIONS

The Evolutionary Mandate

Beginning in the 1940s the US Army made a series of overlapping, but terribly important, contributions to our country. The process continued through to the 1990s.

1940s - taught the country about audio-visual technology.

1950s - led the way in integration.

1960s - did pioneer work with computers and systems.

1970s - integrated the sexes—began energy savings—socialized the soldier.

1980s - pioneered in advanced human performance.

- pioneered in ECOFORCE operations.
- played a role in US/Soviet detente and non-violent combat
- led in energy efficient townships.

Be proud of yourself, Army!





EVOLUTIONARY MANDATE: NATURAL RESOURCES

In 1988 the Army developed a new kind of unit, one that specialized in organizing the community for large scale ECOFORCE operations.

Americans demanded that everyone begin to play a role in the evolutionary development of the nation's natural resources.

The Earth battalions attracted a large number of volunteers and the Army's public image rose dramatically.

NOTE: There was a large segment of the youth who would not consider a combat-oriented job...so this kind of unit helped marshall a useful back-up home guard during a time of diminishing manpower and changing values.

EVOLUTIONARY MANDATE: CAMERA TACTICS

We finally became aware in 1988 that every time we sent an armed force to do a job, the TV camera was present. Over 800 million worldwide viewers watched whatever could be transmitted from our operations.

We discovered you could actually win a battle by force and lose it if your approach was less justified (ethically) than your opponent's.

1989 - The US Army discovered ways to ethically intimidate terrorists, economic blackmailers, radical puppet governments and their kind...by arriving with an unarmed, highly trained force. When these units were turned away or harmed, the power of world opinion turned against these less ethical actions and interests.



EVOLUTIONARY MANDATE: THE INDIVIDUAL

Our Soldiers Are Our Most Precious Resource

We learned they wanted tough but fair treatment...

They wanted challenging training...

They wanted to serve their country in evolutionary ways ...fighting if necessary but serving the natural environment and expecting personal development at the same time.

The Army's ***"Be All You Can Be"*** slogan was operationalized in 1983 when it opened the institute for **Advanced Human Performance** and we began to develop the **Supersoldier!**





If you can't see how the future is and see how to cope with it...then you can't design a solution that works or make a map of how to get there.

REMEMBER: Managers Steer and Leaders Navigate. Are you providing the ***direction*** for your command? □

Moving into the 21st Century

MAJ Elwyn V. Hopkins (OECS)

What appears in this article is a condensation of where the Army is headed in the 21st century. Compiled out of several sources, this information is designed to help field Organizational Effectiveness Consultants to begin *now* to move with the Army into the 21st century.

The future battle. The battlefield of the 21st century will be dense with sophisticated combat systems whose range, lethality, and employment capabilities surpass anything currently known.

- The conflict will be intense and devastating, making it difficult to determine the exact situation.
- In such an atmosphere command and control will be hampered to an extreme degree.
- It is imperative that forces plan from the outset to fight dispersed and within a full NBC environment.
- The battle will be fought with integrated systems of all arms and services.

Future trends — Perspective 2000. Some future trends that will impact on the battle.

- Proliferation of nuclear technology throughout the world.
- Increased foreign investment in technology.
- Accelerating information technology.
- Decreasing numbers of US men and women in the military age population. Older soldiers. Recruiting and retention will be critical.
- Increasing third-world populations, particularly in the lesser developed countries to the south of the super powers.
- Growing worldwide urbanization and overcrowded cities.
- More diversified lifestyles.
- US becoming information-based society, an information revolution.
- World political/economic interdependence.
- More issues/less consensus.
- Decline in earth carrying capacity, less food, more famines.
- International energy dependency.
- Proliferation of arms throughout the world.
- Emphasis on "soft technology" to motivate soldiers, to improve leadership, to bond soldiers to weapons, and to create a warrior ethic.

The Army has selected the following courses of actions to meet the 21st century.

A. The Army has selected a course of action which substitutes technology for manpower to address the declining numbers of military age population; another alternative may be to increase the age of our soldiers.

B. The AirLand battlefield requires a highly mobile, firepower intensive maneuver force which will be capable of totally independent operation, yet a highly synchronized, overall effort. (This is compatible with the Western culture's ability to produce individualism.)

C. Soldiers must be trained to put their loyalty, devotion, and resolve in the junior officers leading these small, tight elements. There will be a sense of total resolve, trust in leadership, competence in abilities and a cohesive understanding of the mission.

D. Approach the battlefield as an interrelated system. Attack deep, see deep, interdict the follow-on forces deep because this will impact on the local battle. Do not "piecemeal" friendly resources, but attack critical targets that affect the local battle.

The essense of the AirLand concept is a style of waging war in which agility, deception, maneuver, and all other tools of combat are used to present the enemy with a succession of dangerous and unexpected situations more rapidly than the enemy can react to them.

- The essential principles of fighting are agility, initiative, depth, time, and synchronization.
- What emerges is a perception of the battlefield in which the goal of collapsing the enemy's ability to fight drives us to unified employment of a wide range of systems and organizations on a battlefield. For corps and divisions this is a much deeper, more interrelated "systems approach" to battle than that foreseen by current doctrine.
- The operative tactics of US forces must provide for quick resolution of battle which allows political authority to negotiate from a position of strength.
- In order to counter Soviet style strategy, we must:
  - Attack deep into second echelons to disrupt the enemy's timetable, command and control, frustrate his plans—thus gaining the initiative.
  - Extend sense of battle in time so that attack of second echelon forces, logistics, and friendly maneuver plans and interrelated. (Think systemically.)
  - Extend range of acquisition and attack resources available to ground commanders.
  - Carefully coordinate all actions on the battlefield so that there is no separation between the close-in and follow-on battles. This will allow the preparation of attack windows to be identified and exploited. We must learn to *manage* the enemy force.
- The intent is to collapse the enemy's will, disrupt the timing, frustrate his intentions so that he is defeated.

One of the principles that has direct OE application is the *initiative* of subordinates. Subordinates in the AirLand battle must carry out their orders based on a total understanding of their superior's *intentions*. Subordinates must seize every opportunity to attack after recognizing and assessing the risk versus the gains.

- It is necessary to create a state of mind in all participants that incorporates total resolve, trust in leadership, competence in one's own ability and a cohesive understanding of the mission.

Command and control become extremely important in the AirLand battle so that commanders can direct and synchronize combat forces to insure unity of effort.

- Initiative, rapid action, and decentralized execution are

enhanced through delegation of authority.

A proposed method outlined in the AirLand concepts is to get our officers and NCOs ready to run the AirLand battle by molding not only their preparations for battle, but also their *every day relationships*. Their intellect, psyche, and reasoning process must be trained for a new way of operation during peacetime service or in combat.

Some additional factors that characterize the AirLand Battle are:

- New technology will provide near real time communication capability throughout the force and will enable built-in redundancy to insure reliable communications.
- Operations will *have* to be faster than the ability of the enemy to react to those operations.
- Staffs will no longer be able to have prolonged analysis, multiple conclusions, or detailed written estimates. Instead, they will take calculated risks—(another potential OE target).
- Battlefield support augmentation must be capable of moving, communicating, fighting and surviving with the combat unit. There will be 360^0 orientation in the battle. Support units must be able to (1) perform their support missions and (2) fight as necessary.
- Decentralized execution, subordinate commanders will have maximum latitude and flexibility of action in their area of responsibility.
- Cities will represent immense tactical and administrative problems to commanders who will have to fight to win the city and then manage the city to provide basic services to the population.

Potential Places for OE to assist in the AirLand Battle 2000 are:

A. Command and control of combat operations.

B. Developing unit cohesion and trust.

C. Monitoring future trends for the Army. (See para 2.)

D. Planning and execution of change in organizations.

E. Treating the battlefield as a system. Integration of weapons, maneuver, and support to attack deep and to orient in 360^0.

F. Pre-battle planning—selecting "high value" targets which, when attacked, will disrupt enemy plans and coordination of service elements for attack.

G. Soldier and technology interfaces and organizational impacts of new technology.

H. Human potential development.

I. Reconstitution of units quickly and effectively.

J. Job design and redesign.

K. Organizational design and redesign.

L. Managing the merger of organizations.

M. Orienting Army leaders on inspiration and navigation as opposed to management and information processing.

N. Creation of a warrior ethic among soldiers.

What has been portrayed above is a glimpse of the future. Is there a role for the OE consultant on the battlefield of the 21st century? I'll let you decide after you have read these excerpts from the final draft of the new FM 100-5:

"The fluid environment of modern war will place a premium on leadership, unit cohesion, and effective, independent operations. The stress on soldiers and units will be greater than any experienced in history. The conditions of combat on the next battlefield will be less forgiving of mistakes and more demanding of skill, imagination and flexibility in leaders than any in previous history."

"First, the entire process depends on motivation. People involved in all aspects of the process must do quickly and well whatever is required. Motivation is the oil that reduces the friction of combat referred to by Clausewitz. Important to motivation in a high risk environment are the concepts of mutual trust, confidence, and esprit—the notions that describe relationships between leader and led."

"Maintaining unit cohesion in the face of battle is an important task for leaders at all levels. Poor morale can weaken any unit. It can affect the unity of effort and teamwork of the best equipped organization. Enemy psychological warfare efforts, the effect of unsuccessful combat actions, or a surprising and violent display of enemy strength can affect morale and unit cohesion."

"The confusion, extreme stress, and lethality of the modern battlefield place a heavy burden on human endurance and courage. The more traditional concerns also remain—fatigue, extreme weather, state of training, and leadership differences. Tactics, training, war plans, and the preparation and selection of leaders must accurately reflect human abilities and limitations. During combat, commanders must focus on the human factor."

The above quotes suggest the charter of OE Consultants, as cited in AR 5-15, "...to transform organizations into high-performing systems." Hopefully, the above material gives you, the practicing OEC, some insights into how to shape yourself and your office to address the Army's need to move into the future. □

OE in the 82d Airborne Division

COL Michael T. Plummer and CPT David L. Abrahamson



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 82D AIRBORNE DIVISION
FORT BRAGG, NORTH CAROLINA 28307

12 Mar 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR ATTENDEES, OEMC CLASS 3-82

SUBJECT: Significant OE Activities

1. The Division OE Consultant Team (OECT) has been involved in a myriad of operations and activities during the past year. I have asked them to compile a list of the most significant ones and to provide a short description of each.

2. The descriptions provided are brief, but should be sufficient for you to determine if a similar operation would have application in your organization. If you or your consultants have any specific questions about these activities, please feel free to contact the Division OECT at Autovon 236-4406/1778 or Commercial (919) 396-4406/1778.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

MICHAEL T. PLUMMER
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff
HQ, 82d Airborne Division
Ft. Bragg, NC

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 82D AIRBORNE DIVISION
FORT BRAGG, NORTH CAROLINA 28307

OE Communique
U.S. Army OECS (ATTN: CPT Larry Boice)
Fort Ord, CA 93941

Dear Larry:

I'm providing you for possible publication in the next issue a composite of OE activities we have been involved in during the past year. Colonel Plummer just presented this to OEMC Class 3-82.

The article we intended to write, based on the Information Paper I sent you, was simply overcome by events (OBE) if you know what I mean.

We hope you will be able to use this in the next issue. You have complete poetic license to do with it what you have to do to make it fit.

Thanks,

DAVID L. ABRAHAMSON
CPT, INF
OEC
HQ, 82d Airborne Division
Ft. Bragg, NC

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

1. ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS MANUAL
2. REORGANIZATIONS
3. CPX DTOC/DSOC REVIEW
4. CORPS COMMANDER GOALS
5. OVERWORKED COMPANY COMMANDER STUDY
6. JUNIOR ENLISTED SPONSORSHIP PROGRAM
7. FORSCOM COMMANDER BRIEFING
8. STRATEGIC PLANNING CONFERENCE
9. STRATEGIC PLANNING CASCADE DOWN
10. SEER SUPPORT FORM
11. ZERO BASE REPORTS
12. ZERO BASE PAD (AUGMENTATION)
13. INFORMATION FLOW STUDY
14. STAFF DISCUSSION MEETING
15. DIVISION COMMANDER/ COMPANY COMMANDERS AND FIRST SERGEANT DISCUSSION GROUPS
16. NEW COMMANDER & STAFF IN-BRIEFING
17. FORCE MODERNIZATION PLAN
18. MFO DEPLOYMENT/ EMPLOYMENT
19. MEETING MANAGEMENT
20. COMMAND CLIMATE TREND ANALYSIS
21. STAFF OPERATIONS
22. BDE OPERATIONS
23. BN OPERATIONS
24. NEW HEADQUARTERS' DESIGN
25. MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM

1. ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS MANUAL:

A major problem faced by the Division is the necessary occupation of large portions of the Division staff with purely peace time/garrison functions which will predictably frustrate a smooth and rapid transition to a war time posture. The OECT formulated a design to assist the staff in identifying, planning for, and if necessary, executing the necessary actions required to conduct this critical transition. An integral part of this operation was the revision of the headquarters organization and functions manual. In it, each function is graphically depicted as being a peace, transition, or war function or a combination of these.

The organization, text, and format of this regulation is a departure from traditional O & F manuals, but it will assist the staff in organizing for more efficient operations. This is accomplished through the delineation of peace through war time functions to deployable personnel, purely peace time functions to non-deployable personnel, and the development of contingency plans for the transition of overlapping areas of responsibility. The O & F Manual will also form the backbone for desk SOPs and continuity files and will assist in bringing new staff officers and commanders on board quickly.

OE Skills Required:

- Organizational Systems Design/Engineering
- Complex System Redesign
- Change management

2. REORGANIZATIONS:

a. Comptroller

The Division staff needed to be more functionally organized to manage and strategically plan, from a systems perspective, the resources (troops, money, material and facilities) of the command. The OECT designed a structure which more closely aligned resource managers throughout the staff and would improve the planning and management functions in this critical area. The Comptroller office was expanded to include Finance, Force Structure Functions (TO&E, MTO&E, etc.) and Automation Management Functions (MISO). The OECT was also moved to the Comptroller office to enhance its macro-level operating ability and to provide a systems perspective to total resource management.

b. G-1

As the Personnel Management Staff Officer (PMSO), the G-1 is responsible for not only personnel management but also health, welfare, recreation, morale and military law and order. In order to allow him to plan, program, and manage all these functions, the following Special Staff offices have been included in the G-1 organization and are under the G-1's direct supervision: Adjutant General, Chaplain, Provost Marshal and Surgeon.

OE Skills Required:

- Organizational Systems Diagnosis
- Organizational Systems Design/Engineering
- Complex Organization Redesign
- Organizational Process Diagnosis

3. CPX DTOC/DSOC REVIEW:

The Division OECT participated in CPX's Certain Guard '81 and Gallant Knight '82 as process observers. The OECT was tasked to observe and provide feedback to the Chief of Staff in the following areas:

a. Certain Guard '81

1. Physical Arrangement
2. Communication Flow
3. Stress
4. Flexibility
5. Planning

b. Gallant Knight '82

1. DTOC Configuration
2. DTOC/DSOC Interface
3. DTOC/All Source Interface
4. Information Flow

Feedback and recommendations were passed directly to individual staff sections as well as through a memorandum for record to the Chief of Staff. Operational refinements are continuing throughout each individual staff section to enhance future operational coordination and capabilities.

OE Skills Required:

- Organization System Engineers
- Organizational Process Diagnosis
- Process Performance Feedback

4. CORPS COMMANDER GOALS:

The XVIII Airborne Corps Commander recently hosted a multi-day conference with his staff and all major subordinate unit commanders. The expected products of the conference were a purpose statement and missions and goals for the Corps. The Division input to the Corps was formulated by contrasting the FORSCOM goals and the Division CG's goals. The identified gaps and support required to accomplish these goals were then translated into Corps goal statements. Of the 16 Corps goal statements now in final draft form, 14 were submitted by the Division.

OE Skills Required:

- Strategic Planning
- High Performance Programming
- Purpose, Mission, Goals Statement Construction

5. OVERWORKED COMPANY COMMANDER STUDY:

Over the years the number of recurring reports in the Division had continued to grow, placing an ever increasing administrative burden on subordinate units. OE technology was used to functionally analyze the purpose and value of each report. Numerous reports were eliminated, others consolidated, and some compiled at higher headquarters, resulting in a significant decrease of administrative burdens at subordinate unit level. The most recent effort was a review of all Division Regulations to delete all specific company commander requirements unless they were absolutely essential. Actions are ongoing to enhance the commanders' ability to devote maximum time to train and maintain.

OE Skills Required:

- Organizational Process Diagnosis
- Time Management
- Problem Solving
- Problem Identification

6. JUNIOR ENLISTED SPONSORSHIP PROGRAM:

The OECT assisted the Division AG in determining data that was required to evaluate the Junior Enlisted Sponsorship Program. A questionnaire based on rank structure and type organization was devised for new incoming

personnel throughout the 82d Airborne Division. Use of this questionnaire identified certain deficiencies in the system and corrective action has been taken to improve the overall program.

OE Skills Required:

- Organizational Process Diagnosis
- Problem Identification

7. FORSCOM COMMANDER BRIEFING:

The FORSCOM Commander invited seven OE Consultants (OECs) from field commands to brief him on the status and activities of OE in their units. The 82d Airborne Division participated and briefed on items 1, 3, 8, 12 and 17 of this paper.

OE Skills Required:

- Purpose, Mission, Goals Statement Construction
- Strategic Planning
- Problem Identification
- Problem Solving

8. STRATEGIC PLANNING CONFERENCE:

The OECT designed last year's Division Management Conference with the focus on completing the new CG's transition and conducting objective based long range planning. Using LTC Burn's Delta Force Concept on High Performing Systems and the CG's OER Support Form, we addressed the key issues of improving training, maintenance, cohesion, and our ability to go to war. Within this framework, specific objectives were established within the four key areas, and strategies to accomplish them were developed. To ensure timely accomplishment of these objectives, a detailed management plan was formulated which included milestones and assignment of responsibilities. To establish a common focus and gain commitment throughout the chain of command, the OER Support Forms of the Battalion and Brigade commanders and Division staff were written in support of the established objectives. In accordance with the management plan, periodic IPR's and a semi-annual review are to be conducted to assess the progress of the overall plan. The initial six month IPR has been conducted and an annual review is planned in July/August to facilitate new ADC's and commanders transition.

OE Skills Required:

- Meeting Management, Strategic Planning
- High Performance Programming
- Change Management
- Purpose, Mission, Goal, Statement Construction

9. STRATEGIC PLANNING CASCADE DOWN:

After the Strategic Planning Conference, the Management Matrix was published and all senior leaders within the Division finalized their OER Support Forms to align with the CG's support form and the matrix. These two documents, the matrix and the support form, were intended to cascade throughout the Division and the chain of command. The matrix has been used by brigades and battalions as a basis for goal setting and operational planning. The OER Support Form has been aligned down through the platoon leader level. In addition, an SEER Support Form was recently instituted and will be used down through platoon sergeant level.

OE Skills Required:

- Change Management
- Information Mapping
- Matrix Analysis

10. SEER SUPPORT FORM:

An extension of the OER support form to key non-commissioned officers in the 82d Airborne Division has been instituted to include the MTOE position of Platoon Sergeant, First Sergeant, Command Sergeant Major, Chief of the Firing Battery, NCOIC of general and special staff sections in HQs elements, and the senior NCO of sections in Combat Support and Combat Service Support units. Commanders may extend the use of the OER support form beyond these positions if desired. The fundamental purpose of this policy is to more effectively communicate the Division Commander's goals and objectives to those Non-Commissioned Officers in supervisory positions most concerned with accomplishing these goals and objectives. This will also enhance the communication process between the rated individual and the rater.

OE Skills Required:

- Workshop Design
- Change Management
- High Performance Programming

11. ZERO BASE REPORTS:

The zero base reports study eliminated unnecessary reports and consolidated, reformated, and reduced the frequency of those that could not be eliminated. Many were changed from typewritten to handwritten. Overall reporting requirements were reduced by 26% and another 57% were changed. This process is conducted annually and is one portion of a large scale effort to reduce the administrative burden at unit level.

OE Skills Required:

- Conflict Resolution
- Change Management

12. ZERO BASE PAD (AUGMENTATION):

The Division PAD is thoroughly reviewed, line by line, twice each year to ensure company commanders do not get stripped of their NCOs and Officers to fill the staff. To date 113 positions have been eliminated.

OE Skills Required:

- Conflict Resolution
- Change Management

13. INFORMATION FLOW STUDY:

Over a period of time, evidence indicated correspondence from Division Headquarters was not reaching MSC's, Battalions, and Separate Battalions. There were also indications of problems with the internal Division Headquarters' correspondence flow. ASD/AG reviewed and documented the internal Division Headquarters system and subsequently revised certain procedures. The OECT tracked 162 pieces of A & B correspondence from the Message Center to Brigades and Battalions. One hundred percent of all tracked correspondence during the test period reached Battalion level. The study will continue and will focus on internal procedures within the Brigades and Battalions. Eventually, the "Black Holes" which are now absorbing correspondence will be identified and eliminated.

OE Skills Required:

- Organizational Process Diagnosis
- Problem Identification
- Problem Solving

14. STAFF DISCUSSION MEETING:

A series of Division Staff/Major Subordinate Command (MSC) staff discussion meetings were conducted in December 1981. The purpose of these meetings was to provide MSC staff sections an opportunity to express any problems they were having with their counterparts on the Division Staff with the Chief of Staff acting as the mediator. At the first meeting, the MSC staff sections expressed their problem areas and Division staff sections listened and asked questions for clarification only. During the second meeting, the Division staff sections responded to the issues surfaced during the first meeting. These meetings were found to be productive for all participants and are being planned semi-annually.

OE Skills Required:

- Meeting Management
- Conflict Resolution
- Role Negotiation
- Workshop Design

15. DIVISION COMMANDER/COMPANY COMMANDERS AND FIRST SERGEANT DISCUSSION GROUPS:

The Division Commander hosted discussion groups with First Sergeants, and Company Commanders respectively in December 1981. The purpose of these meetings was to provide an opportunity for the CG to assess and discuss the current state of the Division as the First Sergeants and Company Commanders see it. These meetings last approximately two hours each and are being conducted twice a year.

OE Skills Required:

- Workshop Design
- Meeting Management/Design

16. NEW COMMANDER & STAFF IN-BRIEFING:

The LTC/COL in process briefing system was time consuming and plagued by numerous schedule changes. This resulted in a waste of valuable time by the briefer and the newly arrived officer. The OECT was tasked to evaluate the process and make recommendations to the G-3 for improvement. It was recommended that only those mission essential briefings be scheduled initially and that other briefings be scheduled from a menu which allows for add ins. This new method was adopted and feedback from both briefers and newly arrived officers indicates it is more effective. It provides information in manageable gulps rather than the traditional "Drinking from the fire hose" option.

OE Skills Required:

- Organizational Process Diagnosis
- Change Management
- Time Management
- Role Negotiation

17. FORCE MODERNIZATION PLAN:

OE techniques were used to develop a plan to ensure the smooth integration of new items of equipment (Force Modernization) into the Division. This plan includes a management template to identify critical tasks, a detailed backward planning checklist, and the designation of system coordinators. It also provides for a systems approach to the integration of new equipment. As a result, the Division is now better able to anticipate problem areas and take appropriate action before crises arise.

OE Skills Required:

- Change Management
- Role Negotiation
- Responsibility Charting
- Meeting Management
- Problem Identification
- Problem Solving

18. MFO DEPLOYMENT/EMPLOYMENT:

An Organizational Effectiveness four-step process (assessment, feedback, action planning, and implementation) was conducted throughout the MFO Battalion. This operation was an in-depth analysis of the organization which included observations, individual and group interviews. Various organizational process diagnosis, and numerous discussions about unit operations with the Battalion Commander and Command Sergeant Major. The process culminated with a three day issue oriented action planning workshop conducted by the Battalion Commander. Each major issue was addressed and an overall plan was developed to enhance the units' daily operations. An OE Consultant will be deploying with the Infantry Battalion Task Force for about 45 days to follow up on the implementation and to assist the command with transition into the area of operation.

At mid-tour another consultant will deploy to conduct a mid-tour assessment and follow-up on the initial implementation. Upon return of the MFO unit, the OECT will assist in transitioning the unit back into the Division.

OE Skills Required:

- Workshop Design
- Meeting Management
- Organizational Process Diagnosis
- Responsibility Charting
- Problem Identification
- Problem Solving

19. MEETING MANAGEMENT:

The OECT assisted the Division Staff to better organize time used for productive meetings. Consultants attended several staff meetings as process observers. Direct feedback was provided each staff section. Recommendations were provided by the OECT and published. Helpful hints for meeting management were included in a memorandum for Division Staff Officers; How to be a Better Staff Officer.

OE Skills Required:

- Meeting Management
- Time Management

20. COMMAND CLIMATE TREND ANALYSIS:

As a part of each unit AGI, the Division Inspector General conducts group interviews with Junior officers, NCOs, and junior enlisted personnel. Quarterly, the comments from these interviews are compiled and analyzed for trends throughout the command. A Command Climate briefing is prepared which contrasts current trends with those of the past. In addition, the entire AGI results are studied to identify trends that require action from within the Division. The OECT assisted in the development of the interview questions and assists in the trend analysis when requested.

OE Skill Required:

- Matrix Analysis

21. STAFF OPERATIONS:

Instead of the Division OECs acting as consultants as well as project directors, they now function exclusively as process oriented consultants. Their mission is to assist the command group and staff in the development of plans and programs dealing with critical issues which have an impact throughout the Division. Items 2, 3, 6, 10, 11, 12, 14, 16 and 19 of this paper are examples of a few of the staff consulting operations.

OE Skills Required:

- Change Management
- Time Management
- Purpose, Mission, Goals Statement Construction
- Organizational Process Diagnosis
- Responsibility Charting

22. BDE OPERATIONS:

As the focus of OE moved to a higher organizational level, the frequency of use of OE techniques for planning and goal/program development increased at the brigade level. To date three brigade-size units have conducted multi-day, off-post conferences and two follow-on conferences are planned. The basic outcome of those conferences has been the development of goals and the plans and programs to accomplish them. Two of these conferences were similar in that they approached this process from the brigade level. After determining the goals, brigade plans and programs were developed. The management responsibilities and related audit functions thus remained at brigade level. In contrast, one brigade chose to center the entire process at battalion level. Using Dr. Peter Vaill's theory of high performing systems as a foundation, the Brigade Commander opted not to establish brigade goals, but allowed each battalion to develop their own plans and programs in support of moving their unit toward becoming a high performing system. The use of OE technologies has thus become an integral part of the management process at brigade level.

OE Skills Required:

- Strategic Planning
- High Performance Programming
- Workshop Design
- Organizational Process Diagnosis
- Organizational Systems Diagnosis
- Purpose, Mission, Goal Statement Construction

23. BN OPERATIONS:

The majority of OE operations at battalion level during the last year were change of command transition workshops. Approximately 60 percent of incoming Battalion Commanders took advantage of this time saving process and they reported it to be most beneficial. As a result of these transitions, some units used OE for long-range planning and problem-solving. This involvement has exposed many leaders to a variety of management techniques such as various methods of problem-solving, goal development, objective setting, responsibility charting, leadership theory, and, most importantly, short and long-range planning. This exposure should assist these key leaders in the application of these critical management skills in their daily operations, i.e., BTMS.

OE Skills Required:

- Problem Solving
- Responsibility Charting
- Long-range/Strategic Planning
- Workshop Design

24. NEW HEADQUARTERS' DESIGN:

In consonance with reorganizing Division Headquarters personnel to facilitate the transition from Peace to War (Re: Topic #3), the actual physical plant layout required modification. Concomitant with the physical restructuring, the new All American Headquarters building will be available for occupation. All staff personnel with tactical operational requirements will relocate to the new building while staff personnel with primary peace time requirements will remain in the old headquarters facility. This restructuring and relocation enhances war time staff coordination and planning and will reduce the time required to transition from peace to war.

Upcoming: Design of new headquarters using information flow as the basis. To be accomplished using student teams from OECTs on their practicum.

OE Skills Required:

- Information Mapping
- Information Analysis
- Organizational Systems Diagnosis

25. MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM:

The Comptroller was recently given the responsibility to perform duties as the Division Automation Management Officer. He has tasked the Force Structure office with this mission and has redesignated them as the Force Structure/Automation Management office. The OECT is in the process of assisting this office in identifying those functional requirements necessary to integrate existing ADP and word processing equipment into a combined network as well as identifying applications for off-the-shelf equipment. The final product will be a plan to manage all automated information and to harness available technology.

OE Skills Required:

- Organizational Systems Design/Engineering
- Complex Organization/Redesign
- Organizational Systems Diagnosis
- Organizational Process Diagnosis
- Change Management
- Strategic Planning □

What SLA Marshall Tells Us About OE in Combat

Major General William S. Augerson
OASD (Health Affairs)

Major General William S. Augerson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Policy, Planning and Systems), OASD (Health Affairs), entered military service in 1945 with the U.S. Navy. Joining the Reserves in 1947, he attended Cornell University Medical College, receiving his medical degree in 1955, and completed his internship at Brooke Army Medical Center in 1956. He holds a B.A. Cum Laude in Physics from Bowdoin College; the Jacobius Prize in Pathology from Cornell University Medical College; and the Special Medical Association Honor Citation in Space Medicine. He served overseas in Vietnam as Division Surgeon and Co of the 23rd Medical Battalion, Americal Division, and at the Landstuhl Army Medical Center in Germany. MG Augerson holds the Silver Star, Legion of Merit, and Air Medal with four clusters among his many decorations.

I would like first to add my congratulations to the many others you will be receiving—not so much for what you have done, which is considerable, but more for what you are going to do. It seems to me that your timing is excellent. You are arriving on the scene at a time when what some of us have always known is being rediscovered by a rather broad consensus—i.e., effective people, effective units, effective leaders are the decisive factors in determining the outcome of combat. Here, more than through technology, is how we will find the edge to fight outnumbered and win. Much history, experience and even systems analysis support this view, though I agree with the opinion expressed in a recent article by T. N. Dupuy: "It is better to have the best soldiers ***and*** the best equipment."

As you begin to apply your new-old process, remember the Army needs your best efforts beginning today. You should be a little bit afraid of the responsibility you have. Here is why. Samuel Lyman Atwood Marshall—soldier, reporter, historian, analyst—did a very simple but hard thing beginning with some of the early fighting on Pacific Islands in WWII. He observed the fighting at close range, and then, at intervals between fighting or whenever a unit was pulled back reserve to rest and reorganize, he assembled small units (platoons, companies—or sometimes leaders from a battalion) and in a structured, organized way let them talk about what happened in the engagement. What had they seen, done? Which of them fired their weapons, when? What had gone well? What needed to be changed?

Because he had the confidence of higher commanders and because he was careful in communicating with intermediate commanders, his reports served to convey a very different reality of what was happening on the battlefield than that which was perceived in various headquarters. He went on with a small team from the Pacific to the European campaigns and later applied the same approaches in Korea, Vietnam. He let soldiers teach us a lot—that only a minority fired in an engagement, that the soldier is over burdened, that we forget the lessons of war very quickly, that fatigue breeds fear and fear promotes exhaustion. He paid much attention to communication—"talking it up"—reports down and to the flanks as well as reports up.

His key discovery in my opinion was that over the course of many great battles the outcome was usually determined by the efforts of a handful of squads, platoons, companies.

The outcome was determined not by "luck" but by the nature of the organizational climate in these small units.

You must begin today—all of you, military and civilian, officer and NCO—to build in peacetime the organizational climates necessary to prevail when mobilization and war suddenly arrive. Effective electronics repair shops and warehouse teams are apt to be the logistics equivalent of SLA Marshall's key squads, and resolute coherence in the non-deploying civilian-dependent-support community can greatly assist deployment. I cannot tell you how to promote that readiness—but each of you has the skill to make the difference as to whether we are ready or not.

I'd like to touch on three themes today: 1. A few stories about my experiences with OE; 2. How to deal with the high paid help; and 3. Some additional combat missions for OE.

I must confess that I think of OE as a process, one that sometimes takes place with the help of trained "practitioners," and at other times without; e.g., when hit by a truck, you need first aid, whether a doctor is there or not.

In the 82d Airborne in 1962, I used a collaborative OE approach with the "docs" and medics to review and revise our medical supplies, based on modeling and calculations we developed from historical sources. We didn't get any supplies but we had a very effective shopping list when money became available as a result of the Cuban missile crisis.

Later at the 2d General Hospital in Germany, LT Bernie Horak, MSC (who subsequently graduated from your course), helped me organize an effective approach to operating our emergency room (ER)—which was a number-one irritant for our community and our staff. The drafted docs felt "dumped on" when their professional peers did not work there. People worked all day, unpredictably worked all night in the ER and were expected to work the next day. Most felt unprepared for some aspects of ER work and the ER staff didn't know who was in charge. Our

community did not appreciate care from a slow, crowded, often angry, sometimes inefficient ER and some of that anger and fatigue carried over to the next day's wards and clinics.

As a result of much "tribal" chewing over of the problems with small and large groups, we ended up as follows:

(1) Having a commitment from the staff that the ER was their collective responsibility.

(2) Treating ER as a planned, scheduled duty—two weeks at a time, with *no other duty expected.*

(3) Putting every MD in the hospital on the roster (in pairs).

(4) Running training courses so that no one felt unable to perform in ER.

(5) Obtaining a staff commitment to be highly responsive for night consultant help.

(6) Having ER performance improve far more than expected.

It worked, is still in use 7 years later, and has spread.

I used OE to plan a major reorganization of USA Med R&D command, along objective-oriented rather than technology-oriented matrix management, and to move the headquarters out of town. No professional help was available but it worked well—especially as we involved the janitors and secretaries.

Right now we are using the DA staff OE consultants to help us in OSD in planning goals and objectives in health affairs—collaboratively with the services. Results are not in on this venture.

As to dealing with senior officers, let me observe that most of them are smarter than they seem and are smarter than you think. At one time they were vigorous lieutenants, competent captains, thorough majors. What happened? In many cases they have become trapped, like flies in amber, in a gummy, complex, institutional bind. Few like it very much.

Your job is to help them "Be all they can be." Rank is a terrible barrier to communications—people tend to tell you what they think you want to hear, and they often hear what they expected you to say.

This is a most undesirable barrier in garrison life and a formula for disaster in battle. The time characteristics of world military affairs no longer permit two styles of operation, peace/war. We must minimize the transition by living and acting in peacetime in ways that promote readiness.

You can play an important role in helping your commander break down those barriers, establishing a climate where people tell him what he ***needs*** to hear not what he ***likes*** to hear. And you can help him sense whether ***his*** communications are being heard and understood.

Robert E. Lee's prescription for success was "Deny yourself." It is not bad advice for OE staffers. You must strive to be objective, to use the power you have, by sharing it. There is no limit to what you can accomplish—by letting others take the credit.

Most of all you must be brave. You must have the courage to see things as they are, and to know yourself. Only then can you help a commander "Know himself and know his unit," and only then can you help a unit "Know itself." You must care and believe or you will not have the courage to withstand the occasional command or unit hostility you will stir up as you get close to the heart of things. Your honesty (which is linked to courage) is the best insurance against OE's becoming a staff ritual without substance.

OE staffers spend a lot of time with commanders and staffs. Take a leaf from SLA Marshall and see that your deliberations involve the people doing the work, on the line.

It is not greatly to our credit that the Army failed to seize on Marshall's methodology and build it into the life of the Army. He and a handful of people made a tremendous impact, but we didn't reinforce success. What I suggest today is that the OE staff needs to be integrated into our TOE system, and that there are a large number of important functions for which they are well suited.

I hope you have talked some here about combat OE. The faculty here have some fine concepts and certainly the attention to battle staff effectiveness is most appropriate.

In *Men Against Fire,* a book each of you must read, Marshall says, "Every new battle presents a fresh variety of tactical problems and requires novel adaptations of old methods; moreover, these problems cannot be seen in full proportion until the troops have arrived on the battleground."

I suggest to you that the OE staff is well suited to aid command by being present during battles and then, during lulls or other opportunities, interviewing units, soldiers, staff

- To document what happened
- To identify what works
- To identify what doesn't work
- To identify innovations which worked
- To serve as an additional feedback to the commander as to how effectively his orders were perceived
- To describe enemy actions/locations perceived by our troops.

The above generalities would include feedback and *documentation* on training, tactics, health and morale, materiel, fire coordination, communications, terrain, enemy tactics. The objectivity expected of the OE staffer makes that person a far more promising "applied historian" than the public affairs officer. By contacting many units, the OE staff can develop a "picture" for the commander which he might otherwise not obtain.

Most units make effective innovations. Marshall repeatedly comments on how these achievements are usually unknown outside the unit. The OE staff could serve to note and propogate these innovations. They don't have to be SLA Marshalls to do this; they need to talk to soldiers and to listen to soldiers in an orderly way, writing down or taping what they say.

Today, I'm giving your library a copy of *Fighting on Guadalcanal,* prepared by LTC Reeder of the War Department General Staff, who went there and listened to soldiers, marines and their leaders and wrote all of it down and shared the lessons. The Chief of Staff, George Cattlet Marshall, said, "We ***must*** cash in on the experience which these and other brave men have paid for in blood."

The last theme on combat OE I'll touch on for you is the matter of reconstitution and replacement. I'm not sure how much is in your course, but the school here has had some very good ideas of how OE techniques can contribute to combat effectiveness in the reconstituting of units. A unit which has been engaged—for example, a covering force armored cavalry unit—is pulled back out of the line somewhat to the rear with a mission of reconstituting itself after combat, providing rear area security and constituting a reserve. In the chaos of battle some units or elements have

become scrambled; leaders and troops have been killed or wounded; ammo, POL, supplies are depleted; equipment has been damaged or lost or is malfunctioning. Everyone is scared, tired, hungry and a little confused about what's been happening, and what's next.

Clearly there is a lot to do. One of the tasks that OE staffers can help with is the important business of replacements, including replacements for leaders.

It is a wonder to me, given the historical problem replacements have been to the U.S. Army, that there is so little direction, training or attention given to replacements. We have never done a very good job. During the Revolutionary and Civil Wars, fine combat units were allowed to wither away from lack of replacements while new units were formed. Despite abundant manpower in WWI, WWII, Korea, Vietnam, we were often critically short of replacements and have often had the experience of retraining support personnel in theater to serve as replacements.

One of the main problems is that even when replacements exist, we don't have a very good way of bringing them into a unit in combat and making them effective. Traditionally they are at high risk of becoming battle or neuropsychiatric casualties or running away. Small teams coming in as replacements generally do better.

The replacements are scared or confused, lack information about what's going on, do not feel (and are not) "bonded" into the unit. They are strangers among strangers. They don't know their leaders and do not automatically have a commitment or sense of unit. Marshall writes of replacements coming into the line during the winter of '50 and getting to know only the people in adjacent fox-holes. We have to do better than that, and you can help.

What I suggest today is that the OE system could be critical in integrating replacements into a unit. For example, a platoon or company session might review the recent battle, developing a picture of this action and identifying points to be emphasized. Various leaders or members speak—anyone can ask questions or comment—and the replacements are there. They get introduced but most importantly they get a sense of the unit, its leaders and personalities—as well as what the organization does. Good units will schedule some simple training to follow such a session to reinforce some of the "lessons learned."

The OE staffer with the perspective of other unit sessions could pass on other lessons learned. He could also keep the command chain posted on the quality, training and morale of the replacements.

The school and you and I need to think more about this process for units which are more forward—perhaps to take place in an accelerated way while refueling and rearming are taking place, or by pulling platoons out to refit and receive replacements.

When we have your ideas together, I'd suggest that a good beginning would be experimenting with the process by modeling replacement activity at the National Training Center (Ft. Irwin) and on maneuvers.

Don't think this is all theoretical—SLA Marshall helped the 2nd Infantry Division reorganize after taking very heavy casualties from the Chinese the winter of '50. He conducted a large number of unit/staff reviews of the battle as seen from smaller units. The division had done better and fought more bravely and effectively than the press or high command appreciated. (Some rifle companies withdrew only when they were down to 20-30 people.)

The division was brought into reserve and told to receive 12,000 replacements and be prepared for commitment within 10 days. Marshall then ran historical review sessions as before ***with the replacements there.*** The division was ready and remained a coherent unit.

A special replacement problem is the one of replacing fallen or broken leaders. Leaders in combat are a high risk group, and much more attention needs to be given to their replacement. As General Granger said in *Infantry* last year, "Your replacements have already arrived"—i.e., over the short term leader replacements will come from subordinates already in the unit. You and the school have worked well on the OE process of command transition in a scheduled, peacetime way. I recommend that you and the school take on the challenge of bringing OE techniques into units ***before*** combat in order to have the unit contribute to leader transition preparation and that you work hard at developing shortcuts to help transition during combat lulls or when new leaders arrive from "outside" as replacement. None of this will be easy; history will help and it's very important. Feedback to higher commanders on how their intent is understood by replacement commanders/leaders could be critical.

That is it: Be brave/be honest/be objective/know yourself/serve your commander, but do it by also listening to his troops—often they know the solution as well as the problem.

There is not enough time during mobilization to totally change the way we do business, so everything we do must be shaped by how it contributes to combat effectiveness.

There is great need for your contribution out there. As long as you are pursuing Army outcomes, don't worry about your bureaucratic future; work on these combat problems and you'll do well.

Remember, great battles hinge on what a few squads or teams do or fail to do. You can make that difference.

Best wishes. □

"We have artists with no scientific knowledge and scientists with no artistic knowledge and both with no spiritual sense of gravity at all, and the result is not just bad, it is ghastly. The time for real reunification of art and technology is really long overdue."
—***From Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance*** by Robert M. Pirsig (1974)

Communique Interview:
Major General Richard Wm. Anson
Chief, Army Force Modernization Coordination Office

Conducted by CPT(P) Lawrence R. Boice (OECS) and LTC Michael W. Rodier (DA)

MG Richard Wm. Anson was the Chief of the Army Force Modernization Coordination Office (AFMCO) when this interview was conducted. Recently, he began his new assignment as Deputy Commanding General, Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT).

He was commissioned in the Infantry after receiving a BS in Agriculture from the University of California in 1952. He has an MS in Industrial Engineering from Ohio State University, and he is a graduate of Command and General Staff College and the Army War College. His more recent assignments include Deputy Director for Force Development and Strategic Plans and Policy, J-5, Organization Joint Chiefs of Staff; Commanding General, 193d Infantry Brigade (Canal Zone)/Commander, United States Army Security Assistance Agency, Latin America; and Deputy The Inspector General (Training and Technical), United States Army.

The following interview, which took place on 23 February 1982, during the OECS-sponsored workshop entitled *"Approaches to Organizational Design and Redesign"*, was conducted by CPT(P) Larry Boice and LTC Mike Rodier.

COMMUNIQUE: Sir, what do you see as the major challenges facing you as the Chief of the Force Modernization Coordination Office?

MG ANSON: Well, I believe my major challenge is in making sure that the entire Army is marching to the same tune as we plan for and field new organizations and new equipment over the next ten years. To accomplish that formidable task, we are putting together a **Force Modernization Master Plan.** The first part of that plan will be the **Modernization Goals and Objectives,** which are pulled together from a number of documents, to include Defense Guidance (Army portion), the Secretary of the Army's goals and objectives, the Chief of Staff's White Paper, the Army Plan, and last but not least, testimony provided Congress by the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff. That, as you know, is an important first step. The second part will be the **Army 90 Transition Plan.** This is a strategy, or road map if you will, as to how the Army will get from our current force structure to that envisioned for the 1990's. Third are fielding distribution plans. These plans show, by quarter, distribution of new and displaced materiel systems down to Battalions and separate Companies. The fourth part of the Force Modernization Master Plan (FMMP) contains the Supportability Assessments for each new materiel system and organizations. In these assessments we've tried hard to accurately determine the Army's capability to totally field a new or displaced materiel system at a desired time and place. For the first FMMP, these assessments have been made for selected major materiel systems and organizations. For the next publication, assessments will be done for all systems and for all DIV 86 organizations as well. By the way, the FMMP is currently being staffed at DA and should be out to the field by the time you publish this interview.

COMMUNIQUE: Sir, you touched several times on the word "system," and the idea of a systems approach, and the impact that will have in various areas on this whole modernization process. Could you comment on how Force Modernization will impact on the following areas: doctrine, training, structure, and equipment? Could you comment on doctrine first?

MG ANSON: I believe there must be a very close planning relationship between **doctrine** and development of new equipment. We have had some shortfalls in this area in the past and TRADOC has been working diligently to prevent recurrences. Ideally, of course, new doctrine should precede and guide the development and acquisition process. We should first visualize the battlefield as it will be, say, twenty years from now, and determine the types of materiel and weapons systems we will need for that battlefield. The current wave of new weapons systems was not really a result of that kind of analysis, but I do feel comfortable that the mechanism is in place to enable the combat developers, working with materiel developers through the TRADOC System Managers, to ensure that doctrine for employment of new weapons systems is developed by the time those systems hit the field.

COMMUNIQUE: Sir, how about training? It seems that there would be considerable impact on the whole area of **training?**

MG ANSON: Certainly. And you're right to say *considerable* impact. Let me give you an example. Consider what is involved if a new weapons system requires a new MOS. In order for a soldier with that new MOS to be on the ground to meet the new piece of equipment, USAREC has to go out and enlist him off the street. They have to know what to look for about three years in advance. TRADOC probably

has to set up a new MOS training course and that entails a lot of advanced planning and programming of resources, training instructors, writing POI's, TM's, and on and on. Then, as the equipment arrives at the unit, New Equipment Training Teams have to be sent out to teach the soldiers already in the unit how to operate, employ and maintain the new system. **And don't forget the Guard and Reserves.** They are part of the Total Army and even if they don't have the new equipment initially, they have a war-time mission to provide most of our maintenance support. So we must plan for and be able to train those people to maintain the equipment in the event of war or mobilization.

A related impact that is very important is that since new weapons systems are brought into the force over several years, we must continue to train our soldiers to operate the old equipment until the total change-over is complete. So, we're talking about soldiers being able to operate and maintain two generations of weapons systems in a new force structure environment. This approaches a very high level of sophistication and makes great demands on the capabilities of our soldiers and our training base.

COMMUNIQUE: Sir, reference that same Total Force Army, what structural impact do you see from the Force Modernization effort?

MG ANSON: Stated simply, Force Modernization has significant **structural** impacts on essentially every element in the Total Army — Active, Guard and Reserves. As you know, the first important change will occur in the transition to Division 86, specifically, with the heavy divisions. It will be a major change in the way the heavy division has been structured in the past. And, of course, this translates into changes in force structure in other active and reserve component units which must be designed to support the new Division 86 concepts.

The force structure changes for the High Technology Light Divisions are yet to be determined. The force structure requirements to support the Rapid Deployment Force are also going to have a major impact on the Total Army. And not to be overlooked are the new structures for Corps and Echelons Above Corps consistent with the requirements for fielding and employment of current and new Divisions throughout the world.

So, that adds up to a significant impact on the Total Army force structure of the future. And don't forget, we're not talking just about the combat units but we're also talking about the Combat Support and Combat Service Support organizations which must be tailored to complement, supplement, and support our maneuver units.

COMMUNIQUE: Sir, there have been several articles published lately and information as to hundreds of new weapons systems and equipment as part to this Force Modernization effort. How will the Force Modernization process impact upon equipment?

MG ANSON: **Equipment** is the largest area of modernization in the US Army. But, in fact, it is more accurate to say that the modernization of equipment is impacting on the rest of the Army. For instance, Division 86 Force Structure has been planned around the new weapons systems capabilities — and support requirements — and the transition plan to Division 86 has been driven by the fielding of those same systems. We are talking about fielding about **400 new materiel systems** over the next ten years. Procurement and fielding will cost billions of dollars. The impact on personnel requirements will be enormous. Most importantly, the impact of that new equipment and the new force structure will move the United States Army into a lead position, qualitatively if not quantitatively, vis-a-vis the Soviets, which is long overdue.

COMMUNIQUE: Sir, what do you see as the impact of Force Modernization on the role of tomorrow's leader? Will it take new styles of leadership or a redefined leadership role for individual leaders?

MG ANSON: I really don't think Force Modernization, per se, will change the style of **leadership** required in the Army. Leadership style has changed because of the way our society has matured. The soldier of today is better educated, more worldly in outlook, and has a greater desire to understand his contribution to the larger picture. He wants to understand *why*. A leader today, therefore, must be able to clearly articulate the logic behind his everyday decisions. Then, during recognized emergencies, his men will react quickly, because, based on experience, they know he has good reasons for his orders. New equipment will have little impact on leadership style.

COMMUNIQUE: Sir, the tactical and technical proficiency that has always been expected — that might be more of a challenge in the future; do you see any shift of that sort?

MG ANSON: Yes, I do. I alluded to that earlier when I mentioned the requirement to remain proficient on both old and new equipment during the transition period. It will be a significant challenge to give our soldiers the opportunity to train hard and train well in employment of both old and new equipment. Since the Chief of Staff made his decision against high/low mixes within Divisions, the major impacts will be in a continuous requirement to train new personnel who transfer into any unit with new equipment from another unit which still has the old.

COMMUNIQUE: Sir, would it be fair to say that the leadership role, if anything, will be more of a challenge after Force Modernization than it has been in the past?

MG ANSON: Yes, that's a fair statement. Leadership has always been a challenge. The doctrinal battlefield gets more and more dangerous. As our modernization progresses, that will continue, but it will also become more complicated. New technology will impact tactics in ways we haven't even imagined yet. For instance, the superb stabilization of the main gun on the M-1 tank may make the tactics of bounding overwatch obsolete. It will be up to our junior leaders on the ground to prove or disprove that concept. I am confident that, as always in the past, our commissioned officers and noncommissioned officers will meet that challenge easily. Our challenge in higher leadership positions is to allow them to do so with as few restrictions as possible.

COMMUNIQUE: Sir, will it require the same skills of a leader once the force is successfully modernized as it will to lead us through that modernization process?

MG ANSON: I believe it will require a higher level of skill in the future, particularly in our junior leaders, for a couple of reasons:

First, the emerging doctrine of the extended AirLand 2000 battlefield includes the concept of striking deeply and quickly at targets of opportunity in the opposing forces' second and third echelons. This is a new visualization of the future battlefield which needs to be better articulated and understood by all leaders from battalion on up. Second, I believe we need to get better, especially at and below division level, at operating and fighting on the **integrated battlefield** of tomorrow.

Our leaders must not only very clearly understand the capabilities of the new and old Army weapons systems, but also be able to integrate their capabilities into a battlefield which contains the weapons systems of the other services. This is made even more complex because the other services are also improving the qualitative performance capabilities of their systems.

The battlefield of tomorrow will be a very complex arena and will require a quantum improvement in the tactical expertise of our leaders of today and tomorrow. They must be able to visualize the battlefield, the new weapons, their relationship with other services, and among themselves on a scale far wider and far deeper than they have worked with and experienced in the past.

"...the complexity of the coming decade will make the OE consultant an even more valuable member of the commander's team."

COMMUNIQUE: Sir, from your perspective, what would you say are the most misunderstood aspects of the Force Modernization effort, Army-wide?

MG ANSON: Probably the most misunderstood aspect of Force Modernization is the **magnitude** of the effort. When I say magnitude, I am again referring to the 400 new materiel systems, plus the new organizations under Division 86, Echelons Above Corps, the High Tech Test Bed Division concept leading to the new high tech light divisions, the Ready Reaction Force and divisions associated with it, and the employment of the air assault and airborne organizations. I don't think that the **total impact** of the large numbers of systems and the changes in the organizations is fully appreciated by the Army as a whole.

My concern in this regard has been expressed before, and this perception is changing; people are beginning to understand now, are beginning to appreciate the fact that this is a tremendous change to the way the Army is going to be doing business, both from the equipment and the organization standpoint. Almost every organization and every function in the US Army today is going to be impacted by what we are doing in modernizing the forces. We need to educate our leaders throughout the Army as to the magnitude of the effort underway and the magnitude of the resources required to support this modernization effort—not just the dollars, but people, training, and supporting pieces of equipment.

COMMUNIQUE: Sir, this process appears not only to be ongoing but **accelerating** as it goes. What do you see as being the **integrating mechanism** for all the changes you are talking about?

MG ANSON: The integrating mechanism is my office. We have been charged by the leadership of the Army to develop a Force Modernization Master Plan, as I have previously discussed. As an important adjunct to that effort, and one in which you may be interested, I have also been made responsible for making sure that existing Army management systems are integrated and working properly. When I find they are not, I advise the proponent of the system of the deficiencies or shortcomings so that they may be corrected.

COMMUNIQUE: Recently, major commands have been calling for OE assistance in dealing with the Force Modernization issues within their own organizations. What, from your perspective, are some possible roles for OE consultants in support of the Force Modernization effort?

MG ANSON: In the past I have effectively used OE personnel to assist me in defining organizational goals and objectives. This is an area where I can foresee OE personnel being very helpful. In the transition process from the current force to the future force, it will be important for commanders to define where their organization is, where it's going, and how it's going to get there. And importantly, how to know when it's arrived at that final objective. If anything, **the complexity of the coming decade will make the OE consultant an even more valuable member of the commander's team.**

COMMUNIQUE: Sir, do you see OE consultant involvement as being appropriate at high levels, or across all commands at all organizational levels or ...?

MG ANSON: I see that OE involvement has a distinct role to play at all levels. I recently had an opportunity to attend a goal setting meeting with the Secretary, the Chief of Staff, the Vice Chief, and other Army Staff principals. The Organizational Effectiveness techniques, criteria and methodologies were just as effective and useful there as they were when I used them as a commander.

"The magnitude of this thing is overwhelming!"

COMMUNIQUE: It seems, sir, that the impact of change on organizations is becoming more complex with the new systems coming in with new demands, and that boundaries that people used to work in now are being broken down; there's a requirement to integrate much more across functional areas and across installations, or even between **DA** and **FORSCOM** or **DA** and **TRADOC.** Do you see that role expanded beyond what it normally has been?

MG ANSON: Yes, I do. If, as in the past, we were introducing, say, a new tank this year and a new air defense system two or three years down the road, the problems would not be so enormous, so pervasive nor so complex as those we are experiencing today. We're talking about 400 new systems; new force structure at Division, Corps, and Echelons Above Corps; a new manning system; a new regimental affiliation concept. We're talking about changing the face and complexion of the Army within a relatively short period of time. The *magnitude* of this thing is overwhelming! We cannot afford mistakes. We don't have the luxury of being able to correct things in one weapons system without potentially impacting on other systems coming rapidly down the line. So, to get back to your question, I see a very high level of interest and an extreme sense of urgency devoted to ensuring the process of modernization works correctly. My office plays a crucial role in raising consciousness across the board among all the Army Staff elements concerned with modernizing things and organizations. We have made progress. There is definitely an increased awareness on the Army Staff of both the magnitude of the modernization effort and the requirement to improve and integrate those management

"...the only game in town right now, as far as the Army Staff is concerned, is modernizing the force."

systems dealing with modernizing and reorganizing the Total Army. The name of the game for the Army Staff is force structure, and **the only game in town right now, as far as the Army Staff is concerned, is modernizing the force.** When I say modernizing I include equipping the force; when I say the force, I'm talking about the Active, the Guard and Reserve. We've made tremendous strides. Accidents have happened. We could talk war stories: what we did, what we failed to do, and who dropped the ball. But we learned from all that. We learned not just to prevent mistakes but also how to systemically identify what the procedures were that needed to be fixed in order to preclude those mistakes from recurring.

COMMUNIQUE: Sir, we appreciate your sitting down with us tonight and taking the time to do this interview. I think your answers are going to be information that a lot of Communique readers have not heard previously.

MG ANSON: Well, thank you. I was delighted to be able to be here. □

The Interviewers

CPT(P) Larry Boice is the current *OE Communique* editor and Chief of Training Literature and Media at OECS. An Infantry officer, he is a graduate of USMA, IOAC and OECC. He has an MS in Industrial/Organizational Psychology from Purdue University. As a hobby, he generates OE-related Beetle Bailey cartoons for the *Communique* in collaboration with Mort Walker.

LTC Mike Rodier is an OE Consultant at Department of the Army. His professional focus is the application of OE to complex systems and long-range (strategic) organizational planning.

He served on the faculty at OECS from 1978-1981. During that period, he served as Chief of the IET Task Force which dealt with describing the ideal organizational climate for socializing recruits into the Army. He then served as a member of External Operations Division, Concepts Development Directorate, which provides consulting services to complex organizations within the Army. He is a USMA graduate, commissioned in Field Artillery, and is a graduate of CGSC. He has an MA in Business, and has completed the Columbia University Executive Program in advanced OD and HRM.

Beetle Bailey—*by Mort Walker*

"Don't lay any certain plans for the future; it is like planting toads and expecting to raise toadstools."
—Josh Billings

"Too many people are thinking of security instead of opportunity. They seem more afraid of life than death."
—James F. Byrnes

"Creativity implies that leap of imagination and understanding which enables individuals to grow in dignity and purpose in a world where whirl is king."***—Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.***

Leadership, Management, Commandership and OE

(Part 2 of 2 Parts)

MAJ Mitchell M. Zais

(Part 1 of this article was published in *OE Communique* issue # 1-82.)

What are the unique aspects of commandership that are not included in either leadership or management? Like the leader, the commander must inspire; like the manager, the commander must plan and organize; yet these activities are insufficient. The commander must also possess and utilize a wide range of cognitive and conceptual skills encompassing a degree of complexity much greater than that required for the exercise of leadership and management.



Figure 1. Commandership includes all aspects of leadership and management. Additionally, the commander must possess unusual conceptual abilities: forecasting, decision-making and information processing skills; as well as assume responsibility for a public relations role and for establishment of his organization's ethical climate.

Commandership

The need for conceptual ability is the single most important factor that distinguishes the functions of the senior commander from those of the leader and the manager. Conceptual ability allows the commander to think and act in terms of the total system within which he operates. This skill implies a broad point of view transcending a parochial focus on the immediate organization. A broad conceptual perspective enables the commander to set long range as well as short range objectives. Setting objectives requires both analytic and synthesizing skills in order to establish the appropriate balance between immediate needs and future requirements (Drucker, 1974). Robert Katz (1955) emphasized the importance of conceptual ability, which allows the commander to see the organization as an integrated system in which the various component sub-systems are interrelated (Clement and Ayres, 1976).

A senior commander must be constantly concerned with how things relate to each other. His desk is the point of contact between a multiplicity of groups, issues, pressures, values. Since every unit in the command is concerned primarily with its own operations, each constantly acts as a pressure group demanding that its point of view and ideas be given more consideration, that things which hamper its activities be changed, that other units give way to it, and that it be expanded or improved so that it can do a better job. Thus, the supply system will be devoted to its own methods and procedures; it will want to have better techniques, more records, and closer controls; and it will give the impression that all other activities should be subordinated to its routines. To other units, it may appear that the supply people think the command is being run for exclusive benefit of supply interests. In the same way, however, the medical system seeks to improve and expand its activities, seeks more authority, and tries to exert more control over command activities. Similarly, other systems struggle to build up their functions (DA Pamphlet 600-15, 1968).

The essence of commandership is not simply solving problems in specific areas but, rather, achieving some measure of integration between the many subsystems that form the command. In fact, the function of commandership has been described as the *integration* function (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). The increasing complexity

Editor's Note: *The entire text (Parts I and II) of the Zais article has been distributed also as a Delta Force Concept Paper.*

Correction of Error

On page 50, issue No. 1-82 of the *OE Communique*, contains a misprint. The correct version of Figure 1 of Part I of MAJ Zais' article is printed below:

Figure 1 — The Process of Leadership



of modern warfare and the US Army has increased the need for greater specialization *(differentiation)* at the same time that it has increased the need for tighter coordination (integration) and the achievement of unity effort among the major functional specialists within the organization. Unfortunately, the need for differentiation is antagonistic to the need for integration; normally, one can be achieved only at the expense of the other. Thus, commandership entails balancing the competing organizational needs of specialization and integration, each of which must be achieved to the maximum extent possible.

An equal and perhaps more important requirement for a commander at this level is to understand how his organization interrelates to a larger system and how to control this relationship. Conceptual ability enables him to understand the relationship between the organization and the larger community, including the political, economic, and social forces which impact on the organization. This conceptual ability facilitates critical decisions impacting on both the present state of the organization and the future direction it will take. Also involved in conceptual skill is a degree of creativity which increases the senior commander's ability to coordinate all of the organization's activities and interests toward a common objective, thereby facilitating long-term planning to meet future contingencies. The importance of conceptual skill cannot be understated; its effectiveness depends upon its natural integration into the individual's make-up (Katz, 1955; Mann, 1965). Cognitive ability possessed by a commander will enable him to adopt a systems perspective. "Successful [command]...requires recognition that problems usually arise from multiple causes which are increasingly complex and interdependent, and that satisfactory resolution requires a clear understanding and explicit knowledge of high level command, leadership, and management" (DA Pamphlet 600-15, 1968). Cognitive ability is the intellectual aspect of commandership and has been much neglected in the literature, even though senior executives and senior commanders attest to individual differences in discerning, conceptualizing, appraising, predicting, and understanding the demands the environment places on an organization. Cognitive ability determines the commander's capacity to obtain information about the organizational environment, to interrelate environmental facts with organizational facts and to forecast the probable effects of different courses of action so as to select the best one. Cognitive ability allows him to be predictive—and being able to predict accurately is the essence of good planning. Thus, the perspective of the commander must extend beyond his own organization and its internal issues to encompass external organizational problems and opportunities which may possibly impact on his organization. The commander must be able to anticipate external influences before they arise and to plan for an appropriate adaptive response (Clement and Ayres, 1976).

Another component or requirement for commandership that is closely related to the ability to conceptualize is the ability to forecast. This entails a future-oriented approach, which means examining the organization as it is, as it will be, and as it should be. To forecast, the commander must consider the political climate, the constraints of social responsibility, and human resource limitation—all of which cannot be quantified. Forecasting involves analytical thought, imagination, and judgment. The commander with forecasting ability automatically considers the future in his present thought and action. "An essential difference between an effective [commander] and an ineffective one is that the effective [commander] thinks of today's actions in terms of tomorrow's objectives, while the ineffective [commander] takes each event as it comes" (DA Pamphlet 600-15, 1968).

Forecasting is difficult to describe in terms of discrete task activities because of its highly cognitive nature. If forecasting is examined as a set of operations, it is clear these operations require decision-making skills, which subsume the ability to establish broad objectives. DA Pamphlet 600-15, *Leadership at Senior Levels of Command,* describes the problems inherent in the setting of objectives:

> ...if missions are clear and stable, and if the objectives are precise and limited—as they usually are for tactical units in wartime—the problem of formulating objectives becomes relatively simple. However, when ultimate objectives are vague and general, and when unit objectives are subject to constant redefinition—as they tend to be for noncombat units anytime and for tactical units under current "peacetime" conditions—then the problem becomes difficult. It becomes difficult because the obvious solution—more elaborate and stricter administrative controls over objectives at all levels—may well be self-defeating, by introducing rigidity where flexibility is needed.

Forecasting and the necessary steps entailed have also been described as "strategic planning." Strategic planning, or forecasting, differs substantively from lower-level managerial planning and requires different skills and abilities. It is important to note that the concept of forecasting and the steps involved in initiating subsequent actions embody more than a set of operations; they refer to all operations leading to a certain result, which Carlson (1951) called "unity of action." For this reason, forecasting is a function that is difficult to dissect into singular tasks.

As noted, another component of commandership which is closely related to conceptual ability is decision-making abilities. At senior levels of command, decision-making is actually policy formulation involving the alteration, origination, or elimination of organizational structure (Katz and Kahn, 1966). And since top-level commanders often make decisions in the context of staff meetings, they must also be skilled at facilitating group discussion (Clement and Ayres, 1976).

As important as conceptual ability and attendant forecasting ability is to the commander, conceptual ability cannot be developed suddenly. If conceptual skill is not nurtured from pre-adolescence, it cannot later be developed in the individual (Katz, 1955). Therefore, it is unreasonable to expect a person to express or to begin developing conceptual skill once he reaches a position of senior command if he has not been thinking this way since childhood. Nonetheless, previously developed conceptual abilities can be enhanced through carefully selected and varying assignments that have been mapped out within a developmental framework.

The implications of the above discussion are self-evident. If the Army seeks commanders who have conceptual skill, it is essential to identify majors and lieutenant colonels who demonstrate conceptual ability. These middle-grade officers must be allowed opportunities to develop conceptual skills through systematic assignments to positions requiring this ability thereby affording them an opportunity to enhance their conceptual ability through task relevant experience. Coaching is one of the best methods to enhance conceptual skill; the superior can allow the subordinate to participate in problem-solving activities and then provide critical performance feedback (Clement and Ayres, 1976).

The commander must spend a great deal of time collecting information about his organization through

briefings, conferences, committees, and reports. He spends much more time accumulating and synthesizing information than he does giving orders, advising, or supervising, activities that are more important for performing the leadership and management roles (Davis, 1953; Clement, 1973). Thus, another requirement for, or component of, commandership is exceptional information processing skills.

Another function unique to the commander is the requirement to assume a public-relations role; a commander serves as the primary organizational representative to other organizations outside of his own. He must interact with civilian or other governmental agencies, deal with the press, meet and greet official visitors to his organization, represent his command on ceremonial occasions, etc. In those instances where he acts in his public-relations role, the commander must be able to articulate the problems, positions, ethos, and philosophy of his organization. Accordingly, public speaking skills are extremely important to the commander.

A final function, and one which clearly distinguishes commandership, is the commander's obligation to establish an ethical climate or "tone" for his command. This is one of the most important but frequently ignored aspects of commandership. As a member of one of the most important leadership groups in the country, a senior military commander acquires position, status, prestige, perquisites, and authority. He also enjoys more autonomy than his subordinates. A professional ethic has the potential to be a powerful force for guiding individual conduct; as such, it can establish and ensure conformity to institutionalize organizational standards and norms. As Clausewitz attested:

> The soldier trade, if it is to mean anything at all, has to be anchored to an unshakable code of honor. Otherwise, those of us who follow the drum become nothing more than a bunch of hired assassins walking around in gaudy clothes...a disgrace to God and mankind.

A commander finds himself set apart and thus subject to a great deal of scrutiny. Particularly subject to scrutiny is his personal sense of integrity as manifested through his behavior. Whether or not he is aware of it, the commander acts as a role model to his subordinates. He, therefore, exercises a great amount of influence over his subordinates' behavior and ethical beliefs. Studies have shown that the ethical beliefs of subordinates are similar to those of their top commanders or executives (Baumhart, 1974; Newstrom and Ruch, 1975). Consequently, the commander has the potential to change and to control subordinates' behaviors by providing an important source of ethical standards. In some respects, the commander's requirement to establish the ethical climate duplicates somewhat the leader's requirement to inculcate values. However, the values inculcated by the leader are more specific and limited, whereas the ethical standards of the senior commander are more global and on a higher level. In other words, the leader's values concern behavioral standards of individuals, whereas the commander's focus is on organizational standards, practices, and climate issues. However, this is not to suggest that the focus of the leader's values are incompatible with the more encompassing values of the commander—for the former often become "fine tuned" by the latter.

Indeed, commanders must set the example if a higher standard of ethics is to emerge in the Army. "Corporate ethics are determined at the chief executive level and filter downward through an explicit or implicit statement of philosophy or through illustrative executive behavior" (Newstrom and Ruch, 1975). As a result, a system for communicating ethical behavior is needed to provide soldiers information regarding acceptable and unacceptable ethical limits. What is required is ethical modeling on the part of commanders, particularly at the top levels of the Army.

Newstrom and Ruch (1975) found that managers are inclined to capitalize on opportunities to be unethical when barriers to unethical behavior are lessened or removed. Individuals clearly need a supportive environment. An environment that undermines their integrity and that routinely penalizes candor and truthfulness is an inhibiting one at best, and a self-destructive one at worst. Rather than scale down or modify institutional and personal standards of ethical conduct so as to bring them more in line with what may be more attainable, commanders must institute reforms to remove those institutional practices which subject individual integrity to unnecessary stress (Clement and Ayres, 1976).

The requirement for commanders to be individuals of high ethical standards has been supported by many authors who have emphasized that senior executives, and hence senior commanders, operate under stringent personal demands which call for them to demonstrate a high degree of integrity. Hemphill (1960), Drucker (1974), Mahler and Wrightnour (1973), and Reeser (1975) are a few who stressed that ethical conduct is an important requirement. Senior commanders clearly have an obligation to be conscious of the propriety of their behavior, to be honest and fair in their interactions with people, to display a sense of justice, to exemplify high personal values, and to demonstrate a sense of morality. Barnard (1938) stated that the main distinction between lower-level leaders and managers and higher-level executives and commanders lies not in the degree of responsibility but in the degree of moral complexity encountered at the different levels. At the higher levels, a commander must cope with complex and numerous behavioral and moral codes; herein lies the opportunity for conflict between varying codes of conduct. Also, at the heart of the distinction is the fact that the commander's ethical behavior is determined individually and conceptually, not by a set of mottos or conditioned responses (Clement and Ayres, 1976).

The necessity for setting the ethical climate has been underscored by Weber (1981), who said, "The task for the Army's top leadership is to define not just 'soldier-battlefield values,' but to develop a concept of values which will transcend the battlefield and form a basis of commonality of values for all leaders and soldiers." And then, "through recruiting, socialization, training, education, behavior modification, or by any other means, instill a common set of values in its members."

In sum, the commander, unlike the leader or manager, must assume a broad, systemic view of his organization. He must possess unusual conceptual abilities to enable him to take a broad view of factors both internal and external to his organization, to forecast the future and desired states for the organization, and to devise action strategies to obtain these desired states. His cognitive ability also enhances the decision-making skills that are inherent in forecasting and strategic planning activities. Commandership also calls for exceptional information gathering and processing skills. Also important is the requirement to assume a public-relations role. The senior commander is responsible for the establishment of the ethical climate within his organization. Finally, "management and leadership must enter into every action of a senior commander. Which function plays the most important role would be impossible to determine" (DA Pamphlet 600-15, 1968).

Organizational Effectiveness

The practice of Organizational Effectiveness (OE) consists of "the systematic military application of selected management and behavioral science skills and methods to improve the total organization function, to accomplish assigned missions, and to increase combat readiness" (AR 5-15, 1982). It is built on the findings of research in both private industry and the US Army. In the course of its evolution since the initial pilot projects of the late 1960's and early 1970's, the focus of the Army's OE program has shifted from the pure human (personal growth) perspective toward a total organizational systems perspective. The result has been the development of a comprehensive, sophisticated, and balanced treatment of human and organizational factors in work settings. Currently, OE is involved in the development of a general management consulting capacity with particular orientation to higher levels of the Army.

The OE program is designed to improve the Army's planning, problem-solving, decision-making, and communication process by helping the commander to improve his organization. Although many academic disciplines underlie the OE process (e.g., management theory, group dynamics, sociology, and psychology) the tenets of open systems theory (i.e., thinking about organizations as systems of interrelated subsystems interacting with their environment) and organizational psychology are fundamental to OE. The systematic application of management and behavioral science concepts and techniques is tailored to the unique requirements of a particular organization. The process is controlled by the commander who is supported by the OE consultant, with the goal of improving organizational performance and thus enhancing mission accomplishment. OE is not a form of individual development for the commander, it is a means of of organizational improvement. Although an OE effort may include individual skill development, its broader emphasis will be in such areas as objective setting, goal setting, long-range planning, organizational design, problem-solving, and linking individual performance objectives to organizational objectives through such mechanisms as the Officer Efficiency Report Support Form (DA Form 67-8-1) and civilian Job Performance Planning Worksheet (DA Form 4968).

It has been approximately 30 years since organizational development (OD) emerged as a discipline. From a modest beginning has sprung a field in which there is a substantial body of theory and practice. Today, OD is taught in schools of business, education, and public administration as well as in the US Army. Not only are there individual courses, but additionally there exist whole programs devoted to training practitioners in this field. Furthermore, OD has been integrated into other courses of study as its theory and practice become more relevant to contemporary organizational problems. The relatively isolated application of OD at companies like Exxon, Union Carbide, TRW, and Corning Glass Works in the 1950's and 1960's has spread to both small and large companies, and the federal and state governments, in addition to the US Army and other branches of the Armed Services. Research in OD has also increased in recent years yielding better theory, concepts, and social technology (Beer, 1980). Today, the Army possesses the largest OD (OE) consulting capacity and the greatest number of consultants of any organization in the world. Until recently the academic community established the direction of, and provided the research and theory supporting, developments in Army OE. The situation is now reversed and Army OE consultants, along with the US Army Organizational Effectiveness Center and School, are breaking new ground in OE theory and application. During World War I and throughout the 1920's and 1930's, the Army was an innovative force in the development of management theory and practice (Barnard, 1938). Later, American industry and business supplanted the Army in becoming the vanguard of managerial practice. It now appears that the Army is again regaining its prominence in the development of organizational and management theory.

Despite its strong beginning and promising future, OD is still widely misunderstood. For every example of a successful application there is an example of its misapplication. For every commander and academician who has come to see the potential of OD, there are others who regard OD as a dangerous, soft-minded, or permissive fad. OD still seems to be plagued by some nagging questions about its legitimacy. At the root of these questions is considerable misunderstanding about the nature of OD. It is often confused with sensitivity training. It may be seen as impractical for military organizations where the brute use of power and the horror of war can be a day-to-day reality. In short, some see it as soft and idealistic and, therefore, a luxury that cannot be afforded (Beer, 1980).

Nevertheless, OE can make a difference in improving military organizations. The effective commander has always intuitively used many of the ideas and practices associated with OE. OE has been helpful to many commanders in enhancing their ability to control behavior within their units, because the ideas and methods associated with OE or can help them to understand organizational problems and to deal with them effectively. Indeed, many of the ideas, theories, or concepts used by OE consultants are similar to the theories held, at least implicitly, by successful Army commanders.

The Role of the Consultant

According to Huse (1980), the overall role of the OD (OE)consultant is to help the commander diagnose the organizational system and to plan strategies for attaining the desired future state of the organization. This implies that the OE consultant, like the commander, must maintain a systemic perspective of the organization and operate from this global, systems view in planning strategies for a better future state. In other words, both the commander and the OE consultant focus on improving the organization to enhance mission accomplishment instead of focusing on the solution to simply social or efficiency problems. The consultant works with the commander to identify problems and to search for potential solutions; he helps people study what they are doing now and to consider alternatives for doing things better. More and more, experts in the OD community are abandoning the exclusively interpersonal dynamics perspectives of OD and are adopting a systems view of OD.

Because the systems view of organizations is an imperative for successful commandership, it is essential that commanders understand the theory and practice of OD. At the heart of this imperative is the fact that both the commander and OE consultant require a broad perspective to allow them to see the organization as subunits interacting with each other and with the environment. This perspective helps them to integrate the efforts of people and groups and to lead them toward the attainment of organizational purposes (i.e., mission accomplishment). Thus, the systems view of organizations, inherent in the commandership function, is an essential part of the OE consultant's function.

In more specific terms, the primary function of the OE consultant is to assist the commander in directing and achieving mission accomplishment. The OE consultant's major vehicle for achieving this goal is his ability to serve as a conduit for information and data; he gathers information throughout the organization, interprets it, and

selectively funnels it back to the client. The client is defined as the commander for whom the OE consultant is working, or, as the unit or organization for which the commander is responsible.

As James Fallows points out in *National Defense* (1981), for the commander "It is far more convenient to know only the facts that are easy to measure and that reflect well on those in the chain of command...That is why the first casualty in any large organization is realistic information from the field." The voluntary and confidential aspects of OE, coupled with the consultant's organizational diagnostic skills, facilitate his acquisition of realistic information from the field. He can then analyze and synthesize this for feedback to the commander. Additionally, he can serve as a means to reduce any barriers precluding the transfer of that information to the commander by reducing the threat inherent in conveying derogatory, negative, or affective information upward in the organizational hierarchy.

Consultant Characteristics

Relatively little research is available about the qualities of the effective consultant. Although some data are beginning to emerge, what information exists is basically anecdotal. (**Editor's note:** With prior consent of the author, I take some exception to this statement. For a more thorough treatment of consultant competencies, as researched and identified by McBer and Company, as contracted by OECS through Army Research Institute, the reader is referred to the article by Dr. Mel Spehn and LTC Ron Tumelson, "OE Consultant Competency Model: Development and Uses." *OE Communique,* issue #3-81, pp. 40-47. Additional references are provided at the end of that article.) Most experts agree, however, that no amount of intellectual knowledge or cognitive skill can compensate for poor interpersonal skills. In other words, technical expertise about the consulting process is insufficient for effective consultation. Like the leadership process, the OE consultation process demands affective or interpersonal skills. Although important throughout consultation, these skills also play a critical role in determining whether or not the consulting relationship will be established in the first place. Whereas OE consultants may have different personal styles and philosophies, they generally share this characteristic (Huse, 1980).

Glickman (1974) describes the abilities and skills required of a successful OE consultant as including the ability to diagnose and describe what is happening in the organization, a basic knowledge of behavioral science techniques and theory, the ability to empathize with others, knowledge of the consulting process and the discipline of OD, the ability to assist in goal setting, and problem-solving skills. Other authors have noted as requirements for consultants the ability to do self-assessment (Lippitt, 1961), the ability to see things objectively (Rogers, 1971), and imagination and flexibility (Havelock, 1973).

According to Ziller (1973), another distinguishing characteristic of the successful OE consultant is best explained by the concept of ***marginality.*** The marginally oriented person is one who can successfully stand on the boundary between two or more groups with differing goals and value systems. Marginal persons tend to have personality profiles characterized by low dogmatism, neutrality, openmindedness, objectivity, flexibility, and adaptable information processing ability. These people are not upset by stress, conflict, or ambiguity; rather, they thrive on it. Individuals with marginal orientations are more likely than others to develop integrative decisions that bring together and reconcile viewpoints between opposing organizational groups, and are more likely to be neutral in controversial situations (Huse, 1980). Thus, the effective OE consultant, like the effective commander, serves an integrative function and uses cognitive ability to balance competing demands of various sub-units within the organization.

A function closely related to the concept of marginality is the notion of ***boundary-spanning,*** which is simply interacting with, conveying information between, and coordinating the activities of two or more organizations or units. While commanders of liaison personnel are normally tasked with this responsibility, the OE consultant can also perform this function.

Earlier we described integration as one of the primary functions of commandership. Not surprisingly, the characteristics of the effective integrator (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967) resemble the characteristics of the effective OE consultant. Like the integrator, the effective OE consultant can influence decisions within the organization with his knowledge, credibility, and expertise. Influencing decisions requires the ability to strike a balance among different perspectives, time orientations, and interpersonal work styles so as to merge extreme viewpoints.

Beer (1980) has described OE consultation as requiring both generalist and specialist skills. The consultant is seen as a generalist in utilizing his organizational and administrative perspective (as required in commandership) and a specialist when carrying out the processes of organizational diagnosis and intervention. As a generalist, the OE consultant understands both the management and leadership processes. He has sufficient knowledge about various functions within the organization; for example, training, tactics, logistics, and administration. He also has sufficient knowledge about parts of the organization (for example, weapon systems and combat and combat support units) to understand their purpose and how the functions and parts fit together. As in commandership and leadership, OE consultation demands high levels of interpersonal competence. OE, like commanderhip, requires both a short-term and a long-term orientation. Finally, OE consultation requires a broad knowledge of administrative and behavioral science rather than in-depth knowledge of one limited theory or subfield. As a specialist, the OE consultant is an expert in the process and techniques of organizational diagnosis. He is highly knowledgeable and skillful in process consultation, systems theory, and the dynamics of planned change.

As mentioned earlier, another consultant attribute that is essential is credibility (Franklin, 1976). The OE consultant must be credible both as a soldier and as a staff specialist. ***He must be regarded as having the ability or the potential to be a commander himself.*** According to Argyris (1970), the essential requirements for an OE consultant include both confidence and interpersonal competence. The OE consultant derives power from his values, role, personality, knowledge, and expertise as well as from the high status which is afforded him by the client organization (French, 1956; Pettigrew, 1976).

In sum, the requirements for successful OE consultation largely mirror the requirements for the effective exercise of organizational authority, and therefore include aspects of leadership, management, and commandership. Primary requirements include a high level of interpersonal skill (leadership prerequisites), confidence and a secure self-image (a leadership prerequisite), technical knowledge of organizational and behavioral science theory and techniques (a cognitive or managerial type skill), the ability to assist in goal setting and problem-solving (an ability that

must be able to cope with a wide variety of constantly shifting interpersonal situations in order to be effective. Thus, the influence process cannot be described in terms of any single, predetermined, or correct way to behave. To maintain control of highly complex organizations requires adaptability, change, and flexibility of operation (Olmstead, 1980). According to Argyris (1957):

> Reality-centered [influence] is not a predetermined set of "best ways to influence people." The only predisposition that is prescribed is that the [organizational authority] ought to first diagnose what is reality and then use the appropriate [behavior].

Accordingly, one of the most important prerequisites for the effective exercise of organizational authority is acute diagnostic skills. Inasmuch as the reality based approach or orientation suggests that the exercise of organizational influence does not involve any set of specific actions, it follows that a person cannot be taught the best solution, style, or technique in performing as an effective organizational authority. Under this approach, training for organizational authority should teach the individual what organizational, inter-group, and interpersonal phenomena to look for, how to see or diagnose these, and how to respond appropriately (Olmstead, 1980).

Conclusions

Different approaches to the influence process, to the exercise of authority, and to OE, are of more than academic interest. Varying approaches determine both the design and conduct of training programs. In many cases within the Army, leadership training is conducted without any clear statement of the assumptions underlying the behaviors which are assumed necessary or appropriate for effective performance. Nevertheless, assumptions are implied in the goals and methods selected for training leaders. Most commonly, however, commanders and trainers have developed approaches for improving the skills involved in influencing people in a relatively casual and ad hoc way; or they have uncritically adopted approaches already prevalent in their organizations or in the civilian community (Olmstead, 1980).

Another problem is that people tend to resist training that involves "leadership" or the influence process. Attitudes are generally organized and integrated around the person's image of himself, and they result in stabilized, characteristic ways of viewing the world, one's work, and other people (Schein, 1962). This stable world view becomes comfortable for the individual, and thus, people will often go to great lengths to preserve it, even in the face of facts and information contrary to their view. To suggest the need for change in a person implies some criticism of him or an existing inadequacy and may threaten the stability of his world view. This threat underlies the common resistence to leadership and management training as well as to OE. Because the exercise of authority involves an individual's characteristic ways of behaving and relating to people, to suggest the need for training or change implies a deficiency in a very personal area; for this reason it is likely to be perceived as a threat to the individual's sense of identity and status vis-a-vis other people. Therefore, threatening information will be blocked out because it attacks his self-image, or it will be interpreted in such a manner as to pose less threat (Olmstead, 1980; Schein, 1962).

If the Army is to accept the need to develop individuals over time, it must recognize that different influence skills are required at different levels within the organization. These influence skills can be classified as either leadership, management, or commandership. Additionally, the Army must develop training programs that are designed to meet the needs at various levels of organizations. These training programs must focus on leadership skills and the interpersonal influence process within lower levels of the Army (NCO and platoon leader), management skills at intermediate levels (captain, major, and lieutenant colonel), while training more senior officers (lieutenant colonel and above) in the techniques and principles of commandership.

Promotion to flag rank does not validate an individual's influence style or skills. Currently, few of the unique skills required for commandership are taught or developed in a systematic way, either on the job, at the senior service college level, precommand courses, or the general officer orientation. Management training for captains, majors, and lieutenant colonels is perfunctory at best. Leadership training within the Army is unorganized and disjointed, and tends to include administrative programs such as the Army's drug and alcohol program and the race relations/equal opportunity program. While some branch schools do teach the principles of effective interpersonal communication or counseling, they tend to focus on specific traits or leader behaviors while ignoring the fact that specific traits and appropriate behaviors are primarily the means whereby leaders are able to establish the strong emotional bond with subordinates that leads to subordinate identification with the leader and subsequent adoption of the leader's values and internalization of the leader's standards of performance. Finally, within the Army there is a wide-spread perception that OE is soft, permissive, and "touchy-feely."

If the Army is to meet the increasing challenge of the 1980's and maximize the effectiveness of its leaders, managers, and commanders, it is imperative that it develop a coherent and integrated training program in the influence process that recognizes the differences between leadership, management, and commandership. This program must then be implemented at all levels of the Army, irrespective of peoples' natural inclination to resist such training. Finally, OE, an effective tool to assist the commander in the accomplishment of his mission, needs to be recognized (and practiced) as such, instead of being misperceived as permissive humanism or as a disruptive intrusion on the rights and perogatives of the commander.

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incorporates both affective and cognitive skills or the area of overlap between leadership and management), marginality and the ability to serve as an integrator (components of commandership), and a broad systems view of organizations and their interaction with the environment (essential for commandership).

The practice of OE requires an outsider or someone with an outside perspective (Argyris, 1970; Greiner, 1967). Normally, this perspective will be adopted by the OE consultant but may also be assumed by a new organizational authority and occasionally by an enlightened commander who is able to step outside the traditions of his organization. An outsider's perspective enables one to present new ideas and viewpoints that can help organizational members approach old problems in new ways.

One thing that OE provides which no amount of leadership, management, or commandership training will ever provide, is an independent, objective expert to assist the chain of command to systematically examine and improve how it operates to accomplish the mission. Because of inherent personal bias, the commander can seldom effectively serve as his own OE consultant; it is virtually impossible for him to view dispassionately his organization from an external perspective. One of the functions of the OE consultant is to determine the sources of problems within the unit. Frequently, however, the commander himself may be doing or failing to do something that causes these problems. A reality of organizational life is that it is often very difficult for the subordinate to confront his boss with the effects of his (the boss's) behaviors.

Michael Beer (1980), a faculty member of the Graduate School of Business Administration at Harvard University, attests to the overlap between OE skills and the skills required at senior levels of command: "The ideas and methods associated with OD are of use to executives in understanding management problems and dealing with them." He states that many of the ideas discussed in his OD text are also used in the Harvard Managing Organizational Effectiveness (MOE) Program, a two week program aimed at helping senior executives diagnose and improve their organizations. To develop an organization, he asserts, a number of roles are required. Someone must: 1) recognize the need for change and initiate the process, 2) collect the data and diagnose the organization, 3) have expertise about organizational structures and processes which could increase effectiveness, 4) be knowledgeable about various strategies and approaches to change, and 5) implement meetings, training programs, and other interventions needed to move change along. Finally, someone must lead by setting expectations and by modeling new behaviors. In some instances, one person, the commander, will carry out all of these roles; in most organizational development efforts, however, the roles are performed by two or more people. For example, to recognize the need for change and to catalyze the process itself is often the role of the authority, but OE consultants can and sometimes do take on this role. Setting expectations and modeling behavior are usually role requirements of the commander, but occasionally these tasks are carried out by the OE consultant. Collecting and diagnosing data, and implementing changes usually fall within the responsibilities of the OE consultant, but sometimes these activities are carried out by an organizational authority within the organization (Beer, 1980). The essence of the relationship between OE and leadership, management, and commandership, is summarized in Figure 2.

As Figure 2 illustrates and as previously described, the functions of OE in some cases are similar to those inherent in the leadership, management, and commandership processes. Sometimes OE functions duplicate the leadership-management overlap. Other functions of OE,



Figure 2. In addition to subsuming certain aspects of leadership, management, and commandership, Organizational Effectiveness provides an independent, objective expert in management and organizational theory and techniques to assist the chain of command to systematically examine how it operates to enhance mission accomplishment.

however, are separate and distinct from those exercised by leaders, managers, and commanders. Thus, OE is not "just good leadership."

Neither is it "just good management" nor "just good commandership." While similarities do exist, OE is a unique blend of perspectives, skills, and processes designed to assist the leader, manager, or commander to improve organizational performance and thus to enhance mission accomplishment.

An Integrative Approach to Influence

Olmstead (1980) describes an integrative approach to understanding the influence process that has recently gained wide recognition: the reality based approach. This relatively new way of thinking about organizations has received a great deal of emphasis from organizational psychologists and organizational development consultants who are concerned with open systems theory, group dynamics concepts, and theories of social motivation. In this approach, the influence process (subsuming leadership, management and commandership) is concerned with all of the phenomena of human organizations. This means that organizational influence cannot be limited to a few highly specific areas. Furthermore, influence is not restricted to person-to-person interactions or even authority-group relationships. In terms of this approach, an organization is viewed as an interactive system, a network of social-psychological relationships in which all the phenomena that arise from interpersonal interaction are relevant. Therefore, commanders must be concerned not only with individual relationships but also with group interaction, inter-group relations, and the hierarchical systems that make up large organizations. Commanders must be concerned with controlling and manipulating these various relationships in such a manner as to maximize the effectiveness of their organizations. Therefore, a commander must be more than merely skilled at influencing individual subordinates. In addition, he must have a knowledge of group and organizational characteristics, and more importantly, he must be able to use this knowledge to achieve organizational objectives. When the field is seen as involving all the phenomena of interaction, the influence process involves coping with the realities of human relationships wherever they may occur. Viewed in this light, the nature of influence (leadership, management, commandership) problems changes continuously; this, of course, implies that the individual

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Unless a capacity for thinking be accompanied by a capacity for action, a superior mind exists in torture.—**Benedetto Croce**

One part of knowledge consists in being ignorant of such things as are not worthy of being known.—**Crates**

Few people think more than two or three times a year. I have made an international reputation for myself by thinking once or twice a week. —**George Bernard Shaw**

"One Clear View": Focusing Readiness Group Assistance Efforts to the Reserve Components

CPT Steve Messman
MAJ Larry Gomez

Have you ever had one of those concerns that no matter how hard you've tried and no matter how much time and effort you've expended, you just never seem to make any progress? And if by chance you are progressing, there doesn't seem to be any way to measure the effect? This is often an everyday reality for the duty position titled, Readiness Group Assistor. The assistor is tasked with the responsibility of working day in and day out with both Reserve and National Guard units, offering advice and assistance and doing what he can to help those units accomplish their assigned missions. Note that we said *offer*. Volumes of data could be gathered to assess the particular dilemma of Readiness Group Assistors having no authority over the units they assist; only the responsibility to do so. No matter how hard they try, progress doesn't come easy (or so it seems) and the fruits of their efforts can rarely be measured.

The Readiness Group (RG) Chief that contacted MAJ Gomez and me about this dilemma, did so with one particular unit in mind. These are the outcomes he wanted to achieve:

- To develop a specific set of Readiness Group goals in assisting this unit.
- To clearly identify measurable objectives that we (the RG) must meet to provide improved assistance.
- To develop an internal action plan for providing the best possible assistance to this specific unit.

The Readiness Group Chief, in formulating these outcomes, established a very important focus: that focus being internal to the RG itself, not the unit to which assistance was being provided. To pictorally display this focus, we used the Weisbord 6-box model[1], with a slight twist.



[1] Weisbord, M.R. "Organization Diagnosis: Six places to look for trouble with or without a theory." *Group and Organization Studies*, 1976, I, 430-447.

RG Assistors who had a vested interest in this unit were selected as participants for the workshop. The first few hours of discussion and consensus building made obvious a very important fact. Each of the RG Assistors was only able to assess/perceive the unit's strengths and weaknesses from a narrow individual perspective. As a group of independent assistors, they lacked a broad understanding of the organization as a "whole." It was not until a thorough discussion of perceived unit strengths and weaknesses that each of the assistors realized the diversified jumping off point from which their assistance was being rendered. Perhaps the greatest benefit derived from the workshop's initial session was the tremendous amount of information being shared and the knowledge gained by different perspectives on why and what types of assistance programs were being developed independently of one another.

It's important here to note the organizational structure in which this Readiness Group functioned and the manner in which assistance was being rendered. All assistance was being provided by four distinct groups of branch assistors. This diagram illustrates their structure:



An important lesson which became obvious through group discussion was the fact that there had not been a need to share information when providing direct assistance by individual areas of branch expertise; for example, infantry and quartermaster. Each assistor could work independently with little or no degradation to his individual assistance effort. The QM assistor, a CSAT member, focused primarily on the assistance effort to the Support Battalion and the S-4 concerns; meanwhile, the INF assistor, a BAT member, focused on the INF Battalions and the S-3 concerns. It wasn't until they collectively shared insights as to perceived organizational problem areas that they realized the benefit of cross-fertilization in identifying "common" concerns and expanding their narrow and fixed branch focus to a more complex "organizational focus."

To further emphasize this structural reality, we developed the concept of "one clear view" (portrayed on the next page) during the early phases of the workshop. It legitimized the different perspectives as seen through the eyes of the total number of Readiness Group Assistors working in the same large organization. By combining/sharing all of their individual perspectives on the assistance needs of this specific organization, we were able to build one clear view of the organization as a whole.



The basic flow of information generated and discussed during the conduct of the workshop was as follows:

STEP 1	RG's purpose as it relates to this specific organization.
STEP 2	What's going well for us in the unit.
	What's not going well for us.
STEP 3	Weighing the impact of the wells/not wells on the RG's ability to fulfill its intended purpose for the unit.
STEP 4	Prioritize those impacts that will pay the highest returns.
STEP 5	Top 10 Goals.
STEP 6	Action Plans for Attaining Goals.

THE CONSULTING PROCESS

STEP 1

The first task at hand during the workshop was to **identify the purpose** of the RG as it relates to the specific unit being targeted for an improved assistance plan.

A "brainwriting" technique[2] was used to develop a consensually agreed upon purpose statement. The end results of the process was as follows:

RG's purpose as it relates to this unit is . . . . **"to assist the (unit) to accomplish its assigned missions with emphasis on readiness and mobilization."**

[2] See Eggleston, D. "Brainwriting for Priorities." *OE Communique,* issue #1-82, pp.58-59.

A special note of thanks goes to MAJ Darry D. Eggleston, OE Consultant with the Army National Guard, Eastern Regional Center, located in Edgewood, Maryland. His assistance in the design and initial conduct of the workshop was critical to its overall success.

STEP 2

Once the consensus was reached on the RG's purpose statement, the next step in the workshop was to determine all of those things which, in support of the previously defined purpose, WERE GOING WELL and NOT SO WELL. This is done by breaking the large group into two smaller work groups, brainstorming a list of "wells and not so wells," and returning to the large group to eliminate the duplicates. Each item, listed as either well or not well, was then placed on a 5x7 card to facilitate the process to be used in Step 3. Examples of perceptions of what was going well and not so well for the RG in attaining their desired purpose outcomes were:

WELL	NOT SO WELL
• Access to units.	• We deal too much with FT staff; not enough with reserve chain of command.
• Numerous requests for assistance.	• Guidance and direction is inconsistent at varied levels.
• RG credibility. • BTMS. • SQT training.	• BAT is not fully aware of TNG or assistance capabilities of ASAT, CSAT, and vice versa.

STEP 3

The wells/not wells were then weighted as they impacted on the RG's purpose statement. Using the Force Field Analysis as outlined below, the group was asked to **weigh the impact** of each well/not well in answering the question: "What impact does each item have on the Readiness Group's ability to accomplish the purpose as stated (in step 1)? The following Force Field Analysis was used:

+ 5	+ 4	+ 3	+ 2	+ 1	0	- 1	- 2	- 3	- 4	- 5
could not get much better		going well		positive impact	no impact	negative impact		going badly		cannot worsen

Each item on the well/not well list (now on 5x7 cards) was placed in a weighted position on the force field analysis chart and thoroughly discussed as to the reasons it belonged there. The importance of the force field analysis process used in this manner was manifested in the end product: a visual display of all the forces having an impact on the Readiness Group's ability to accomplish its purpose and a method of weighing the impact of each force.

STEP 4

In developing an analysis of the most significant forces which strengthen or impede the RG's ability to accomplish its intended purpose, the following question was asked: "What forces, from the Force Field Analysis chart, based on the RG's ability to improve them, will have the most beneficial result on the RG's ability to accomplish its stated purpose?"

All individuals were asked to provide what they thought represented the TOP 5 FORCES from that chart that, if strengthened, **would provide the most significant improvement.** The large group was broken into four small groups at this point and a brainwriting technique was then used to arrive at one list of 10 items that the entire group could agree upon.

STEP 5

Based on the list of 10 priority concerns, **goal statements were written.** At this point in the workshop, the participants had developed their own list of top 10

goals that, if attained, would greatly improve their effectiveness in accomplishing their purpose (step 1).

It is important to emphasize here that throughout this workshop, virtually all of the data has been tied together from the very start. **Note:**

STEP 1	What is our Purpose?
STEP 2	What is going well/not well in the accomplishment of the Purpose?
STEP 3	How heavily do these items impact on the RG's ability to accomplish its Purpose (force Field)?
STEP 4/5	Based on the significance of each force, what can we improve that would have the most beneficial result on the RG's ability to accomplish the Purpose (Goal)?

In addition, throughout the workshop the maintenance of a totally internal focus was stressed: What can we (the RG) do; not what can the unit do.

STEP 6

The final step, and probably the most difficult, was the **action planning** of each individual goal statement. The format for each Action Plan included:

a) **The outcome:** if the goal was achieved, what would the RG have?

b) **Obstacles:** what gets in the way of goal achievement?

c) **What has to be done:** to overcome the obstacles?

d) **Who:** has to do it?

e) **When:** must it be completed?

The Readiness Group now has "one clear view" of the unit. All RG personnel involved in this workshop have a clearer understanding of what their role is in relation to this specific unit and have detailed plans of how to achieve their most important goals for improving their assistance and a total commitment to do so.

Of primary importance is the fact that the RG Assistors now agree on the most serious problems and on what they either can or cannot influence. The detailed plans of how to achieve their most important goals are designed so that the assistors can focus their energy on the areas they have influence over. □

The proof of research and development decisions is in combat. We win or lose depending upon the soundness and timeliness of our decisions. There once was a time when we could correct bad decisions as a war went along but no longer is this true. We may no longer depend upon someone else to take the first brunt of combat, and we will not have the time to correct bad technological decisions. Now we must be right the first time. **—General James M. Gavin**

Whenever a new weapon, or a new tactical method, is introduced, it is always looked upon with the gravest suspicion. That is one reason why a study of the History of War is so important, since through it can be seen over the ages the effect on war of such novelties. Such a study shows that the human mind has been slow to grasp the possibilities of the new arrival and to adopt the tactics which will put it to the best use. In fact, as in the case of the tank, the new arrival has usually been treated as an adjunct to, and clothed in the tactics of, the older arms.

—General G. M. Lindsay

Skill Assessment
A Model for Maximizing Mission/Training Match

CPT Roger W. Pietz

CPT Roger W. Pietz is a 1979 graduate of OECS. Since graduation he has served as the OEC for the 18th Engineer Brigade. CPT Pietz holds a BS in Chemical Engineering from the Colorado School of Mines. Since beginning his military career in 1971, he has held numerous command and staff positions with VII Corps, the 79th Engineer Battalion, 1st Infantry Division, and 34th Engineer Battalion.

INTRODUCTION

The peacetime missions of many Combat Support and Combat Service Support units closely parallel their wartime missions. Units in this category often consider their daily mission accomplishment equivalent to the training an Infantry unit might conduct. This is certainly a noble philosophy, yet it is rarely executed as such and it certainly is not practical.

The Skill Assessment Model was designed to overcome the lack of practicality in executing a peacetime mission as if it were a training exercise. It can be described as a move from a "mission" base to a "training" base.

The Skill Assessment Model provides a planning tool that can:

- help units link their peacetime operations with their wartime mission
- maximize the training value derived from each peacetime operation
- define training and the leader's role in that training.

The Skill Assessment Model is not designed to replace existing training technology. It is therefore, both compatible with and complementary to the Battalion Training Management System (BTMS). Integration with BTMS training will be detailed in the last section of this article.

BACKGROUND

The Commanders of Combat Heavy Engineer Battalions and Companies often espouse the philosophy that "construction is training." It would be hard to deny that some training value is derived from the execution of a unit's construction program. Yet seldom is the maximum training benefit derived from these peacetime operations. Missed training benefit also occurs in unit motor pools, supply rooms and orderly rooms. I, therefore, feel confident in concluding that few combat support or combat service support units derive the maximum training value from each peacetime mission.

The Combat Heavy Engineer Battalion has been selected to illustrate training problems and the application of the Skill Assessment Model since it provides an easily seen example, which can then be translated to other units. This example is chosen due to the author's familiarity with Engineer units.

Typically, units setting about their peacetime missions exhibit the following characteristics:

- The understanding of the link between peacetime and wartime missions is not clear.
- Training is *not* planned into the operation.
- The "mission" becomes the number one priority to the exclusion of people, training and readiness.

An additional element of mission accomplishment is the soldier. The soldier in these units is a key ingredient in the training equation. Consider for a moment the training background and state of mind of the soldier when arriving at the unit. Initial entry training (IET) provides only a minimal level of skill for the soldier. After completion of IET the soldier takes a 30 day leave and inprocesses for one to three weeks during which time the "forget curve" sabotages the minimal skill level provided in IET. It is no wonder leaders continually complain the IET system is not doing a good job of training the soldier and/or the soldier is poorly trained.

SKILL ASSESSMENT

The Skill Assessment Model addresses many of these shortcomings. Each support mission is approached as if it were a training opportunity, not a support mission. This requires the leader to ask "who *can't* do this task?" This is an approach in direct opposition to the normal mode which asks "who *can* perform this task?"

The Skill Assessment Model is depicted in Figure 1. A mission becomes a training opportunity as soon as it is assigned. The task list is critical because it identifies all tasks composing a particular mission. Additionally, the Job Analysis step may reinforce the link between wartime and peacetime missions. The leader can ask, as he prepares the task analysis, "how does this relate to my wartime mission?" This forces a connection between the two. The Soldiers Manual and unit ARTEP are ready guides to analyze and reinforce the peacetime/wartime link.



Figure 1

In step 2, Skill Analysis, the tasks are reduced to their skill components. For example, the mission is to build a small building. One task is to erect the walls. The skills associated with this task are: use hand tools, plumbing (leveling) a vertical surface, installing a door etc. As the leader identifies each skill he analyzes the ability of each of his subordinates in each of the skills. He may use either objective test results, such as SQT results or an in-house test or a subjective analysis to determine skill level.

The analysis of skill levels is the basis for the Training Plan. The Training Plan enhances the traditional OPORD or mission order by identifying when to train what skills, who will train them, and, using the mission provided, how to train. Some tasks will require intensive training as they are accomplished, others a moderate amount, and still others no training at all. This last category being those tasks the unit can already perform to standard and requiring no further training.

Lastly, the skills are reinforced, which enables the unit to profit from the mission. Having developed the skills initially, the remainder of the mission is used to reinforce the proper execution of the skills. The unit in the building example trained heavily on the erection of the first wall (a new task for them) and it took a long time. Using the new skills, the other three walls were erected speedily with no errors. The unit now has a new set of skills that are practical and, as a by-product, the mission of constructing a building is completed. NCOs have learned the training process and trained their soldiers. The soldiers have learned a skill and completed a meaningful day's work.

The peacetime/wartime link is built and reinforced as "training" replaces "mission." This occurs in part through the use of the unit ARTEP to analyze the training components of each task, and through the more rational approach we are taking toward our daily tasks. As we learn to take the opportunity to analyze tasks for training benefit, we can similarly learn to analyze missions for training benefit.

IMPLEMENTATION

One method of implementing the Skill Assessment Model is through the BTMS Workshops. BTMS provides sound training and planning skills at both squad and platoon level. Prior to the workshop the trainee selects a project that he is either working on or will be working on. This project is then used throughout the BTMS Workshop to show the integration of Skill Assessment and unit mission. The trainee uses the new skills to help plan and execute the project. Additionally, at platoon level, the planning steps used in the preparation of the Training and Evaluation Plan can be tailored to the planning steps used in unit project planning.

In addition to the use of BTMS, actions at unit level must be taken to implement Skill Assessment. Extensive planning and transition management are required to make the move from a "mission" base to a "training" base. The unit must understand how it will function and define what it desires from the leadership once the Skill Assessment Model has been adopted. A key issue to be addressed here is "Will mission accomplishment suffer if we approach the unit mission from a training base?" This issue must be addressed on a unit-by-unit basis.

The move is a difficult one. Yet, it must be made if units ever intend to develop into a part of a combat-ready force. □



Organizational Design and Redesign: An OECS Workshop

Dr. Ben Roberts, CPT Jacky Hungerland, CPT Bill Barko (USAOECS)

During the week of 22-25 February, 1982, OE Center and School sponsored a training workshop entitled *"Approaches to Organizational Design and Redesign."* From the 45 teams applying to attend the workshop, 22 teams, including representation from several MACOMs, were selected. These teams were made up of 24 principal participants and 21 Organizational Effectiveness Consultants (OECs). The key presenter for the workshop was Dr. G. K. Jayaram, a nationally known consultant with experience in teaching and consulting on the application of techniques and approaches for organizational design, long-range planning, human resource management, job design, socio-technical systems and open-systems planning.

The workshop was the fourth in a series sponsored by OECS. The overall purpose of these workshops has been to bring together key Army leaders and their respective OE consultants to focus on issues important to the Army. Previous workshops have dealt with management of change, long-range organizational planning, and socio-technical systems design/redesign.

Photo by Bob Britsch

Group Session

According to CPT Bill Barko, coordinator of the workshop, learning objectives for this training event were twofold:

1. To provide a conceptual framework for organization design/redesign by understanding:
   a. Systems theory and its relationship to organization design/redesign;
   b. How systems theory applies to Army organizational issues;
   c. The interrelationship of technology, structure and organization design;
   d. Alternatives to designing organizations.
2. To develop action steps for an organization design/redesign effort by:
   a. Understanding key considerations in managing an organization design/redesign project;
   b. Selecting and applying methods to manage the organization design/redesign process;
   c. Developing a realistic milestone schedule for the design/redesign effort;
   d. Identifying and applying methods to resolve road blocks in a project.

Photo by Bob Britsch

BG Turner, LTC Adkinson, COL Gilkey, and BG(P) Mehl

Dr. Jayaram presented a series of lectures on the major management issues and implications in organization design/redesign. The material in each lecture was then used as a foundation for practical application planning in small group sessions. Results of the small group efforts were then reported to the general assembly for information and discussion. Small group sessions were facilitated by OECS staff: LTC Jim Berg, LTC Warren Klein, MAJ Bubba Hopkins, MAJ Mario Macaluso, MAJ Mark Olson and Mr. Bob Goodfellow.

In order to evaluate workshop outcomes, attendees responded to workshop rating checklists (where 0 = poor and 10 = very good) and survey questions that were based on the workshop learning objectives. Table 1 presents the average rating and the range of ratings assigned by attendees to workshop dimensions. Table 2 presents the number of "yes" responses (based on a Yes/No option) to the survey questions.

Based on attendees' responses, it is apparent that the workshop met its major objectives in that the majority of attendees stated they had gained knowledge of the conceptual framework of organization design and redesign and had increased their abilities to apply practical design and redesign techniques. The development of realistic milestone schedules remained a problem for many attendees. Attendee rating of the workshop content and the value of outcomes for present and long-range planning ranged from above average to very good. The consensus was that the instructional consultant, Dr. Jayaram, was outstanding and his theoretical presentations were extremely valuable.

Workshop attendees expressed some general comments

Table I
Participant and OEC Ratings

[illegible]	Participants (N = 22)		OEC's (N = 19)	
	% Rating	Range	% Rating	Range
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

[illegible]

Table II
Participant and OEC Ratings

SURVEY QUESTION	Number of Participants Responding "Yes" (N = 22)	Number of OEC's Responding "Yes" (N = 19)
1. Did you learn any new concepts or practical design redesign techniques that you didn't know prior to attending this workshop?	21	17
2. Are you now better able to understand the interrelated framework of organization design redesign in following areas:		
a. Understanding complex system components?	20	18
b. Recognizing possible potential problems in scheduling action plans, in the transition process?	17	17
c. Identifying system components within your own organization?	19	17
d. Understanding how systems theory applies to [illegible] organizational issues?	18	17
e. Understanding how to develop alternatives in designing organizations?	19	17
3. As a result of the workshop, have you increased your ability to apply:		
a. Practical design redesign techniques?	19	18
b. Techniques to identify key considerations in managing organizational design redesign projects?	20	18
c. Alternate methods of managing organizational design redesign projects?	17	16
d. Techniques to develop realistic solutions schedules?	6	10
e. Methods to overcome blocks to design or implementation of organizational design redesign projects?	15	18
f. Methods for accommodating the impact of technology in organization design redesign?	13	15

on the training and provided the following information on "Lessons Learned":

Organization Design/Redesign

- Scientific approach to organization is essential in the dynamics of Army peacetime and planning operations.
- Proposed organizational efforts must be based on sound design techniques if long-term goals are to be attained and if proposal is to receive credibility.
- Models presented allowed selective use to establish framework to address issues. The bell curve model for the life cycle of an effective organization was especially useful in how to insure better acceptance and understanding of design strategies.
- Obtained a better understanding of and appreciation for the value of organizational design and effectiveness procedures/techniques, including components necessary for a viable organization, and procedures for making corrections to organization design.
- Developed a better understanding of the systems theory of organization and the need for systems planning, including design considerations, methods of identifying and dealing with environmental influences, and the impact of information processing on organizational effectiveness.
- Received key information regarding sources of conflict within an organization and identification of where in the structure barriers to organization design might occur along with strategies for resolving or avoiding these conflicts.
- Design/redesign is a dynamic, continuous process.
- Acquired increased knowledge regarding the concepts and functions of integrating mechanisms, including the functions, processes and essential supporting conditions for integration.
- Most of the processes applicable to design/redesign are also applicable to identifying and resolving other organizational issues.

Photos by Bill Billich

Above, left: Dr. Collier. Above, right: Dr. Jayaram.
Below: Dr. Nelson, MG Anson, and BG(P) Mehl.

Management Issues

- Tough to mix valuable learning experiences with complex issues.
- Realized the need to bring key players into planning phases in order to identify their needs and perspectives.
- Unless the top searches out and then listens to the bottom, no progress is made—senior officers must learn to listen effectively.
- We need to be clear on expectations of participants and purposes of workshops we design.

In response to the interest in these issues demonstrated by the number of applications for the workshop, USAOECS is preparing a package of information describing the concepts, theoretical base and process of organizational design and redesign as they emerged during the workshop. In addition, USAOECS will continue to compile data feedback to improve the Army's concept of and approaches to organization design and redesign. □

Dr. Roberts received his Ph.D. in Social and Organizational Psychology from Penn State in 1977. Prior to joining the OECS faculty, he was Assistant Professor, Department of Psychology, University of Florida. During that period he spent one year as a project director and research scientist at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore. A recent OECC graduate, he became Concepts Development Specialist at OECS in January 1982.

CPT Hungerland is a Ph.D. psychologist with over 15 years of experience in instructional system development and evaluation, and in the implementation of organizational change within the Army. Prior to joining the OECS faculty, CPT Hungerland was Chief of the Psychology Service at Womack Army Community Hospital, Fort Bragg, NC. CPT Hungerland is currently assigned to Research Division, Concepts Development Directorate.

CPT Barko holds a Master's degree from Loyola University in Chicago. An MSC officer, he is a 1978 graduate of OECC. He served as OE consultant at Madigan Army Medical Center before joining the OECS faculty in 1980. His expertise is in the areas of sociotechnical systems design and long-range planning; he has published several articles in national journals on these topics. He now serves as Chief of Research Division, Concepts Development Directorate.

JAYARAM CONFERENCE ATTENDEES
22-25 February 1982

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Office of the Chief of Staff, Army
Washington, DC 20310

Major General William H. Schneider
Chief of Staff
US Army Material Development and Readiness Command
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Colonel Jack Gilkey
Director, Resources Management
Office of Corps of Engineers
US Army
Washington, DC 20314

Brigadier General (P) Walter J. Mehl
Director, Manpower Programs & Budget
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
US Army
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Brigadier General Gerald H. Bethke
Assistant Division Commander
101st Airborne Division (AASLT)
Fort Campbell, KY 42223

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Mr. Curtis W. Leonard
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Photo by Bob Brown

BG Bethke and COL Golden

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Chief, Management Division, DCSRM
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Dr. Jack Collier
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Colonel Paul Cerjan
Chief, HTTB
Fort Lewis, WA 98433

Major Arden M. Reed
Chief, OE Office (ATZH-TAS)
USA Signal Center & Fort Gordon
Fort Gordon, GA 30905

Photo by Bob Britsch

Dr. Tannenbaum and MAJ Yates.

Colonel Thayer Cumings
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USAIC & Fort Benning
Fort Benning, GA 31905

Lieutenant Colonel Robert Logan
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

Photo by Bob Britsch

CPT Boice, COL Novotny, and MG Schneider.

Major Gary R. Oldham
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Chief of Staff
Nebraska National Guard
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Lieutenant Colonel Stanley L. Wade
National Guard Bureau
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Colonel Michael G. McAdams
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USA Training & Doctrine Command
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Colonel John D. Smythe
DCSRM
Headquarters, Fifth US Army
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Brigadier General William G.T. Tuttle, Jr.
Director, Force Management, DCSOPS
US Army
Washington, DC 20310

Colonel Leo M. Childs
Deputy Commander
USASC & Fort Gordon
Fort Gordon, GA 30905

Photo by Bob Britsch

Registration.

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Mr. Bruce Malmont
Director, Management Information Systems
DESCOM
Chambersburg, PA 17201

Pike, Bunting, Goodfellow, and McNeill.

Lieutenant Colonel David Blodgett
Chief, Concepts Branch
HHTB
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Project Officer
Headquarters & Headquarters Company
First Infantry Division & Fort Riley
Fort Riley, KS 66442

Captain (P) Charles Andre
Headquarters & Headquarters Company
AFZN-PA-H
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Photo by Bob Britsch

LTC Berg, LTC Klein, and MAJ Hopkins
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□

Conferences As OE Targets

Jack W. Collier (FORSCOM)



Dr. Jack Collier retired from the Army in 1973 with 26 years service. He received a BS degree in chemistry from the University of Miami (Florida), a Masters of Education from Auburn University and a PhD in Education Administration specializing in leadership at Georgia State University. He has been a part of OE in HQ FORSCOM since the start up days in mid 1975.

PURPOSES

- State some thoughts on conferences and how Organizational Effectiveness (OE) consultants can use these as an intervention strategy.
- To explain the OE role in the FORSCOM Commanders Conference.

WHY CONFERENCES ARE IMPORTANT

They are frequently either decision making forums or provide information which becomes the basis for decisions by others. The next time you sit in a conference, calculate the cost per minute from the estimated salaries of those present. It is not uncommon for a small conference to cost about ten dollars per minute. It is important that the time be well spent and that there is something worthwhile as an output.

The future state is frequently discussed. Conferences are generally called to disseminate information or do some problem solving. Both of these contribute to what the future will be.

The basis for plans is determined. This can be a spin off from some decision that is made. If a consultant is in the conference, this can be recorded as a future opportunity to be explored.

Influential people are in attendance. Grade is not necessarily the determining factor here. Power people generally attend. This power can be derived from position, knowledge, referent or any other source. In any case these are people who can manage change in an organization.

Consumes a lot of the manager or commander's time. This is time that should not be abused. The Doyle and Straus Techniques of Meeting Management can make the time more productive, especially when assisting in the planning phase.

Immediate feedback of results. If the conference has been aided by the OE consultant, then credibility has been established or enhanced immediately. This can open doors to other issues to be worked on in other parts of the organization.

HOW OE CAN HELP

Select the proper time to enter the net. This can be anytime between concept of the conference to execution. The earlier the consultant starts working with the conference planner or responsible person the greater the opportunity to make significant changes.

Who to talk to. The highest official responsible for the conference would be the ideal person, but this is not always practicable. Many times some project officer has been assigned and this is the only person you are permitted to work with. Accept this and work with the person while keeping in mind what is best for the total organization.

Process to follow. Take the ideas from the person you are working with and build on these as best you can. You will meet more resistance if you resist the ideas of the person you are working with. More success will be realized if you modify and build on that which someone already has a stake in.

Use the basic O-M-R model in providing assistance. It is surprising how many experienced people continue to work this backwards. They start out with the idea that they can handle 50 people for two days. This is followed by a look at the number of topics they want presented and if they are really experienced they may get to purpose or outcomes. This process fosters mediocrity.

Evaluation. This is always a critical element because it guides us towards doing a better job next time. The most frequent oversight in evaluation is to measure what was done rather than whether the outcomes were accomplished or not.

ACTIVELY SEEKING AN OPPORTUNITY TO HELP

Scout for points of entry. In most organizations some office is responsible for overall coordination of conferences. This could be a point of entry to identify key responsible people involved in conferences.

Make personal contact with the project officer. Most project officers will welcome assistance if contact is made before decisions get locked in. After you have talked with the project officer, it would be advisable to put your recommendations for conduct of the conference in writing. This helps in assuring mutual understanding and wider dissemination of the same idea.

Look for high visibility payoff. Work on those conferences that are dealing with issues that have the greatest impact on the organization. When success is achieved others will start initiating the process they have observed.

AN EXAMPLE: FORSCOM COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

A message was sent to the field by Secretary General Staff (SGS) announcing the conference and asking for field input on what should be covered. This was observed by the OE staff and two actions were taken. An offer was made to the SGS to assist in data reduction and analysis of field input. Additionally, a memo was sent to the Chief of Staff describing the results of the previous year's evaluation and expressing the need for early announcement of expected outcomes.

The Commanding General (CG) published an outline of his concept of what the conference would look like and called the staff together to get their reaction to it. Considerable discussion occurred around the proposed agenda, but time ran out before consensus was reached on what changes should be made, so the meeting closed with the thought that the CG's guidance would be followed as existed.

The OE office had worked up an alternative design for the conference, but did not get an opportunity to explain it during the CG's meeting. It was in writing and was given to the Chief of Staff (CofS) immediately after the meeting suggesting that he give it to the CG to take on a temporary duty trip with him; otherwise an opportunity would be lost. The CofS decided to ask the CG to look the design over while he was away from the headquarters.

The CG called the CofS (from Panama) the next day issuing new guidance for the conference, which was essentially what the OE officer proposed.

The chief summoned the staff chiefs to pass on the new guidance and tasked the OE officer to put it into a briefing to present at a staff meeting. This was accomplished and all that remained was execution.

Since OE was heavily involved in the conference it was considered essential to send a memo to the SGS outlining OE responsibilities and milestones as understood. This memo came back as a tasker saying here is what you are responsible for. This made it legitimate to work with the rest of the staff in the assigned areas.

There was no magic in the whole design. Basically it reduced the amount of lecture time and increased workshop time. Maximum use was made of read ahead material and fact sheets rather than briefings. Two new ideas were used for this conference. One was a future look at FORSCOM by LTC Jim Channon and the other was the use of admission tickets which were two good ideas per FORSCOM attendee. These were published during the conference in a "Good Idea for Thought" book.

A description of the conference design follows:

General Information

The focus of the Conference was to project present day knowledge on requirements and opportunities of the future. Conference time was 170800 Nov 81 to 191130 Nov 81. Each day was a mixture of general assembly presentations and group discussion. Much information was distributed in printed form. During formal presentations frequent breaks (two each AM) were used.

Day 1 AM
CG Welcome and Overview of FORSCOM

The CG discussed highlights of the Chief of Staff of the Army Commander's Conference as they pertained to FORSCOM.

Visions of the Future

A formal presentation by LTC Channon, 9th Inf Div portraying the FORSCOM Commander of 1990 using a lot of visual artistry. He projected what some of the demands of the 1990's would be and how we might meet those demands. His briefing encouraged all to think and plan for the future. [*Editor's note: See article by LTC Channon elsewhere in this issue*].

Route of March for FORSCOM

Formal presentations by the staff on the most important things occurring now which are leading us into the future. The direction of FORSCOM "pink card" was used as a focus for these presentations and Missions I, II, III and IV were followed sequentially, highlighting the current Areas of Interest for particular points to be made.

Day 1 PM
Workshop-Training Distractors

One workshop was conducted for AC and one for RC (1 hr 20 min duration). Each was repeated one time. These workshops explained some training distractor initiatives being considered at higher levels, got group reaction and input to these, and collected thoughts and comments from the group about other initiatives. Chaired by DCSOPS and facilitated by OE.

Workshop — Sports/Competitive Marksmanship

One workshop for AC (1 hr 20 min, repeated one time). This workshop presented the two programs as they currently exist and through discussion collected information to aid decisions on what the future should be. Chaired by DCSPER and facilitated by OE.

Workshop — The Company Commander (RC)

One workshop for RC (1 hr 20 min repeated one time). Three NG and three USAR Captain Company Commanders were brought in one day early to collect their perceptions around specified areas. These were presented by the Captains to the RC Commanders who then discussed them in terms of implications for change. Chaired and facilitated by OE.

Day 2 AM
Route of March for FORSCOM

Continuation of staff presentations started on Day 1 AM.

CG TRADOC

Thirty minute overview of activities at HQ TRADOC having implications at HQ FORSCOM.

Day 2 PM
Workshop — Battalion Maintenance Management System (BMMS) and Individual Training

Two workshops for AC/RC (1 hr 20 min.) Each repeated once. This workshop presented techniques employed in 7th and 24th Div in implementing BMMS followed by questions and answers. A video tape on individual training by CG FORSCOM was shown and reactions of participants obtained. A copy of the tape will be mailed to each participant. Chaired by DCSLOG and facilitated by OE.

Reactions to FORSCOM Presentations

Two workshops for AC/RC (1 hr 20 min.) Each repeated once. This workshop was designed to get reactions to Visions of the Future and Route of March presentations from Day 1. Chaired and facilitated by OE.

Day 3 AM
New Issues Workshop

Four simultaneous workshops with AC/RC (40 minutes). This provided an opportunity for everyone to contribute questions, comments, and/or recommendations to be considered by HQ FORSCOM. A book of responses is being prepared by the staff to distribute to participants. Chaired and facilitated by OE.

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The evaluations indicated that the conference was a success. Some spin offs from the process are being used for other conferences in the headquarters. Also more assistance is being rendered with organizational issues beyond the four-step. Greater acceptance to work on more complex issues has its roots in a successful FORSCOM Commander's Conference where something different was tried. □

Effective Use of OE: An Address

LTG Julius W. Becton, Jr.

LTG Julius W. Becton, Jr. serves as TRADOC Deputy Commander for Training and as the Army's Inspector of Training. He is the Army's senior-ranking black officer, with more than 33 years of active commissioned service. He was awarded the Knight Commander's Cross, one of West Germany's highest military awards, in recognition of his accomplishments while commanding the VII Corps in Germany from October 1978 to July 1981.

The following excerpts are from the opening address given to the OE Managers Course (OEMC) held 15 March 1982 in Williamsburg, Virginia.



I have been a buyer and user of Organizational Effectiveness for a very long time.

I'm concerned that the commanders and managers—you—are not really getting a full measure out of your OE consultants, and I want to share with you some ideas and some of my concerns. Hopefully, you will take back to your home station some suggested ways to exploit the potential, the full capacity of your OE consultants. I am convinced that, if you do that and are able to exploit their full capabilities, you will make my job as the Army Inspector of Training much easier as I report to the Chief of Staff of the Army. (For those of you who are history buffs, you will know that we have not had an Army Inspector of Training since von Steuben.)

Today's Army is faced with many challenges, and each one suggests in part a potential role for the OE consultant—whether it's force modernization or Army Cohesion and Stability Study (ARCOST) initiatives. Mobilization, proponency, and all combat related operations are roles that the OE consultant can get involved in. And as you heard COL Golden say, this OE Managers Course will cover many of these during the next several days. As you know, in the past OE used to be almost exclusively the purview of the people who handle the daily personnel problems, the people managers. However, today managers and commanders are using OE as a resource which can assist with other areas, such as strategic planning, organizational design and redesign, open systems planning (that's some fancy words for identifying a future state that you or your commander thinks the organization should look like and then planning operational and organizational strategies on how to achieve or attain that state), performance management, and a systems view of organizations.

Now this sounds as though it relates back to the people aspect—the former turf for OE, but there are significant differences. Here it involves the aligning of personal values and organizational norms leading to job performance objectives. In other words, we now work with people as one component of an organizational subsystem, as opposed to using people as the total system. Here we will emphasize the critical role played by the OE manager—you— in committing the OE assets against the important issues facing your command. This workshop will certainly emphasize the importance of understanding OE program management. It will give you a better understanding of the capabilities of the graduates of the OE Consultant Course (OECC) and the many OE consultant applications. Sure, the OE folks make great facilitators and are good at it. In too many cases, they have developed outstanding expertise in facilitating simply because that is all they were previously required to do. However, we have other things for them to do now. In your notebook, at the last portion of Section I, you will find 50 possible OE consultant applications; I would refer you to those because that's just a ***start*** of the things that your OE consultants can get involved in. Each application is significant by itself and, if properly addressed, can make a discernible improvement in almost any organization. Failure to employ these OE techniques does not necessarily mean that your project (or you) will fail, but the possibility of failure is probably a bit higher when you fail to use the OE consultants.

I'd like to offer a personal example. When I took command of VII Corps in October of 1978, I found out quickly that, although I was following a very successful commander who did many things, there was no one single published list of objectives for the Corps. We had objectives from the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe; we had objectives from the Commander in Chief, United States Army, Europe; and we had another set of objectives from the Commander of CENTAG. We also had staff objectives from VII Corps. When you get down to where the rubber meets the road, at the Battery, Troop or Company level, the first sergeant or that captain commander was overwhelmed by the things that he had to do. About six months into command I published my objectives, seven things that were to be accomplished in priority. I stated early on: I don't care what anyone else tells you, these are the things I want done. I generated those seven things with my Deputy Commander, MG Will Latham, and my Chief of Staff, BG Slick Henslick. That was in April of 1979.

In June of 1979, I decided to go around and check to see how well those hard-charging 106 battalions were complying with my objectives. Of the first seven battalions I came across, three never heard of that paper, two vaguely remembered having seen it, one found it down in his S-3

shop buried in a desk drawer, and one out of seven was following something resembling my seven objectives. In July of 1979 I changed my list of objectives a little bit, modified it and said again: "Guys, get on board; get with the program!" Now let me tell you who these people were, so you'll have an idea of the caliber I am talking about. Dean Tice, Lieutenant General now, was Commander of the 3d Infantry Division; Glenn Otis, Commander of TRADOC, was then Commander of 1st Armored Division; Harvey Williams, Major General, who is now ARMR III Commander, was the Corps Artillery Commander; Bob Wagner, the 2d Cavalry Regiment; Ben Register, 2d Support Command Commander; they are all hard-charging, dedicated people. In January of 1980, which is now almost a year after the objectives were first published, I had somewhat of a blood letting with all the commanders. I said: "I've had it! I expect compliance; get with the program. These are the seven things I expect you to do." And every time, each of them said, "Yes sir, I understand that," and then went back doing the things they wanted to do. But, at least, I got the message across by January.

The following July, one year and three months after we published these very important seven objectives, I got smart. I said, "Fellows, we're going to have this Commander's Session, Commander's Call, devoted to something called VII Corps Objectives. We will start with a blank piece of paper. Now, we're going to start with the question: Do we need these objectives? And if we need them, what should they look like?" At the end of that session, we came out with seven objectives that, with the exception of some wordsmithing, looked identical to the ones that I had come up with sixteen months earlier. What was the difference? I think it's rather self-explanatory. They, the commanders, became ***part of the objectives;*** they participated in the formulation. I had OE help, something which I should have learned 30 years ago, and I did, but had forgotten about.

You and your commanders can do the same thing; fall into that trap and fail to get the support and involvement of your command. Every time it happens they can defeat the most well-thought-out program, no matter who the boss may be. I learned that and relearned it and relearned it and am sharing it with you. I might tell you that about April of 1981, now two years later, it was amazing how many company commanders, battalion commanders, brigade commanders and major commanders were saying, "These are ***our*** objectives; these are the things ***we*** want to do." They had bought into what was important. Again, your OE consultants can help you avoid that pitfall if they are properly utilized. As OE managers, it is critical that you team up with your OE consultant in supporting a commander and attacking those critical issues that the Army is faced with today.

I am going to close by sharing with you some twelve points in a Philosophy of Command that I've used for a very long time. I have been using them because they have helped me to come to grips with the things which I think are important:

1. Be professional.
2. Integrity is non-negotiable.
3. Loyalty is a two-way street.
4. Chain of command works—If we use it.
5. Innovate—Seek a better way.
6. Admit mistakes.
7. Disagreement is not disrespect.
8. Challenge assertions.
9. Be sensitive to (and intolerant of) abuse and misuse of our troopers.
10. Conservation is everybody's business.
11. Maintain your sense of humor.
12. Keep things in perspective.

I am not going to discuss them in detail, but these are the twelve things which I have used. I believe that your OE consultant can help you buy into an understanding of these kinds of things. That same OE consultant would tell you and ***should*** tell you that he or she doesn't make decisions; that's ***your*** job, the person in charge, the leader, manager, or commander.

I'm convinced that we sometimes get ourselves wrapped around the axle. We cannot see the trees for the forest. We think that the world is coming to an end. And we as managers, be it commanders at Lieutenant or General or any place in between, fail to use all the talents that we have available to us. I am convinced that OE is one of the neatest things that I've seen in the Army since sliced bread. Commanders or managers who fail to employ or maximize the use of their OE consultants deserve to get exactly what they're asking for.

Good luck in the conference. Learn all you can about maximizing the effective use of the OE consultants in your various commands. The OE folks have the capability to make a great contribution to improving the readiness of the Total Force; it's up to all of us to make that happen.□

It is surely one of nature's jokes that she so often gives an abundance of self-confidence to those who are not analytical and withholds even a smidgen of it from those who are.
—Patricia Pumphrey

False conclusions which have been reasoned out are infinitely worse than blind impluse.—**Horace Mann**

ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS
UPDATES

HQDA Updates

MAJ(P) Lew Flanders
8-227-3700

Retain ASI 5Z: After a year of staffing and a thorough review, **BG Hugo** decided to retain ASI Management 5Z for the near term (CY 82-83). During the next year further action will occur to enlarge the common ground between ASI 5Z and Specialty Code 45 (Comptroller) with a long range possibility of converting the ASI 5Z to an SSI within SC 45. Details will be given in an information letter to all commands and OEC's.

Performance Management, Army (PMA): As a result of an August 1981 meeting, the Secretary and Chief of Staff, Army decided to continue the Performance Management concept as a joint Secretariat and Army Staff effort.

The result of PMA will be an integrated strategy to provide the direction for the Army by:

a. Developing a process by which the HQDA Staff can collectively set the focus for the future.
b. Translating Army goals into specific long range objectives against which resources can be allocated.
c. Providing the vision upon which the Army Plan and POM can be based.
d. Fixing accountability and measuring progress.
e. Improving teamwork among the Secretariat and Army Staff.

On May 20th a one-day (PMA) meeting was held at Ft. Myer to review the long-range objectives for the seven Total Army goals. Future meetings will be scheduled as necessary to review progress and confirm or refine direction.

OE Plan (FY 83-84): Published and distributed to all commands a HQDA letter 5-82-1, dated 30 April 82. This plan replaces the OE 3-10 Year Plan, and guides program management actions to accomplish those tasks which are critical to achieving the overall objectives of the OE program.

Hail and Farewell: Farewell to **LTC(P) Tom Johnson.** Tom will have a slightly longer commute but shorter hours beginning August when he attends the National War College at Ft. McNair in Washington, D.C.

Welcome to **LTC Bill Landgraf** who is joining us from SETAF, Italy, via OECS Class 1-82. LTC Landgraf will be working the education and training actions in the OE program. We also welcome **MAJ Paul Keller,** who is serving 2 weeks of annual training (AT) with the OE Office in a MOBDES position. We are also very happy to welcome **Ms. Laurie Buel,** a new secretary to the OE Office.

New OE NCO Career Manager at MILPERCEN: MSG John Frye replaced **CPT(P) Rita Csonka** in April. CPT Csonka has been assigned as the senior consultant in EUSA, Korea. MSG Frye will be responsible for the selection, screening, and assignment process for all NCOs in the OE program. NCOs interested in applying for the OE consulting program should contact MSG Frye at MILPERCEN, AV 221-0327, or write to: Cmdr. MILPERCEN, ATTN: DAPC-EPZ-O, Eisenhower Ave., Alexandria, VA 22331.

MACOM Roundup

FORSCOM

LTC Mike Adkinson
8-588-3537/3538

OFFICE MANAGEMENT STUDY

We are currently working with a major staff element to determine management requirements and associated information processing needs within the organization. The major objectives of this study are to establish management goals and objectives as related to total FORSCOM missions, validate management functions and determine units of measure, establish a decision level for each functional area, identify intra- and inter-office information and administrative requirements and related information and word processing requirements, and to develop a plan to provide an interactive office management system. The study will be conducted in four phases. Currently we are involved in Phase I, data collection. Completion of the study is scheduled for May 1983. POC is Charles E. Flaherty, AV: 588-3537.

LONG RANGE PLANNING SYSTEM

We are gathering data and developing a model for a FORSCOM Long Range Planning System. The basis is that there is a need for improving the process of integrating missions, goals and objectives with the long range resourcing systems now in existence. Assessment information is being gathered from both ends of the spectrum (high and low) to determine how FORSCOM best "fits" into the planning system. If you know of some good long range planning systems in being, or have a workable model, please drop us a line. POC is Bob Hamilton, AV 588-3538.

HAIL AND FAREWELL

MAJ John K. Selfe has joined OE Staff as of 10 May 82. MAJ Selfe has completed his MS in OE at the Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, CA, and formerly graduated from OECS in 1977.

MAJ Henry (Hank) Kimner was recently reassigned to DCSPER, HQ FORSCOM. Hank's expertise in OE Program Management was responsible for many significant improvements in that vital area.

FORSCOM sadly bids farewell to a fine group of consultants who have spread their wings and are moving on to other areas:

MAJ Ford McClain, III Corps and Ft. Hood
MAJ Reggie Yates, Ft. Campbell, KY
MAJ Lee Anderson, 82nd Airborne Div
CPT Bob Bell, XVIII Abn Corps
CPT Damon Marshall, XVIII Abn Corps
CPT(P) Steve Runals, 193d Inf Bde (Panama)
MAJ Al Gimian, ARMR I HQ
CPT Paul Trahan, RG Lewis

CPT Steve Messman, RG Meade
MAJ Kenneth Rice, 4th Inf Div
MAJ Tom Banyard, RG Los Angeles
CPT Jon Weber, 11th ADA
MSG Tom Graham, 3d ACR
MSG Don Perry, 3d ACR
SFC Clyde Ellison, 4th Inf Div
MSG John Frye, Ft. Devens, MA

15-19 MAR 82 OEMC, WILLIAMSBURG, VA

Participation by FORSCOM OE Managers in the last Managers Course was the best to date. A total of 21 FORSCOM Managers took part in the 4 day course. Additionally, it was gratifying to note that 13 of the managers were from Reserve Component organizations. We hope the interest on the part of FORSCOM Managers continues, because the course gets better each time it's given.

TRADOC

LTC Bob Radcliffe
8-680-3312/3316

FY 83 Increase to OE Force in TRADOC: Personnel in DCSRM at Headquarters TRADOC have indicated that the below listed assets have been approved and applied to installation and activity TDA's effective 1 Oct 1983. Personnel requisition should be submitted as soon as possible. Contact your force development personnel in the Comptroller Office at the installation. Assets are applied as part of Program Development Increment Package (PDIP) 235 (Transaction Code P 6286).

Fort Lee (LOGCEN)	0-3
Fort Lewis (4th ROTC)	E-7
Fort Riley (3d ROTC)	E-7
Fort Knox (2d ROTC)	E-7
Fort Bragg (1st ROTC)	E-7
Aberdeen Proving Ground (OC&S)	E-7
Presidio Monterey (DLI)	E-7
Fort Gordon (DPCA)	E-7
Fort Devens (USAISD)	E-7
Fort Lee (LOGCEN)	E-7
Fort Ord (CDEC)	E-7
Fort B. Harrison (SSC)	E-7
Fort Rucker (USAAVNC)	E-7
Fort McClellan (DPCA)	E-7
Fort Eustis (USATCFE)	E-7
Fort Lee (USAQMCEN)	E-7
Fort Leavenworth (USACGSC)	E-7
Fort Dix (DPCA)	E-7
Fort Jackson (USATC)	E-7
Fort Leonard Wood (USATCE)	E-7
Fort Monroe (TRADOC)	E-7

LETTERS TO THE FIELD: Since January five letters have been sent to you in the field with subjects and dates indicated below. Give us a call if they have not been received.

8 Jan 1982	Information for TRADOC OEC.
1 Mar 1982	Service School Organizational Effectiveness (OE) Instructors' Conference, 25-28 Jan 82.
19 Mar 1982	Force Modernization Initiatives.
5 Apr 1982	Discussion Items — Interim Review Action and Planning Conference (RAPC), Williamsburg, VA, 15 Mar 82.
9 Apr 1982	Work Environment Improvement Teams (WEIT).

PERSONNEL CHANGE: MAJ Mary Mudd departed Headquarters TRADOC on 3 May for duties in the Contracting Office at Fort Eustis. MAJ Ken Rice, currently assigned as an OE Consultant in the 4th Inf Div at Ft. Carson, will report for duty on 15 June.

OFFICE TRANSFER: On 10 May, final approval was given to transfer Organizational Effectiveness under the Chief of Staff. The TRADOC Functions and Mission Regulation, manning charts and other administrative documents are currently being revised to reflect same. Telephone numbers and physical location of the office will remain the same at this time.

CHIEFS OF STAFF CONFERENCE: During the period 28-29 April, MG Blount hosted the TRADOC Chiefs of Staff Conference at Fort A.P. Hill. CPT Brosseau and I supported this effort and had an opportunity to meet each of your Chiefs of Staff. The conference seemed to go quite well and hopefully will reinforce the utility of OE support of major management conferences.

OE OPERATION CONCEPT STATEMENT: The OE operational concept statement has been written by OECS and submitted to HQ TRADOC for final staffing before going to the Commander for approval. When approved, the document will provide a concept for Organizational Effectiveness which defines the role, mission, and method of operations for Organizational Effectiveness Consultants on the AirLand Battlefield in supporting commanders and staff, before, during, and after battle by improving combat effectiveness. The TRADOC action officer is MAJ Sam McKenty, AUTOVON 680-3080.

OECS Updates

Operations and Support Directorate

LTC Ronald L. Sheffield
8-929-5919/4882

OECS student load has dropped significantly for OECC 2-82 and 3-82. One of the major reasons for this is the overfill of students in the last six classes. Remember to plan about 10 months in advance for your replacement.

As noted in the last *Communique,* OECS will lose six of its SQI 3 NCOs by November. So far, only 3 personnel have expressed an interest in being assigned to OECS. The procedures for consideration are (1) send a letter to the OECS Commandant explaining why you desire the assignment; (2) send a copy of above letter to MSG Frye at MILPERCEN; (3) let your specialty assignment person know of your desire. Before a decision is made, OECS will conduct an informal survey for recommendations for approval/disapproval of your request. You will be notified of the final decision, as will MSG Frye.

SFC Young graduated from the OECC and has now returned to her position as NCOIC of Operations and Support.

Officer assignment to OECS is difficult. OECS is at ODP at present time and is projected to stay there. However, there is a critical need for an ORSA officer. If you know of one who would work well at OECS, send me the name.

In order to reduce questions and concerns that have arisen as a result of the name change of the 16-week course from the OE Staff Officers Course (OESOC) to the Organizational Effectiveness Consultant Course (OECC), I have written a letter dated 16 May 1982 to the American

Council on Education explaining that the course has remained the same. I have asked them to change the name in future publications. A copy of that letter will be included in all future requests for accreditation from educational

Concepts Development Directorate

LTC Joe Black
8-929-7886/7106/7108

Concepts Development Directorate continues to expand its networking and liaison role, within both the Army and the civilian community. This Directorate participates actively on the Delta Force electronic conferencing net which links together over 100 personnel committed to improving the Army. A sub-net of this conference has been started to address areas of special interest to OE. This Directorate is also participating on the "ODNET" which is a teleconferencing network established by Dr. Saul Eisen of Sonoma State University, California. The "ODNET" was formed to allow consultants to share ideas and communicate electronically. It uses the GTE Telemail system which is relatively inexpensive for the quality of service. Any questions about either of these networks should be addressed to **Major Mark Olson,** Autovon 929-7886/7106/7108.

Dr. Laurel Oliver of the Army Research Institute made a liaison visit to OECS 11-13 May and provided the Research Division of CD the most recent information on the status of research projects related to OE. The Arthur Young OE Impact Study and the OEMIS project were the key subjects discussed. More than ten other research-based efforts were also discussed. The status of these projects will be reported in the next issue of *OE Communique.*

Members of the External Operation Division (EOD) recently made a presentation to the Council on Development, Education and Training of the Conference Board, and are presently consulting with TRADOC Combined Arms Test Activity (TCATA) on strategic planning.

EOD is looking for opportunities to work with organizations in major change efforts and complex systems consulting. Please call us with your ideas, opportunities and requests for assistance. We are scheduling about two months out, so please call early. We do want to help. Our autovon is listed above.

Training Developments Directorate

Dr. Mel R. Spehn
8-929-7058/7059

Quality Assistance visits (to Service School OE instructors) conducted so far this year include the Infantry School at Ft. Benning, Transportation School at Ft. Eustis, Engineer School at Ft. Belvoir, Ordnance School at Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Missile and Munitions School at Redstone Arsenal, Chemical School at Ft. McClellan, Military Police School at Ft. McClellan, Signal School at Ft. Gordon, and Institute for Military Assistance at Ft. Bragg. Proposed QA visits for the remainder of 1982 include Chaplain School at Ft. Monmouth, Quartermaster School at Ft. Rucker, Infantry School at Ft. Benning, AG/Finance Schools at Ft. Harrison, Armor School at Ft. Knox, Artillery School at Ft. Sill, Academy of Health Science at Ft. Houston, AD Artillery School/SGM Academy at Ft. Bliss, and Intelligence School at Ft. Huachuca.

RB 26-12 "Performance Management/Appraisal Conference (PMC)" has been reprinted and is being distributed. It was authored by LTC Frank Burns and Mr. Bob Klaus, with Dr. Linda Nelson and LTC(P) Bob Lander.

RB 26-13 "Management of Stress in Organizations," authored by LTC Bill Fisher, is being distributed also.

CPT Cornelius "Neno" Easter is the new OECS RETO/Leadership Officer.

SFC(P) Belasto attended the Mobilization POI Conference at Fort Benning in February.

OECS has developed an Individual Training Plan Proposal for the 16-week course that is in the process of final staffing. Mr. Bobby Baker from Fort Bliss was instrumental in the development of the planning document.

The Instructional Training System (ITS) contract for Competency Recognition Training of instructors is expected to be let at the end of June. Preparations are underway to conduct training in the July to September time frame.

Max D. Smith of Benedict College, Columbia, SC, has returned as summer-hire writer-editor.

A new piece of equipment has Visual Information Specialist **Coy Brown** pleased. Visual Graphics Corp's Pos-One 320 Camera System gives him increased options in preparing graphics.

We have received TRADOC approval to convert selected OECS training literature (ST and RB) to Training Circulars for Army-wide distribution. So far, five have been staffed with and approved by all three Integrating Centers (Ft. Leavenworth, Ft. Lee, Ft. Harrison).

OE Videotape Wins Award

One of the tapes on OE available through TASC was recently honored as the year's outstanding systematically designed ETV training product prepared by a TRADOC school.

The US Army's third annual Vincent F. DeRose Award for excellence in educational television was won by TVT 120-72 "Organizational Effectiveness - Planning." The 20-minute videotape was produced by **CPT Larry Boice** of OECS (assisted by **SFC Dik Belasto**) and directed by **Harold Hunt** of Fort Sill's Educational Television, Training and Audiovisual Support Center. **COL Harm Stryker,** Deputy Commander of Army Extension Training, Army Training Support Center, Fort Eustis, presented the award to OECS Commandant **COL William L. Golden.** The award is named after the late Vincent DeRose, formerly of the US Army Training Support Center, who dedicated his career to improving the quality of the TRADOC ETV facilities and their productions.



Photo by Coy Brown

DeRose Award Presentation
SFC Dik Belasto, CPT Larry Boice, and Mr. Harold Hunt

The award-winning program portrays a post Commander and an OE Consultant as they review assessment data, identify key problem areas, and develop an action plan to solve installation-level problems. The production emphasizes the importance of participation by key personnel in developing the action plan and dramatizes the key functions served by the OE Consultant at critical points during the planning phase of the four-step OE cycle.

Key roles in the TV tape include **Dr. Mel Spehn** as C of S, **LTC Ron Tumelson** as DPT, and **LTC Tom Forsythe** as DPCA.

Other videotapes in the same series are as follows:

TVT 120-68 "What is OE?"

TVT 120-71 "OE - Assessment"

TVT 120-73 "OE - Implementation"

TVT 120-74 "OE - Evaluation/Follow-Up."

These videotapes are available through TASC.

Being produced now (to be distributed by 1 Oct 82) are two additional tapes:

TVT 120-69 "Transition Meeting: Change of Command"

TVT 120-70 "Systems Approach to OE."

Training Directorate

CH(COL) Marion Pember
8-929-3519/4021

OE Consultant Course (OECC)

At the present time Classes 2-82 and 3-82 are in residence. Class 1-82 graduated on 30 April. Class 1-82 was one of our largest classes, with 56 students. The FTX sites for 1-82 were: Ft. Hood, Ft. Sill, Ft. Gordon, Ft. Campbell and the U.S. Military Academy. Class 2-82 will attend FTX at Ft. Riley, Ft. Dix and Ft. Lewis. Class 3-82 will go to Ft. Benning, Ft. Lee and Ft. Polk. The FTX practicum continues to be the major learning experience for students, and our clients indicate that the FTX greatly helps them in their efforts.

We continue to implement the competency model with success. The total training effort is greatly assisted by Training Development personnel who have designed each lesson plan and are looking to the future to train the faculty in competency recognition, using **interactive video** technology. The Evaluation Directorate has provided excellent internal evaluation for the course to insure we are training as planned.

The Training Directorate welcomes **LTC Boone Emmons.** He will be working in the Basic Consulting Skills Division. As most of you know, Boone comes to us from MILPERCEN as the OE Assignment Officer. He was a member of Class 1-82.

We say farewell to **LTC William R. Fisher,** the Director of Training. Bill has been the Director since 1979. Over the past years, Bill not only has managed the Directorate with success, bringing innovative changes and improvements, but also has written several articles. His latest booklet (RB 26-13, *"Management of Stress in Organizations")* has been very popular in both military and civilian organizations. On top of all this he completed his Ph.D. in Psychology, recently. Bill will assume his new duties as Professor of Military Science, Northwestern State University of Louisiana in the fall. **CH(COL) Marion Pember** is the new DOT as of late June 1982.

Leadership and Management Development Trainers Course (LMDTC)

Thus far in FY '82, LMDTC's have been conducted at three locations. Interest remains high. Remaining courses are scheduled for Europe, Ft. Devens (Jul) and Ft. Ord (Aug). Courses for FY '83 are scheduled for Ft. Sill (Oct), Ft. Eustis (Jan) and Ft. Gordon (Mar). The POC is **MAJ Steve Whitaker,** AV 929-4021/5308.

OE Managers' Course (OEMC)

The final OE Managers' Course of 1982 will be held 13 - 16 Sep 82 in San Diego, CA. Since AR 5-15, effective 1 Mar 82, mandates attendance by OE Managers, swift response to your MACOM announcement message will confirm your OEMC course slot. For those new to the OE program, the OEMC is a particularly appropriate course for supervisors of OE consultants (OE Managers) and those individuals directly charged with complex, systemic responsibilities (CG, DCG, C of S, etc.). The schedule for FY '83 is being staffed at this writing; the probable time frames are: Jan 83 - Europe; Mar 83 - East Coast; Jun 83 - West Coast; and Sep 83 - East Coast. For information on the OEMC, contact **MAJ Dave Leslie,** AV 929-2889. For attendance, contact your MACOM OE office.

Evaluation Directorate

LTC Tom Forsythe
8-929-4574/4312

Personnel changes. The Evaluation Directorate will sorely miss the services of **Major Eddie Mitchell** who departed the command in June to attend CGSC. His contribution to OE and to the Army has been significant. Good luck, Eddie.

Internal Evaluation Division. The 16-week OEC course will be evaluated six times for each class. The evaluations consist of surveys developed around competency related behaviors. The surveys will consist of a pre-survey at the beginning of the course, a post-then survey at the end, and four in-course evaluations. At the end of CY 82 classes, an analysis will be made of the pre-then-post survey results. Significant findings will be published in a future issue of the *Communique.*

External Evaluation Division. The 1982 external evaluation visits to TRADOC posts were completed in April; analysis of data is being performed at this time. The support and hospitality extended to the external evaluation teams by the TRADOC OEC's were greatly appreciated.


A Stray Calf from the "MACOM Roundup"

DARCOM

Highlights of the 1981 External Evaluation Report: An Analysis of OE Consultant Training Through External Evaluation of Field Performance

I. Method: The Evaluation Directorate, OECS, is chartered to annually evaluate the training received by OE Consultants through an examination of the work they do in the field and their resultant benefits. External evaluation follows the six-year plan shown in Figure 1.

The 1981 evaluation was to determine how well OE activities support combat units.

The 1982 evaluation of OE in TRADOC is already in progress. Each year, the following three general questions are asked:

A. What is OE doing to support mission accomplishment?

B. Are graduates satisfactorily prepared to influence mission accomplishment?

C. What are the trends in OE use by combat units?

To obtain answers to these three questions from all perspectives, the following methods were used:

A. Mail out survey to all known OEC's in FORSCOM and USAREUR.

B. Interviews of selected field OEC's, OE Managers, clients of OEC's and non-users of OEC's.

C. Examination of OECC student performance in FORSCOM units using the FTX Performance Checklists, FTX Case Studies and FTX User Questionnaires at the end of their OE operations and 45 days later.

The people surveyed represent a cross-section of positions and types of combat units throughout Europe and CONUS. A short synopsis of demographics is at the end of this summary.

To help define mission accomplishment, all people surveyed were asked the same (systemic benefits) question shown below:

Did (or can) OE operations lead directly to improvements in:

A. ARTEP Training, EDREs, FTX Efforts

B. Maintenance or equipment availability

C. Mission clarity

D. You the commander

E. Chain of command impact

F. Personnel performance

G. Unit structure

H. Relations with personnel/units outside your organization.

II. Findings

A. What is OE doing to support mission accomplishment?

1. OE/OEC's support mission accomplishment in the following systemic areas:

   a. Mission clarity

   b. Personnel (satisfaction and teamwork)

   c. Commander and chain of command

2. The most frequent operation was the Transition Workshop.

3. The newest workshop with rapidly increasing use is the Strategic Planning Workshop addressing purpose, mission, goals, and objectives.

4. OE/OEC's least often support mission accomplishment in the following areas:

   a. Structural changes

   b. Training and mobilization. OE is seen as focused on Army issues **outside** the realm of daily operations of combat units.

   c. Maintenance/logistics

5. OEC's seldom work on mobilization and are given no role in combat.

B. Are graduates satisfactorily prepared to influence mission accomplishment?

1. OEC's are well prepared in many areas. OEC users, non-users, and OE Managers are all impressed with the quality of OEC's, their professionalism, and their training.

2. OEC's need additional preparation in the following areas:

   a. OEC's are not able to easily explain results/benefits. Likewise, users do not describe or monitor the organizational benefits from their OE operations. Indeed, one-third of the users were unable to explain OE benefits to their peers or superiors.

   b. Almost all OEC's use, or are expected to use, expert consulting, especially when dealing with general officers.

   c. OEC's do not do long-range planning in developing their work schedule. The majority use a 3-month demand planning calendar. They learn how to manage their offices after arriving on station.

   d. Graduates asked for more information on Combat-Related OE and on Complex Systems to meet field demands. Some who were confident in their knowledge of the Strategic Planning Workshop remained hesitant to use it.

   e. There are two aspects to successful marketing—advertising and selling. OEC's are not advertising the practical systematic benefits and,

Figure 1

6 Year OE Eval Plan

	79	80	81	82	83	84
SAMPLE	100% SURVEY ALL SUB-POPULATION	MACOM HQ'S & SMALL CROSS-SECTION SAMPLE	COMBAT UNIT SUB-POPULATION & NG, AR, READINESS Q'S IN SEMI A ARMY-WIDE SURVEY (10%)	SCHOOLS & CENTERS	DARCOM HSC COMMUNITIES	100% SURVEY ALL SUB-POPULATIONS SAMPLE
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL OE POPULATION	100%	+ 11.6%	+ 50.6%	14%	23.8%	100%

therefore, missing opportunities to sell their services. The most **successful OEC's** (20%) explained the benefits and enough detail on procedures for the commander to clearly see the value of OE to the organization.

C. What are the trends in OE use by combat units?

1. The 3 biggest issues facing practicing OEC's during 1981 were:

a. Resistance from commanders (especially 0-5 and 0-6) who don't see the practical benefits of OE.

b. Staying technically proficient.

c. Working alone.

2. OE slots are not TO&E positions. This suggests that the need for, or use of, OE in combat is not recognized.

3. LMDCs are rapidly decreasing. OEC's are not managing a program of regular LMDC training.

4. OEC's lack some credibility outside their branch/MOS. Senior NCO OEC's, on the other hand, have credibility with most senior officers.

5. There appears to be a reluctance on the part of commanders to be "labeled" as non-users of OE.

6. Observation and interviews revealed the following major emerging environmental changes in the Army which impact on units to which OEC's are assigned:

a. Man the Force

(1) Cohesive operation readiness training (Cohort)

b. Train the Force

*(1) BTMS

*(2) Army Training Standardization Program

*(3) NTC

c. Equip the Force

(1) Division 86

(2) XM-1 Tank

(3) Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV)

(4) 100 new weapons systems

(5) Forward stationing of forces

d. Run the Force

(1) C^3 System

(2) Budget

e. Plan the Force

(1) Force Modernization

f. Fight the Force

*(1) Transition to War

**These changes were specifically mentioned by commanders during interviews.*

III. 1981 External Evaluation Demographics

A. Number of Sites Visited = 19

Europe = 8

FORSCOM = 11

B. Type Units

Army HQ (reserve)
NG Region HQ
Corps HQ - 4
2 Europe
1 ABN 1 Inf
ABN Div - 2
Inf Div - 2
Armor Div
Arty Grp - 2
Arty Bde - 2
Eng Bde
Sig Bde
Spec Forces
Supp Comm (COSCOM)
Separate Bde

C. Number OEC's Surveyed = 138

D. Number OEC's Interviewed = 57 + 2 technicians

E. Number Users Interviewed = 31

F. Number Non-Users Interviewed = 19

G. Number NCOs Interviewed = 11

H. Number OE Mgrs Interviewed =9

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This evaluation of OE in combat units was conducted by the Directorate of Evaluation, United States Army Organizational Effectiveness Center and School. The participation of the following individuals in preparing this report is greatly appreciated: LTC T. Forsythe, LTC D. Arnold, MAJ L. Edwards, MAJ E. Mitchell, SGM J. Cato, MSG W. Cudger, SFC T. deGrom, SFC R. McFarland, Dr. J. Eppler, Dr. L. Guido, Ms. L. Greene, Ms. S. Toler

The data were provided by the men and women from combat units throughout the U.S. Army. Without their valuable cooperation, this study could not have been conducted. □

Video recordings were made of approximately 24 hours' worth of presentations at OE '81, the professional development workshop sponsored by the HQ FORSCOM OE office in September 1981. Point of contact for ***information*** about the available videocassettes is the HQ FORSCOM OE office, at Autovon 588-3537/3538. Point of contact for ***duplication*** of the videocassettes is TASC TV Branch, Fort McPherson, GA 30330, Autovon 588-3350.

Organization Design and Redesign

Broad Approaches to Organization Design, Including Systems Approaches

Basil, Douglas C., and Cook, Curtis W.

THE MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE. McGraw-Hill, c1974.

Chapter 8, pp. 180-204, puts the concept of organization design into the context of change and recommends matching the design to the state of an organization's environment.

Beckhard, Richard, and Harris, Reuben T.

ORGANIZATIONAL TRANSITIONS: MANAGING COMPLEX CHANGE. Addison-Wesley, c1977.

Handbook for navigating the waters between present state and desired future state, including suggestions for appropriate management structures in the interim.

Beer, Michael

ORGANIZATION CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT: A SYSTEMS VIEW. Scott, Foresman, c1980.

Chapter 10, "Structural Innovations and Interventions," pp. 157-186, briefly summarizes change activities in the structural subsystem of an organization.

Galbraith, Jay

DESIGNING COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS. Addison-Wesley, c1973.

Offers a framework to use in choosing an organization design and presents design alternatives, with emphasis on matrix design.

Galbraith, Jay R.

ORGANIZATION DESIGN. Addison-Wesley, c1977.

Expansion of author's earlier work, DESIGNING COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS.

Galbraith, Jay R., and Nathanson, Daniel A.

STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION: THE ROLE OF STRUCTURE AND PROCESS. West, c1978.

A process-oriented approach to the linkage between organizational structure and strategy, with considerations for choosing a specific organization design.

Hicks, Herbert G., and Powell, James Donald, editors

MANAGEMENT, ORGANIZATIONS, AND HUMAN RELATIONS: SELECTED READINGS, 2nd edition, McGraw-Hill, c1976.

Peter Drucker gives a brief overview of organization design in the article "New Templates for Today's Organizations," pp. 157-167.

Huse, Edgar F., and Bowditch, James L.

BEHAVIOR IN ORGANIZATIONS: A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO MANAGING, 2nd edition. Addison-Wesley, c1977.

Chapter 10, pp. 325-352, deals specifically with structural design considerations in a systems context.

Ivancevich, John M., and others

ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND PERFORMANCE . Goodyear, c1977.

Part 4, "Organizational Structure and Process," pp. 312-474, is a well-documented overview of the workings of an organization, including its structure and its options for choosing that structure.

Johnson, Richard A., and others

THE THEORY AND MANAGEMENT OF SYSTEMS, 3rd edition. McGraw-Hill, c1973.

Part 2, "Design and Analysis," pp. 139-314, provides theory and cases based on a systems approach to organization design/redesign and the related activity of problem-solving.

Kimberly, John R., and others

THE ORGANIZATIONAL LIFE CYCLE: ISSUES IN THE CREATION, TRANSFORMATION AND DECLINE OF ORGANIZATIONS. Jossey-Bass, c1980.

Focuses explicitly on the dynamic quality of organizational progression, including suggestions for the kinds of organizational design which would be most effective for each stage in the cycle.

Miles, Raymond E., and Snow, Charles C.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGY, STRUCTURE, AND PROCESS. McGraw-Hill, c1978.

Describes and analyzes the ways organizations adapt their structure and processes in strategic response to their environment.

Mintzberg, Henry

THE STRUCTURING OF ORGANIZATIONS: A SYNTHESIS OF THE RESEARCH. Prentice-Hall, c1979.

Dissects and examines the structural elements of organizational design and then reassembles them into "natural" configurations.

Newman, William H., and Warren, E. Kirby

THE PROCESS OF MANAGEMENT: CONCEPTS, BEHAVIOR AND PRACTICE, 4th edition. Prentice-Hall, c1977.

Part I, "Organizing: Structural Design," pp. 18-132, and Part II, "Human Factors in Organizing," pp. 133-224, summarize considerations and potential for many types of organization designs.

Pasmore, William A., and Sherwood, John J., editors

SOCIOTECHNICAL SYSTEMS: A SOURCEBOOK. University Associates, c1978.

Collection of readings, including G. K. Jayaram's "Open Systems Planning," which offer perspectives on various aspects of the relationships between the social and the technical subsystems of an organization.

Stephens, James C.

MANAGING COMPLEXITY: WORK, TECHNOLOGY, RESOURCES AND HUMAN RELATIONS, revised edition. Lomond Books, c1977.

Puts organization design in the context of its interrelatedness to other considerations in complex organizations.

Sutherland, John W.

SYSTEMS: ANALYSIS, ADMINISTRATION, AND ARCHITECTURE. Van Nostrand Reinhold, c1975.

Includes organizational structure with other considerations for designing and managing systems which are capable of problem-solving at a complex level.

Sources and Resources

Lynn Dixon Herrick
Librarian - USAOECS

Feedforward

Leading off this section is an update on videocassettes which are available to OE offices for professional development use. There continues to be considerable confusion regarding methods of obtaining copies of video programs. Here's some information that may be useful in unravelling the mystery.

Most presentations that are recorded on videocassette have a relatively small intended audience. The TV Branch of the Training Aid Support Center (TASC) system which produces a program retains the master in order to fill requests for duplication of the program. Since they are in the filming and duplication business they normally do not loan out copies. In order for you to obtain your own copies, either you or your local TASC office will usually be required to supply blank videocassettes to the TV Branch which stocks the master.

A few presentations are intended for a wider audience and copies are distributed automatically to local TASC Film Libraries, which then loan the videocassettes just as they do the commercially produced 16mm films that are in their collection. A point to remember is that material which is not copyrighted may be duplicated for retention in an office collection. This involves some coordination on yourpart between the local TASC Film Library, which loans the item, and the local TASC TV Branch which duplicates it.

You've probably noticed that there's been no mention of the OE Library. That's because we are not in the supply system: we don't have master copies of any presentations, nor do we have duplication facilities. We *are* in the information "brokerage" business, however, so if you have any questions about using the TASC system to obtain videocassettes please call Autovon 929-7228.

The latter portion of this section is a bibliography of books in the OE Library collection which treat the subject of organization design/redesign. Several OE Consultants who are already involved in design/redesign activities report that their involvement has given them new appreciation for the terms "strategic" and "long-range"!

Videocassettes Available in the TASC System

WHAT IS OE? (color-20 min-1979) TASC #TVT 120-68
Basic introduction to Organizational Effectiveness theory and practice.

ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS—ASSESSMENT (color-11 min-1980) TASC #TVT 120-71

ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS—PLANNING (color-20 min-1981) TASC #TVT 120-72

ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS—IMPLEMENTATION (color-30 min-1981) TASC #TVT 120-73

ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS—EVALUATION (color-14 min-1981) TASC #TVT 120-74

Each videocassette in this series produced by OECS provides information about a specific aspect of the OE four-step process of consulting. ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECIVENESS—PLANNING received the U.S. Army's Vincent F. DeRose Award for excellence in educational television in 1981.

The point of contact for these videocassettes is the Film Library of your supporting Training Aid Support Center (TASC). Another interesting series in the Film Library system is "The Army Reports." COHESION (TASC #TAR 66) contains excerpts from a speech by U.S. Army Chief of Staff GEN Edward C. Meyer on the problems of manning the force in the 1980s.

LONG RANGE PLANNING IN COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS (color-60 min-1981)
TRADOC #9U/920-075-0373-B
POC: TASC TV Branch, Fort Ord, CA 93941
Autovon 929-3810
LTC Jim Looram, former head of the External Operations Division of OECS, addresses concerns of managers of complex organizations who are involved in long-range planning activities.

FORSCOM 1990 (color-75 min-1981)
Unnumbered
POC: TASC TV Branch, Fort McPherson, GA 30330
Autovon 588-3350
A "think piece" with a future's orientation in which LTC Jim Channon portrays the FORSCOM commander in the year 1990. Originally prepared for the 1981 FORSCOM Commanders Conference. *(See article by Channon in this issue.)*

ARMY 86 (color-length unknown-1981)
TRADOC # unknown
POC: TASC TV Branch, Fort Eustis, VA 23604
Autovon 927-4668/4764
Nontechnical summary of the Army 86 concept and progress that is being made in the transition to that concept.

AIRLAND BATTLE 2000 (color-45 min-1982)
TRADOC #7A-777-8209-B
POC: CDR, U.S. Army TRADOC, ATTN: ATDO-ZV, Fort Monroe, VA 23651 Autovon 680-3397
Projections of potential battlefield situations in the time frame 1995-2015 and the type of military force which will be required by those situations.

ABILENE PARADOX (color-120 min-1981)
Unnumbered
POC: Defense Systems Management College, Bldg 202
(ATTN: Mr. Dee), Fort Belvoir, VA 22060
Autovon 354-2388/3049
A witty presentation in which consultant and academician Jerry Harvey explores implications of the crisis of agreement, the Gunsmoke Phenomenon and the Ahso Defense.

US Army War College

ARMY COMMAND AND MANAGEMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE, 1978-79 edition. USAWC, 1978.

Chapter 3, "Structure," summarizes the evolution of organizational theory regarding structure, concluding with the systemic approach.

Weisbord, Marvin R.

ORGANIZATIONAL DIAGNOSIS: A WORKBOOK OF THEORY AND PRACTICE. Addison-Wesley, c1978.

Chapter 7, pp. 104-114, is an adaptation of the basic concepts in MATRIX by Davis and Lawrence. Chapter 8, pp. 115-123, is a summary of design possibilities for proactive organizations.

Focused Approaches to Organization Design

Davis, Stanley M., and Lawrence, Paul R.

MATRIX. Addison-Wesley, c1977.

Everything you ever wanted to know about creating and managing a matrix organization (one with a multiple command system).

Herbst, Ph. G.

ALTERNATIVES TO HIERARCHIES. Martinus Nijhoff, c1976.

Provides an overview of many forms of organizational structure and explains three non-hierarchical forms: composite autonomous group, matrix, and network.

Kolb, David A., and others, editors

ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY: A BOOK OF READINGS, 2nd edition. Prentice-Hall, c1974.

The article "Organization Design: An Information Processing View," pp. 313-322, by Jay R. Galbraith, ties organizational form to the level of task uncertainty.

Lawrence, Paul R., and Lorsch, Jay W.

ORGANIZATION AND ENVIRONMENT: MANAGING DIFFERENTIATION AND INTEGRATION. Irwin, c1967.

Chapter 9, pp. 211-245, applies the concept of differentiation and integration to the design/redesign of complex organizations.

Lippitt, Gordon L.

VISUALIZING CHANGE: MODEL BUILDING AND THE CHANGE PROCESS. University Associates, c1973.

Chapter 7, "Organization Change Models," is potentially helpful to those who wish to improve their use of models in thinking about and planning for change in the design of organizations.

Steele, Fred I.

PHYSICAL SETTINGS AND ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT. Addison-Wesley, c1973.

Reviews the functions of physical design in an organization and suggests methods for improving organizational competence through environmental competence.

Zaltman, Gerald, and others

INNOVATIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS. Wiley, c1973.

Chapter 3, "Characteristics of Organizations Affecting Innovation," pp. 105-155, includes aspects of organizational structures which affect the innovation process.

Psychosocial Aspects of Organization Design, Including Job Design

Ackoff, Russell

CREATING THE CORPORATE FUTURE: PLAN OR BE PLANNED FOR. Wiley, c1981.

Practical procedures for utilizing an interactive planning process (a sort of participative OMR) in organization design/redesign projects.

Davis, Louis E., and Taylor, James C., editors

DESIGN OF JOBS, 2nd edition. Goodyear, c1979.

Covers the past, present and future of job design principles and applications.

Hackman, J. Richard, and Oldham, Greg R.

WORK REDESIGN. Addison-Wesley, c1980.

Specifically addresses the design/redesign of jobs and work systems within organizations.

Heaton, Herbert

PRODUCTIVITY IN SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS: ORGANIZING FOR PEOPLE. McGraw-Hill, c1977.

Strongly advocates the addition of Theory Y management methods to those of Theory X in designing the managerial subsystem of service organizations.

Hunt, Raymond G.

INTERPERSONAL STRATEGIES FOR SYSTEM MANAGEMENT: APPLICATIONS OF COUNSELING AND PARTICIPATIVE PRINCIPLES. Brooks/Cole, c1974.

An articulate reminder, from a systems point of view, of the advisability of considering the people involved in an organization redesign.

Likert, Rensis, and Likert, Jane Gibson

NEW WAYS OF MANAGING CONFLICT. McGraw-Hill, c1976.

Applies the authors' System 4 participative management approach, including the "linking pin" concept, to organizational problem-solving.

Mink, Oscar G., and others

DEVELOPING AND MANAGING OPEN ORGANIZATIONS: A MODEL AND METHODS FOR MAXIMIZING ORGANIZATIONAL POTENTIAL. Learning Concepts, c1979.

Explains a "psychological design" for an open organization which functions with maximum effectiveness in the areas of purpose, internal responsiveness and external responsiveness.

Ouchi, William

THEORY Z: HOW AMERICAN BUSINESS CAN MEET THE JAPANESE CHALLENGE. Addison-Wesley, c1981.

Advocates the synthesis of Japanese and American management philosophies and organizational structures in order to increase the productivity of American corporate industry.

Schneider, Benjamin

STAFFING ORGANIZATIONS. Goodyear, c1976.

Links personnel selection and performance criteria into the overall organizational and social systems in which they function in order to see the broader picture.

Steers, Richard M., and Porter, Lyman W., editors

MOTIVATION AND WORK BEHAVIOR. McGraw-Hill, c1975.

Chapter 12, "Job Design Factors in Motivation," pp. 396-436, links employee motivation and productivity to variations in job design.

Weick, Karl E.

THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF ORGANIZING. Addison-Wesley, c1969.

Considers design to be the processes, basically similar in all organizations, by which an organization creates, maintains and dissolves its social subsystem. □

OECS Sendoff: LTC William R. Fisher

The following interview was conducted for the *OE Communique* by CPT Gayle Fix of Training Directorate, OECS.

LTC "Bill" Fisher has been a faculty member and Director of Training (DOT) since 1978, after graduation from the OE course in 1977. LTC Fisher has had a varied military background as an aviator, commander, and educator. He holds two master's degrees and a Ph.D. in psychology and has written numerous articles on organizational development. LTC Fisher departs OECS to become a professor of Military Science at Northwestern State University in Louisiana.

Communique: You've been here several years now, both as an instructor and as the DOT. Since your arrival, what changes have taken place in the direction of training for OE consultants?

LTC Fisher: In my view, the basic philosophy has not changed: we want consultants to know a great deal about people (and themselves) and to be able to develop a systems model to apply to the 4-step process.

However, we have made changes by updating content; for example, we have improved systems theory, interviewing, and facilitation skill building and have added case studies. All have been evaluated as very useful to students. The results of the 1981 field evaluation found that OEC users, non-users, and OE Managers are all impressed with the quality and professionalism and training of our graduates. Other changes include moving away from LMDC in the 16-week course, expanding the various kinds of workshops, and getting the students to see themselves in various roles: there are times to be a process consultant and times to be an expert consultant. I am also very proud that our students do so well on the practicum (FTX), and that they work at higher levels. And we have worked hard to improve our academic standards. Lastly, I did make a change that seems to be working. When I became Director in 1979, we had three divisions in Training. We redesigned and changed the structure and now have a Basic Consultant Skills Division and an Applied Skills Division.

Communique: If you had the opportunity to begin again as the DOT, what would you do differently?

LTC Fisher: I would work harder on recruiting faculty to insure a more diverse representation and on getting more outside assistance in design and implementation of our courses. This is critical to keeping the course up to date. I would have used more OE techniques within the directorate. I'm like any other boss—I get busy and the staff is too busy to team build or plan for the future, so we don't. The last two years have been difficult due to large classes. We generally have two classes in session here at Ft. Ord; we must also train LMDTC eight times a year, and conduct the OE Managers Course. I just couldn't get everyone together as often as I would have liked. We did manage, however, to go off-site about two times a year to relook our courses and plan for the new year.

I would also try to develop a common vision or purpose and get individual faculty members to accept personal responsibility for not only their own performance but also that of the organization as a whole. I've been successful when I've been able to support the purpose and vision of an organization and to get people to work as a team. I would implement an instructor competence training program and have the new instructors trained by our best instructors. I would also have liked the organization to have moved out of inclusion. But looking back over twenty years of being in organizations, I'm not sure that's possible. Lastly, I would develop a meaningful reward system for the faculty; I have not rewarded them adequately.

Communique: You've done a lot of research on the management of stress in organizations; in your opinion, what impact is stress having on the Army?

LTC Fisher: I appreciate your asking that question. When I was doing my dissertation, I found that stress may be the major reason why organizations are not effective. Some people can handle stress well; many cannot. Few, if any, combat units take the time to conduct stress management programs. But the ones that do, get a great payoff. Before people can change, they need help; the top management must say that stress and burnout is a problem and then provide assistance. It would be my dream for the Army to mandate stress management training at all levels. I have no data on what impact stress is having on the Army; however, I think if stress is not reduced and burnout not identified, organizations will have major problems.

My approach has been preventive. Once you're sick, it's too late. I also see OE as preventive. We have preventive maintenance programs for equipment but not for people. I remember that I had a logbook for each helicopter and truck in my unit and everyone inspected those books, but we didn't have a logbook on our soldiers. Why not? I would love to design a logbook for soldiers and spend the same time on them that we do on equipment. However I still have hope. I get a lot of calls from people who have read my booklet, *"Management of Stress in Organizations," (RB 26-13)* and they tell me they are starting their own personal stress reduction programs and trying to do organizational stress reduction programs.

Communique: If you were to continue in your present assignment as DOT, what primary accomplishment would you want to attain?

LTC Fisher: I would want to expand the 16-week course to 18 or 20 weeks; add more classes on evaluation, strategic planning, and implementing the competency model; encourage greater use of TVs in the classroom; expand theory classes. To stay current in this business you just have to read. I have just read Dr. Burke's "Who Is the Client?" in *OD Practitioner*, Vol. 14, No. 1, June 1982. Every OEC and OE Manager should read that article. OD is exciting because we are just on the ground floor. People like Burke get you to think. The *sine qua non* of consulting is finding out who you are working for and then building a relationship. Burke's idea of in-betweenness is what we should be teaching.

I would also make sure that we continue teaching our students about themselves and others. I don't care how good your systems model is; if you can't get in the door and build rapport, you can't get work. Lastly, I would work to get OECS, DA OE, and the MACOMs to develop a common vision and purpose. The OE community needs a strategic and tactical plan. Over the years OEC's have simply wanted to do their own thing without telling others. It's no wonder commanders are confused about what we do and

don't do. What a consultant does at one post can reflect on all of us, good or bad. I still think it is possible to get all of us to work together. Once we have common vision, we can work on performance; then we can design a useful OE course. I would also continue the OE Managers course. I look at that course as a strategic effort and one that I'm very proud of. Hopefully, I will be remembered as one of the guiding forces in producing that fine course.

Communique: What concepts or methodology should be the focus of OE Consultant training in the future?

LTC Fisher: We need to listen to commanders and their needs, not ours. We need to learn from people like W. Warner Burke, Jay Galbraith, Bill Pasmore, Peter Vaill, and others. We need to work hard in getting OE into combat units. We need to learn from the past. We need to talk about stress and health. I would like everyone—commanders and consultants—to read Peter Watson's book, *War on the Mind,* Basic Books, 1978, and then design programs to help soldiers. We must get into computers. There is so much we could do to help our Army! OE Consultants can and should do as much as possible. And as I've said before, we must work together.

Communique: Based on your years of experience, what do you see as the future of OE in the Army?

LTC Fisher: I think the future is bright if we have a common purpose, continue to train our consultants to be useful, and keep good people in the program. Why not move the OE School to DOD level? The few Navy, Air Force, and Government civilians we have had in the course have been outstanding. At the DOD level we could do more and keep the course full.

Communique: Is there anything we haven't covered that you'd like to?

LTC Fisher: Yes, I would like to say to all OE Consultants in the field and the faculty and staff here at Ft. Ord how much I have enjoyed them and the opportunity to be their teacher and friend. I love to teach, and I hope they will remember me. I look forward to being a professor of Military Science, but I will miss this place and the wonderful people in the OE profession. I have deeply enjoyed working for COL Golden. He allowed me the opportunity and freedom to conduct an exciting and important OE course. As I look back, I'm proud of the 16 graduate credits we have for the 16-week course. I'm proud of a very overworked faculty, and I'm proud of our students for participating in a field that is sometimes very frustrating but also rewarding. I hope I have made things better. □

Beetle Bailey—*by Mort Walker*

We have now at least grasped the hardest of all the truths this nation has had to learn; however remote the aggression; however distant the social or economic disasters that afflict other peoples, sooner or later we ourselves will feel their impact.
—Summer Welles

Continuing Training

LTC Ron Tumelson
(HRM, OECS)

★ **Course title:** Strategic Planning: A New Focus for Organizational Development.

Presenting organization: NTL Institute

Presenter: Dr. Peter Vaill

Tuition cost: $600 (Number of days: 6)

Synopsis: Designed to enable the OE practitioner to assist top management set basic goals and objectives more effectively and evaluate an organization's relation to its environment. Concept of "strategic planning" is explored in depth and examples of strategic planning systems are examined. Opportunities for OE interventions are identified that may make such planning more effective and efficient. Issues are dealt with in profit and non-profit organizations.

Level of training: Advanced (x) New concept (x)

Specific recommendation(s): Highly recommended for OEC with little experience in strategic planning. Instruction is designed to complement and draw heavily on the total expertise of individual consultants/managers.

★ **Course title:** Strategy Development Workshop

Presenting organization: Forum/Schrello

Presenters: Ron Smith, Ray Nienburg

Tuition cost: $595 (Number of days: 2½)

Synopsis: This program dealt with the question of the likelihood of current strategy being effective in achieving desired results in the future. Most of the time was devoted to application of a structured, step-by-step process to document current strategy and assess whether any changes are needed in light of expected future conditions. The strategy development workshop covered *strategic business planning* with emphasis on how to distinguish *strategic* decisions from operating decisions.

Level of training: New Concept

Specific recommendation: This is a highly disciplined method of arriving at business decisions as currently taught. It does not have enough direct military application to justify the cost of the training. Trying to put an Army green suit on it would not be worth the effort.

★ **Course title:** Executive Excellence in Meeting and Negotiations

Presenting organization: Precision Models, 9701 Wilshire Blvd, Suite 712, Beverly Hills, CA 90212 (In Washington, DC area by NLP Institute, 1739 P Street NW, Washington, DC 20036)

Presenter(s): John T. Grinder, Ph.D.

Tuition cost: $350 (Number of days: 3)

Synopsis: A seminar based on John Grinder's Precision Model (tm) (and Neuro-Linguistic Programming (tm) (NLP)) approach to meeting management and negotiation skills. The frame (of reference) for this seminar is the application of NLP techniques and the Precision Model to organizational behavior.

Level of training: Basic (x) Advanced (x) New Concept(x)

Specific recommendation(s): Highly recommended for OE Consultants with the outcome of increasing organizational effectiveness by explicit changes in specific patterns of organizational as well as individual behaviors.

★ **Course title:** Principles and Techniques of Quality Circle Management Procedures (QMT 082).

Presenting organization: Air Force Institute of Technology, School of Systems and Logistics, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio.

Presenters: Professors Virgil Rehg and Guy Shane, Major Russ Lloyd (very professional and experienced in QC).

Tuition cost: None (Number of days: 5)

Synopsis: The student is first introduced to the history, concepts, and philosophy of quality circle management. The student then acquires the principles, tools and techniques necessary to teach quality circle coordinators, leaders and circle members. Students also learn how to introduce, apply and implement, and operate quality circles at their installations. This course includes an effective combination of in-depth lectures, guided discussions, case studies, workshops and experiential learning exercises. Additional topics taught include group processes (e.g., conflict management, trust, listening skills, how to conduct an effective meeting) and evaluation methodology. Upon the completion of the course, students leave with the materials required to implement a quality circle program at their installation.

Level of training: Advanced, new concept.

Specific recommendation(s): Highly recommended for consultants in organizations with operating QC's or high potential for QC implementation. This staff has DoD proponency for QC's, and in addition to this course, offers a two-day senior executive workshop and is planning a QC conference to be conducted in the Washington, D.C. area during the fall of 1982.

★ **Course title:** Strategic Planning

Presenting organization: American Management Association

Principal instructors: Mr. Donald M. Cope and Mr. William S. Birnbaum

Tuition cost: $860.00 (4 days)

Synopsis: A factual, comprehensive course aimed at providing step-by-step guidance in the implementation of the strategic planning process in organizations. The week-long session was a blend of proven planning techniques, case histories, and student exercises. Key topics included: an explanation of strategic planning, how to conduct a situational analysis and environmental scan, how to develop meaningful strategic objectives, how to strategize and why, how to create action and contingency plans, case history presentations, the human aspects of planning, the development and implementation of the final plan, and current topics in planning.

Level of training: Old and new concepts, advanced.

Specific recommendation: (1) Applicability. The course material presented was very applicable to the current direction of this command. The strategic planning process which was presented has potential for use at division/installation level and higher; (2) Potential value. Recommended for OECs needing a strong background in the strategic planning process.

★ **Course title:** Planning and Control

Presenting organization: Schrello Associates Inc., Fidelity Federal Plaza, 555 East Ocean Blvd., Long Beach, CA 90802 (213) 437-2234.

Presenter: Raymond Nienburg

Tuition cost: $525.00 for 2 days.

Synopsis: Focus on steps in planning after strategic direction has been established. Highly structured approach through a series of printed forms/formats. Attempt is to slow down mental planning process through a snapshot view of each step. Case study of manufacturing plant used as vehicle for practical exercise. Company teams are formed from participants. Process stressed versus content.

Level of training: Basic level. Old concept but some good "tools" for capturing data are used.

Specific recommendations: The highly structured approach using multiple forms is tedious. Workshop oriented towards private sector business and employs much business jargon/concepts. May detract from basic learnings applicable to Army OE consultants. Concepts are not new and if presented in same manner as workshop to military would probably meet with resistance. Not recommended for most OE consultants who have been working for more than 6 months.

★ **Course title:** Managing Personal Stress and How to Do Stress Training.

Presenting organization: University Associates.

Presenter(s): John D. Adams, Ph.D. and Lawrence Porter, Ed.D.

Tuition cost: $250.00 (Number of days: 2)

Synopsis: Personal stress management discussions and demonstrations included biofeedback, the physiological and psychological effects of stress, and how strain relates to stress. Other topics included lifestyle change, personal planning, and a framework for stress management. The day ended with Yoga and a relaxation (meditation) exercise. The second day we focused on the "How To" of designing and conducting stress training.

Level of training: Basic(x) New concept(x)

Specific recommendation(s): Highly recommended for OECs having a need to design and conduct a stress management program for a client organization.

★ **Course title:** How To Do Stress Training.

Presenting organization: University Associates.

Presenter: John D. Adams

Tuition cost: $150.00

Synopsis: An overview of Stress Management Workshops of various time durations, designs, technologies, tools, and resources for stress training. Introduces instruments for measuring job related stress, personal stress, and family related stress; meditation and other stress-reduction exercises; films for stress reduction; biofeedback techniques. An exercise in which groups of participants constructed a stress workshop module. Course literature consisted of a text, a workbook, and a handbook.

Specific recommendations: Workshop was beneficial; however, I learned nothing new regarding workshop construction that I had not learned at OECS. The main value was the "content" matter which was presented.

★ **Course title:** "Futuring"

Presenting organization: National Training Laboratory.

Presenters: Ronald Lippett and Edward Lindaman

Tuition cost: $500.00

Synopsis: Presentation by Edward Lindaman on the philosophy and principles of futuring; explorations of case studies of long range and short range planning designs; specially designed personal experiences of futuring, with emphasis on value decisions involved; back home design projects using the techniques of action planning developed by Ronald Lippett. There was daily conceptual work, skill practice, and back home planning.

Level of training: Advanced; new concept.

Specific recommendation(s): A process for assessing potential impact of possible future events on a given organization. It provided methods for OE consultant use in organizational diagnosis and creative problem-solving.

★ **Course title:** Positive Power and Influence

Presenting organization: NTL Institute

Presenters: Diana Harrison and Jim Kouzes

Tuition cost: $722.00 (Number of days: 5)

Synopsis: The workshop allowed participants to experience, by role-playing, different influence styles and increase influence skills. We were able to action plan strategies for dealing with situations within our own workplace/organization.

Level of training: Advanced(x) New concept(x) Old Concept (x).

Specific recommendation(s): The skills learned in this workshop will be helpful to OECs when doing any type of OE operation. They are especially helpful when an OEC has to assume the role of expert consultant. Recommend that OECS teach influencing skills to their students. □

U.S. Army Organizational Effectiveness Center & School
Fort Ord, California

OE Consultant Course 1-82
Graduation - 30 April 1982

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