

Vol. 6 - No. 3
1982

OE

COMMUNIQUE

The Professional Organizational Effectiveness/Development Publication of the U.S. Army



**BE ALL YOU CAN BE:
IMPLEMENTING THE SEVEN TOTAL ARMY GOALS**

Major General William S. Augerson, graduation speaker, congratulates Phil Behnke and Gabby, members of OECC #1-82.

Be All You Can Be:

Blind veteran completes OECS

Article reprinted from Ft. Ord Panorama, June 17, 1982.

by Robert B. Britsch and Max D. Smith

When Phillip R. Behnke received his diploma from Fort Ord's Organizational Effectiveness Center and School April 30, he astounded his original skeptics. The rumblings of doubt and concern began in January when Behnke arrived at OECS for the 16-week course that trains organizational effectiveness consultants for the Army.

There had previously been a few civilian students at OECS, but never one like this Paterson, N.J. native now living in Pompton Lakes, N.J. with his wife, Dorothy, and four daughters, Maureen, Eileen, and twins Jennifer and Colleen. Behnke is blind!

He had not always been blind, and he had never planned to become an expert in the effective management of organizations and personnel. In fact, Behnke had completed nine years toward his NCO Army career when he had to take a medical discharge in 1968 because of his eyesight, which had been gradually diminishing since childhood.

After then completing an undergraduate degree at Ramapo College and a Master's from Seaton Hall University at South Orange also in New Jersey, Behnke applied for a Civil Service job at Picatinny Arsenal under the disabled veteran program. He worked in the alcohol rehabilitation program for a short time but was transferred to the arsenal's OE section. He was not enthusiastic about the change since he did not know much about organizational effectiveness and

was not confident in it.

However, his boss had a long talk with him and told him there was an opening for an OE consultant, which he thought Behnke could handle after receiving the proper schooling.

And that is how the former 82nd Airborne Division soldier and his seeing-eye dog, Gabby, came to be at Fort Ord last January, and was greeted with concern and skepticism.

Quickly solved were the immediate considerations such as living quarters, care of a dog, dining facilities, and transportation to and from class. The 16-week course, however, is complex and highly visual at times. The wide spectrum of topics covered such things as intrapersonal dynamics and self-reliance, group development theory and practice, communication skills and effective feedback.

Written examinations, a course paper, and field training practicum with written case study further complicated Behnke's chances for success.

However, two things aided him. Gabby, his seeing-eye dog, did more than just provide Behnke with confident mobility; it also served as an "ice breaker," since the other students often wanted to pet the dog and had questions about its training five years ago at a Morristown, N.J. training center.

Another assist to Behnke's sight was a new computer-type instrument that scans printed material and transmits electronic impulses of the letter shapes through the fingertips. Although

Behnke is just learning to use the machine, with experience he will be able to read up to 60 words a minute.

Behnke's skills and enthusiasm for hard work and fun soon became apparent at OECS. Within two weeks, his assigned mentor, Dr. Jerry Eppler, noted that one of the most significant skills Behnke possessed was in getting the students in small group sessions to focus on matters affecting their feelings as well as their minds. He was also skilled at helping the group discriminate between content and processes for achieving that content.

According to Eppler, Behnke stated in his course paper that he learned more during his OE training than he remembers learning in all of his formal schooling, including his Master's and that he took risks and looked at his self-defeating behaviors, changing them in small group settings.

The last major hurdle Behnke had to overcome was the practical application of the knowledge, skills and attitudes acquired during his OE training. This phase of Behnke's training was supervised by Ch. (Col.) Marion D. Pember.

Behnke and a partner worked with a property control branch of supplies and services, designing a training program and presenting a communications workshop. Pember soon noticed one possible advantage Behnke's blindness provided: "After seeing Phil's interaction with people he met for the first time, I felt he appeared disarming and non-

threatening. He may very well get a lot more information from clients than those of us who can see and are perceived as more of a threat."

Pember was also impressed with how perceptive Behnke was and how he has an awareness of things around him a person with sight takes for granted. He is extremely sensitive to movement, sounds, and the closeness of objects. Pember said Behnke's most noticeable limitations were the inability to detect and interpret facial expressions and non-verbal communication between members of a group. He observed that with an OE partner, these limitations should not pose a problem.

"I never heard Phil complain or ask special favors or privileges," Pember added. "He speaks as we do, using visual terminology, and at times makes jokes around his blindness."

When asked how he felt about having future handicapped students attend OECS, Pember replied, "If a person has met all other requirements, then a handicap should not prevent one from attending the course. However, if applicants do not meet all the requirements, they should not be accepted just because they are handicapped. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits."

Dr. Eppler, Behnke's academic mentor, agreed. "Phil Behnke will be an excellent OE consultant because of his commitment and enthusiasm to learning. He can now do anything a consultant needs to do to accomplish the mission."



U.S. Army TASC Photo by Bob Britsch

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

Organizational Effectiveness Center and School Fort Ord, California

Issue No. 3 - 1982

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The OE Communique

The *OE Communique* is published quarterly under the provisions of Chapter 5, AR 310-1. The Mission of the *OE Communique* is to provide state-of-the-art information on the application of the Organizational Effectiveness (OE) process in units and organizations throughout the Army. The *Communique* seeks to provide a forum for the exchange of innovations and lessons learned in the use of OE techniques and to foster the development of research and evaluation methods for determining the contributions of OE to combat readiness. The *OE Communique* endeavors to develop closer ties with all OE Consultants and to provide a supplement to their continuing training. A major objective is to provide commanders and military and civilian leaders at all levels with practical and timely information for use in initiating and sustaining OE operations.

Unless otherwise specifically stated, the opinions and conclusions expressed in the material presented in this publication are the view of the author and do not necessarily reflect official policy or thinking; publication herein does not constitute endorsement by any agency of the U.S. Army or Commander, USAOECS. Unless otherwise indicated, material may be reprinted if credit is given to the *OE Communique* and the author.

The use of masculine pronouns to refer to both sexes has been avoided in the *OE Communique* whenever possible. An author's pronouns are used, however, when editorial changes might result in introducing unintended nuances.

Beetle Bailey cartoons are adapted and used with permission of the artist, Mort Walker.

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CONTROLLED CIRCULATION POSTAGE RATE

Controlled Circulation postage paid at Sacramento, California.

**OECS 24-hour answering service:
AUTOVON 929-2606**

(Leave a recorded message which will be responded to during the next duty day.)

Table of Contents

Implementing the Seven Total Army Goals
BG(P) Victor J. Hugo, Jr.

**Total Army Human and Leadership Goals
(An introduction)**
LTG M.R. Thurman (DCS PER)

The Human Goal
MAJ Barry A. Berglund (ODCS PER)

Army Leadership Goal
LTC Norman L. Grunstad (ODCS PER)

The Materiel Goal
LTG Richard H. Thompson (DCS LOG)

The Army's Management Goal
LTC James E. Thomas (COA)

Toward a High Performing Fort Dix
MG Robert H. Forman (USATC and Ft. Dix)

Managing By Goals (Problems for the Army Organization)
CPT Louis P. Cantolupo (Korea)

Goal-Setting and Implementation (A Training Model)
CPT Louis P. Cantolupo (Korea)

Battle Staff Process of Dispersed Command Post with SPADS
MAJ Dan McGrew and
Ms. Martha Jutte (V Corps)

A Commander's Guide to Division 86
MAJ Elwyn V. Hopkins (OECS)

Recruiting the Future (Management Development in an Army National Guard Recruiting Force)
MAJ Darry D. Eggleston (NG)

Mind, Body, Spirit: Total Soldier Wellness
LTC John Alexander, MAJ Jeff Anthony,
MG William S. Augerson, Dr. Jerry Eppler,
LTC(P) Tom Johnson, MAJ Mark Olson,
Ms. Lilith Ren, and John Le Bourgeois

Androgynous Behavior in Leaders and Consultants
Dr. Janis Day and Dr. Jerry Eppler (OECS)

Management and the Sexes: Toward a Middle Ground (book review)
Marc E. Miller (Management Review)

How Women are Recasting the Managerial Mold
Genita Kovacevich-Costello (San Jose Mercury News)

Commandant's Comments
COL William L. Golden

Editor's Page
CPT(P) Lawrence R. Boice

OE Program Management Model
LTC Warren I. Klein and
LTC Thomas K. Forsythe (OECS)

OE Consultant's Guide to Implementation of WEIT
SFC Wayne Reed (OECS)

Doubling Your Consulting Impact
MAJ Eddie Mitchell (CGSC)

How to Make OD Work Better For Your Organization
Robert W. Bauer (Management Review)

When the Balloon Goes Up
CPT Nancy L. Freebairn (WESTCOM) and
CPT Glenn M. Hulse (SETAF)

Continuing Training
LTC Ron Tumelson (OECS HRM)

Sources and Resources
Lynn Dixon Herrick

OECC Class 3-82 Roster

OE Updates

COMMUNIQUE OF THE COMMANDANT

COL William L. Golden

My comments this time are short; Major General Hugo introduces well the theme for this *Communiqué*. I will supplement his remarks briefly.

A funny thing happened on the way to organizing the contents of this Total Army Goals issue: the table of contents did not separate neatly into seven categories, as originally intended. The interrelatedness and overlapping nature of the subject matter submitted should be no surprise to advocates of a *systems* view. Articles seeking to address one of the goals inevitably contain implications for all the goals.

We didn't set out to "create" articles on each of the seven goals. Rather, we invited the readership to write on the announced theme and then published what came in. If certain goals seem over- or under-treated herein, that may tell us something useful about ourselves. Either consultant-authors are more involved, or more enamored, with some goals than with others—or, the would-be writers are so intensely dealing with certain goal implementation strategies that they haven't taken the time yet to document and submit their work. To the extent that the latter is true, future *Communiqué* issues will continue to reflect such work.

One of the topics discussed at the OE Review and Planning Conference (RAPC) in August was the requirement for each command to report progress toward achieving each of the Total Army Goals. In that



spirit, future articles on this theme are encouraged and anticipated.

The *OE Program Management Model* article, by LTC's Warren Klein and Tom Forsythe, provides excellent guidance for commanders, program managers and consultants. Its aim is to ensure that each command OE program is best organized and functioning to render optimal support towards implementation of the Total Army Goals. The article is organized around the basic O-M-R model. That the O-M-R is a time-tested and effective, if not *original*, model is attested to below:

The only way to achieve true success is to express yourself completely in service to society. First, have a definite, clear, practical ideal—a **goal**, an objective/*outcome*. Second, have the necessary means to achieve your ends—wisdom, money, materials and **methods**. Third, adjust all your means **resources** to that end. —**Aristotle****

The "Planning for Organizational Effectiveness" calendar is back by popular demand, and is early, as requested. It contains 14 months, for longer-range organizational planning.

In closing, here are some behavioral reminders for all who seek to improve the effectiveness of military organizations:

1. **Be yourself.** Cultivate desirable qualities.
2. **Be alert.** Look for opportunities to express yourself.
3. **Be positive.** Determine your *goal* and the route to it.
4. **Be systematic.** Take one step at a time.
5. **Be persistent.** Hold to your course.
6. **Be a worker.** Work your brain more than your body.
7. **Be a student.** Know your job.
8. **Be fair.** Treat others as you would be treated.
9. **Be temperate.** Avoid excess in anything.
10. **Be confident.** Have faith that cannot be weakened.

— Everett W. Lord**

**From *The Forbes Scrapbook of Thoughts on the Business of Life*. New York: B.C. Forbes and Sons, 1976.



CAPT (O-6) Ernest V. Haag, United States Navy (right), is congratulated upon his graduation (3-82) from the U.S. Army Organizational Effectiveness Center and School (OECS) by Commandant William L. Golden during ceremonies at Ft. Ord, CA. CAPT Haag, formerly with OPNAV 643 in the Pentagon, is the highest ranking officer from another Service to graduate from the Army OECS. His present assignment is with Headquarters, Human Resource Management Detachment, Naval Air Station, Alameda, CA.

Sign in an executive office: "What I am about to say represents one four-billionth of the world's opinion."

— Jack Williams
Phoenix Gazette

Guidelines for Aspiring Authors

WHO READS *OE COMMUNIQUE* AND WHAT DO THEY WANT TO READ?

Here's a thumb-nail sketch of the readership and its needs, based on the early returns on our recent readership survey: [FLASH! Your *Reader Response Form* was included with issue #2-82, between pages 60 and 61. If you haven't done so, please fill out and return it!]

Half are *OE* Consultants, a fourth are commanders or field grade staff officers, and a fourth are federal service or civilian executives, academicians, or OD practitioners. All major commands (MACOM's) and most federal agencies are represented among the readership.

WHAT DO THEY READ?

Half of the audience reports reading every article in every issue; most of the others read several, or most, articles in each issue. The sections normally read include: All (cover to cover), 40%; Special Feature Section, 97%; Updates (DA, MACOM, OECS), 79%; *Communique* Interview, 75%; Commandant's Comments, 70%; Sources and Resources, 69%; Editor's Page and Letters to the Editor, 65%; and Page-filler quotes, 63%.

In *past* issues, the most popular topics have been: **Leadership** (especially articles by Zais, M. in issues #1-82 and 2-82, and Burns, F. in issue #2-82); **Organizational Planning and Complex Systems** (especially Pike, G. in #2-81 and Looram, J., et. al. in #1-82); **The Future** (especially Channon, J. in #2-82 and Goodfellow, R. in #4-81); **OE in Combat** (especially Augerson, W. in #2-82); and **Communique Interviews** (especially with General Officers, issues #2-81 & 2-82).

On the first 100 surveys returned, over **70** different articles were mentioned at least once as being **the most** beneficial! Obviously, readership needs are diverse.

HOW USEFUL DO READERS FIND THE *COMMUNIQUE*?

On a scale of 5 to 1 (5 = highly useful, 1 = not useful), readers so far have given the *OE Communique* a mean rating of 4.5, in terms of usefulness to them in their jobs.

WHAT TOPICS SHOULD WRITERS FOCUS ON FOR FUTURE ARTICLES?

Readers are requesting more emphasis, in future issues, on the following themes: The future Army and *OE*, new *OE* technologies, techniques and innovations; Evaluation, validation, and follow-up of *OE* operations (specific techniques); *Practical* information on what other *OE* Consultants are doing in the field (successful workshop designs); Leadership, followership, subordinate development and *OE*; Strategic planning; and Senior Army leaders' perceptions (systemic challenges for *OE*, especially in support of Total Army Goals).

WHAT WRITING STYLE AND ARTICLE LENGTH IS ACCEPTABLE?

Be *direct* to be effective; *Communique* readers are busy, practical-minded people. Use of *jargon* is discouraged (If you can't rephrase it, maybe you don't understand it, either). Spell out acronyms the first time you use them. Avoid sexism; not all *readers* are male, nor are all

commanders male. (Hint: To avoid repetitious use of "she or he", "she/he", or "s/he", use of *plurals*, such as "they," is encouraged where possible).

Acceptable length is determined by the topic and the relevance of the article. As of next issue, the *Communique* becomes a 64-pager, so space is always a precious commodity. Be concise but complete in presenting your material.

WHAT ELSE SHOULD AUTHORS KNOW ABOUT SUBMISSION?

Send an original and one copy, if possible. **Both should be typed and double-spaced.** All charts, graphs, tables and references should be on separate pages at the end. Inclosure of a short biographical sketch and black and white photograph is encouraged.

WHERE SHOULD SUBMISSIONS BE SENT?

Send all submitted material to:

USA OECS
ATTN: *OE Communique*
Fort Ord, CA 93941

HOW LONG DOES IT TAKE FROM SUBMISSION TO PUBLICATION?

Cut-off dates are normally 3 months prior to publication. Articles are sometimes held another 3 months if the context is more appropriate for the following theme issue, or if space does not permit immediate publication. (Often, submitted material *determines* the theme, rather than vice versa). Questions? Please call AV 929-7058/7059. Commercial is (408) 242-7058/7059.

*For those who are wondering, the "(P)" stands for "perpetual."

Dear Larry,

I want to thank you for publishing the Significant Activities of the 82nd in the recent issue of the *Communique*. What I failed to include in the letter were the names of my fellow consultants, who were as responsible for all those Significant Activities as were myself and Colonel Plummer. If you would, in the next issue please make mention of them.

MAJ Lee Anderson—Chief 82nd OECT
CPT Ben Clawson
SFC Jesse Laye

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Implementing the Seven Total Army Goals

MG Victor J. Hugo, Jr.

MG Victor J. Hugo, Jr. has been the Director of Management, Office of the Chief of Staff, Army since 30 June 1981. Some of General Hugo's key duty assignments in his more than 28 years of active military service include Staff Officer in the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Commander, 16th Air Defense Artillery, XXIV Corps Artillery, Vietnam; Commander, 16th Air Defense Artillery Group, Highlands, New Jersey; numerous positions on the Army General Staff including Executive to the Chief of Staff, Army; and Commanding General, 38th Artillery Brigade (Air Defense), Korea. He graduated from the United States Military Academy at West Point in 1954 and earned Master's Degrees from the George Washington University in 1966 and the University of Southern California in 1977.

The theme of this issue, "Implementing the Seven Total Army Goals," is timely. These goals, and the Total Army mission they support, mutually provide the vision and direction for the Army of the future. They are being used to guide our efforts as leaders and managers. We will use them to provide focus to our planning and programing as we prepare for that future. I want to expand on the overall context of the goals and the process we plan to use to make them a reality, and, from my perspective as the proponent for the OE program, to discuss likely implications of that process for OE in general.

The seven goals were derived from the desire of both the Army Secretariat and Staff to work as a team to achieve common ends and to provide coherent guidance to the Total Army. That guidance is provided by the merger of the agreed upon goals and our institutional values stated in FM 100-1: loyalty to unit and institution, selfless service, and self-responsibility. Together they form the foundation for our policies and operating procedures, and the basis of decentralization.

The organizational implementation of the 7 goals entails some basic changes to the way we have done things in the past. Over time we have sacrificed planning for programing and, as a result, gradually lost sight of desired outcomes in the resources allocation process. We now have the opportunity to reorient our thinking and procedures, but we must do this in a planned, systematic way. The process we are using to guide our organizational changes is ***Performance Management Army (PMA)***. That process allows our top leadership to focus on these types of issues: providing future vision, values, and policy guidance; establishing desired goals and direction, and then actively engaging in the planning and controlling functions; and, deriving priorities so that subsequent decisions create the most effective Total Army. In order to stay on track and to consciously manage changes in the system, the PMA process incorporates these features:

- The integration of Army Secretariat and Staff efforts to provide coherent guidance and improved teamwork among civilian and military leadership.



- A managed method to ensure that resource allocations are considered in accordance with goals and priorities.
- A means of control that fixes responsibilities and provides the opportunity to measure actual versus planned progress.
- A system to ensure top-level commitment to the management of changes in procedures so that we remain adaptable to environmental changes. This is top-down managed evolution.
- A focus on the Total Army.
- The involvement of major subordinate commands in the planning and programing processes so that ensuing policies and resources are aligned with Total Army Goals and are thus appropriate for the Total Army.

The last point gives all of us involved with OE an active role in helping our local commands and staffs as they implement the goals. The entire PMA process can be replicated at any level; organizational goals, purposes, and priorities need to be clear and understood. In addition, if we are to optimize our total system effectiveness, local commands need to align their goals and objectives with those of HQDA. Once this is done and leadership roles and responsibilities are clear, then resources can be employed effectively so that we make possible the right kind of Total Army.

As you read through the content of this issue, I hope you gain the same sense of optimism that I have about our dedication to becoming an Army of excellence. Our commitment to institutional values and core missions will guide our achievements as we deal with the complex and accelerating changes that face us. The systematic implementation of the seven Total Army Goals will ensure that we become the best Army possible—the American people expect and deserve no less. □

Total Army Human and Leadership Goals

Foreword

The Human and Leadership Goals are central to accomplishment of the Army's mission. While each of the seven goals is important in its own right, these two speak to the cornerstone of our Army—its people.

I am excited by the challenges contained within the framework of these goals. As you will find from reading the brief articles that follow, we have prepared strategies for their implementation. Specific supporting objectives are being developed to focus on necessary policy or resource changes to make the goals happen.

Much effort and teamwork remain, but building an Army of excellence is well within our grasp. Together we can make these goals a reality.

M.R. Thurman

Lieutenant General, GS
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel



The Human Goal

MAJ Barry A. Berglund
(ODCSPER, HQDA)

"A Total Army composed of military and civilian professionals who loyally serve their nation in rewarding careers."

Attracting and retaining high quality Total Army members is key toward insuring that service in the Army remains a way of life and not just a job. This commitment to a profession is accomplished by striving to provide all members meaningful and satisfying duty, adequate living and working facilities, equitable compensation, professional development, advancement opportunity and wholesome family life. Success in these and similar efforts will provide credence that the Army believes that people are our most important resource.

Our Army is people. It always has been. It always will be. Yet somehow over the years we as a nation became more focused on the flash and glitter of machinery and "things," and relegated people to a category along the same plane as our hardware. "If it breaks, get it fixed—or better yet get a new one."

People are not disposable. They are not commodities. They don't have shelf lives or expiration dates. They have needs, emotions, aspirations and a never-quenched thirst for pride, esteem and belonging. Wearing a common uniform or swearing an oath is not enough. There must also be a common understanding that what we are doing is important, purposeful and appreciated.

The Human Goal seeks to refocus our energy. It speaks to a mutual commitment. It demands loyalty, professionalism and commitment from the Army's military and civilian team. It recognizes that there is no higher technology than the human spirit. It is the very foundation for the other Total Army Goals. It belongs to us all.

We share responsibility for the Human Goal. For ourselves. For each other. The heritage of our Army is steeped with examples of a willingness to place the greater good ahead of personal interest or self-glory. In the not too distant past we as a nation and Army temporarily forgot this. Yet, our values of service, responsibility and loyalty endured. The Human Goal seeks to cement these essential values.

How do we implement the goal? First we recognize that it will not be accomplished by one office, by a study group or a committee at the Pentagon or anywhere else. The Human Goal cannot be "tasked" to one individual. Army policy which supports the goal must be written. Policy which does not must be ferreted out. Resources need to be obtained and distributed.

A goal strategy will be outlined and put into operation. Thus far, the strategy seems to fit into three basic categories:

First, we must do an even better job in meeting the basic needs of those who serve our Army than we have in the past. While we have traditionally placed much of our emphasis in these fundamentally important areas, work remains to be done. For example, the places in which we live and work must meet at least minimum standards, our compensation

system must be fair, and our medical system second to none.

Second, the sense of belonging to a purposeful organization needs to be elevated. We know that a tightly knit, cohesive unit produces committed, motivated soldiers. Duty must be meaningful and satisfying, opportunity for professional development and advancement recognized, cohesion technology developed and exported to our units, and human problems resolved within the capability of the unit. We must also develop and implement policies which return our soldiers to society equipped with the necessary skills and attitudes to make further contributions to the Nation.

The ultimate intent is pursuit of an Army of excellence and high performance. A positive spiral can be created which will widen and grow when we provide people with the experience of individual and unit success. This success will be built by such initiatives as executive leadership programs which are designed to provide senior leaders with new concepts and techniques for developing high performance. In addition, a mechanism can be constructed to formulate strategies for increased human productivity. Research and development on human technology can and will be elevated and focused together with that of our hardware and equipment.

The goal speaks to the human spirit. It recognizes that the success of an Army ready for combat depends upon the total readiness of people, machinery and doctrine—closely fitted and unified in common purpose. The task of setting forth a strategy and implementing it will be dynamic and exciting. The end result will be a new morale, a new determination and a new spirit.

General of the Army George C. Marshall spoke to this state of mind:

It is staying power, the spirit which endures to the end—the will to win. With it all things are possible; without it, everything else—planning, preparation, and production—count for naught.



Beetle Bailey—by Mort Walker



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Army Leadership Goal

**LTC Norman L. Grunstad
(ODCSPER, HQDA)**

"A Total Army whose leaders at all levels possess the highest ethical and professional standards committed to mission accomplishment and the well being of subordinates."

Leadership is an art—the human influence process that welds individuals into cohesive units committed to achieving the assigned mission. Competent, effective leadership is the Total Army's key to success in training and success in the ultimate test—combat. Total Army leadership is founded upon the time-tested principles of leadership and is intended to develop in all members the enduring values of:

- Loyalty to the Nation and its heritage
- Loyalty to the Army
- Loyalty to unit
- Selfless service
- Personal responsibility

Back in August of 1981, the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff, sent a signal to all Army leaders to start getting their thoughts together for a mainstream effort on leadership. They made leadership an Army goal—one of the seven Total Army Goals that give purpose and direction to the institution. Giving purpose to an institution as large and complex as the whole Army is something our senior leaders do not do casually, or often, so it grabbed our attention right away.

The first reactions were predictable, "They're dead serious!" . . . "This is important!" . . . "What do we do now?" The answer to the last question came quickly: "Formulate a vision and a strategy; get into the resource stream and implement this goal."

The vision and philosophy came first. About 100 people who care a lot about Army leadership met at Carlisle for a week in March. It was electric. Slowly, the idea evolved that there is only so much energy available in an organization. What we spend

reacting to or protecting the "system," just to keep the house from falling down, is not available to be adventuresome, creative or innovative. The latter is the kind of energy the leadership of the organization needs to do what it must do and be what it can be.

How to get that kind of energy dispersed down through the levels of the organization is more of a mind-set than a method. Senior leaders have to push it down, share the power with those below, empower subordinate leaders to do what they already know needs to be done. That became the vision—getting that power, that creative energy, down where it can make a difference.

Implementation was still a long way off, at this point, so the real work began.

To get resources, we had to enter the Army's Planning, Programming and Budgeting and Execution System (PPBES). The process that presently links the planners and programmers is the Mission Area Analysis (MAA) Process. We decided to use this process both because of the linkage with PPBES and because of its inherent logic as an analytical format. The process simply triggers the user to ask, and answer, three questions:

- a. **Where are we now?**
- b. **Where are we going?**
- c. **How do we get there from here?**

Lengthy analysis of the first two questions finally resulted in some general, long-range objectives:

LONG—RANGE OBJECTIVES

CLIMATE...

An environment in each Army unit that reinforces values and empowers leaders at all levels to seize the initiative and act creatively.


SYSTEM...

Align the personnel system and the training system to support unit performance and the leader development process in units.

DOCTRINE...

Leadership doctrine and training materials to provide for a leader development program which is comprehensive, sequential and progressive and integrates the school with the field.

Further analysis of the third question resulted in a strategy to achieve those objectives:



The analysis process is still underway. Many specific supporting objectives have been written and categorized by the length of time it will take to accomplish them.

Further clarification and rationalization of both the strategy and supporting objectives are necessary. In particular, objectives must be written in such a way that they can be both measured and funded. Also, certain questions about how to enter or impact on the PPBES have not yet been resolved.

The Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth, which holds proponency for leadership doctrine, has already prepared a draft operational concept for leadership. Currently, CAC is hosting a series of workshops to develop the core curriculum for the Officer Basic Course.

The train is moving; we invite you on board. □

The Materiel Goal

A total army equipped and sustained to win any land battle.

LTG Richard H. Thompson
(DCSLOG, HQDA)

LTGEN Richard H. Thompson, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, entered the US Army as an enlisted man in 1944, advancing to the rank of Staff Sergeant. He was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in 1949. His many duty assignments have taken him to Japan, Korea, Germany and Vietnam. LTGEN Thompson holds a BA Degree in Social Science from the College of the Ozarks, and Masters Degree in Public Administration from George Washington University. His previous assignment was as the first commander of the U.S. Army Troop Support and Aviation Materiel Readiness Command, an organization formed by the merger of the Army Aviation Systems Command and the Troop Support Command. He was promoted to Lieutenant General and assumed his current position on 1 August 1981.



This article addresses the MATERIEL GOAL for which the DCSLOG and the ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY FOR INSTALLATIONS, LOGISTICS and FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT have been designated lead agents.

"The Total Army requires a technically superior and powerful arsenal of effective weapons and equipment which can be transported, simply operated and easily maintained. Weapons and equipment must be developed through a cost disciplined acquisition process that places total system in the hands of trained personnel in the shortest time possible. Resupply capability must be complete and sufficient for sustaining extended combat. Logistics support procedures must exist between the US and its allies to assure a mutual capability to deter aggression, to respond to any attack and to preserve scarce resources."

In March 1982 the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, Logistics and Financial Management and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics were designated as joint lead agents for development of objectives in support of the Materiel Goal. As is evident from the expanded goal statement above, this presented an exciting challenge.

Key to this undertaking is recognition that the development, acquisition and fielding of new equipment and systems is time consuming. The process takes many years. We therefore decided to project our future needs. We could then plan for the transition from where we are now into that future environment. To accomplish this, more than twenty reference documents were reviewed. The AirLand Battle 2000 provided the best perspective of the future battlefield. The materiel needs for the year 2000 were then derived through examination of that battlefield environment.

It is obvious that neither today's equipment nor our distribution and support systems and procedures meet future battlefield needs. A look at the current materiel life cycle process also disclosed the need for change.

The current process has normally focused first on development and acquisition, then on distribution, and finally on support. While there are many agencies involved in each step, the tendency has been to address each step in isolation. This isolation must be broken down. An overall management scheme must be formulated to correlate the steps of the materiel process.

Based on the foregoing, four basic objectives were developed which provide the foundation for achieving the Materiel Goal.

- **THE MATERIEL OBJECTIVE:** Materiel which meets the needs of the Army through the year 2000.
- **THE DISTRIBUTION OBJECTIVE:** Materiel distributed to the right place on time, in the quantity required to optimize combat power through the year 2000.
- **THE SUPPORT OBJECTIVE:** Comprehensive logistics support systems responsive and sufficient to sustain the Total Army through the year 2000.
- **THE MATERIEL MANAGEMENT OBJECTIVE:** Materiel capability optimized by innovative management of available resources through the year 2000.

Each objective has a number of specific characteristics. As an example, the materiel objective addresses such things as improved mobility, modular design and survivability while the distribution objective addresses rapid response to user needs and a corresponding reduction in expensive and vulnerable field stockage.

Having defined the objectives, it was necessary to develop a strategy for their accomplishment. The path is not direct between today and the year 2000. As we move through the transition, we must insure that we are always ready to meet any contingency that may arise. Old and new equipment and systems must be compatible on the battlefield. Each generation of equipment must link to the one it replaces. A balance must be maintained in several regards: planning with programing and budgeting; active with Reserve components; and Army with other services and allies. Finally, we must continually analyze the benefit to be derived against the cost involved to insure we receive the optimum return from our investment.

Also important, our personnel and training systems must produce soldiers skilled and motivated to operate and maintain the systems, and to accommodate the transition from old to new

equipment. Leaders at all levels must emphasize the proper use and maintenance of materiel. At the same time, the materiel process and our plans for support must recognize the needs and capabilities of our soldiers.

Individual strategies and supporting tasks have been developed for each of the four objectives. However, we have just scratched the surface. The real work lies ahead. The staff has laid the groundwork. Now the entire Army must join the effort. Achievement of the Materiel Goal will require initiative, innovation and full participation and support throughout the Total Army. We must employ advanced management techniques in accomplishing its supporting objectives and strategies. Current concepts for materiel and support systems must be changed. Indeed, a new materiel planning and execution vector must be established and pursued. □

Beetle Bailey—by Mort Walker



Men who are rich have times when they don't listen. Men who are quite bright have times when they don't listen. Men who are both bright and rich always listen. That is how they got the money, and that is how they keep it. —John D. MacDonald

You can never plan the future by the past. —Edmund Burke

Give to the world the best that you have and the best will come back to you. —Madeline Bridges

If we find nothing of interest where we are, we are likely to find little of lasting interest where we wish to go. —Edwin Way Teale

The Army's Management Goal

LTC James E. Thomas (COA)

A Total Army which efficiently and effectively uses the resources made available.

The Secretary of the Army recently told Congress, "... one of the most critical tasks we have at this period in time is the management of our resources ..." Nearly three years ago the Army's Chief of Staff stated, "Training for combat and execution of wartime missions is the purpose of the entire peacetime Army. All of our management activities, both military and civilian, must be geared to this end." These two statements provide the FOCUS—*training for combat* and *execution of wartime missions*—and the PRIORITY—one of the most critical tasks—for the Army's Management Goal.

The Management Goal is not an end in itself; it exists solely to support the accomplishment of the other six Army Goals. Army management is the *art* and *science* of achieving maximum productivity from resources—people, money, materiel, facilities, information and time—through appropriate systems and techniques. One point should be emphasized, however: MANAGING THE ARMY IS NOT THE SAME AS MANAGING A BUSINESS!

- **A business operates to make a profit.**
- **The US Army operates to deter war and, if deterrence fails, to fight and win.**

What, then, is the appropriate framework for the Army's management? We seek a balance of "art" and "science" in our approach to management. We need to establish favorable *conditions* (leadership, climate setting, decision managing) within which traditional *processes* (planning, organizing, staffing, integrating, controlling) are applied. Army management is achieved through goal-based organizational objectives that flow from the Departmental level, through the chain of command, to individuals. Application of this concept will result in congruency—at all levels—of goals, priorities, resources, authority, accountability and rewards. This congruency should render somewhat moot the age-old arguments about "centralization" and "decentralization."

Six objectives have been developed to support achievement of the Management Goal. From the objectives will flow numerous tasks and, in this regard, Peter Drucker's observations are most pertinent:

Each member [organization] of the enterprise contributes something different, but all must contribute toward a common goal. Their efforts must all pull in the same direction, and their contributions must fit together to produce a whole—without gaps, without friction, without unnecessary duplication of effort.

The Army Management objectives are briefly described below.

DEVELOP, ARTICULATE AND PROMULGATE THE ARMY MANAGEMENT PHILOSOPHY

We do not have a recorded, approved philosophy of management. The philosophy is needed to provide the "guideposts" for our actions, and we need to incorporate a single, accepted philosophy in our professional education and our regulations so that we can institutionalize our management practices.

DEVELOP EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT PROCESSES AND CONDITIONS AT ALL LEVELS WHICH LINK ARMY GOALS AND OBJECTIVES WITH ORGANIZATIONAL OBJECTIVES AND THE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PROCESS.

This objective addresses the flow of objective-setting from the highest to the lowest levels of the Army. Further, it relates those objectives to the program and budget development, execution and review processes, and it provides a basis for measuring progress and detecting diversions with regard to achieving the objectives.

REVITALIZE SUPPORT TO LEADERS THROUGH IMPROVED MANAGEMENT SUPPORT CAPABILITIES AT THE OPERATING LEVEL.

Through this objective we will identify the requirements of the leaders at operating levels, generate the resources required to solve the problems and develop better-trained and educated managers for the future.

PROVIDE ADEQUATE AND COMPREHENSIVE DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS TO COMMANDERS AND MANAGERS

We are primarily oriented on automated systems with this goal. We seek modern capabilities, reduction in details presented to the decisionmakers through rigorous analytical techniques, improved timeliness in providing information, increased data-compatibility across systems, and disciplined requirement-setting and standardization of terms of reference.

DEVELOP INTEGRATED MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT AND EVALUATION

The Army's Economies, Efficiencies and Management Improvements Program is the umbrella that supports this objective. Incentive awards for efficiency, improved acquisition processes, aggressive follow-up of results of inspections and audits, exploitation of management improvements, recognition of information and time as resources that must be managed, and reduction of labor-intensive operations and sharing good ideas are the types of actions that assist in achieving the objective.

OE Contributions to EEMI

OEC's throughout the Army are in the unique position to benefit the EEMI program while concurrently providing increased justification for the need to maintain and expand the OE function through the program and budget process.

The consulting services provided by OEC's, in many instances, contribute to resource savings and cost avoidances through more economical and efficient ways of accomplishing a given function. These improvements may surface through quality circles, objective setting efforts or scheduled OE sessions with various groups. When this occurs, the OEC **must** encourage the functional proponent or local commander to document the initiative and resultant savings in the EEMI Program and indicate that the results are due in part to the contributions made by the OEC. OEC's do not submit EEMI reports as they relate to their OE operations. Examples of savings should, however, be passed on to OEC&S for their use.

When EEMI initiatives are received at HQDA as part of the Program and Budget process, it is a simple matter to summarize the initiatives and resultant savings in which OEC's played a key role. This information can then be used during the PPBS process as resource justification indicating the wide-range of benefits provided to the Army by the OE effort.

LTC Tom Raley
LTC Al Coke
(HQDA)


ESTABLISH A COMPREHENSIVE SYSTEM OF INTEGRATED INTERNAL CONTROLS THAT WILL REDUCE VULNERABILITY TO FRAUD, WASTE AND ABUSE.

This goal is designed to fix responsibility for actions and to engender public trust. Effective stewardship of our resources requires an effective system of audit trails and controls that use all existing inspection, audit and review agencies in a coordinated manner to ensure compliance with directives and to eliminate management inefficiencies.

The foregoing management objectives provide the overall fabric for the accomplishment of improved readiness in the Army within the structure of the other Army Goals. The objectives will change over time, as some are deleted and others are added. However, these objectives represent a start toward providing the Congress and the American Public with the "tight-fisted and cost-conscious managers" that they expect—and deserve—in their Army. □

LTC James Thomas is the Chief, Resource Management Analysis Division, Office, Comptroller of the Army. Previous assignments, in Germany, Italy, Korea, Vietnam and the CONUS, include Senior Analyst, Army Management Division, OCSA; Operations Analyst, ODCSOPS, HQDA; battalion commander; and a variety of other assignments at division and lower levels. He has a Master's Degree in Management and is a graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College.

Beetle Bailey—by Mort Walker



LEADERSHIP OF FORT DIX PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE

LEADERSHIP OF FORT DIX REPORT

LEADERSHIP OF FORT DIX REPORT

LEADERSHIP OF FORT DIX REPORT

INTRODUCTION

GIVEN THE IMMENSE CHALLENGES
AND OPPORTUNITIES WHICH
WE, THE LEADERSHIP OF FORT DIX,
FACE AS WE INFLUENCE
THE OBJECTIVES OF OUR POST IN
THE COMING YEARS,
WE WHO ARE COMMITTED TO LEADERSHIP
IN CHOOSING THE FUTURE OF OUR POST
MUST TAKE ADVANTAGE OF EVERY TECHNIQUE
THAT CAN HELP US
DEVELOP HIGH-PERFORMING INDIVIDUALS
AND HIGH-PERFORMING TEAMS
AND HIGH-PERFORMING ORGANIZATIONS.

CHARACTERISTICS OF HIGH PERFORMING ORGANIZATIONS

- Leadership style is **creative**
- Management form is **evolutionary**
- Organizational structure is **self-organizing**
- **Teamwork** is focused on the task.
- **Leadership** is **strong and clear**
- **Commitment** and **Motivation** are always high.

Peter B. Vaill, a renowned expert in High Performing Systems (HPS), has further characterized HPS leaders as having a **high sense of purpose**. He uses the word “purposing” to refer to a continuous stream of actions by an organization’s formal leadership which have the effect of **inducing clarity, consensus, and commitment** regarding an organization’s **basic purposes**.

For us at Fort Dix, that translates to leaders who understand our **mission, our values, and our operational norms or guidelines** and, most importantly, are **driven** to action based on this understanding. Further, our leaders clarify and develop this understanding in their subordinates.

Vaill goes on to identify three prominent **characteristics of leaders** of high performing organizations. They generally put in extraordinary amounts of **time**, have very strong **feelings** about achieving the organization’s purposes, and **focus** on key issues and variables. He advises the would-be leader to:

“seek constantly to do **what is right** and **what is needed** in the organization (Focus). Do it all out in terms of your **energy** (Time). Put your whole **psyche** into it (Feelings).”

A strong advocate of organizational effectiveness, Major General Robert H. Forman, Commander, USATC and Fort Dix was first introduced to “High Performance Programming” at a workshop conducted by LTC Frank Burns. Following this workshop he decided to have a similar workshop for his senior leaders.

LTC Burns and Dr. Linda Nelson were invited to Fort Dix to conduct a one-day High Performance Programming Workshop with all of the key Dix leaders. At the conclusion of the workshop, the group committed themselves to a continued application of the techniques learned through the implementation of a phased Values-Based Performance Management/Appraisal Conference (USAOECS RB 26-12). “Toward a High Performing Fort Dix” is the result of three intensive half-day conferences at which the senior leadership of Fort Dix, with the assistance of the OEC, developed the values, operational guidelines and mission of Fort Dix. The senior leadership’s next challenge is to develop and implement strategies to incorporate the contents of “Toward a High Performing Fort Dix” into their own organizations.

The senior leaders of Fort Dix, in an effort to bring clarity and understanding to our MISSION, VALUES, and OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES, developed the following mission statement for Fort Dix.

MISSION

The Fort Dix Mission is to help the Army be ready for the next war by providing the leadership, management, command and control, and resources necessary to operate a Training Center; to be operationally ready; to accomplish area support; and to be prepared for mobilization.

This means that:

- We provide the Army with skilled, motivated, disciplined, and physically fit soldiers.
- We insure all Fort Dix deployable units and soldiers are combat ready.
- We plan, prepare, and test for our mobilization mission.
- We provide quality and effective support in accordance with Army Regulation 5-9.
- And that we accomplish our missions in the spirit of Fort Dix values and operational guidelines.

ARMY GOALS

Four ARMY GOALS that have significant application at Fort Dix are:

READINESS

A Total Army prepared for the "3 days of war": to deter the day before; to fight and win on the day of war; and to terminate conflict in such a manner that on the day after war, the United States and its allies have an acceptable level of security.

HUMAN

A Total Army composed of military and civilian professionals who loyally serve their nation in rewarding careers.

LEADERSHIP

A Total Army whose leaders at all levels possess the highest ethical and professional standards committed to mission accomplishment and the well-being of subordinates.

MANAGEMENT

A Total Army which efficiently and effectively uses the resources made available.

VALUES

The following VALUES have been developed for our total community:

1. **PURPOSE:** Maintain a full appreciation of the mission and a perspective of how we contribute. This means that we:
 - a. Clarify and develop an understanding of the Fort Dix mission.
 - b. Communicate the individual and organizational role in accomplishing the mission.
 - c. Develop an understanding of the values of Fort Dix.
 - d. Focus on actions of consequences to Fort Dix and the Army.
 - e. Evaluate performance against objectives
 - f. Recognize actively the accomplishments of our subordinates.
 - g. Maintain and enhance our image as a good place to work and live.
2. **COMPETENCE, COMMITMENT, and HIGH STANDARDS:** Dedicate ourselves to excellence in achieving our objectives efficiently and effectively. This means that we:
 - a. Define clearly our standards and expectations.
 - b. Insist on competence and expect a higher order of competence and responsibility.
 - c. Provide supervision, feedback, appropriate counselling, and training.
 - d. Establish excellence as the standard for performance and recognize it when demonstrated.
 - e. Insist upon honest, fair, and objective performance evaluations.
 - f. Accomplish all tasks to the fullest of one's capabilities.
 - g. Demand personal dedication in ourselves and others.
3. **TEAMWORK:** Work harmoniously to accomplish a common goal. This means that we:
 - a. Communicate actively with all personnel and agencies.
 - b. Display a helpful, supportive, and positive attitude.
 - c. Share resources, material, and information willingly and without reservation.
 - d. Maintain a climate that is characterized by trust, honesty, and fairness.
 - e. Accept responsibility for our actions.
 - f. Involve managers in discussions which affect their areas of responsibility.
 - g. Promote professional camaraderie.
 - h. Correct rather than blame.
4. **SENSE OF URGENCY:** Attack every task with vigor and enthusiasm. This means that we:

- a. **Define** each task clearly.
- b. **Establish** realistic priorities and dedicate appropriate resources.
- c. **Complete** the task in accordance with established priorities.
- d. **Demonstrate** and encourage a positive attitude.
- e. **Recognize** that many tasks must be done now.
- f. **Exercise** command judgment in responding to emergency requirements.

5. **CREATIVITY:** Create an environment which encourages new ideas. **This means that we:**

- a. **Minimize** fear of failure through rewarding successful innovation and tolerating honest mistakes.
- b. **Seek** new and better ways to accomplish the mission.
- c. **Challenge** subordinates to maximize their potential.
- d. **Look** to the future and look for opportunities.

6. **GROWTH:** Encourage people to apply themselves to being "all they can be." **This means that we:**

- a. **Promote** opportunities for study and reflection.
- b. **Encourage** a high degree of participation at all levels in the decision process.
- c. **Challenge** subordinates to maximize their potential.
- d. **Encourage** and structure individual and collective development.
- e. **Maximize** delegation of responsibility and authority.
- f. **Provide** equal opportunity for all.

7. **CARE:** Demonstrate a dedication to the quality of life of each individual who lives or works in the Fort Dix community. **This means that we:**

- a. **Show** people we care.
- b. **Develop** a commitment to improve the quality of life of all members of the community.
- c. **Listen**, hear and respond to people's needs.
- d. **Foster** a sincere, visible effort to take care of "PFC Dix" and members of his or her family.
- e. **Adhere** to the principles of fair play and integrity when dealing with others.

8. **SERVICE:** Provide complete, accurate, and timely support in a manner which promotes satisfaction and the dignity of the person. **This means that we:**

- a. **Instill** a high sense of duty in subordinates.
- b. **Develop** a prompt, willing, and cheerful approach to mission accomplishment.

- c. **Encourage** a "can do" spirit.
- d. **Insure** professional execution of duties and attitude.
- e. **Encourage** a high sense of civic responsibility.
- f. **Foster** the idea that everyone at Fort Dix is here to serve others.

9. **ETHICS:** Adhere to the principles of honesty, fairness, and integrity. **This means that we:**

- a. **Insist** on truthfulness with ourselves, superiors and subordinates.
- b. **Conduct** ourselves in accordance with the highest moral and professional standards.
- c. **Demonstrate** intellectual, personal, and professional honesty.
- d. **Act** with moral courage.

PURPOSING

The purpose of this paper is to CLARIFY the understanding of our MISSION, VALUES, and OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES.

"The process of setting or clarifying values, goals, missions, organizational objectives, and individual objectives should begin at the top and proceed systematically down through the chain of command."

What is now required is clarity and commitment at each organizational level.

"Missions and organizational objectives are essential at **each organizational level** —to guide and track the organization's contribution to the performance of the larger organization it supports ——and thus to the accomplishment of the FORT DIX MISSION."

At each organizational level in the chain of command, **unity of purpose** can be achieved **only** if the MISSION and objectives of the organization are understandably **linked** to the mission and objectives of the next higher organization.

"**Setting** realistic organizational objectives and tracking performance must remain the firm responsibilities of the chain of command."

SO WE NEED BOTH

LEADERSHIP — which provides **VISION** and **DIRECTION**

and

MANAGEMENT — which **GUIDES** and **TRACKS** progress.

Finally, individual performance objectives must be developed which clarify how the individual's performance is expected to contribute to the performance of the team and organization.

"The new OER and civilian appraisal systems provide us a means we can use to FIX individual ACCOUNTABILITY and RESPONSIBILITY."

Major General Robert H. Forman was born in Phoenix, Arizona, graduated from Arizona State University, and is a veteran of more than 31 years of active commissioned service. He is a graduate of the Command and General Staff College and the U.S. Army War College.

He served as a Battery Commander in Augsburg, Germany and commanded the airborne artillery battery which accompanied the airborne forces in Lebanon during the summer of 1958. He also commanded a field artillery battalion in the 82nd Airborne Division, and the 214th Field Artillery Group. Additional assignments have included Assistant Professor of Military Science, Department of the Army Staff, Faculty of the Command and General Staff College; Field Artillery School; various advisor roles in Vietnam; Deputy Commanding General, Ft. Leonard Wood; and Deputy Commandant, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. In February 1981, General Forman assumed his current position as Commanding General of Army Training Center and Fort Dix, New Jersey.

Without question all leaders at Fort Dix expect to be HIGH PERFORMING. It will happen, though, only when we each dedicate ourselves, our focus, and our energy to reach that organizational state of excellence. This paper is the first step toward a HIGH PERFORMING FORT DIX.

The next step is YOURS. □



Major General Robert H. Forman

When we do not find peace of mind in ourselves, it is useless to look for it elsewhere.

—La Rochefoucauld

What is truly indispensable for the conduct of life has been taught us by women—the small rules of courtesy, the actions that win us the warmth or deference of others; the words that assure us a welcome; the attitudes that must be varied to mesh with character or situation; all social strategy. It is listening to women that teaches us to speak to men. —Remy DeGourmont

People seem not to see that their opinion of the world is also a confession of character. We can only see what we are; if we misbehave, we suspect others. —Ralph Waldo Emerson

The individual has a strong desire to become himself; given a favorable psychological climate he drops the defensive masks with which he has faced life, and begins to discover and to experience the stranger who lives behind these masks—the hidden parts of himself. —Carl R. Rogers

Let each of us become all that we are capable of being. —Thomas Carlyle

Managing by Goals

Problems for the Army Organization

CPT Louis P. Cantolupo

If consensus were reached on the value of managing an organization by goals, the following benefits could be described:

- **Managing by goals brings purpose to the organization.** The organization understands itself and its contribution to society.
- **Managing by goals brings work to the organization.** An organization clear on its purpose creates meaningful, challenging work to support that purpose, that larger contribution to society.
- **Managing by goals builds the organization.** An organization sure of itself and the things it must do is an organization which is growing and achieving.

For the Army organization, however, the process of managing by goals is in trouble. Members at every level point to goals going nowhere and to a work climate just as confused, just as alienated, as that which existed prior to the establishment of goals.

It seems as if things have gotten worse since the goal-setting conference.

As if I didn't have enough work already, now these goals of theirs have given me more work than I can ever possibly hope to handle.

These and similar complaints are being raised in Army organizations that claim to be managing their mission by goals, and the complaints grow louder each day. Goals are not reaching the organizations' members, who are the only individuals who can make them work.

The sections which follow show how the nature of goals—their composition, the foundations on which they are based—creates problems for the Army organization and for efforts at accomplishing missions through them.

THE MULTI-FACETED NATURE OF GOALS

When John Kennedy announced it was the goal of the United States to put a man on the moon by the end of the decade, he was speaking of a *national effort*, one combining the talents and resources of many individuals and agencies. NASA's achievements, as formidable as they were, were in fact dependent ultimately on the will, contribution, and common vision of vast segments of the American public.

Of successful goals this may be said: They are embraced by a large, diverse group of people, all of whom are working together out of commonly felt needs and aspirations.

When this does not occur, when goals are seen as belonging to one person or interest group, all attempts at achieving them fail. People throughout the organization resent them, resist them. What may have been intended originally as a device to bring the organization together works instead to tear it apart.

As an illustration, it is not unusual to see an Army headquarters set goals in training, wartime operations, logistics, personnel management and quality-of-life. It is also not unusual for the same headquarters to fix

responsibility for implementing the training and wartime goals on G-3, the logistics goals on G-4, the personnel management goals on the Adjutant General, and the quality-of-life goals on G-1. It is not unusual, in other words, for an Army organization to define the first step in managing by goals as finding each goal "a home." That home is the functional element of the organization most closely identified with the particular goal.

Here is where the problem begins. In the focus on "function" there is lost a perspective on the entire organization. The commonality of effort which may have sparked the goals at the beginning—a goal-setting conference, for example—is no longer exploited as the process for attainment. Goals are no longer perceived as *organizational goals*, but as sectional goals, resting solely within the responsibility of the functional element involved.

G-3, as a case in point, manages the training goals. At no time, however, is there an articulation of the special training needs of combat support and combat service support units, which should come from G-4 and G-1. The Comptroller wonders aloud at who will pay for the programs created by these goals, and units in the field see them as unrealistic and in conflict with other requirements. Team effort ultimately degenerates even within the G-3 element itself, as responsibility for accomplishing the goals falls solely on the shoulders of one or two action officers.

At no time does each element of the organization ask itself "How do these goals apply to me?" On those rare occasions when the question is raised, it is in its negative dimension: "To what extent will those goals rob my section of people, power, prestige?"

■ **Of successful goals this may be said: They are embraced by a large, diverse group of people, all of whom are working together out of commonly felt needs and aspirations.**

"How does it apply to me?" is an easy question to ask, but a most difficult one for the Army organization to answer. Schooled over many years in the utility of a vertical chain of command, members fail to recognize when other relationships may be appropriate, indeed, essential. That the chain can also run horizontally, toward working with someone else's boss instead of one's own, is more a fact of literature than of practice.

A staff chief, for example, may require an action to be "coordinated," but what he is really requiring is "concurrence" after the fact. The evidence of joint planning is not expected, by anyone.

Conditions are further complicated by a value referent which, in terms of both reward and punishment, still puts the premium on the productivity of *each* individual, as opposed to one which sees achievement as the sum total of all individuals working together.

The revised officer evaluation reporting system is a good illustration. Officers find themselves with the requirement

of setting individual performance objectives in what amounts to an organizational vacuum. They search in vain for evidence of a larger, collaborative goal-setting process at the top, and failing to find it, set their own objectives, whose only purpose may be to help their own interests come evaluation time.

An inverse of the organizational pyramid occurs, as the Army organization demands of the individual what it has failed to demand of itself: the development and articulation of purpose and the means, or goals, to achieve it.

Failing to recognize that goals are indeed *multi-faceted*—involving many different people, talents, resources—results in an Army organization concentrating more on its functions, its policies, its procedures than on the ultimate, more genuinely affecting aims to which these activities contribute.

It is an Army organization concentrating on the wrong priorities, the wrong capabilities—the wrong results.

THE “FUTURE QUALITY” OF GOALS

Returning to the opening example, the goal of placing a man on the moon was not an exercise in crystal-ball gazing. Indicators in the economy, in social attitudes, in the achievements of America’s scientific, academic, and military communities were clear that such a goal was attainable. What was needed, what was provided, was a leadership which seized on present-day trends as building-blocks of tomorrow’s reality.

The future cannot be predicted, but it can be *planned*.

Conditions in the environment—economic, social, military—exist to shape the future to a desired outcome. It comes down to a question of who manages whom. Does the Army organization manage its environment; or is it in fact managed by that environment, thrown about as in some tumultuous inferno, reacting to events it can no longer control?

The organization’s future is present in many things. It is present in current population structures and dynamics, in the local community, the nation, the world. It is present in the programs being developed at higher headquarters, in the decisions of Congress and the President. It is present in nearby port and transportation facilities, the rate of inflation, the rising tide of consumer expectations, the decision to make “no decision” on the Draft. Rare, however, are goal statements informed by this assessment, and of actions which speak of the future in believable, achievable terms.

The Commander asks for a weekly activities report and gets a compilation of statistics. Quarterly review and analysis (R&A) sessions have become quarterly “review” sessions, and in each staff section’s race for still more view-graphs, the organizational equivalent to “keeping up with the Jones’.”

With a lifeline to tax dollars, survivability as an institution is not nearly as much a concern to the Army as it is to, say, the grocery store outside the gate. This security against default, as necessary as it must be, does, however, affect perceptions on the fundamental responsibility of organization.

Responsibility for innovation, as a primary example, is never as immediate, as pressing, as challenging. On the contrary, it is often resisted. By its nature, it causes the organization to inquire into methods and concepts that have not proven bothersome for most of the principals involved. This inclination not to “change a good thing” filters down to all levels and nullifies the very thinking central to goals formulation—a vision of the organization doing new and better things.

Of successful goals this too must be said: they speak of performance, of growth, of innovation. They are imbued with a “future quality,” that is, a form, a vitality, which accepts the inevitability of present conditions, and their ability to speak of tomorrow in meaningful, inspired terms.

THE STRATEGIC GOALS

Goals for the Army organization may be divided in two groups: those which *maintain* systems, known as operational goals; and those which *create* systems, known as strategic goals.

The following is an example of an operational goal: “Ensure assigned units receive satisfactory ratings on the next Annual General Inspection (AGI).” Here, the emphasis is on ensuring that assigned units adhere to standards established by the AGI. Within this goal there is sufficient latitude. A unit may, for example, exceed current standards, but at no time are the standards themselves subject to change, and indeed the emphasis is on ensuring they are upheld.

Programs deriving from this goal may include assistance visits to assigned units, codification of AGI readiness conditions (e.g. “go,” “no go”), and pre-AGI inspections by the senior commander. Again, effort is directed toward maintaining pre-determined standards of performance.

Using the AGI subject, a strategic goal may be written as follows: “Develop a proposed AGI based on recently acquired missions and resource constraints.” In this case, there exists the potential for a new system. Programs here might include defining the new missions and resource limitations, application of findings against current AGI standards, and preparing briefs to higher headquarters on alternative forms of evaluation and the rationale behind them.

Efforts at strategic goal-setting, in other words, create new work: programs, new procedures, new foundations to organizational purpose.

Both operational and strategic goals are cornerstones of Organizational Effectiveness. Both are needed. The strategy which causes the organization to create should have a process to ensure that creation is sustained, is improved upon, is executed fairly and efficiently.

The essential point in all of this is not the validity of one set of goals over the other but, rather, the fact that strategy creates *work*. The strategic goals come first.

For the Army organization, however, strategic goal-setting is the less frequent form of endeavor. Stripped to its simplest meaning, the Army mission is to fight and win the next war. The task is clear, specific; it is the task of Army units to ensure that its operations support this.

Indeed, the quintessence of American military behavior through the centuries has been on formulating the politics which lead not to wars, but rather to their execution. By tradition and by practice, the Army organization is an “operations” organization, and its goals reflect this.

The behavioral norm therefore is not to conceive, not to create, but to *do*. This focus on *task* affects thinking throughout the Army organization and creates the risk that no one is conceiving, no one is innovating. The General, in other words, is just thinking of “bigger” tasks. Each individual, each unit waits for guidance which may never come.

As in the case of the preference for individual versus team productivity, discussed previously, the system of reward and punishment serves to reinforce this tendency,

at the expense of a more expanded, strategic thought process. Commanders are evaluated on how they pass AGIs, not on their creation of new ones.

A branch shorn from its vine cannot grow. The vine in this case is that activity of mind and logic that enables the Army organization to *grow*, to perform and achieve.

Of successful goals, then, this must also be said: their first responsibility is a creative one which restores commitment to the organization and confidence in its future.

PERSPECTIVES ON GOAL-SETTING

From this discussion several conclusions may be drawn.

It is not the number of goals established that is important, but the *capability* of an organization to carry them out. Factors unique to the Army limit that capability in at least three ways:

1. The organizational structure, in its concentration on vertical channels of communication, "blocks out" a view of goal attainment as one involving the entire organization—all its people, resources, and experiences.

2. Since profitability (and, hence, survivability) as an institution is not at stake, a disincentive exists toward genuine innovation and the thinking which supports it. Analysis of present-day problems and their influence on the future therefore lacks the force and relevance of more traditional undertakings.

3. The emphasis on task accomplishment (i.e. operations) works against strategic, or creative, goal-setting. Goals, where established, tend more toward maintenance (or, at best, improvement) of existing functions than toward change.

Work ultimately comes to be seen more as a function of *effort* than of results. Three examples follow:

1. At an Army-level headquarters it is common to find duty positions labeled "Briefers," almost as if the command briefing is an end in itself, a privilege which can only be extended to a few officers.

The content of the briefings often sustains that image. The audience is given information on all of the organization's functions, *but on none of its problems*, nor is the information tied to larger aims of the organization or trends affecting its future growth and development.

2. Much time and effort is spent in organizations on justifying the need for more and better people, rather than on programs aimed at making *better use* of the people presently assigned.

3. In garrison organizations the "training program" is often a replica of one conducted in a combat division, pushed on the organization as an additional duty. Garrison commanders find themselves having to choose between support for training *or* mission accomplishment, to the detriment of both. Absent is the initiative which makes full use of the garrison's many and varied support services as the primary training vehicle.

The characteristics of goals are *interrelated*. Goals which manage the future are strategic goals and, in their implication for organizational development, make clear the fact that no one individual or group alone is capable of attaining them. These goals are truly multi-faceted; and in their reliance on coordination of effort, the Army organization grows—as an organization and as a *team*.

The characteristics of goals, though they create problems for the Army organization, create for that same organization the *opportunity* to choose between paths of least resistance and new, solid foundations to achievement. □

Goal-Setting and Implementation A Training Model

CPT Louis P. Cantolupo (Korea)

This model depicts graphically the process of managing an organization by goals from the standpoint of both positive and negative outcomes.

Present operations in the organization are shown as a continuum.



At the intervention of a consultant or as the result of an assessment of organizational effectiveness, or both, it is decided that effectiveness can best be enhanced by the establishment of organizational goals.

A goal-setting conference or similar workshop is convened for this purpose.

During such a conference the organization is actually "jarred" from its present method of thinking and

operations (hence, the dotted extension to the continuum).



In this turbulence, information surfaces which could lead the organization in new directions. Major changes in structure, resources, and procedures are implied.

Toward the end of the conference, a consensus of sorts is reached and organizational goals are established.

This is shown as a solid extension to the original continuum and denotes the fact that new goals lay the foundation to new thinking, new ways of doing things. The use of a different color emphasizes this potential for change.



At the conclusion of the conference, the goals are published and distributed throughout the organization. At this point they are perceived by organization members as an addition to current operations.

Perhaps the most critical stage in the management of goals, this begins for the organization a series of choices...

1. The organization can ignore the goals and continue its original operations.

2. Or, the organization can attempt to implement the new goals in addition to everything else it is doing.

Because present operations remain the same, members soon come to regard the goals as overly burdensome and unrealistic. The goals are resented—and resisted.



They remain on the periphery of what members regard as their real mission and real problems. ("As if I didn't have enough work already, now these goals of theirs have given me more work than I can ever possibly hope to handle.")

Under these conditions the organization goes through the ritual of management by goals. ("It's that time of the year to update our goals, folks.")

3. Or, the organization has a final choice: It can regard the goals as the basis for present operations.

For this to happen, however, the organization must over a period of time commit itself to abandoning thinking and operations no longer relevant to its new purpose.

This process is shown in three stages as follows:

Later...

And still later...

The organization ultimately transforms itself into a new state of effectiveness.

Implications:

This model suggests that the process of setting and implementing goals should be a *continual* one. The organization's environment is continually changing,

creating new problems and new opportunities. Organizational goals therefore are only as good—only as valid—as their ability to adapt to these changes, and to create necessary related changes throughout the organization in response to them.

The model also raises questions concerning the extent of the organization's *commitment* to managing by goals and the *quality* of interventions aimed at fostering that commitment. To what extent, for example, is the organization willing and able to manage by goals?

How carefully have consultants prepared the organization for that undertaking and its ramifications?

- What kind of training is being conducted to help the organization overcome behavioral norms impeding goal setting and other change efforts?
- How thorough are the analyses of environmental influences on organizational effectiveness? How well have they been presented to the top leadership? To what extent, in other words, has the need for change been expressed?
- What kind of structure has been established to manage implementation of the goals once they are established?

These questions are critical to the inquiry required to manage an organization by goals—and to manage the goals themselves.* They focus on the need for outcomes which work *for* the organization and those responsible for its management.

* On this, see Sherwin, Douglas S., "Management of Objectives," *Harvard Business Review*, May-June 1976.

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Battle Staff Process of the Dispersed Command Post Integrated with SPADS

MAJ Dan McGrew and Ms Martha Jutte (V Corps)

Traditionally, the Command Post of any U.S. Army tactical unit has attracted various numbers of personnel at various times, but all tacticians agree that there are too many people located at the CP. Not only does it create tremendous logistical problems but also the current enemy doctrine places a high priority on the identification and destruction of major unit communication centers. The possibility for an enemy action against such an element is too tempting to risk.


Thus, the dispersed Command Post concept was born. The idea is simple: Spread the various elements of the Command Post into a modular framework (or MODs) and the survivability of the total Command Post from direct enemy attack is greatly increased. HQ, V Corps is now actively using this concept.

The V Corps OE office was asked by the Corps G-3 to observe the Battle Staff Process focused on the two major objectives of exercise CARAVAN GUARD III, 29 June - 1 July 1982. Those objectives were: (1) Initial test of the V Corps Main CP and (2) The initial field test of the Staff Planning and Decision Support System (SPADS), an automated information distribution and processing system consisting of Apple Computers, floppy discs, digitized graphics, print outs and word processors. The exercise was a computer-driven (CAMMS) exercise with battalion cells operating from a central map board and brigade, division, and corps Command Posts operating from field locations.

Corps CP structure during the exercise was as follows:

a. Corps Main CP was dispersed in a small village. The CP was modularized and modules were distributed among local facilities. Average distance between modules was 200 meters for testing purposes, but the actual implementation of the dispersed concept will be at distances considerably greater than shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1



- b. Corps rear CP was located at a rear hardened site.
- c. Corps TAC-CP was configured in Organic M577s and operated from a field location forward.
- d. Corps rear area operations center (RAOC) was located VIC Friedburg.

SPADS equipment was fielded in the Corps HQ with major items by module as shown below:

MODULE	STAFF DUTY STATION	SHARED OUTPUT STATION	NETWORK MANAGER
			COMM GATEWAY
Current Battle	4	1	1
Plans	1	1	1
FSE	3	1	1
CE	1	0	0
Support	2	1	1
Intel	2	1	1

The observations we made are being shared with you to assist you in any future Battle Staff processing in which you may be involved. There are issues and concerns that must be resolved before any such concept can be implemented effectively.

a. First, the dispersed CP is a radical departure from the traditional CP. Traditionally, if a problem occurred that required face-to-face coordination between the G-3 and the G-4, one of them lifted a tent flap and conducted the coordination. With the G-3 and the G-4 separated by several kilometers, this solution obviously won't work.

b. Second, one of the great all-time problems that has caused commanders to lose sleep is the visualization of a nuclear round exploding on their CP at 1700 hours. Classically, commanders and staff come together at 1700 hours for the evening "Dog and Pony Show"; i.e., the evening SITREP and briefing on future operations. In the AirLand Battle environment, this process will be sheer madness; we simply need another way to communicate information and maintain consistent data flow. The SPADS concept addresses that need. Inputs from computer terminals are fed into a common file system located in the current operations MOD. This information is processed into a standardized reporting format and then fed to the commander and his staff for almost instantaneous assessment and decision-making. The entire process replaces the 1700 hours SITREP as well as simplifies battle situation reporting.

There are potential psychological problems in eliminating the evening SITREP as well as dispersing the CP. Senior commanders and senior staff officers "grew up" under the old centralized system in which a tremendous amount of "socializing" occurred during the

SITREP and in which they were able to lift the flap of the tent of their nearest counterpart in order to coordinate or simply talk about the current situation or a future operation. The dispersed CP and the implementation of the SPADS concept eliminates face-to-face interaction. A more subtle factor, but just as powerful as socializing, is the visibility one derives from being around a senior commander. Gone will be the days of the traditional staff officer or subordinate commander who personally briefs the commander about his particular area. The need for visual, auditory and kinesthetic validation by the commander and the briefer cannot be ignored. Our observation is that the senior commanders and senior staff officers (senior 0-5s and 0-6s) resisted the SPADS concept because of these visual, auditory, and kinesthetic factors. One other significant observation is that the senior officer, under the SPADS concept, has less to react to, and this creates a sense of boredom or uninvolvement on his part. The intensity of the battle is not conveyed as powerfully as under the traditional mode. In actuality, this new concept frees our senior officer for more *proactive* behavior and less *reactive* behavior. The problem we identified is that senior officers typically have been highly involved in *reactive* behavior. They must be retrained to think in the *proactive* state. This will not only create an environment for better planning but will also allow the more junior officers and NCOs the freedom to develop their own expertise in their individual fields.

As a consultant processing the battle staff under a like concept, be aware of these differences from "normal" battle staff processing:

- a. Check the outcomes of the system to see if they are articulated on a system-wide basis. Does the system supply inputs needed, in a timely manner for quality decision making?
- b. Does the system provide for a data display priority; that is, are critical inputs displayed before other data?
- c. Check the status of operator training. Are the MODs one deep or have they provided for a number of trained operators?
- d. The staff action officer (ACTOs) should work in concert with the system operators. Watch how information from the system is passed to the ACTOs.
- e. Be aware of the error factor in transferring data from the system to briefing maps.

f. Senior officers may distrust a computer system. Be aware of behaviors which defeat the implementation of the system; i.e., senior officers "visiting" other senior officers in their MODs. There is a need for senior officers to see their counterparts physically when decisions are made which may affect the lives of many soldiers.

g. Security requirements for the Command Post are dramatically increased due to having MODs separated by several kilometers.

h. Because the MODs are separated by a certain number of kilometers, consultants will experience some difficulty in physically checking out specific problem areas; e.g., an observation is made that perhaps a communication problem exists between G-3 and G-4, and so the consultant must travel from one MOD to the other to verify the observation.

i. Due to the use of computers, a tremendous amount of information is relayed to the CURRENT OPERATIONS MOD almost instantaneously. Consultants must observe how the inputs are received, formulated and articulated to ACTOs. These observations allow the consultant to provide timely feedback so that change can be immediately implemented. The computer adds time factors which prevent the consultant from assuming a passive mode if he or she is to be a positive force in changing/influencing the process.

We strongly feel the dispersed Command Post coupled with a future generation of the SPADS concept must be implemented in the near future in order to increase the survivability of tactical leadership and assure continuity of command during times of war. The dispersed MOD concept coupled with a system like SPADS offers unique challenges for the OEC. The key to how the OEC is perceived lies in his or her ability to provide feedback in an aggressive, timely manner so that positive change can occur immediately. □

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Major Dan McGrew graduated from OECS in December 1977. He was the OEC for the Second ROTC Region, Fort Knox, Kentucky until May 1981. He is currently assigned to V Corps, Europe and holds the position of Chief, V Corps OEC.

A Commander's Guide to Division 86

MAJ Elwyn Hopkins (OECS)

THE ARMY OF THE FUTURE

Over two decades have passed without a significant modernization of the Army. Meanwhile, threat forces have become more powerful, deadly, and varied. The battlefield of today and the future will be characterized by the most lethal level of combat ever known. These facts have led the Army to institute a modernization process introducing new equipment and new organization structures. Between now and 1990, the Army will begin a massive transition process to move into the future as indicated in Figure 1.

TRANSITIONING THE ARMY TO THE FUTURE




Figure 1

In the past, when only a few weapon systems were entering the inventory in any one year, they could be handled on an individual basis. Today, the massive modernization effort of **Division 86** will require new ideas and new procedures for the transitioning of the Army from the present to the future. This paper is designed to help Army commanders in their efforts to transition their units to **Division 86**.

THE COMMANDER AS A KEY TO DIVISION 86

The commander is one of the key ingredients to successful modernization. He or she insures that a climate conducive to modernization exists. Creating such a climate consists of:

1. Planning the modernization effort,
2. Motivating soldiers to achieve new levels of performance,
3. Managing and controlling the changing situation, and
4. Creating an atmosphere of teamwork in which the unit can learn from its mistakes.

In addition to creating a favorable climate, the level of the commander's personal involvement will be greater in the **Division 86** modernization process than in the past because of the large number of changes that will occur in a short period of time. Such involvement does not mean that a commander will be involved in the day-to-day details of the changeover. Instead, it means that he or she is going to be *responsible to support* the modernization effort and to *plan and institute* an action plan to be carried out by the unit. It becomes essential, therefore, that a commander have a clear vision of where his unit is going and has planned for detailed action plans on how to get there. Thus, the commander is a key to the process of change through establishing a favorable unit climate for the change to happen and by planning action steps to accomplish the change.

PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH CHANGE

It is very important to understand the problems associated with the introduction of change in order to prevent these problems from having adverse impact. Some fairly predictable problems occur when large-scale change is introduced into an organization. These problems, as

represented in Figure 2 are:

1. The people in units will resist change,
2. A unit undergoing a large change can rapidly become unmanageable,
3. There will be a teamwork problem due to personnel changes.¹

THE PROBLEMS OF CHANGE²




Figure 2

As seen in the figure, the first problem is that individual members of the unit will resist change, not because the change is unnecessary, but because the old way of doing things is well known and the new way of doing things has not been established. Putting new equipment into a unit may require soldiers to find new ways to do work, and the new way might not be perceived as being as successful as the old way. Such a situation causes individual resistance to change.

The second problem has to do with management and control of unit activities. During a period of transition, units have the potential to lose the capacity to effectively coordinate work to accomplish the mission. As changes in the normal work process occur, it becomes difficult to monitor performance and make corrections. This control problem is magnified by the lack of experience with new equipment or new procedures. Another factor making unit control difficult is that the unit is faced with performing three different sets of activities when it was designed to perform one. This means that during the transition to **Division 86**, a unit must respond to demands on the "old" structure while moving through a transition structure in order to institute a "new" organization (see Figure 3). Thus, the potential for a unit to lose sight of its objectives and its direction is great. The management systems, the planning mechanisms and the problem-solving capacity

of the unit are going to come under extreme pressure. While the unit undergoes change, the potential is great for conflicting priorities, unclear guidance, and an ambiguous situation. This truly is a leadership challenge to the commander.

DEMANDS OPERATING ON A CHANGING UNIT




Figure 3

The third problem in large-scale change will be the planned dismantling of smoothly functioning work teams and the reestablishment of new work teams. This occurs when soldiers are shifted in the organization in order to meet the demands of a new TOE, TDA, etc. When such new teams and groups are formed, the potential increases for disagreements over the ways work is to be done. In short, the unit atmosphere may become one of increasing disagreements and conflicts. Teamwork throughout the unit may appear to drop. This is to be expected. Traditionally, disagreements and differences of opinion in our units were considered to be wrong and caused by "trouble-makers." In a period of large-scale change, however, such differences and apparent conflict are inevitable and are part of the nature of change. When these events occur, they should be viewed as healthy growing pains. The most productive way to handle this situation is to treat such differences as *positive* with the potential to lead to new, innovative ideas for unit improvement.

As demonstrated in Figure 2, there is an interdependence among the parts of a unit. When one of the predictable problems associated with change is not handled well, then it can affect other parts of the unit. Through awareness and planning, commanders can defuse these problems. Thus, a *planned* change with action steps designed to solve these problems is better than simply allowing the modernization of **Division 86** to "happen" to a unit. Such methods are outlined below.

THE RESISTANCE PROBLEM

To handle the resistance problem, the commander's overall strategy is one of increasing soldiers' motivation to accept the change. A unit must be motivated to change and such motivation must be initiated by the commander. Here are some methods to do this:


1. Use information and communication to show the unit what it will look like in the future. Differences in the present level of functioning with the expected future performance should be carefully outlined in order to generate a sense that a better unit will be formed when new organization is put into effect.
2. Have as much participation by the unit members as possible in planning and executing the change. This will tend to produce a sense of commitment throughout the unit, which will contribute to motivating people to make changes.
3. Use extensive education and training to increase confidence with new equipment and procedures. When confronted with new equipment and new procedures, soldiers may be reluctant or unable to use them. This inaction may stem from the fact that their knowledge or skill levels do not allow them to approach the tasks or equipment with confidence. Such training is in addition to the normal, required

training given in units, so commanders must allocate time to this critical task.

4. Provide rewards and incentives to the soldiers for their successes during the changeover period. Recognition, promotion, performance evaluations, job assignments, and status symbols should be reviewed and oriented on supporting the modernization effort.
5. Establish an understanding climate that allows soldiers to express their frustrations, problems and apprehensions. This does not mean that a lack of discipline is to be tolerated, but it does mean that time and opportunities have to be provided for soldiers to disengage from the previous way of doing things and to air their problems with job adjustments.

These five tactics are outlined in Figure 4.

SOLVING THE RESISTANCE PROBLEM



- Publish information to generate acceptance of new organization.
- Have extensive participation by unit members.
- Conduct education and training in new equipment and procedures.
- Use rewards and incentives for assisting the modernization.
- Provide time and opportunity to disengage from previous work methods both physically and psychologically.

Figure 4

THE CONTROL PROBLEM

To handle the management and control problem, a general strategy is the creation of a special management structure that is designed and responsible to successfully implement **Division 86** in the unit. This structure may be full-time in that this is the sole job for a selected group, or it may be part-time with selected personnel devoting part of their time to planning and managing the change. It is extremely difficult for the personnel who are charged with the day-to-day functioning of a unit to successfully plan and execute a large-scale, complex change.³ Some methods to solve the control problem are as follows:

1. Selected personnel are set up to perform the job of planning and executing the change while leaving others available to carry out the daily operations of the unit.
2. When this special management group is created, it will require resources from the unit and support from the chain of command. This "transition" group would then be given the charter to manage the transition, develop a transition plan, and design the feedback system to insure the transition is on target.

3. The commander's role is one of initially creating the group, supporting its activities with guidance and resources, and generally supervising the transition activities.

Figure 5 supplies an overview of the strategy and tactics used to solve the problem of control.

SOLVING THE CONTROL PROBLEM

Problem




Figure 5

THE TEAMWORK PROBLEM

The final predictable problem, the teamwork problem, represents a true challenge to the commander. The disbanding of some intact work teams, the establishment of new work teams, and changes in procedures or reporting relationships will create a situation in which teams which once functioned smoothly may become ineffective. The general operating strategy here is to take steps to generate a feeling of stability and confidence in the ability of the unit to weather the transition. The idea here is to promote the feeling that this transition has only temporarily negative effects and that, overall, the unit is still able to be effective. Here are some ways to do this.

1. Present a powerful, graphic, understandable vision of the end result of the change. The changeover from the present unit to the **Division 86** and a successful changeover become a focus for the unit's activities. When talking about the transition in a unit, each leader should have a really good answer to the question, "Change for *what*, and for *whom*?" The answer that is right will create a reaction such as, "Ah, *that* is really worthwhile; *that* is worth going after!"⁴ In order to make the future state exciting and powerful, the commander may have to create symbols and some new language to enhance the acceptance of the transition program. For example, code names can be given to various phases of the transition.
2. Accentuate places where *no* change will occur. These places will give soldiers a sense that a few things are changing but other things are remaining the same. This generates a perception that the change has definite limits, thus creating a climate of *stability*.
3. Have clear, announced plans and activities that demonstrate that the unit is "ahead of the power curve" instead of behind it. This in itself will generate *confidence* and *trust* that the unit can survive the transition to **Division 86**.
4. Have activities and time in the transition plan that allow a newly formed work group/team to plan for how they are going to work together

under the new structure. This allows for a faster start-up time and results in *improved performance* for a new work group.

5. Communicate continually to the unit. Some ways to do this are:

- a. Explain in simple terms exactly how each group and person will benefit from a change,
- b. Use simple language and simple graphic symbols,
- c. Maintain excitement by dramatizing, highlighting and focusing on key individuals and groups,
- d. Repeat messages regularly and consistently, using every form of communication available in the organization,
- e. Invest resources seriously in these communications as a vital necessity,
- f. Plan for feedback communication from all levels of the organization. Provide easy channels to present complaints and suggestions. Such activities need to increase as the rate of change increases.⁵

6. Inform Key groups outside of the unit who must support the change efforts. Nothing is more demoralizing than to create a better way to do work, make a change, and then have outside authorities reject it, causing instability. Therefore, the key supporting units, headquarters, and other staffs must be made aware of what is going on in the unit so that they can be prepared to assist, or at least not interfere with the unit's transition. Figure 6 outlines the tactics for solving the teamwork problem.

SOLVING THE TEAMWORK PROBLEM




Figure 6

THE COMMANDER'S ROLE

The commander's role that emerges in the transition to **Division 86** is that of setting up the methods to effect the change, and then supervising others in their execution of the detailed plan. The commander functions at a strategic level, and thus is better able to keep his or her attention focused on the "big picture." The following guidelines outline a typical role of the commander in the changeover:

- Provide the unit with official, authoritative policy and guidance.

- Take the lead in being the key proponent for changing to **Division 86** and clarify the rationale for the change.
- Provide motivation for the unit to change. Manage the reward system to best influence the achievement of the successful transition. Provide credit where due and after the transition to **Division 86**.
- Identify and select the best strategy and plans for making the transition happen.
- Create a management structure to plan and implement a transition action plan.
- Provide resources and other support to the transition management structure.
- Provide guidance and decisions that balance the needs and resolve the conflicts of the ongoing operations with the demands of the transition action plan.
- Oversee the progress of the implementation of the transition plan.
- Play the lead role in communicating major decisions about the change, progress reports, and feedback to the unit.
- Oversee progress reports and feedback, and identify "lessons learned" for other units and future changes.
- Create methods to redevelop teamwork in the unit during and after the change.⁶

THE CHALLENGE

In summary, when a unit begins to come to grips with **Division 86**, the commander will have a large role in orienting the unit and helping it to successfully cope with the problems of resistance to change, management and

control, and teamwork. The commander, through his or her leadership, can establish a positive climate toward change and play a large role in the navigation of the unit in the turbulent waters of change. The commander's role, as outlined above, is an active one focused on the larger perspectives of the transition efforts. By carefully planning the changeover and controlling the change effort, commanders will be able to assure the continued combat effectiveness of their units during the changeover to **Division 86**.

NOTES

1. Adapted from David A. Nadler. "Managing Organizational Change: An Integrative Perspective," *Journal of Applied Behavioral Sciences*, Vol. 17, No. 2, (1981). This reference gives an excellent account of how civilian managers can deal with the same issues presented here.
2. *Ibid.*
3. Richard Beckhard and Reuben T. Harris. *Organizational Transitions: Managing Complex Change*. Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1977.
4. Gerald J. Skibbins. *Organizational Evolution: A Program for Managing Radical Change*. New York: AMACOM, 1974
5. *Ibid.*
6. Adapted from Linda S. Ackerman. "Role of Manager in Change" lecture presented at the Management of Change Conference sponsored by USA Organizational Effectiveness Center and School, August 1981. □

Men who are rich have times when they don't listen. Men who are quite bright have times when they don't listen. Men who are both bright and rich always listen. That is how they got the money, and that is how they keep it. —John D. MacDonald

Those whom you can make like themselves better will, I promise you, like you very well.
—Lord Chesterfield

To know that we know what we know, and that we do not know what we do not know, that is true knowledge. —Confucius

I sometimes suspect that half our difficulties are imaginary, and that if we kept quiet about them, they would disappear. —Robert Lynd

You work that you may keep pace with the earth and the soul of the earth. For to be idle is to become a stranger unto the seasons, and to step out of life's procession. —Kahlil Gibran



RECRUITING THE FUTURE MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT IN AN ARMY NATIONAL GUARD GUARD RECRUITING FORCE

MAJ Darry D. Eggleston (NGB)

management development. Without his willingness to call in an OE Consultant, his desire to experiment with success, and his leadership, this operation would never have been possible.

RECRUITERS AS MANAGERS

This recruiting force differs from most military organizations in that from the lowest level of fulltime personnel (the recruiter) to the highest (Recruiting and Retention Manager—RRM), each is a manager. These recruiters not only manage their own time, facilities, and equipment but also plan the use of and supervise part-time recruiters from the units they support.

Recognizing recruiters as managers, it is essential to develop a management development program for them. A management development program is a systematic, growth-oriented, investment process of gaining, training, and maintaining decision makers to dynamically attain the organization's goals. An organization without such a process for its managers relies upon luck and good

fortune rather than planned progress. At the beginning of this operation, the RRM had inherited an organization without such a program, but he was able to develop one with far-reaching results.

ENTRY

In 1980, "manning the force" was the top priority in the Army National Guard.³ Although only recently becoming the RRM, this manager was being increasingly pressured to increase enlistments without being allowed the time to fully analyze the situation within the organization.

INTRODUCTION


This study evaluates an organizational effectiveness (OE) management development program within an Army National Guard (ARNG) fulltime recruiting force from September 1980 through January 1982. Without identifying the force, it will discuss the conditions in the force at the beginning of the effort, the plan developed to improve those conditions, the outcome of that plan, and the future of the program in this organization.

This study adds to the mounting evidence that OE can "make significant improvements in combat readiness during austere times. . .(by). . .giving systematic attention to improving organizational processes."¹ The results show that OE techniques can be directly and quantitatively linked to increased effectiveness and responsiveness in support of both the U.S. Army's Human and Management Goals U.S. Army's Human and Management Goals.²

From the beginning, the Recruiting and Retention Manager (RRM) must be given credit for being both receptive to personal change and innovative in his approach to

¹Organizational Effectiveness Study Group, Office of the Chief of Staff, Department of the Army, *Organizational Effectiveness in the U.S. Army* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1977), p.iii. For other examples of successful OE operations, see Mitchell, Eddie, "OE Produces Results," *OE Communiqué*, Issue 2-81, pp. 92-93, and Stewart, W.L., "Fort Carson Evaluation of OE Operations," Issue 1-80, pp. 95-116.

Figure 1
RRM'S PERCEPTION OF ORGANIZATION



²The U.S. Army's Human Goal is "A Total Army composed of military and civilian professionals who loyally serve their nation in rewarding careers." Its Management Goal is "A Total Army which efficiently and effectively uses the resources made available." Marsh, John O. Jr., Secretary of the Army, and Meyer, E.C., Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, *Total Army Goals*, 7 December 1981 (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1981), p. 2.

³U.S., National Guard Bureau, 1980 *Annual Review* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980), p. 27.

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE TITLE

- 1 RRM's Perception of Organization
- 2 Recruiter's Perception of Organization
- 3 Recruiting Force's Environment
- 4 Four-Step Process
- 5 GOQ, November 1980
- 6 Seven Options
- 7 Desirec Changes for RRM
- 8 Desired Changes for RIO
- 9 Desired Changes for SGM
- 10 Desired Changes for Management Group
- 11 Desired Changes for Recruiting Force
- 12 Calendar of Events
- 13 Workshops
- 14 March 1981 GOQ
- 15 Compare GOQs
- 16 GOQ Ranking Comparisons
- 17 Production by Quarter


He was observant enough to notice things just did not work the way they could. He felt isolated and considered quitting not only this job but the National Guard as well. He had been in the job for 10 months and could expect to remain there only three more months (since the previous manager served only 13 months). Although he was the Recruiting and Retention Manager, he had little time to devote to retention, since the recruiting force was in such a disarray. He was having to make decisions which he thought could be made at lower levels of the organization (Figure 1). For example, recruiters were calling him rather than using the established chain of command.

He had little faith in his two direct subordinates. He barely spoke to either of them, nor did they attempt to talk to him if it could be avoided. He complained that it had taken them two weeks to try to decide—between them—which unit won a recruiting contest, and still failed to make a decision in time to reward the winning unit with a promised trip.

Of the two Area Managers, one lacked knowledge of events within his area and the other seemed to care little about the welfare of his recruiters. One Area Manager could be relied upon to call him daily with new ideas while the other seemed to avoid him at all costs.


The recruiters seemed afraid to talk with him about anything but the most immediate problems—discussions of how the force would operate in the future seemed beyond their interest—but they were dedicated. They knew their mission was six new recruiters

per month, and they seemed to want to reach that objective at any cost. They worked as individuals and seemed to like it that way.



These were generally his perceptions when he called me in to discuss the possibility of conducting an OE operation. During discussion, he listed five goals for the organization:

- a. Increase the number of recruits enlisted through more effective methods.
- b. Improve the ability of recruiters to work together.
- c. Improve the rapport and interface with the force's environment (Figure 3).



ASSESSMENT

Using a systems view, the OE consultant looked at the unit's environment, unit climate, supervisory leadership, co-worker interaction, work group process, and effects upon personnel. These are the results of the initial assessment.

The environment was composed of 7 major components (Figure 3):

- a. The communities within the state which the force relied upon to provide recruits. Unfortunately, the majority of community members did not actively support the Army National Guard (ARNG). Most parents saw ARNG recruiters as being Army recruiters, inferring that if their children enlisted, they would be gone for many years. The knowledge of the ARNG's excellent benefits was limited to




Figure 3
RECRUITING FORCE'S ENVIRONMENT

- d. Improve his office's responsiveness to the needs of the recruiters.

- e. Improve the effectiveness of meetings.

It was agreed that a four-step process would be used in the operation: assessment, planning based upon that assessment, implementation of the plan, and evaluation of the plan over time (Figure 4). We agreed that any person questioned during the assessment would remain anonymous, that the RRM would receive both positive and negative feedback, and that the RRM would retain control of the operation: he would make all decisions; the OE Consultant would make recommendations. With those consensual agreements, the assessment began.

nonexistent within the community; the force's efforts in advertising them (for reasons discussed later) had not been successful.

b. Two major commands within the State's ARNG. In one of the commands, recruiters were not supported and were looked upon with suspicion and distrust. In the other command, there seemed to be confusion concerning the role of the recruiter and the chain of command they used. In both commands, commanders blamed the recruiters for not being able to gain qualified, "acceptable" new members.

c. The Office of the Adjutant General (which is the highest headquarters in that state). At this level, performance revolved around the

adage, "if you can't produce, we'll get another manager who can." Although the RRM's immediate supervisor tried to be understanding, he, like the RRM, had little time to investigate the real situation in the force or the causes behind the force's problems. He did support bringing in an OE Consultant. Other managers at that level continually blamed the new RRM for not being able to "influence the action."

d. Department of the Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). This command listed requirements for recruiters to attend its school and required them to pass its skills qualification test in order to remain employed (although their schedules allowed little time for study). TRADOC also ran the training schools for new recruits which the recruiters brought into the ARNG.

e. National Guard Bureau (NGB).⁴ This agency lists requirements that recruits must meet before enlisting; lists qualifications for members to be retained after enlistment; and offers organizational effectiveness (OE) assets.⁵

f. The other recruiting and retention forces in the other 54 states, territories, and the District of Columbia to which the force is continually compared.

To determine the condition of the remaining subsystems of the recruiting force, the OE Consultant administered a computer assisted survey, the General Organizational Questionnaire (GOQ) tailored to the recruiting force (Figure 5), conducted interviews of all available members (two recruiters were in school), and observed several meetings.

RESULTS

The unit climate was barely positive. The more positive aspect was that the recruiters wanted to give their best effort. In addition, they got a sense of accomplishment from being a vital part of the force with jobs directly related to the unit's mission. They stated that they wanted to remain in the force as long as they could (often because it was challenging just to survive). Lastly, they agreed they were not afraid to make mistakes—as long as they "made mission." The unit's mission was recruiting; their mission goal was six new members per month per recruiter, or be terminated.

Their collective vision of the chain of command was substantially different—and more confusing—than the RRM's version (Figure 2). Each recruiter seemed to owe loyalty to, and confer with, a different member of the recruiting headquarters.

Their complaints centered around (1) decisions being made at the top without allowing them to imput suggestions; (2) interference from the two major commands and the Adjutant General's office; and (3) not getting information on activities and lessons learned from the other recruiting areas. The over-riding fear was that if they failed to "make mission," they would lose their jobs.

Some related horror stories concerned nonproducing recruiters arriving at meetings only to be informed, right in front of their peers, that they had been fired. (This had not happened under the current RRM; it happened over two years earlier. Since


the organization had changed managers so frequently, the current members were still suffering from the Theory X management practices of a previous RRM.) There was basis for the fear of failure. In the 24 months prior to the assessment, 25 recruiters had left the force.

This fear created all types of nonproductive behavior: Recruiters were stealing recruits from each other; circumventing the chain of command; and lying about reports.

The supervisory leadership subsystem revealed a lack of role clarity, distrust of leadership ability, and charges of favoritism. Most recruiters hoped that the new RRM would change things but also accused him of favoring members of the force who had previously served in the elite unit from which he had come. Most complained that the Recruiting and Induction Officer (RIO) would not obtain advertisements they needed in local papers in order to sell the ARNG program (even though the RRM said this was the SGM's job). The sergeant major (SGM) was seen as being self-seeking and apathetic about the conditions under which recruiters had to work.

When asked about their supervisors (the Area Managers), there was agreement that the supervisors knew what the mission was ("mission is 6") and emphasized it, encouraging recruiters' best efforts. On the negative side, the supervisors (1) were not regarded by recruiters as being leaders, (2) had little influence upon decisions made at the recruiting head-quarters, (3) failed to provide required materials for recruiting, and (4) only told recruiters when they did wrong; never when they did right. Recruiters agreed that meetings were boring, unproductive, and a waste of time.

Figure 5
GOQ, November 1980



⁴"The National Guard Bureau is both a staff and operating agency . . . it is a joint bureau of the Departments of the Army and the Air Force. The Chief, National Guard Bureau, reports to the Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force through the respective Chiefs of Staff and is the principal staff advisor on National Guard affairs." 1980 Annual Review, p. 4.

⁵"In order to help improve the effectiveness of National Guard units, NGB established a Guard-wide Organizational Effectiveness (OE) program consisting of three regional centers," Lieutenant General La Vern E. Weber, Chief, National Guard Bureau, in a cover letter to 1980 annual Review. Also see, Halus, Michael B., "Organizational Effectiveness in the National Guard," *OE Communiqué*, Vol. 5, No. 1, Winter 1981, pp. 21-24.

The co-worker interaction subsystem revealed that only two recruiters in the force worked as a team. Most recruiters had stereotyped other recruiters in harsher terms than any other group I spoke to from the force's environment. The biggest complaints were that other recruiters (1) never told them when they did a good job and (2) could never be trusted.

The work group process (how the job is done) subsystem revealed that recruiters were trained for the job they were doing but that supplies and equipment were not adequate to do the job (for which they blamed their supervisors, the Area Managers).

The effects upon the personnel subsystem indicated that the unit did not have a drug problem (although some questioned that fact). What did not show in the computer assisted survey was the amount of pressure the recruiters were under and the effect it had upon their interaction with each other, potential recruits, their families, and their friends.

THE OE MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT PLAN

Upon hearing and seeing the data collected, the RRM was presented with seven options (Figure 6). At that time, he and the OE consultant developed a long-range plan. The plan had the desired outcome of obtaining the RRM's original goals plus accomplishing any new missions given to the force by its higher headquarters. In addition, it was tailored to modify the behavior of its members:

Figure 6 SEVEN OPTIONS

1. Do Nothing.
2. Stop! Change Everything.
3. Stop! Study Situation More.
4. Tinker With Organization Elements.
5. Align Attitudes and Goals.
6. Affirmative Action.
7. Job Enrichment (Changing the Rules).





a. The Recruiting & Retention Manager (Figure 7).

b. The Recruiting & Induction Officer (Figure 8).

c. The Sergeant Major (Figure 9).

d. The Management Group (Figure 10).

e. The Fulltime Recruiting Force (Figure 11).



As part of the plan, it was agreed that (1) periodic workshops would be conducted, (2) another survey would be made six months later, and still another to follow.

To carry out the OE Management Development Plan, the OE Consultant obtained support of other OE Consultants from the Capitol Area Network for Organizational Effectiveness (CANOE).⁶ Five workshops were conducted to implement that original plan (Figures 12 & 13). At the end of each workshop, attendees evaluated its worth.

29 Jul 1980	- OE Briefing Heard by RRM.
4 Sep 1980	- Contract to Begin The Operation's Assessment.
8 Sep 1980	- Initial Briefing to Recruiting Force.
Sep-Nov 1980	- Survey Conducted.
4-5 Dec 1980	- Role Clarity Workshop (Management Group).
8-9 Jan 1981	- Team Building Workshop (Recruiting Force).
29 Feb 1981	- Decision To Begin 2nd Assessment.
Mar 1981	- Survey Conducted.
30 Apr-1 May	- Action Planning Workshop (Recruiting Force).
5-6 Aug 1981	- Managerial Leadership Workshop (Management Group).
29-30 Oct 1981	- Organizational Time Management Workshop (Force).

CALENDAR OF EVENTS

Figure 12

Figure 13 WORKSHOPS

• **ROLE CLARITY WORKSHOP:** An experientially-based workshop designed to gain a clear understanding of how the chain of command is to work; where each manager fits in that chain; and what role each manager is to play in achieving organizational goals. It differs from the traditional approach of the manager telling the subordinates where they fit in the organization by allowing the subordinates to tell the manager where they think they fit in and reaching consensual agreement on where they will fit in.

• **TEAM BUILDING WORKSHOP:** Designed to create a team of recruiters. Its strength lies in synergistic problem solving exercises and interpersonal communications models and experiences presented in a climate of stress—the normal working environment for recruiters. It combines personal growth with professional growth to equal team development.

• **ACTION PLANNING WORKSHOP:** Designed to synergistically build a plan of action for winning an interstate competition between several recruiting organizations. As a part of this workshop, both recruiters and spouses received interpersonal communication and stress management training.

• **MANAGERIAL LEADERSHIP:** Designed to develop the leadership and the management skills of the management group through experiential instruction. The similarities, differences, and supporting characteristics of leadership and management were analyzed by the attendees.

• **ORGANIZATIONAL TIME MANAGEMENT:** Designed to confront the reports process in an organization, allowing workers to state opinions on how to more effectively report and measure progress and for management to respond by making key decisions in a timely manner during the workshop.

SUCCESS IS AN OUTCOME

By the time the second formal assessment took place many changes had already occurred in the force (Figure 14). Two workshops had been conducted: A Role Clarity Workshop for the Management Group and a Team Building Workshop for the entire force. By the end of the Role Clarity Workshop, recruiters had discovered they could nonoffensively confront their supervisors and not be fired. In both workshops, the workers were asked to define their roles in the organization.

⁶The Capitol Area Network for Organizational Effectiveness (CANOE) is an informal organization sponsored by the Organizational Effectiveness Office, Management Directorate, Office, Chief of Staff, US Army. It consists of OE consultants, within the Department of Defense, located in the vicinity of the "National Capitol Region." *Charter*, CANOE, undated. See also Coleman, Bruce, "CANOE for Sale," in *OE Communiqué*, Vol. 1-79, January 1979, pp. 72-74. Consultants who gave of their talents and their time in support of this operation—in order of their entry into the program's support—were: CPT Jennifer Jones, MAJ Robert Butehorn, MAJ James M. Stark, SGM James Watson, MAJ Larry Gomez, MAJ Fred Jeffords, LTC Verley Tate, Mr. Kai-Peter Koenig, SFC Tony Love-Gonzalez, and CPT Steven Messman.

Figure 14
March 1981 GOQ

SUPERVISORY LEADERSHIP

- + Easy to see supervisor.
- + Supervisor encourages best effort.
- + Supervisor gives clear instructions.
- Supervisor helps me plan ahead.

UNIT CLIMATE

- + I want to give best effort.
- + OE training is beneficial.
- + Rules are enforced.
- + Routine activities are aimed at mission accomplishment.
- + I am technically qualified for my job.

EFFECTS ON PERSONNEL:

- + Satisfied with my job.

WORK GROUP PROCESS

- + Working in job trained for.
- + I understand what is expected.
- + I am getting training to take on more responsibility.

CO-WORKER INTERACTION

In the environment, comments about an improvement in supervisory leadership and the recruiters' improved attitudes were increasing in number.

The unit climate revealed recruiters continuing to want to give their best effort. They noted that rules were enforced in the force (replacing the charges of favoritism in the first survey). They agreed they were technically qualified for their jobs and that their routine activities were aimed at mission accomplishment. Most rewarding to the OE Consultant was the agreement that the organizational effectiveness program had a beneficial effect upon the recruiters.

They lauded the improvements in their meetings and the better understanding all had about what their roles were in the organization. The supervisors were not only easy to see but issued clear instructions when giving missions. As always, they agreed the supervisors were encouraging the recruiters' best efforts.

Although co-worker interaction did not reveal either a positive or a negative ranking in the computer assisted survey, recruiters had begun to exchange ideas and suggestions with one another—perhaps with a strong "wait and see" attitude—but a step in the right direction, nonetheless.

The workgroup process subsystem showed gains in understanding what was expected of them and, perhaps most encouraging, was the ranking of getting training to take on more responsibility.

The most satisfying result of the survey to the RRM was the strong ranking of, "All in all, I am satisfied with my job," by the recruiters in the effects upon personnel subsystem.

Now, do **not** be misled into believing we had created Camelot in the recruiting force! What we had done was to make headway (Figure 15 & 16). There were still serious issues ahead. Some of the recruiters complained that they spent too much time away from their spouses and families. Some complained that their supervisor needed more management training. Finally, the pressure of an approaching competition with other states' recruiters in their area was beginning to build. So we addressed those issues.

EXPANDING POTENTIAL

Training was offered to recruiters' spouses. Training concentrated upon interpersonal communications; the recognition and management of stress; and self-improvement. Participating spouses added comfort and support to the recruiter's efforts. The recruiters, on the other hand, were able to





Figure 16
GOQ* RANKINGS COMPARISON

NOVEMBER 1980			MARCH 1981		
RANK	ITEM	%	RANK	ITEM	%
1	10	4.84	1	10	4.95
2	8	4.71	2	86	4.80
3	26	4.64	3	89	4.75
4	34	4.64	4	99	4.74
5	36	4.59	5	62	4.74
6	93	4.55	6	31	4.68
7	83	4.50	7	26	4.68
8	35	4.50	8	36	4.63
9	96	4.50	9	70	4.63
10	17	4.46	10	58	4.63
11	20	4.46	11	40	4.63
12	62	4.46	12	63	4.63
104			104		3.80
105	3	3.18	105	6	3.80
106	45	3.07	106	45	3.80
107	46	3.04	107	27	3.79
108	44	3.04	108	43	3.75
109	5	3.04	109	23	3.75
110	38	3.04	110	4	3.75
111	43	2.89	111	2	3.65
112	24	2.89	112	61	3.63
113	6	2.71	113	13	3.55
114	2	2.61	114	24	3.55
115	61	2.19	115	42	3.40

*GOQ = General Organization Questionnaire



communicate their feelings and problems in terms their spouses could understand, and were able to begin to understand that although their world revolved around recruiting, their spouses' lives included other interests. For both marriage partners, the OE Management Development Plan offered a learning, growing experience.

Succeeding workshops added more skills to the Management Group. Synergistic problem solving was applied to the upcoming interstate competition with amazing results in commitment and enlistment increases. Recruiters began to realize that "The future doesn't just happen . . . we, by our collective endeavor, invent the future."⁷ A successful awards program was initiated by the RIO who had once been described as being unimaginative. The sergeant major offered suggestions which eased recruiters' working conditions. The importance of input from members did not detract from mission accomplishment. It enhanced it.

As time passed, it became apparent that much of the recruiter's time was being spent filling out reports; their solution: address the matter in an open forum during an Organizational Time Management Workshop. They were asked which reports should be consolidated or eliminated and they responded. The Management Group agreed with the suggestions. Substantial numbers of reports were eliminated. Production of new recruits again increased.

IF IT'S SUCCESS, IT'S MEASUREABLE

Retention of recruiters improved. In the 24 months prior to the beginning of the OE operation, 25 recruiters left the force. In a 30-person organization, that is a substantial turn over. (This is more evident when one realizes that once a recruiter leaves, a long chain of events follows before his replacement can become productive. In fact, almost three months expire before the replacement produces his first recruit.) In the 20 months since the operation began, only four recruiters left the force.

As a matter of record, several recruiters and almost all of the Management Group were offered jobs in other organizations, and each turned down that offer. The RRM was


not only offered another job with a promise of thousands of dollars in increased pay, but he was also offered a chance to command the elite unit to which he had once belonged if he would leave the recruiting force. He chose to remain. (The recruiters cheered his decision.)

The bottom-line measurement of success in recruiting is the number of new members enlisted. Figure 17 shows that enlistments have increased dramatically. Yet these recruiters go farther. They become personally involved with the new recruit. They ensure he attends the state's Recruit Training Program; ensure his enlistment package is letter-perfect; often transport him to the airport when the recruit leaves for basic training; answer letters from the recruit while the new Guardsperson is

attending initial military training; and personally reintroduce the new member to his company commander upon the soldier's return from training. There is concern for the newly gained member from the first time he enters the recruiter's office seeking information about the Army National Guard, which has added to that state's improved retention of soldiers.

Two items in chart 17 need elaboration. The national monthly average is 12% for induction of Category IV personnel (the minimum mental category acceptable). This state quit enlisting this category in the first quarter of 1980. Secondly, the force had, by the end of the second quarter of 1982, exceeded the Adjutant General's recruiting goals for all of Fiscal Year 1982.

Figure 17
PRODUCTION BY QUARTER



* Percentage increase over same quarter, previous year.

** Stopped recruiting Category IV personnel.

⁷Quote from Dr. Peter Vaill, George Washington University, given during "Long-Range Planning Conference," 8-11 December 1980, sponsored by OECS. Quote also appears on 1982 Organizational Effectiveness Planning Calendar (inclosure to *OE Communique*, Issue 4-81), and in "Commandant's Comments" *OE Communique*, Issue 2-81, p. 3.

THE FUTURE IS CREATED

The future of this OE Management Development Program is bright. Its success is based upon these concepts:

a. "Changing things is central to leadership and changing them before anyone else is creativity."⁸ The Recruiting and Retention Manager was a creative leader who was unafraid of experimentation. He was the key to the success of his organization.

b. Don't allow the urgent to destroy your focus on the important. The RRM was willing to invest the time and resources to focus the current situation before he made rash, and perhaps, wrong decisions about the future.

c. "In striving to reach the heights of our profession, let us not forget the depths of our need to be human."⁹ The RRM realized that the strength of his organization was his people. He sought to provide personal growth training for them, in addition to team building and professional development.

d. "Management of the many is the same as management of the few: it is a matter of organization."¹⁰ The RRM, above all else, had the skills of a manager. He had the self-confidence and the willingness to expand himself with his organization's growth. He correctly identified that an inherent part of any organization is the family of its members and he had the foresight to include their development with the force's recognized members.

e. Support of higher headquarters is essential. The RRM's supervisor recognized the Recruiting and Retention Manager's potential and allowed him the space to learn, to reach, and to grasp success as an outcome.

The Organizational Effectiveness Management Development Program is a success. It was tailored to the organization it began with and was flexible enough to adapt to the many additional personnel who have been added to the force since it began. It, like

the organization it supports, will continue to adapt, to expand, and to develop managers of the future. □

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⁸Jay's Law of Leadership, cited in "Commandant's Comments," *OE Communique*, Issue 4-81, p. 4.

⁹Quote from Major Robert Butehorn's invocation at "OE '81," a conference of OE consultants, in Atlanta, Georgia, 22 October 1981.

¹⁰Quote from Sun Tzu, cited in Griffith, Samuel B., *Sun Tzu, The Art of War* (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 90.

Mind, Body, Spirit: Total Soldier Wellness

Editor's note: This article is a reprint of chapter 6 (pp. 30-44) from Army Leader Development, Delta Force 10th Meeting, 8-12 March 1982.

The realities of the year 2000 and beyond will provide this Nation, this Army, our leaders and our soldiers with a mind-boggling continuum of complex challenges that will attack the very core of our will to survive.

The time is rapidly approaching when we can no longer ignore the research that has provided insight into the potential power to be derived from the integration of mind-body-spirit. Power in the form of a force multiplier is available at no extra cost—it is contained in every soldier in our Army.

The technology that exists today, or that is rapidly evolving, can provide the tools necessary to effect that integration. A rare, yet fleeting, opportunity to initiate a quantum leap in soldier performance is upon us with the meeting of an increasingly well-defined challenge and the availability of technologies to meet that challenge. It is a window, in our view, of the future that cannot remain open long.

Mental, physical and spiritual "wellness" can become a part of our individual and collective being . . . projecting an image to prospective recruits, our soldiers, our Country and our adversaries that Army leaders are committed to the concepts of physical fitness, mental toughness and the warrior spirit.

"Army. Be All You Can Be"

. . . a reality, not just a slogan.

THE FUTURE . . . A VISION

For the future, be all you can be—A Reality

A requirement for leaders of the future will be to develop and sustain soldiers capable of achieving optimal performance in support of Total Army Goals. A comprehensive, preventive maintenance of the soldier initiative that integrates physical conditioning, mental toughness and the warrior spirit becomes an essential resource in support of that requirement.

Total soldier wellness not a perceived responsibility of unit commander

Within units today, commanders do not possess or demonstrate a perceived responsibility for the total wellness of soldiers. Poor communication between commanders and health-care proponents inhibits the commanders' ability to influence the health-care systems.

Relationship of mind-body-spirit integration to mental toughness, physical conditioning and the warrior spirit not yet described or acknowledged.

In-service efforts to encourage the development and application of mind-body-spirit integration are lacking. There does not appear to be any emphasis on investigating the relative merits of mind-body-spirit integration. It follows that we have not acknowledged the usefulness of mind-body-spirit integration. We have to clearly describe the relationship between mental toughness, physical conditioning, warrior spirit, and their impact on combat effectiveness.

Some current thinking is beginning to bring it all together . . .
. . . nutrition, weight control, fitness . . .

We recognize that there are now several significant, high-level command initiatives that are looking at the concept of such an integrated program, i.e., physical fitness, nutrition and weight control. Specific components of these initiatives include consideration of support systems that provide positive reinforcement of program objectives. (An example is the move to insure that physical-conditioning training is conducted during duty hours, as a legitimate part of the daily training regimen, not before or after normal duty hours as a form of punishment or a method for breaking loose more time for other activities.)

... but who's listening?

If our recruiting slogan is the target, we haven't hit it yet

Although a great deal of emphasis has already been generated by recent general-officer policy meetings, changes at unit level are not yet effected. Believability remains a problem, i.e., "I hear what they say they want, but what are they doing to help me believe them?" Further, there is a great deal of variance remaining between units in the application of the Army's physical conditioning programs.

Our current physical conditioning program does not meet the demands of today's wide range of job-task requirements. It does not challenge individuals to "Be all you can be." The disparity in the support and reinforcement of current program objectives is partially the result of our tendency to focus on a short-term fix as contrasted with a long-term strategy that recognizes the importance of an individual soldier's mental and physical well being over an extended period.


So today we can expect to hear a company commander say, "You are so important to this outfit, Motor Sergeant, that you don't have to work out with us today." It is time to recognize the importance of a long-term perspective, to free the commanders to say . . . and believe, "Your contribution is so important to this unit, Total Soldier, that you will get your ass out with us for P.T. now."

WHERE WE CAN BE . . . A STRATEGY

Soldiers, Commanders and doctors . . . a "wellness" triad

A strategy for the long term must inculcate the concept of "wellness" into the Total Army so that the medical community, the commander and the soldier become partners in developing and sustaining that component of overall soldier performance. This triad relationship should provide the necessary linkage, and congruence, between what the command says and what the field does.

The examples provided in the accompanying graphic are for illustrative purpose and are by no means a comprehensive assessment of all aspects of the strategy that would lead to desired outcomes. The examples attempt to give a quick look at where we are . . . and where we could be; or from another perspective, "What changes are necessary?"



What we have to do is:

- Establish a network of people who will work the mind-body-spirit interface problem.
- Initiate action research now into options identified by above network.
- Exploit the findings of the 82nd Airborne field test of the impact of nutrition and body rhythm on performance (After Action Report Bright Star '82—The Jet Lag Diet).
- Develop an executive-level health maintenance plan for top Army leaders.
- Integrate stress management training into field operations (e.g., simple meditation exercises, "cat napping").
- Exploit OPFOR findings in military psychology, sports medicine and the like. Find out why the United States Olympic team claims "cross crawls" (a body-mind linkup set of exercises) led to two gold medals.
- Educate leaders at all levels in the need for a longer-term orientation toward their profession. (Why do we need an annual OER?)
- Line up our reward systems to reinforce leaders who adopt a long-term orientation.
- Consider creating an ASI for unit-level coaches/sports medicine specialists who would assist individuals in setting maximum goals for development (See Dallas Cowboy Development Plan).
- Develop a high-stress vitamin pack to supplement Combat rations until C-rations can be improved.
- Develop a pilot program to test the concepts of mind-body-spirit integration. The high tech test bed could be the testing ground.
- Train soldiers to increase capacity for complex thought (e.g., absorption of multi-source information—Concentrix).
- Teach applications of intuitive decision making.

The way we have to do the above is:

- Co-opt the elders of the medical profession into supporting the notion of "soldier wellness" as a partnership between soldier-commander-doctor.
- Don't sell wellness as another Army program; excite commanders and soldiers with the possibilities.
- Integrate body-mind-spirit activities into daily life (e.g., cross crawl exercises before combat; sensory calibration before live fire exercises; visualization of success before tank gunnery).
- Spread the concept of soldier wellness incrementally in bits that the Army can take.
- Build on successes of incremental introduction of the concept... let the good word spread; watch the demand for participation grow... satisfy the demand.

SUMMARY

Create a Total Soldier Wellness System that will empower our commanders and their soldiers to truly "Be All We Can Be!"

To do this we can:

Examine yesterday's fitness program, and incorporate new technologies to live up to our vision of "Be All You Can Be!"

Create, develop, and sustain Total Soldier Wellness by using an integrated approach

that insures combat readiness, via physical conditioning, mental toughness, and warrior spirit.

Provide resources, flexibility and opportunities to the commander for Total Soldier Wellness.

Allow commanders to be responsible.

Encourage responsible, courageous risk-taking. Encourage corrective feedback as we find increasingly effective ways to implement this system. □

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Androgynous Behavior in Leaders and Consultants


Dr. Janis Day and Dr. Jerry Eppler (OECS)

Dr. Janis Day is a faculty member at OECS. Her background includes fourteen years of community college teaching and former ownership, with her husband, of Alternatives, Inc., a management training and consulting firm. She is the author of a experiential college text, *A Working Approach to Human Relations in Organizations*, Brooks/Cole, 1980. She recently completed her Ph.D. in human relations in management at Columbia Pacific University.



Dr. Jerry Eppler has a broad background as educator, counselor, administrator, and consultant. An OECS faculty member, Dr. Eppler has had considerable experience as a counseling psychologist specializing in the human problems of management which present themselves at the individual, small group, and organizational levels in the work environment. For the past six years he has had a key role in the integration of Organizational Development technology into the U.S. Army. Specifically, he played a crucial role in designing the four-month graduate-level course in organizational effectiveness. During his tenure at OECS he has held the position of Dean of Individual Skills Division.

As an acting consultant in the Army's only traveling management consulting team, he has provided consulting services to general officers in complex organizational systems. Specifically he has served as consultant to the Logistics Center for the U.S. Army, 6th Army Headquarters and FORSCOM. Privately he has consulted with Weyerhaeuser Corporation, the Seattle Public School System, Arizona Employment Service, and others.



A professional educator who has taught in the elementary schools, high schools, undergraduate and graduate departments in colleges and universities, Dr. Eppler has received five awards for teaching, counseling and management supervision excellence during his tenure at OECS.

Dr. Eppler received his Ph.D. from Arizona State University in 1970 and has done post doctoral work at Harvard University.


We have found in our teaching and writing that there is no subject as controversial as one which calls into question what behavior is "right" for males and what behavior is "right" for females.

Those brave enough to stay with us to the end of this article will gain a broader understanding of behavior in general, a historical perspective on androgyny, an insight into effective leadership according to new research findings on androgynous behavior, and a new interpretation of effective OE consultant behavior.

Early 20th Century Psychotherapist

Carl Gustav Jung

Jung, at one time a student and colleague of Sigmund Freud, theorized that all people have a masculine, assertive aspect to their personalities called "animus," and a passive, soft, yielding dimension, which he designated "anima." Jung said that men identify with their masculine side (animus) and wear their femininity (anima) on the inside, and women do just the opposite. He explained the attraction between the sexes as people being drawn together because of the polarity of their needs:




He said that on the physical level, man is usually the initiator. His vision includes providing for others. He is the positive force in assertive and aggressive ways; i.e., protector, provider.

On the emotional level woman is the initiator, the positive factor, and man is the receiver. A significant element of the core of woman revolves around love. She will endure deprivation and suffering and still come through very strong if she feels loved.

The mental level is the positive source in man, Jung said, and the receptive potential in woman. Man tends to forget that a woman's mental faculty hungers for excitement, and he often does not relate to her on a mental level. Her mind is as capable of being fruitful as her body.

On the spiritual level, woman has the positive thrust while man is the receptor of thrust. Through a woman's love, man touches on his spirit and awakens this potential power in him.



Jung thought that male/female attraction occurred because of the polarity of their needs. He said what the other person represents to us is what needs to be brought out in our own nature. And that "the same things hidden and unrealized within myself are the things I love in you." Or in other words, the two sexes complemented each other. The man was mentally and physically strong and the woman was spiritually and emotionally strong.

Thus, Jung observed a functioning, male-dominated society that made sense for that time in history.

Radical Feminism

By the end of the 1960s, a crashing feminist movement exploded upon the country protesting against this domination. Betty Friedan in the *Feminine Mystique* and Caroline Bird in *Born Female* wanted women to assume masculine behaviors and take their "rightful," and equal, place among men.

The rage of the leaders of the women's movement made sense for that time in history, when women were required to take jobs in which they found themselves low in the hierarchy and poorly paid.

Moderate and radical feminists looked to history for matriarchal societies, systems in which females had held the major authority positions. They found a few examples in primitive tribes, and they found that in both Babylonia and ancient Egypt women had enjoyed considerable independence and high status. In Egypt women owned property, took part in commerce, public life, and mixed freely with men.

Finding few examples, some feminists concluded that since males wrote the history books, naturally women wouldn't be properly represented.

Radical feminists, with whom Gloria Steinem was perhaps unfairly identified, passed out pamphlets at women's support groups that urged women to plot to outnumber men at meetings, to maneuver powerful seats in meeting rooms, to form support groups and networks to pass along vital information, and to control confrontations with males by being openly hostile and aggressive. Some of these feminists even denied a need for men in their lives, preferring to view men as the "enemy." Below are the divergent views of Jung and the radical feminists on behavior continuums:

JUNG

WOMEN	MEN
Passive	Aggressive
Soft	Provider
Yielding	Powerful

RADICAL FEMINISTS

WOMEN	MEN
Powerful	Powerful
Aggressive	Aggressive
Confrontive	Confrontive

Spinoffs of the Dicotomy Between Jung and the Radical Feminists

These opposing and contradictory views spurred hundreds of empirical studies. In the last decade, developmental, educational, clinical, social and vocational psychology have explored the question: "Are sex-linked behaviors caused by biological differences or merely the result of social conditioning and role modeling?"

Some make interesting reading. For example, it has been shown that castrated roosters don't crow or fight. And a hen low on the female pecking order pecks her way to the top after sufficient injections of testosterone. Researchers caution, however, that lower animal behavior has little or no relevance to humankind because humans have a more advanced brain "wrapped around" a sort of animalistic reptilian core brain.

In one experiment, six-month-old babies of the same height, weight, age, and general appearance were diapered, dressed in pink and called "Beth." Strangers were asked to hold and describe the infant. The same babies were dressed in blue and called "Adam." Another group of strangers described the baby. "Beth" was most often labeled as little, cute, weak, and delicate. "Adam" was most often called alert, firm, coordinated, and strong. (the babies' real sex was immaterial.)

We do know based on studies of human babies that on the average boy babies raise up their heads more often, leading researchers to speculate that boy babies are more "aggressive." Girl babies on the average move their mouths and vocalize more often. Since little girls (after some modern world socialization, of course) talk more, researchers are saying the girls probably are more "verbal."

The research is clear that there are marked physiological differences between males and females. However, behavior is another matter. But our knowledge about the "naturalness" of sex-linked behavior is still sketchy and hampered by what we have come to expect.

Enter Androgyny — "Both And" Thinking

S.L. Bem, a Stanford University researcher, asked hundreds of students at Stanford University to sort behaviors into three categories: masculine, feminine, or neutral. From their responses, she concluded that being "ambitious" was masculine behavior, being "understanding" was feminine behavior, and that being "truthful" was neutral behavior.

Dr. Bem developed the BSRI, Bem Sex-Role Inventory (Bem 1977), a quiz that adults can take to see whether they see themselves as being stronger in "male" behaviors, stronger in "female" behaviors, or balanced between both.

The quiz takers who were balanced and comfortable using BOTH the masculine, harder behaviors AND the feminine, softer behaviors were labeled as being androgynous (from the Greek *andro*, "male," and *gyne*, "female"). The word **androgynous** is used in biology to describe flowers bearing both staminate and pistillate parts (male and female) in the same plant. The word is also used in religion, mythology, and psychology.

Bem then gave self-esteem tests to all three categories, those who identified with the harder behaviors, those who identified with the softer behaviors, and those who were androgynous. Although only about twenty-five percent of the quiz takers were androgynous (balanced), these people tended to have higher self esteem, regardless of their sex.

Researchers Janet Spence and Robert Helmreich of the University of Texas correlated higher grade point averages of MBA students with being androgynous. Another of their studies correlates higher scientific achievements with being androgynous.

Leadership and Androgyny

Defining leadership as "behavior that (1) helps the group accomplish its work (task needs) and (2) helps the group meet its social/emotional needs (relationship needs), researchers Bales and Fiedler found that most people in leadership positions seem to prefer one or the other of these functions. But it is interesting that their research shows that leaders who are concerned with their subordinates' relationship needs actually get more work from their followers than leaders concerned with task requirements. Furthermore, if a group has a "task master" leader, another person will arise from the group to take care of the relationship needs. And conversely, if the leader tends to emphasize relationships, another person will evolve to lead getting the work done.

Researchers Blake and Mouton have found that the **very best leaders** are people who are concerned with **both** the task and relationship needs of their subordinates. Jay Hall, using data on more than 11,000 managers from all hierachial levels in a variety of organizations, corroborated their reports and says that the higher-achieving managers tended to place an equal emphasis on the task and the people.

Combat, emergency, or short-term leadership assignments are not adequately represented in these studies, however, and we might speculate that the harder, more task oriented behaviors would be the most effective during critical times. Many military leaders were those men who, in crisis, did what they had to do. And their followers were willing to put relationship and personal needs on "hold."

W. Warner Burke, professor of psychology and education at Columbia University's Teachers College has come up with a very interesting hypothesis: Task behavior is essentially masculine and relationship behavior is essentially feminine. (See "Leadership: Is There One Best Approach?", *OE Communiqué* issue #3-81, p. 15.)

Agreeing with this hypothesis, the authors sorted Bem's list of masculine and feminine behaviors into the two categories Task Related Behaviors and Relationship Related Behaviors:

Task Related Behaviors

- Independent
- Assertive
- Ambitious
- Forceful
- Analytical
- Willing to take risks
- Makes decisions easily
- Self-sufficient
- Dominant
- Willing to take a stand
- Individualistic

Relationship Related Behavior

- Yielding
- Cheerful
- Affectionate
- Loyal
- Sympathetic
- Sensitive to the needs of others
- Understanding
- Warm
- Compassionate
- Eager to soothe hurt feelings
- Does not use harsh language

All of the behaviors under Task are masculine and all those under Relationship are feminine. This would seem to support Burke's hypothesis.

Most successful leaders, according to Hall and to Blake and Mouton, are both task centered **and** relationship centered; thus, if Burke's hypothesis is correct, the best leaders are those who exhibit androgynous flexibility in behavior. Being relationship centered is the second best kind of leader. Least effective would be those leaders who concentrate only on the task.

Productive Consulting Behaviors

Androgynous people make better students, scientists, and leaders, and they have higher self-esteem. These people are successful because they have a wider repertoire of behaviors from which to draw, depending on the situation, irrespective of whether they are male or female. To expand one's repertoire of behavior means keeping the behaviors that are already assets.

Even Carl Jung thought that people in search of good mental health needed to "get in touch" with their opposite polarity. But he did not say that a healthy personality needs to have **both** relationship/feminine/anima **behaviors** and task/masculine, animus **behaviors**. The authors believe that, like physiology, behavior *evolves* and that what is functional or works, comes to be. We believe giving people permission to have androgynous behavior makes sense for this time in history.

The authors think that the Consultant Competencies developed by McBer for OECS (through ARI) require the greatest flexibility and adaptability, using **both** sides of the behavior spectrum. OE Consultants who are successful, according to OECS, possess a high number of these competencies (which are listed at the end of this article). As with leaders, then, the most successful consultants exhibit androgynous behavior, regardless of whether they are male or female consultants.

ANDROGYNOUS LEADERS AND CONSULTANTS

ACCORDING TO DAY AND EPPLER

WOMEN	MEN
Assertive	Assertive
Sympathetic	Sympathetic
Analytical	Analytical
Loyal	Loyal

Many so-called "neutral" behaviors are used by the competent consultant, or for that matter, by any serious professional: being helpful, friendly, reliable, adaptable, truthful, tactful and sincere.

Do you know if you have a balance between the harder and softer behaviors? Or are you strong in one and weak in the other? To find out, take the shortened form of the Bem Sex Role Inventory. (See the Bibliography for the full, validated research instrument.)

ANDROGYNY QUIZ

How often do you display the following characteristics?
Use the key below to indicate your responses.

1. Usually not
2. Occasionally
3. Quite often
4. Almost always

M _____
F _____

1. <input type="checkbox"/> Aggressive	11. <input type="checkbox"/> Dominant
2. <input type="checkbox"/> Affectionate	12. <input type="checkbox"/> Sensitive to others
3. <input type="checkbox"/> Ambitious	13. <input type="checkbox"/> Forceful
4. <input type="checkbox"/> Compassionate	14. <input type="checkbox"/> Sympathetic
5. <input type="checkbox"/> Assertive	15. <input type="checkbox"/> Self-reliant
6. <input type="checkbox"/> Gentle	16. <input type="checkbox"/> Tender
7. <input type="checkbox"/> Athletic	17. <input type="checkbox"/> Independent
8. <input type="checkbox"/> Loving toward children	18. <input type="checkbox"/> Understanding
9. <input type="checkbox"/> Competitive	19. <input type="checkbox"/> Willing to take a stand
10. <input type="checkbox"/> Loyal	20. <input type="checkbox"/> Warm

Scoring. To score this quiz, add up your scores after all the uneven numbers, 1, 3, 5, 7, etc., and record the total under M for masculine behaviors. Then add up your scores after the even numbers, 2, 4, 6, etc., and record the total under F for feminine behaviors. Your behavior is *androgynous* if your two totals are within a few points (up to five or so) of each other.

If you are not balanced between the harder behaviors and softer behaviors, we at the Organizational Effectiveness Center and School invite you to experiment with the behaviors on the side of yourself that is less well developed. If you find yourself anxious or uncomfortable in behaving in unaccustomed ways, we would remind you that there is no personal growth without tension. In fact, tension and psychological anxiety are our greatest allies when it comes to making real change in our lives.

Like a computer system which needs hardware and software to function efficiently, the more successful leader or consultant, no matter whether male or female, needs harder AND softer behaviors. The Army's slogan, "Be all you can be," takes on new meaning in light of current research and theorizing on androgynous behavior.

The authors would appreciate your participation in a research project. Can you separate the following consultant competencies into male, female, or neutral behaviors? Let us hear from you. We are interested in your perceptions.

CONSULTANT COMPETENCIES

Check one: (M) male (F) female (N) neutral

- Has knowledge of OE theory
- Has knowledge of the user organization as a system
- Has self-confidence
- Has low fear of rejection
- Has perceptual objectivity
- Exercises restraint
- Accepts responsibility for failure
- Recognizes/overcomes limits of own expertise
- Sees self as substantive expert
- Develops others through skill transfer and behavior modeling
- Is concerned about clarity
- Values user input
- Identifies key concerns and issues not identified by user
- Creates positive image
- Uses interpersonal influence strategies
- Demonstrates concern for impact
- Communicates clearly
- Understands own impact on others
- Uses unilateral power to manage and control OEC resources
- Recognizes and obtains multiple perspective on situations/problems
- Uses theories and concepts to develop and articulate diagnosis
- Demonstrates cause and effect thinking
- Identifies key themes in data
- Recognizes and conforms to user expectations and organizational norms
- Uses problem-focused adaptation of techniques and procedures
- Assumes and differentiates among multiple roles
- Takes advantage of opportunities
- Demonstrates concern for measurable outcomes
- Has heightened sense of time as a resource

Janis Day, PhD
Jerry Eppler, PhD

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Management and the Sexes: Toward a Middle Ground

This book review originally appeared in *Management Review*, November 1981, pages 62-63.

The author is Marc E. Miller editor of the "Books for Managers" section.

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THE ANDROGYNOUS MANAGER. Alice G. Sargent.
AMACOM, 1981. 238 pages

Webster's defines "androgynous" as "having the characteristics of both male and female," which provides a clue as to why so many (male) managers are wary of the term. There is the obvious fear of being labeled unmasculine; but, more importantly, says author Sargent, "men see androgyny in terms of surrendering the power mechanisms they've built for themselves, of entering a 'less than I've already got' situation. Men have worked so hard at being cool, tough, and rational that the idea of being vulnerable or revealing their feelings scares them."

Sargent bases this theory on numerous interviews she conducted for her book. One of the central ideas of *The Androgynous Manager* is that androgyny should be a growing process for both sexes; moreover, it can result in a more efficient (and collectively happy) organization. Indeed, the author writes, "The thesis of this book is that expressive behaviors—namely, a sensitivity to personal needs and to alliance building—are just as important as task-oriented behaviors—setting high standards for oneself and others—in managing today's workplace.

If the androgyny concept sounds like a first cousin to the "9.9" manager of the Blake-Mouton grid, it should. "There are similarities," Sargent told *Management Review*. "But androgyny isn't a fixed point on a scale. It's contingency management—the ability to pick the appropriate behavior according to a given situation. For most people, this means expanding their freedom of expression."

The book applies the concept to practically every aspect and style of management: human resources, strategic planning, management by objectives, matrices, communications, and so on. In fact, much of *The Androgynous Manager* reads like a straightforward management primer. One can read whole chapters and find practically no mention of sexual stereotypes or "male" or "female" attitudes. This is deliberate strategy on the author's part—to treat androgyny as second nature, as so ingrained in management styles that categorizing and analyzing it is unnecessary. But, of course, it is necessary, and other sections of the book demonstrate specifically

how androgynous management can be applied to certain situations.

Sargent does not advocate a total changeover from typically "male" management styles to "female" styles. In fact, the very terms "male" and "female" are troublesome. Androgyny implies a blending of the two; but if the concept is ever achieved on a large scale, the result may be something quite different from what we have imagined. Sargent writes: "Adopting the concept of androgyny does not mean that men and women (or male and female managers) will come to behave exactly alike. When the door is opened and we are all free to select beyond sex-role stereotypes, a whole new range of behaviors will be possible and each of us will be free to choose our own blend."

Some managers have already achieved a mix, but androgynous management is still practiced on too small a scale to clearly diagnose. There is some evidence, however, suggesting that certain kinds of workers can accept androgyny more easily than others. According to Sargent, "I've found [from conducting management workshops] that the people who shift to an androgynous management style most easily are former engineers who have become project managers. Most of them are relatively unfamiliar with behavioral science theory, so they don't have any preconceived notions on male or female management stereotypes. Also, Type A people—people who have decided that they're not going to give their lives over to their employer—adjust to androgyny more readily than Type B people." The reason is that organizations, implicitly, are "male"; men have dominated management styles for so long that the corporate identity has become male.

The book contains several useful tables and exercises. One can be used to determine whether the reader's current management style is male, female, or (to the extent that it can be defined) androgynous. Sargent also includes a "Manager's Inventory of Work Relationships," which simultaneously gauges the reader's skill in working with people and—to an extent—his or her potential for developing an androgynous style.

How Women Are Recasting the Managerial Mold

Genita Kovacevich-Costello

The old bag of managerial tricks is losing its magic in today's workplace. Being direct, forceful and competitive to get the job done is no longer enough. Worker expectations and job values are changing, and being in management is going to require "a lot more love and affection,"

says Harold Leavitt, professor of organizational behavior at Stanford University's Graduate School of Business.

There will be more emphasis on vicarious and helpful behavior, he says, with less importance attached to control and competition.

Leavitt's prescription for effective management assumes the expressive traits that women have traditionally adhered to have finally found a place in the business world. According to Alice Sargent, consultant and trainer in organizational development and author of *The Androgynous Manager*, those traits will go hand-in-hand with the traditional male behavior patterns.

How It Applies

Don Wells, corporate supervisor for Ampex's Organizational Development and Training, has worked with Sargent and describes how the psychological term "androgynous" applies to the state-of-the-art of business management.

"The word represents what it was intended to," explains Wells. It is derived from the Greek word *andro*, meaning man, and *gyny*, meaning woman. Androgyny implies that a person can reflect both masculine and feminine characteristics.

"What that might represent in a manager," says Wells, "is someone who is aggressive and individualistic as well as affectionate and sensitive to the needs of others."

Freed from sex role prescriptions, the androgynous manager, according to Wells, is able to draw from a much broader range of behaviors in tackling management functions. But that means many managers—both men and women—will either have to brush-up on or develop certain skills.

Sargent illustrates these in her book. For men, they include learning to express personal feelings and valuing interpersonal relationships. Women typically need to work on developing a task-orientation and communicating directly and assertively.

Wells cites his own boss as a good example of this androgynous blend. "I like his style," he says. "If the situation calls for it he can say, 'Look, if this needs to be done I have the power to do it.'" But when being tough isn't necessary to the task at hand, Wells' boss appears equally free to express a gentler side—laughing with him and showing emotion.

While it is apparent how women could contribute to the development of this management style, they haven't been fully utilized in this way. In fact, says Roy Amara, president and senior research fellow at the Institute for the Future, women have "been made to manage like men."

Amara suggests, however, that "when you get enough of them, perhaps they can exercise an influence on the system rather than having it shape them."

Wells sees this happening. The second and third waves of female managers are saying, "I'd like to adopt the good things I see in traditional management," says Wells, "without leaving behind the things that are true to me as a woman and have helped me to get here."

Karlene Roberts, chairman of the Organizational Behavior Program at UC Berkeley's School of Business Administration, agrees with Wells' observation. "Right now there is a critical mass of women at entry-level

management positions," she explains. And according to Roberts, "They seem to feel okay about bringing their femininity into the corporate structure."

The idea of feminizing the workplace is not completely new. Roberts asserts that some androgynous concepts have been taught for years in business schools under the guise of a participative management style. But they have been slow to catch on in places where the old-line authoritative model is still in good stead.

Today, because of the changing profile of the marketplace, managers are being forced to expand their notion of what it takes to be effective.

Worker expectations have been a major catalyst in this shift. Workers want more from their jobs than just a paycheck, says Amara. They want to be involved in decision-making and have opportunities for personal growth.

"This requires a style of management that is more one of an orchestrator and guider than a driver," he says.

Technology also is forcing changes in management style. "We are now living in a knowledge versus an arms and legs world," says Leavitt. "When people carry their skills around in their heads," he explains, "performance becomes a function of their willingness to work."

Motivations are different in a knowledge environment. "A lot of people are finding that managing software programs is less disciplined, more artsy, more interactive than managing hardware programs," Leavitt explains. "It is much harder to control except by controlling in the sense of building the goodwill of the people."

The Impact of Computers

Computers have become equalizers in the workforce. "The role of computers has been to give everyone a certain level of quantified information and skill," explains Amara. "The distinction between a superior and subordinate will be based more on the softer, more judgmental, planning-oriented characteristics."

American businesses also are adding up the price they are paying for Japan's success with a management style that emphasizes group cohesion and participation. In Japanese companies, says Leavitt, a person gets promoted to a middle-management job "largely because he has demonstrated to the people in the organization that he has a lot of savvy and understanding about other people and a lot of skills in helping them develop and grow."

Bob LeDuc, personnel manager for Hewlett-Packard Laboratories and a graduate of Stanford's Graduate School of Business, recognizes the need for managers to be as concerned with relationships as with the task at hand. "Being successful means insisting on top performance and doing that in a way that is supportive," Le Duc says.

By learning to balance their feelings with objectivity and to rely on intuition as well as logic, managers may be able to fulfill this broader management role. □

This article originally appeared in the San Jose, California *Mercury News*, April 25, 1982, p. PC 1.

OE Program Management Model

LTC Warren I. Klein and LTC Thomas K. Forsythe (OECS)

OVERVIEW

This article presents a model for the proactive management of an Organizational Effectiveness program and is applicable at organization or installation level. The model is general in nature and, like any prescriptive or diagnostic organizational model, must be tailored to the particular environment, culture and purpose of the organization. The Supporting Actions outlined in the model were derived from input by current and past MACOM OE managers and OE Consultants in the field.

The purpose of the model is to present the Essential Principles for starting and sustaining an effective OE program. The ultimate desired outcome is the institutionalization of OE at the organizational or installation level. By institutionalization we mean that OE is understood, accepted, resourced, and utilized as appropriate in the same manner that other Army staff elements such as G-1, G-3, JAG, etc., are understood, accepted, resourced, and utilized.

This article is of value to OE Consultants, OE managers and senior commanders who have a genuine desire to maximize the use of OE in their organizations.

PREMISE OF ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS PROGRAM

The Organizational Effectiveness program is established to provide commanders and managers with leadership and management technologies to enhance the readiness and effectiveness of their units and organizations.

CONCEPT OF ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

Based on the above premise, it follows that an OE program is tailored to the *unique needs* of the organization and is controlled by the commander or manager. In order to best identify those unique needs, we first must understand the *desired outcomes* of the organization, its strategy for achieving these outcomes, and the organizational structure and processes for implementing that strategy. Once these organizational dimensions are identified, we can begin to formulate an OE program based on the model of managing OE programs.

In developing the model, we first asked present and past MACOM OE managers to brainstorm the key ingredients of successful OE programs; what were those things that differentiated the effective OE programs from those programs which never seemed to really go anywhere? This information and data from the annual OECS external evaluation of OE in the field were analyzed and grouped according to common actions and events. From these groupings were derived the Essential Principles which, when combined with the desired outcomes stated above, fit very neatly into the Outcomes - Methods - Resources strategy model.¹ The OECS Complex Systems Model (see Fig 1) was also used as a foundation for the development of

the Essential Principles.

Recognizably, some of the key (if not *the* key) ingredients of an effective OE program are the skills, personality and general competencies of the incumbent OE Consultants. However, these factors are not included, because the purpose of this model is to set up a system (organization or installation-level) to enhance the OE program by putting the OE Consultant in the best situation for success. In other words, the "superior" OE Consultant will not lessen the program's impact because the program is optimally situated for success in the system it supports. Systemically, if the program is effectively in place, the variables are reduced to the OE Consultant and the command climate.

1. OE Program Has a Strategy for OE Applications/Operations

The most critical aspect of any OE operation is knowing where you are going; what is the desired outcome? Only when this has been determined should methods of getting to that desired outcome be considered. This principle is absolutely essential to the program's success.

a. *OE Program has a strategy which supports the total organizational strategy.* An organization/unit must have a clearly defined purpose and a strategy for achieving that purpose in order to focus its efforts and process feedback to determine if it is in fact meeting the needs of its environment. It therefore follows that in order to support this strategy, the OE program must itself have a strategy which supports the *organization's* strategy. This OE program strategy consists of a mission(s) or purpose and a long-range plan which describes how the OE program strategy is to be implemented and how it supports the organization's strategy. To the extent possible, this long-range plan should commit OE efforts to specific tasks to be done or recommended, as well as identify potential systemic issues² for OE operations. In addition, it is key to the success and institutionalization of the program that the plan is sensitive to and seeks out those tough organizational issues which have systemic impact. In other words, seek out those tough, systemic issues which, if resolved, will significantly improve the organization's output or product. The obvious outcome, then, is an OE Program that is congruent in both purpose and behavior with the organizational system which it supports.

b. *OE Program markets OE technology as an available resource for increasing organizational effectiveness.* The marketing of OE technology is critical to educating potential users as to its capabilities and scope. We found that while most potential users understood how OE technology could generally be applied to goal setting, they did not have a full appreciation of its system-wide

accomplishing the outcomes and the resources necessary to implement the strategy are determined. This process ensures that the desired outcomes determine implementation, as opposed to resources and/or methods determining outcomes. (See OECS ST 26-150-7 "Effective Planning," p. 5.)

¹ *The Outcomes - Methods - Resources strategy is an approach to decision making which first and foremost considers the outcomes. Once the desired outcomes are decided, the methods for*

² *SYSTEMIC ISSUES, as used throughout the model and this article, refers to issues which affect the organization's output and desired outcomes or cross major organizational subsystem boundaries or affect multiple organizational subelements.*

COMPLEX SYSTEMS MODEL

Figure 1




Figure 2

O+M+R		ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS PROGRAM MANAGEMENT MODEL	
O U T - C O M E S		1. INITIAL OUTCOME: TO IMPLEMENT AN OE PROGRAM 2. INTERMEDIATE OUTCOME: TO SUSTAIN AN EFFECTIVE OE PROGRAM 3. FINAL OUTCOME: TO INSTITUTIONALIZE OE AT THE ORGANIZATIONAL AND INSTALLATION LEVEL	
M E T H O D S		ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLES	SUPPORTING ACTIONS
	1. OE PROGRAM HAS A STRATEGY FOR OE APPLICATIONS/OPERATIONS.		a. OE program has a strategy which supports the total organizational strategy. (1). It has a mission statement which supports the total organizational strategy. (2). It has a long-range mission statement which supports the organization's mission. (a). It seeks out targets of opportunity which address systemic organizational issues. (b). It is particularly sensitive to those tough organizational issues. b. OE program markets OE technology as an available resource for increasing organizational effectiveness. c. OE program contributes to command education. d. OE program routinely provides organizational trend information to the commander/command group e. OE program establishes a feedback process to review the implementation of the overall OE strategy.
	2. OE PROGRAM IS MANAGED AT THE HIGHEST ORGANIZATIONAL LEVEL.		a. OEC's are consolidated and assigned at the highest organizational level that has a common purpose in order to facilitate operating on systemic issues. (1). OEC's are assigned at command group level. (2). OEC's operate under a team concept. (3). OEC team comes under a single rating scheme. b. OEC's have legitimate access to commanders (decision makers) c. OE office is located in proximity of the command group offices, where the program is managed d. OEC's have routine access to command group staff meetings
	3. OE PROGRAM IS SEEN AS HAVING THE SUPPORT OF THE COMMANDER.		a. OEC's do not work exclusively with any particular organizational subsystem, but instead are sanctioned through command emphasis to operate throughout the organization in order to work on systemic issues. b. OEC's have the flexibility to concentrate resources in one part of the organization. c. Appropriate decision makers, in addition to the OE manager, attend the USAOECS Managers Course. d. OE-related positions are filled and additional support is provided as necessary. e. OE program addresses systemic organizational issues. f. Student FTX teams from the Organizational Effectiveness Center and School are invited to the organization on a recurring basis.
	4. OE OFFICE OPERATES AS A LEGITIMATE STAFF SECTION.		a. OEC's attend, and provide appropriate input to, staff calls as a legitimate staff section. b. Normal staff information and actions are staffed through the OE office. c. OE operations are included in staff management reviews within the norms of confidentiality. d. OEC's are assigned routine additional duties but not tasks which could represent conflict of interest. e. OEC's are not appointed as project personnel for non-OE office. f. OE office is a separate staff section.
	5. OE PROGRAM HAS AN INTERESTED, ACTIVE OE MANAGER.		a. OE manager has attended the USAOECS OE Managers Course. b. OE manager is an active integrator between the OE program and the command. c. OE manager encourages the OEC's to operate at different organizational levels in dealing with systemic issues. d. OE manager monitors and supports personnel, facility and budget requirements. e. OE manager keeps abreast of past, present and future OE operations. f. OE manager is an active resource for organization information.
	6. OE PROGRAM DOCUMENTS ITS OPERATIONS.		a. Each OE operation is briefly documented (USAOECS RB 26-8). b. Documentation of OE operations includes an evaluation for results. c. Results of OE operations are published in a manner which does not identify units or personnel.
R E S O U R C E S	7. OE PROGRAM IS RESOURCED TO ACCOMPLISH ITS MISSION.		a. OEC's have access to a clearly identified and supportive network of resources for high intensity, short-duration operations. b. OE is a separate program budget item. c. Adequate administrative and logistic resources are assigned to the OE office. d. OEC officer positions are coded AERB whenever appropriate. e. OEC officer positions are requisitioned by more easily supported specialty codes (not just 41). f. Civilian OEC positions are created whenever appropriate. g. NCO OEC positions are created whenever appropriate. h. OEC replacements are requisitioned to provide for timely replacement. i. OEC requisition status is followed up on a monthly basis.

application possibilities. In areas such as acquisition, reorganization, and organization start-up, it was felt that there were "traditional" experts such as the G-3, G-4, DIO, etc., to handle the tasks, and OE's place in (and contribution to) the process was not understood.

c. *OE Program contributes to command education.* OE Consultants have a great deal of educational material available which, if distributed to appropriate command levels, could substantially increase the awareness and appreciation of OE technology. Examples are strategic planning, stress management, meeting management and problem solving.

d. *OE Program routinely provides organizational trend information to the commander/command group.* One of the key missions of any staff section is to provide the commander with meaningful information, and the OE staff section is no exception. No one should have more organization-wide trend data available than the OE staff section, and it is essential that a process be established for passing this information to the commander or command group. Doing this, especially by means of a briefing, absolutely raises the command's awareness of the OE program and provides another critical viewpoint to the commander and command group.

e. *OE Program establishes a feedback process to review the implementation of the overall OE strategy.* Vital to all of the above is a feedback mechanism for stepping back and reviewing the fit of OE activities with the OE program strategy and the organization's mission (purpose). Without a process to do this, it is easy, in the complexity of OE operations, to wander off course and not self-correct. It is essential to the success and institutionalization of the OE program that OE activities be congruent with the organization's mission.

2. OE Program is Managed At The Highest Organizational Level

The current trend regarding the organizational placement of the OE program is to move it under the Chief of Staff. This puts the program under the management of the organizational boundary spanner, the person who certainly must look at all issues and decisions from a systems viewpoint. A fact of organizational life is that the closer a resource is, both organizationally and physically, the more likely it is to be used. If the OE program is to be used to assist the total organization, it has to be managed by someone who is at or near the hierarchical top of the organization and who has a systems perspective; it has to be where the action is.

a. *OEC's are consolidated and assigned at the highest organizational level that has a common purpose, in order to facilitate operating on systemic issues.* A key concept of this section and the entire OE Program Management Model is that of the "highest organizational level that has a common organizational purpose." This talks to systems within systems. All OEC's at an installation should be consolidated in order to more effectively use the resource at the highest level. However, exceptions may be made when an organization on the installation clearly has a purpose different from that of the senior or major unit. An example of this is Combat Developments Experimentation Command (CDEC) at Fort Ord, California. CDEC clearly has a different organizational purpose from the 7th Infantry Division and, therefore, should manage its own OEC's. Conversely, at installations where the primary tenant is a division and there are also TDA OEC's slots to support the post, the OECs should be consolidated, since the organizational purposes of the division and post are, from an OE standpoint, basically the same. A somewhat grayer area is the situation of the separate brigades at

Forts Benning, Knox and Sill. While their primary mission is to support the Infantry, Armor, and Artillery schools, they also have a FORSCOM readiness mission. The bottom line rationale is to consolidate and assign the OEC's at the highest organizational level in order to enhance benefits of better mutual support during times of TDY and leave; better resource management in terms of supplies, equipment, and clerical support; and the general synergistic effect of a cohesive group.

1) The assignment of OEC's at the command group level (commander, deputy commander, chief of staff, etc.) increases the chances that the OEC's will be more fully utilized in dealing with systemic issues. They will become a legitimate part of the organizational problem-solving mechanism.

2) OEC's work more effectively in teams, in that multiple viewpoints of the implications of complex, systemic issues produce better courses of action than does a single focus. This is one of the fundamental tenets of training at OECs. Consolidation of the OEC's increases the probability that the OEC's will work in teams, as well as their capacity for synergistic action.

3) A single rating scheme enhances the focus of OE resources. In cases where OEC's work well together but are assigned to, and rated by, different commands, situations arise in which the OEC's cannot support each other because of conflicting demands on their time. It is very difficult to maximize resources that serve two masters.

b. *OEC's have legitimate access to commanders (decision makers).* If the OE program is to support the organization, it must have access to those leaders who determine the organization's direction and methods for accomplishing the desired outcomes. This "legitimate access to the decision makers" is no more than is accorded to any key staff member, nor is it any less. This access allows first-hand dissemination of unique organizational trend data as well as the ability to lend insight from another focus, just as the insights from the G-1 and G-3, for example, are from different but equally important focuses. The essential outcome will be that the OE Consultants are considered vital contributors to members of the organizational decision-making process.

c. *OE office is located in proximity of the command group offices, where the program is managed.* A great deal can be learned about an organization from just being near where the decision makers do business. It encourages use and inclusion not only by the decision makers, but also other key members of the system who gravitate to the area where the decision makers do business and, therefore, are more likely to converse with the OE Consultants than if they were located elsewhere. Also, as stated above, a physically close resource will tend to be used more often, which is particularly important if OE has not yet been fully institutionalized into the organization's decision-making process. Finally, the OE program is more apt to be proactively managed by the OE manager if the office is located in the vicinity of that manager.

d. *OEC's have routine access to command group staff meeting.* Command group staff meetings, while traditionally not decision-making forums, are generally a place where a great deal of information regarding various cross-sections of the organization is disseminated. The presence of the OE Consultants at these meetings has two major purposes. First, it puts them at the major organizational information-sharing session where they are privy to systemic issues, both positive and negative. Second, their presence at this staff meeting legitimizes their existence and their role. It also presents the OE Consultants with the opportunity to talk with the organization's key staff members on a regular basis.

3. OE Program Is Seen As Having The Support Of The Commander

The key aspect of this principle is commitment. The success of an OE program is, to a great deal, dependent upon the commander's support of the program. Ideally, the commander uses OE, talks about its results, and encourages others to use it. But there are other aspects of command support that also have a very positive effect on the OE program. The concepts of "Behavior is believable" and "Actions speak louder than words" are critical to others' view of the commander's commitment to the OE program.

a. *OEC's do not work exclusively with any particular organizational sub-system, but instead are sanctioned through command emphasis to operate throughout the organization in order to work on systemic issues.* While there may be some organizational subsystems that the commander is more concerned with than others, it must be recognized that impacts on one subsystem are felt in all the other subsystems; therefore, all subsystems must be looked at. When speaking about and supporting a systemic OE operation, it is important that the commander emphasize the operation to all parts of the system and ensure that all subsystems know they may be a part of the operation and may well be affected by it.

b. *OEC's have the flexibility to concentrate resources in one part of the organization.* At the same time, the OE program must have the flexibility and sanction to concentrate its resources in one part of the organization, when appropriate, in order to address critical issues.

c. *Appropriate decision makers, in addition to the OE manager, attend the USAOECS OE Managers Course.* While it is important, and indeed required, that the OE Program Manager attend the OE Managers Course (see paragraph 5 a below), it also enhances the OE program when other decision makers attend the course as well. This is especially true for key personnel who are in the OE rating scheme or who influence the scope and focus of OE operations. The OE Managers Course provides an overview of OE theory, operations, and OEC skills, as well as giving attendees the opportunity to discuss implications of OE in their organizations. In addition, new skills are provided which provide immediate benefits and thereby enhance the image and understanding of OE.

d. *OE-related positions are filled and additional support is provided as necessary.* Behavioral support is as important as verbal support, if not more important. It is definitely a statement of command support if all the OEC positions are filled, and the OE office has adequate facilities, clerical support, and equipment (see paragraph 7 below).

e. *OE program addresses systemic organizational issues.* If the OE program's strategy is to work on systemic issues which support the organization's mission (see paragraph 1 above), then the commander shows support for the program by using OE technology to deal with such systemic issues.

f. *Student FTX teams from the Organizational Effectiveness Center and School are invited to the organization on a recurring basis.* Another behavioral support of the OE program is the invitation of student FTX teams from USAOECS into the organization. This demonstrates belief in the technology, as well as the program. The rationale for doing this on a recurring basis is to keep the idea visible and to insure that the invitation is not made on a one-time checklist basis.

4. OE Office Operates As A Legitimate Staff Section

In order for the OE program to gain and maintain credibility, the OE office must be seen as being a legitimate

staff section. Simply designating it as a legitimate staff section is not enough. The organization must *behave* towards the OE office as it does towards the other institutionalized staff sections. We talked to commanders who couldn't understand why OE wasn't being sufficiently used by their subordinates whenever the opportunities presented themselves, particularly after they (commanders) had recommended OE to them on several occasions. Upon further inquiry, however, we discovered that those commanders and their organizations did not provide the OE office the opportunities to operate as a legitimate staff section in order to gain the exposure and resultant credibility required for institutionalized use of OE. As a minimum, actions that support this principle should include the following:

a. *OEC's attend, and provide appropriate input to, staff calls as a legitimate staff section.* In other words, they attend the organization staff calls on a routine basis rather than on an occasional basis as an "outsider"—which often happens.

b. *Normal staff information and actions are staffed through the OE office.* Insure that the OE office is listed on the organizational staff distribution list. As an added benefit, the OE office will be exposed to organization information which it would otherwise not have.

c. *OE operations are included in staff management reviews within the norms of confidentiality.* The best marketing tool is a documentation of what the OEC's are doing and have done. With the recognition of legitimacy comes the responsibility of proving your worth.

d. *OEC's are assigned routine additional duties but not tasks which could represent conflict of interest.* Of particular concern is the assignment of investigative officer duties to an organization in which the OEC had previously consulted. Otherwise, OEC's should be assigned their fair share of routine additional duties.

e. *OEC's are not appointed as project personnel for non-OE related tasks.* We have encountered situations in which OEC's were involved in time-consuming tasks which were not even remotely connected to their primary function. They included the task of developing civilian-hire programs, assignment as protocol officer during ROTC summer training, developing training packages for newly assigned personnel, and designing visitor sponsorship procedures for a post. Also, it is expected that OEC's may be assigned as project personnel for various projects such as AER officer or sponsorship of post visitors. But efforts must be made to insure such an assignment is done on a fair share basis and not on the "step child" basis as has been noted in several organizations.

f. *OE office is a separate staff section.* It should not be "absorbed" by other program offices such as the Equal Opportunity Office, Human Resource Office, or the Comptroller's Management Office, as we have so often observed. Its mission is unique and it should, therefore, stand alone as a staff section. Also, giving it a separate staff status keeps the office from being obscured or confused with the thrust of the other specialty programs, such as being strictly a "people program" or a comptroller program.

5. OE Program Has An Interested, Active OE Manager

This principle simply states the need for a boss who not only supports the OEC but who also actively participates in the OE program. Too often we find that the OE manager is detached from what the OEC is doing because he or she fits one or more of the following:

- a) Doesn't understand OE
- b) Is apathetic towards OE
- c) Claims the need for confidentiality and anonymity of

OE data doesn't allow the OE manager to become familiar with the OE effort.

The most damaging aspect of this situation is that often the organization's confidence in the OE program is eroded when it appears that the program lacks the full support of the OE manager. In order to prevent such an occurrence, the following proactive supporting actions are recommended:

a. *OE manager has attended the USAOECS OE Managers Course.* This is a must. Our frequent visits to the field have conclusively revealed that the managers who have attended the course have demonstrated a more supportive attitude for the program than those who haven't, primarily because they considered themselves to be sufficiently knowledgeable in the business of OE. The course gives the manager the "executive knowledge" required to successfully manage the program. (Also, OE managers are required to attend the course in accordance with AR 5-15.)

b. *OE manager is an active integrator between the OE program and the command.* This entails the surfacing and coordination of the interdependent needs of the OEC's and the command. More specifically, whenever the manager becomes aware of opportunities for OE consulting, he or she should suggest the use of OE to the potential user or inform the OEC's about the possibilities of an OE operation. The OEC's need this kind of information just as the command needs to be made aware, or reminded, of the services that the consultants can provide.

c. *OE manager encourages the OEC's to operate at different organizational levels in dealing with systemic issues.* There are two key points of emphasis here. They are "at different levels" and "with systemic issues." By its nature, a systemic issue permeates the entire organization from top to bottom. The OE Program grows in legitimacy when it is seen operating at all levels of the command in working on the systemic issues.

d. *OE manager monitors and supports personnel, facility and budget requirements.* An even stronger and more descriptive term for this supporting action is that the manager "fights" to insure that the OE Program is accorded its fair share of the above assets. How often have we seen OEC's that are stuck away in some little office at the corner of some post with their own personal typewriter, no clerical assistance, and a meager budget (if there is one at all) as a separate budget line item?

e. *OE manager keeps abreast on past, present and future OE operations.* By being so informed, the manager is better able to influence where the OEC's work and the kinds of issues on which the consultants should be working. It also allows the manager to evaluate the OE program and the consultants' performance.

f. *OE manager is an active resource for organizational information.* The manager is usually a staff officer who is relatively senior and who, therefore, has access to information within the organization via staff calls, staff papers, briefings, grape vine and other information networks that the OEC is not privy to. Such information could be highly beneficial to the OEC in formulating a clear picture of the organization's subsystems. The OE program needs a strong manager. The relatively junior-grade consultants need the full support of the more senior-grade manager who can give the program credible visibility and valuable input by virtue of his or her organizational position and experience. Just as the training officer cannot operate effectively without the full support of the G-3, or the Division transportation office cannot perform its functions without the G-4 support, so can't the OEC without the OE manager's active backing.

6. OE Program Documents Its Operations

In an address to a graduating OEC class, *LTG J.R. McGiffert*, then Director of the Army Staff, stated, "Document your efforts, for success is its best advertisement. It will help institutionalize our gains and keep our momentum moving forward."

Successful OEC's have heeded this advice. These consultants can readily show the successes and failures of their operations from which lessons have been learned and through which they can stand up to be counted. Documentation in the future will be particularly important as the OE community moves towards a fully automated OE information management system wherein OE operations are reported after being sanitized for confidentiality and anonymity.

a. *Each OE operation is briefly documented (USAOECS RB 26-8).* We particularly recommend the use of RB 26-8 because it presents a simple format for documentation and serves as an excellent guide in developing and explaining the outcomes derived from an OE operation. (Pages 6 and 7 have recently been updated; otherwise, the October 1981 version is current.)

b. *Documentation of OE operations includes an evaluation for results.* The McBer study (1980) on OEC competencies revealed that "results orientation" is the most consistent competency that discriminates the outstanding consultants from the average ones. They were able to articulate their OE efforts in terms of the results they produced. They were thus able to communicate to decision makers, potential users and to the OE community, the value of OE through the benefits gained.

c. *Results of OE operations are published in a manner which does not identify units or personnel.* This requirement has long been the trademark and one of the key strengths to the OE program. It must not be violated. Therefore, care must be exercised to preserve the confidentiality and anonymity of the data.

7. OE Program Is Resourced To Accomplish Its Mission

This principle of being adequately resourced has at least two outcomes. The obvious one is to provide the wherewithal to get the job done. As the supporting actions indicate, the resources come in various packages: administrative, logistical, financial, and personnel support. The secondary outcome, but of significant impact, is the message or signal that is sent out when the program is adequately resourced. It suggests to the organization that the OE office is for real and important enough to be accorded a fair share of the available resources. This kind of positive image is necessary, particularly in organizations in which the OE program has not been solidly established.

a. *OEC's have access to a clearly identified and supportive network of resources for high-intensity, short-duration operations.* In simple terms, we're talking about short-fused actions in which the final product is required as soon as possible in a professionally done manner. Without such pre-designated resources, the OEC's find themselves practically begging for assistance, such as typing, chart work, or working space, at the last minute in a short-fused situation. As a result, the final outcome may be an unprofessional or late product.

b. *OE is a separate program budget item.* The benefits of having a separate program budget item instead of being part (especially an unknown part) of another program's budget are obvious. The OE program can be better managed and plans can be more predictably carried out when the OEC's and OE managers know the exact dollar amount of their budget.

c. *Adequate administrative and logistic resources are assigned to the OE office.* These would include, for example, clerk-typists, desks, chairs, files, office supplies, telephones, typewriters, and suitable office space and location.

d. *OEC positions are established as Army Education Review Board (AERB) positions whenever appropriate.* AERB positions require personnel with advanced degrees. Whenever the level of the OEC activity reflects a justified need for OEC's with advanced schooling, a concerted effort should be made to insure the positions are identified as AERB slots. This would apply particularly in organizations where the user-client system is primarily staffed by personnel possessing advanced degrees. This AERB classification will serve to gain credibility for the consultants, as well as to allow them to better serve the command with the additional knowledge base.

e. *OEC positions are requisitioned by more easily supported specialty codes (not just 41).* Due to the restricted number of available SSI 41 personnel and positions in the Army, requisitions for an SSI 41 OEC have difficulty being validated. A more reasonable approach is to requisition an OEC with predominant SSI of the officers assigned to the organization, using 41 as the secondary skill identifier. For example, the predominant SSI in an Infantry Division is 11. Therefore, an 11A41A 5Z requisition would stand a better chance of being validated for fill than would a 41A11A 5Z. One of the most difficult problems we're faced with is the lack of timely replacements with some overlap between incoming and out-going OEC's. Timely submitted and validated requisitions will solve that problem.

f. *Civilian OEC positions are created whenever appropriate.* This is especially apropos for organizations with predominantly civilian personnel and because civilian OEC assignments are more stable than are military. Therefore, during gaps in military assignments, the civilian can provide the necessary continuity. An additional bonus that sometimes may be gained by having a civilian OEC in the organization is that of credibility. When working with senior military officers, the relatively junior-officer OEC's (Captains for example) often have

difficulty establishing their credibility because of the traditional values in the military concerning rank. Civilians, however, do not display their background and experience on their clothing as does a military person and are, therefore, an unknown to the senior officers. Their credibility, then, is judged more on what they do than on what rank or experience is represented on their collar.

g. *NCO OEC positions are created whenever appropriate.* This possibility is often overlooked by the organization, yet we have found that in many situations, particularly when working primarily with enlisted personnel, NCO OEC's are most effective; also the Officer-NCO team concept has proven to be readily acceptable and effective in military organizations. As with officer requisitions, NCO requisitions should also request individual qualifications reflective of the populations served.

h. *OEC replacements are requisitioned to provide for timely replacement.* The OEC and manager should be fully aware of the requisitioning system. Of utmost importance is knowing when to submit requisitions for timely fill. The requisitioning system varies between overseas assignments and CONUS assignments. Become familiar with the requisitioning format and the reasons why requisitions are validated or nonvalidated.

i. *OEC requisition status is followed up on a monthly basis.* This action is recommended in conjunction with the discussion in 7 h. above. Even after requisitions have been validated, if they are not filled in a reasonable period of time, as specified by regulation, they are automatically cancelled and new requisitions are required. A proactive procedure for following up on replacement action will enhance the chances for proper fill action.

SUMMARY

We believe that an objective, outcome-oriented view of the recommended actions reflects sound managerial, staff, and organizational behavior. When implemented, this model will result in a clearly valuable management and leadership tool benefiting the commander and the U.S. Army. □

A leader is best when he is neither seen nor heard, not so good when he is adored and glorified, worst when he is hated and despised. But of a good leader, when his work is done, his aim fulfilled, the people will say, "We did this ourselves." —Lao-Tzu

If you don't enjoy your own company, you're probably right. —Arnold Glasow

Easitability often springs from incompetency. The man who is master of his job usually can keep calm. He knows how to meet each situation that arises and does so capably, without fussing or fuming. To get a better grip on your temper, get a better grip on your job. —B.C. Forbes

You can never plan the future by the past. —Edmund Burke

OE Consultant's Guide to Implementation of WEIT

SFC Wayne Reed (OECS)

INTRODUCTION

"How do I implement the Work Environment Improvement Team (WEIT) concept without becoming permanently involved?" Field Organizational Effectiveness Consultants (OEC's) have posed that question to me many times. In this article, I will answer that question and others. I will cover many aspects of the OEC's role—from marketing of the WEIT concept to the continuing relationship with a firmly established WEIT program. Additionally, I will cover the OEC's role in an organization that already has Quality Circles in operation. This is not an exact "how to" plan, but rather a general guide that will have to be customized by each individual OEC to fit him or herself and the particular organization and situation. Time frames that are presented will vary from organization to organization.

MARKETING

The WEIT concept is not "just another" productivity program. It represents a management philosophy of trust in soldiers or employees, of allowing them to become more intimately involved in the work process, of committing resources to their growth and development, of building teamwork within natural work units, and of opening communication channels between the chain of command and soldiers or employees.

The decision to introduce WEITs also means the decision to manage more by participative principles, since the WEIT concept is based on the premise that soldiers or employees can be creative and contribute to solving problems by participating in the decision-making process on matters affecting them. In short, authority and responsibility are pushed down to the lowest levels possible. Evidence from Socio-Technical Systems and Living Systems Theory support the idea that the best place to control problems is as close to the source as possible.

As is evident, WEIT is an OE intervention. It is a planned "bottom-up" change to an organization's management philosophy, practice and culture, for the primary focus of the WEIT concept is *long-range people-building* with secondary benefits of increasing productivity and quality in an organization. Since it is vital that the key decision makers thoroughly understand these fundamentals, the OEC must present them very clearly and forcefully. The WEIT concept is not to be marketed as a panacea for all of the productivity or quality problems in an organization, but rather as a clear OE intervention that is based on a sound assessment of the organization.

WEIT MARKETING STRATEGY

To successfully market a product, it must fulfill a need. In this case, the product is the WEIT concept and the need it fulfills is solving organizational problems. A marketing strategy that an OEC can use to market the WEIT concept is the model from "An Empirical Study of a Model and Strategies for Planned Organizational Change" by Marc Aric Frohman, ISRUM (1970), adapted by CPT Linda Franklin, OEC, USA Readiness Group.

There are two dimensions in the solving of a problem: **Importance** (the amount of pain or frustration that a problem creates) and **ability** (the perceived ability to change or influence a problem). If you use these two dimensions as axes, the result is four quadrants.

Quadrant LL: When the amount of pain or frustration created by a problem is *low* and the perceived ability to influence or change it is *low*, the probability of its being solved is also *low*. Most likely, the problem will continue to exist at a subconscious level.

Quadrant HL: This occurs when *high* pain or frustration is created by the problem, but the perceived ability to influence or change the problem is *low*. This normally results in the problem being diagnosed as "unsolvable" and comments such as, "It is irritating as hell, but I guess that we will have to live with it."

Quadrant LH: When the perceived ability to influence a problem is *high*, but the amount of pain and frustration it creates is *low*, the probability of action will usually not be taken to solve it. Rationalization for not taking action will be "It is not important enough for me to waste my time."

Quadrant HH: This is where problems are solved. The problem creates *high* pain and frustrations and the perceived ability to influence the problem is *high*. The probability that action will be taken to solve the problem also increases to a *high* level.


Let's take a normal situation in an organization. A manager notices a problem and feels that it is creating enough pain and frustration to be important. The manager calls a subordinate, describes the problem, and states, "Take care of it." The subordinate looks at the problem and either decides that she or he does not have the ability to influence it or that the problem is of low importance. When this occurs, the probability that any action will be taken is minimum. Only if the subordinate perceives that she or he has a high level of ability to solve the problem and that it has high importance, will the probability of it being solved be increased.

The WEIT concept increases the probability of organizational problems being addressed and resolved by placing the authority and responsibility at the level where the pain or frustration is felt the most—the worker level. Furthermore the WEIT training raises the workers' perception of their ability to influence or change conditions that will result in problem solutions.

ASSESSMENT

How is an assessment of an organization conducted to determine if application of the WEIT concept will be beneficial? An easy approach is to look for negative forces such as:

The organization is under extreme stress. If the organization is having union-management conflict or suffering from internal personnel conflicts, it will not be a good candidate for the WEIT concept.



The organization is not supportive of the participative mode. The organization does not have to totally embrace participative principles but it must have a minimum level of acceptance for WEITs to survive. If there is a high level of distrust between soldiers or employees and management, WEITs will not succeed.

The organization is undergoing major structural or personnel changes. If an organization is in the midst of other major changes, it is not appropriate to add the further disturbance of implementing WEITs.

The organization will not expend the necessary resources. An organization that wants to shorten the training time or eliminate any aspect of the concept (i.e., steering committee) is beaming a warning signal that should not be ignored.

Obviously, there are many factors to consider in determining the readiness of an organization to employ the WEIT concept. If, after consideration of these factors, the OEC judges an organization to be unsuited for implementing the WEIT concept, it is the duty of the OEC to so state to the commander. The commander has the final decision and responsibility of implementing WEITs and if she or he still desires the implementation, it is the responsibility of the OEC to insure the commander is aware of the potential problems and the low probability of success.

Once a commander has said, "Yes, our organization wants to start WEITs," and in the professional opinion of the OEC the climate is receptive, the next question is, "How do we implement them?"

IMPLEMENTATION

Implementation of the WEIT concept is accomplished by a three-phase process: pre-training actions, implementation of pilot study and post-pilot study activities. The three phases are presented as a guide, not as a strict "how to" plan; they will have to be customized for each organization. **CAUTION—DANGER—WARNING!** It is very easy for the OEC to become a WEIT administrator!! Due to the internal OEC's experience and knowledge, she or he will be looked upon as the most logical and ideal person to manage the WEIT concept. A consultant could, therefore, slide effortlessly into the position of manager if care is not taken. Once this occurs, it is very difficult to reverse. The OEC must take great care to maintain minimum involvement in order not to dilute the organization's ownership of the concept. The OEC should evolve through the following roles: consultant, consultant and trainer, trainer, consultant, expert resource.

How does the OEC stay minimally involved? The answer to that question is also the first action following the determination to implement WEIT. That action is the identification and selection of a coordinator, which is the most critical step, both to the involvement of the OEC and to the success of the organization's WEITs. This identification and selection of a coordinator is ultimately the commander's decision, but the OEC should offer advice on criteria for selection. Ideal criteria include:

- Is LMDTC graduate, minimum LMDC graduate.
- Has knowledge of organizational systems, management theory and behavioral science.
- Has high level of interpersonal skills.
- Has thorough knowledge of organization's operation.
- Has comfortable relations with both management and soldiers/employees.
- Is a self-starter.

- Believes in the WEIT concept completely.
- Is not a "glory seeker," but an individual who works so that others may be recognized and rewarded for growth that she or he has helped them achieve.
- Cares for people and is able to stimulate them.
- Is able to train people.
- Is able to express self both verbally and in writing.

(This list is not all inclusive; it is intended to be used as a frame of reference.) Careful consideration must be given to the selection of the coordinator, a key person who will be the point of contact and the action arm within the organization to implement WEITs.

As soon as possible after selection of the coordinator, the OEC should meet with her or him for discussion of the coordinator's role and responsibilities in implementing WEIT in the organization (at this time, the OEC *changes* roles and becomes a consultant/trainer). The OEC should furnish the coordinator with a copy of the WEIT manuals and advise the coordinator to become completely familiar with their contents. If applicable, the next action step is for the commander to notify the president of the local union and the civilian personnel office of the intent to initiate WEITs within the organization.

The next step is selection and initiation of the steering committee. This step is also highly critical as the steering committee will determine the policy and procedures for the operation of WEITs. The steering committee will manage the change brought about by the introduction of WEITs to the organization. In selecting people for steering committee membership, use strategic planning and political savvy. The WEIT concept cannot be "dropped" on an organization. The change must be carefully planned and managed so as to mesh the WEITs and the organization with the minimum amount of turmoil. In this step the OEC acts in the role of consultant, offering expert advice, helping to identify potential stakeholders, etc.

The next major step is to conduct a baseline measurement of the organization. The OEC's primary responsibility during this step is the administering, processing and analyzing of the Job Comparison Survey. Additionally, the OEC should work closely with the coordinator to obtain a baseline of productivity performance indicators. Conducting the baseline measurement is also the first step of the built-in evaluation of the WEIT concept, for this initial "snapshot" of the organization will be compared to data obtained later in the pilot study and will serve as documentation of effects of the WEIT.

Now, it is time to implement the WEIT promotion and publicity plan that was developed by the steering committee. WEITs are started on a limited pilot basis but a modest, yet broad-reaching, internal promotion and publicity campaign is a necessity. It is very difficult to obtain support and cooperation from other soldiers or employees, managers, departments and staff support groups when they do not know what WEITs are and what they do. All levels of management, from the top down to the individual soldier or employee should have a comprehensive understanding of the WEIT concept and its initiation on a pilot basis.

The final action step of the pre-training phase is selection of pilot WEIT leaders. After selection, the chosen leaders and their department managers should meet with the steering committee for a general question and answer session. Also, the coordinator should furnish the leaders with copies of WEIT manuals for familiarization prior to the training. If a supervisor volunteers to initiate a WEIT, but in the opinion of the OEC and coordinator she or he does not possess the desired characteristics, it is

recommended that she or he attend an LMDC prior to attending the WEIT training.

Once the pre-training phase is completed, Phase II—Implementing the Pilot Study—begins. The OEC's role now becomes that of trainer. As the principal trainer during the WEIT training course for the pilot team, the OEC should assume total responsibility and should be thoroughly familiar with all of the WEIT training modules. She or he should customize the training to fit the people involved and the organization. As long as the OEC does not deviate from the learning objectives, she or he has a free hand on methods or group exercises to fit the training to the situation and the organization. Throughout the WEIT training course, the OEC should involve and focus the attention of the coordinator on process observations and facilitation. Close attention should be given to the data provided by the participants on the evaluation sheets so that future training can be improved. The training course is presented as a pilot so that lessons learned may be applied. After completion of the training course, the OEC should maintain close contact with the coordinator and leader, keeping "a finger on the pulse" to determine deficiencies in the training or any remedial training that may be required. The OEC should also monitor the WEIT pilot study to ensure all necessary actions and functions are being performed.

Phase III—Post-Pilot Study Activities—starts 90 days after completion of the pilot training course. At that time the OEC conducts an in-process review of all aspects of the organization's WEITs: baseline productivity performance indicators, the agendas and group memos of all steering committee and WEIT meetings, promotion and publicity plan, and WEIT policy and procedures. The OEC should also observe a meeting of each pilot WEIT and, in addition,

should interview WEIT members, non-members, leaders, coordinator, steering committee members, levels one and two of management above each pilot leader, peripheral employees, and random mid-level managers. All data and recommendations should be given to the coordinator with the understanding that the information will be briefed to the steering committee and the pilot WEITs.

Results of the final audit should be briefed by the OEC to the commander six months after completion of the pilot training course. At this stage the OEC should be in a position to withdraw from direct involvement and return to the role of an expert resource who is available on an on-call basis.


CONTINUING RELATIONSHIP

The OEC should maintain a good working relationship with the coordinator, who should be advised that the OEC is available to assist with his/her expertise whenever needed. Care must be taken that the coordinator does not become dependent on the OEC and that ownership of the WEIT concept is totally transferred to the organization.

RELATIONSHIP WITH ONGOING QUALITY CIRCLES

If an OEC is assigned to an organization that has ongoing Quality Circles, she or he should advise the program administrator or facilitator that she or he is available as an expert resource to assist in any way possible. Additionally, the OEC may be aware of areas in the WEIT concept that would enable an organization's Quality Circles to improve; if so, it is the OEC's responsibility to share that knowledge with the Quality Circles' program administrator or facilitator. □

Beetle Bailey—by Mort Walker



Doubling Your Consulting Impact

MAJ Eddie Mitchell (CGSC)

Over the last three years while visiting numerous OECs throughout the Army, I have run across a major problem in our consulting community: Most OECs do not get hired to do a second operation in a unit after having successfully conducted a transition. This is a common phenomenon. In fact, for many OECs, transitions compose the majority consulting service provided to their command.

In trying to answer why OECs are blocked from accomplishing second operations in a transitioned unit, I have spoken with many OEC users, non-users, and OE Managers, studied OEC office procedures and goals, and discussed field operations with experienced and inexperienced consultants. This research has led me to believe that graduates leave OECs without a strategy to sell their services in both garrison and the field.

The orientation and practice presented at OECs, during the sixteen week course, emphasize performing OE operations under garrison conditions. The instruction provides little explanation of how such things as role clarification, etc., have applicability or increase unit readiness or mission accomplishment.

So, the OECs hit the field and successfully help lieutenant colonels, colonels or generals rapidly and smoothly take over a unit. But, after assuming the mantle of command, the commanders' needs change. They next must find out how their unit executes field operations. It is at this time that the unit moves out of garrison and leaves the OEC, butcher paper, and "interaction method" behind.

This last statement may be somewhat harsh but expresses the feelings of many users and non-users who do not know that OECs could be helpful to assess battle staff effectiveness and can provide training which would directly improve unit field performance. On more than one occasion, when "staunch" non-users have learned that the

local OEC did have the skills to help improve their battle staffs, I have seen them contact the OEC and request such support.

What type of strategy, then, could increase an OEC's impact into the field operations environment? What type of strategy would lead to at least one more operation after a successful garrison transition? I suggest that an OEC use a *secondary* and main attack process.

The secondary attack is the garrison transition. This implementation allows easy access into units; while it progresses, the OEC-client system relationship grows, and an initial assessment is made. *The secondary attack softens up the unit to accept OEC assistance* in improving unit readiness.


This assistance is the main attack and is presented in the form of a battle staff transition. To sell the unit on the assistance, the OEC can explain that *commanders also need to transition into their fighting role in the new battle staff*. The OEC can point out that a battle staff transition, early in the new commanders' tour, will help the leaders in identifying their units' field operating weaknesses and strengths and more rapidly allow them to insure their units develop into high performing fighting machines. The battle staff transition or training program will help a command and control element mesh as a team.

I believe that if the OEC offers his or her skills in a package form such as a "menu" of pre-FTX, during-FTX, and post-FTX activities, then the potential client can more easily comprehend how the OEC can benefit the unit. These benefits would consist of assessing field operations, feeding the findings back to the unit, and assisting the unit in identifying needed future staff training exercises. Columns one and two of Figure 1 portray such a "menu."

Battle Staff Training Package

WHEN	ACTIVITIES	OEC SKILLS
Pre-Exercise	Training Purpose Workshop 1. Pre-Exercise Assessment 2. Exercise Purpose & Standards Meeting 3. Employment Clarity/ Teamwork Meeting 4. Observation Training	1. Assessment, Interviewing 2. Goal Planning & Evaluation 3. Role Clarity & Conflict Resolution 4. Battle Staff Observation
During Exercise	Training Observation 5. Command and Control Observations 6. Fighting Doctrine Observations 7. Lessons Learned Observations	5. Battle Staff Observation 6. Battle Staff Observation 7. Battle Staff Observation
Post Exercise	Training Achievement Workshop 8. Training Feedback Meeting <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Review Exercise Purpose• Observation findings (+/-)• Identify Training Strengths/Weaknesses 9. Training Problem Solving Meeting 10. Short/Long Range Tng Plan Update	8. Data Feedback 9. Problem Solving/Action Planning 10. Long Range Planning

Figure 1



On studying the menu a commander, chief of staff, XO, or operations officer can easily grasp how the OEC's support would parallel and augment training and training management activities commonly performed in an organization. Unit personnel will also be more responsive to the menu if the OEC uses unit terminology when explaining the package. For example, a disagreement could exist between cavalry units and their brigade staffs. The cavalry commanders might feel their personnel are being improperly employed. OECs would be more successful at getting their services utilized if they offered to help facilitate a meeting dealing with tactical employment problems, instead of offering to do conflict resolution.


Pre-1981 graduates of OECs may not yet be aware of the

methods of providing feedback on fighting doctrine and command and control behaviors. Figure 2 shows the model that is used.

It should be obvious to tactically proficient consultants that commanders, XOs, or operations officers would be eager to insure their battle staffs were proficient in performing the fighting doctrine tasks listed on the map.

Thus, by employing a garrison transition followed by a battle staff transition, the OEC at least employs his or her basic skills twice as often as is presently performed. By employing the strategy described above, the OEC will double his or her consulting impact. □

Figure 2
Fighting Doctrine Map





U.S. Army Organizational Effectiveness Center & School Fort Ord, California

**To: Army Commanders, Leaders, Managers, Chiefs, Directors,
and Supervisors at All Levels**

This article provides an excellent template with which to measure whether your Organizational Effectiveness (Organization Development or OD in civilian parlance) program has a strategic perspective and is achieving its potential in your organization.

Although written in the terminology of a civilian readership in whose world the words *manager* and *management* also connote leaders, supervisors and those "in command" in the corporate world, it is easily translatable into Army terms. The precepts described are equally applicable to Army organizations, both TOE and TDA, and can be used to troubleshoot your OE program.

Underlining has been added for emphasis.

How to make OD work better for your organization

ROBERT W. BAUER

REMEMBER WHEN Organization Development (OD) was just a fad, and not a very popular one? A little over a decade ago, opinions about its value and future varied considerably. Practitioners generally viewed it as one of the last frontiers from which to achieve substantial improvement in productivity and alleviate the growing problem of employee alienation ("blue collar blues"). Managers expressed a whole spectrum of views on OD, ranging from "You're preaching communism!" to guarded interest and enthusiasm—with a healthy dose of skepticism. OD programs were usually started in good times and abruptly thwarted when business turned down; they were considered luxuries, always prey to cutbacks or elimination.

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In those years, many different programs or processes were tried: sensitivity training, survey feedback, team building, management by objectives, and so on. Results from these efforts were mixed at best. Since then, OD practitioners—consultants, internal change agents—have struggled to establish the field as one that is understood, accepted, and of value to organizations and management.

Recently, a major impetus to OD has occurred in the United States with the growing awareness that the Japanese are beating us at what we used to consider our own game: superior management. Suddenly, programs which were viewed as luxuries and "interesting but not terribly relevant to the organization's long-term mission" are seen as vital and necessary for survival, growth, and profitability. The mantle of legitimacy now cloaks quality of worklife, quality circles, employee involvement, and other development

programs. Serious commitments are being made to implement such programs in an ever-increasing number of organizations.

Does this mean that OD has finally come of age and will live up to the high expectations that have been created? Or is this just another passing stage, and will there ultimately be a return to business as usual? No one knows for certain, but several problems inhibit effectiveness of the process.

Problem areas

Lack of a proper definition of Organization Development. If 20 people were asked to define what "Organization Development" means, 20 different answers would be forthcoming. This has undoubtedly contributed to the confusion over what OD can and should accomplish for an organization.

Generally, OD is defined in vague, abstract terms such as "gain-

ing employee involvement" or "human resource development" or "training and development" or "management development" or "improving quality of worklife." Underlying these terms is a series of programs (tactics, interventions, processes) intended to produce certain results. When defining Organization Development activities or programs, one should include any effort focused on improving an organization's performance, productivity, effectiveness, or profitability.

Often responsibility for OD resides under the vice-president for human resources or personnel (a staff function) and is dominated by behavioral scientists and/or the training specialists—not always the best route. Programs tend to follow the functional expertise of the practitioners, and few human resource (or personnel) staff members have any substantial line management experience; thus they lack understanding or appreciation of the range and type of problems faced by the line manager. To reach its full potential, OD must respond to problems and issues across a much wider spectrum than generally exists, leading to the second problem.

Lack of a multidisciplinary approach. Generally, organization problems are approached on a functional basis. If they are technical problems, technicians are called in; if they are "people" problems, trainers or human resource development (HRD) people are summoned. And yet, most significant, complex, high-payoff problems (or opportunities) are both technical- and people-related.

This is illustrated by the current emphasis on implementation of on-line, real-time EDP information systems which ultimately will impact people from top management down to the worker on the shop floor. Here is a situation where both technical and people issues must be addressed in an integrated program or risk of failure increases dramatically. The same holds true with virtually all

"technical" systems which are implemented in organizations. It would seem, therefore, that when these programs—which can be viewed as OD programs—are undertaken, a multidisciplinary approach is necessary, blending technical, line management, and HRD resources. Too often now, technical people design a program and thrust it on the organization and then the HRD people are expected to clean up the resulting mess—a losing proposition.

A multidisciplinary approach would help overcome another problem faced by many OD practitioners: the stigma of being a staff function. Staff groups can be among the most unloved people in an organization, especially where the role of staff groups is unclear (Are they a service function or an independent fiefdom

Let's face it—many of us are really closet autocrats. We all have deep-rooted values and beliefs that make it difficult (and in some cases impossible) to become the kind of managers we'd like to be. Many OD programs assume that, with a week's training or less, managers will see the light, take the sacred oath, and become living, breathing, committed participative managers. The world doesn't work that way. Changes in the way people behave as managers take place gradually, even imperceptibly, and they need continual reinforcement.

The OD process must also include recognition that there will be periodic backsliding by even the most enthusiastic converts and that it will be months or years before significant, institutionalized change

"OD must be viewed in terms of the total organization—its technology, systems, and people. It is not the province of a particular function or staff group, but should be a multidisciplinary approach."

wielding a great deal of power over line organizations?). Only when staff people are integrated with line managers and technical experts, and when real-world, important organizational issues and opportunities are focused upon, is OD allowed to accomplish what is expected of it.

Deep-rooted cultural resistance to OD. Most OD programs are based on concepts of developing trust, respect, cooperation, coordination, participation, involvement in decision making, team building, group problem solving, and on and on. Intellectually, most managers can agree that these concepts are worthwhile. Unfortunately there is a considerable gap between intellectual acceptance and consistent day-to-day application and use.

occurs. Many programs, however, are dead and buried long before this takes place. Sometimes, when quick, dramatic results are not forthcoming, the program is assumed to be a failure and something else replaces it.

OD is usually not part of a long-term strategic plan. Many organization charters and/or mission statements make broad, sweeping references to the value of employees, the need for their involvement, participative management, improving quality of working life, fostering trust and respect, and so on. In many organizations, these are just words displayed on a fancy plaque, nicely framed for outsiders to view and admire. Rarely are the words supported by incorporation of thoughts, concepts, and objectives into the

strategic planning process, which is normally devoted to specific, tangible, measurable factors—market share, R&D, new facilities, entry into new markets, return on investment, and/or equity.

Unfortunately, OD programs are seldom incorporated into strategic planning. Development programs are viewed as separate, distinct efforts and implemented in a piecemeal fashion. To yield the greatest benefit, they should be treated in a strategic sense and made a living, breathing part of the long-term planning process—in effect, become a way of life rather than “here today and gone tomorrow.” This brings up another significant problem.

Short-term focus hurts OD effectiveness. In recent years, much criticism has been leveled at U.S. management for its preoccupation with getting results in the short term—this day, week, month, year. Management and boards of directors place considerable emphasis on maintaining and increasing earnings per share, profit on sales and shareholder equity, and return on net assets. Meanwhile, short shrift is given to longer-term goals and objectives. While these short-term measures are important, criticism for such an approach is warranted for many organizations. It represents a clear difference between U.S. management and the Japanese, who generally focus more on long-range planning.

The emphasis on getting short-term results spills over into management views on OD. Often one of the first questions asked about an OD effort is, “How quickly will we see results?” A second commonly asked question is, “How long will the program last?” While it is certainly legitimate to ask these questions, they reflect a preoccupation with short-term, specific, bottom-line results that are virtually impossible to guarantee (and in many OD processes impossible to achieve) in a short period of time. There are several rea-

sons why OD generally is not a short-term tool:

- OD programs usually involve some form of *behavioral* change in people across broad segments of an organization. These changes can't be mandated; instead, through the OD process, they grow gradually. Few visible results are evident for months, and institutionalization of the changes may take years, particularly in large organizations.

• Because OD programs focus on people, and how people interact with and use the organization's systems, technology, and equipment, they deal with a highly unpredictable element. While systems, technology, and equipment are tangible, rational, and well-defined, human behavior is not. Every organization has a different culture and level of maturity in human interaction, and faces different sets of problems and opportunities. At the start of an OD program, it is very difficult to predict how quickly progress can be achieved given these variables.

• The level of management commitment, understanding, support, and involvement is difficult to predict at the onset of most OD programs. Normally, there is spoken commitment in the beginning, but whether it will remain when the tough parts of the program arise (and there are tough parts to all OD programs) is not easily determined up-front. If commitment wanes, it can seriously impact the program's effectiveness and ultimately kill it.

• OD program results are difficult to measure, especially where they are tied to the organization's performance and productivity data. Organizations generally are undertaking other improvement programs on a continuing basis, independent of the OD effort (capital replacement and expansion, upgrading technology, improving systems), and the economy is constantly changing for good or for ill. Because of this dynamic situation it is difficult, if not impossible, to separate im-

provements gained through the OD effort from other programs, activities, or events which are going on simultaneously.

• Another factor that often creates a problem in measuring impact of OD programs is lack of accurate productivity and performance data (a major problem in many service and governmental organizations). Further, in most OD programs there is a time lag (as much as a year or more) between the time the program is undertaken and the time when performance and productivity are affected.

Even though results are hard to measure and OD programs are both complex and hard work, it doesn't imply they should be avoided. Problems can be anticipated and overcome with careful, front-end analysis and planning.

New OD programs become management fads. That OD programs tend to become current fads is closely related to the seductive belief that quick, short-term results are achievable. The OD boneyard is littered with many programs which have been tried and eventually discarded: sensitivity training, behavior modification, management by objectives, zero-deficit, transactional analysis, transcendental meditation, survey feed back, training programs of an endless variety. Some programs do survive and are gradually modified to a point where they become unrecognizable in relation to the original version. (This may be to the good!) Quality of worklife, quality control circles, and maintaining non-union status programs are today's fads. As with previous OD programs, they risk being tomorrow's casualties.

Why OD doesn't always work

Each of these programs has merit and value, producing significant results when properly applied. Therefore, it is reasonable to ask why so many have not lived up to their initial expectations. The reasons appear to be:

- Managers (and OD practitioners) are prone to select programs which seem to offer solutions to problems they *think* the organization may have, especially if their competition is using the program or someone they respect or admire is touting it. Many users talk glowingly about these programs, especially in the early stages, to show how innovative and ahead of the times they are. When the program doesn't live up to expectations, people generally don't talk about it—who wants to talk about failure?—and the program quietly dies. There seems to be a tendency to look for a “magical” solution to an organization's ills—resulting in frustration and a continuing search for the brass ring.
- Management often views these programs as a way to fix problems “down there”—in lower levels of an organization. They don't realize that most problems faced by organizations today are management problems. Dr. W. Edwards Deming, who has contributed so much to productivity and quality improvement in Japan since World War II, estimates that 85 percent of the problems related to productivity and quality can only be solved with management involvement. This makes them *management*

tices have not been traditionally supported and encouraged by management. Implementation of such a program can look very threatening to participants.

Quality circles, quality of work-life, and other such programs run a high risk of becoming passing fads in many organizations. It is *not* because they don't work. Rather, they are being applied in the wrong place, at the wrong time, without adequate support, training, or understanding. Unrealistic expectations are attached to the programs. There is some indication that the glamour is already beginning to wear off these approaches; their merit and value are being questioned increasingly.

Many OD programs lack systematic tracking and follow-through. Many OD programs don't achieve their anticipated results due to poor tracking and follow-through. At first there is usually enthusiasm and interest in the program. As time goes by and results are slow in coming, the press of day-to-day activities begins to take precedence over the program, and interest and involvement quickly evaporate. Upper management often contributes to this by giving very clear signals that the original program is less important than “get-

tial flurry of activity, quickly become hard work with progress made at an excruciatingly slow pace. To maintain program momentum, it is critically important that upper management stay involved in the process, monitor progress on a timely basis, and insure that program activities receive sufficient priority. There is nothing worse than organization members working hard, being innovative and creative, coming up with significant suggestions or ideas for improvement, and finding that the decision makers can't meet with them or respond to them for weeks or months.

The reward system often doesn't support OD efforts. When an OD effort is undertaken, there are expectations that results will eventually be achieved from the process—higher productivity, better quality, increased job satisfaction, lower turnover and absenteeism, better management-employee relations. Other expectations are also created; there is the vague feeling that something good will occur for people participating in a successful program. Often there is an underlying question of “What's in it for me, if we go through this disruptive, sometimes painful change process?”

Rewards can come in many forms, from a simple expression of appreciation for effort put forth, to pay increases, bonuses, and even promotions. All too often little thought is given to whether OD efforts are, in fact, supported by the reward system. Problems arise when:

- Management support and recognition for program achievements is not provided in a timely manner or is viewed as superficial.
- Promotions and/or pay increases to individuals are based on factors other than performance, quality, and contribution to the organization's goals and objectives.
- Management is viewed as taking credit for the efforts of lower level people.

It boils down to a fundamental point: If the program is good for the organization and requires everyone's

“Union leadership is more interested in becoming involved in OD programs. This is a significant step forward in changing labor/management relations from adversarial in nature to collaborative.”

problems. If OD programs are to work, and if full value is to be obtained, all levels of management must be involved.

● OD programs frequently run counter to an organization's culture and style of management. It is one thing to involve employees in a program that encourages participation, innovation, creativity, and risk taking. It is quite another if these prac-

ting on this hot, new problem.” After a few months, some groups may have given up totally on the program; others are struggling to maintain it; and others are just plain confused as to where it's really going.

This situation often stems from a lack of careful tracking of program activities and results, and a lack of management support and follow-through. OD programs, after the ini-

support to be successful, then it had better be good for everyone—or enthusiasm, commitment, and effort may be seriously diminished.

Making OD work

Given the nature and significance of the problems confronting successful implementation of OD efforts, the question still remains—can OD live up to the high expectations that have been created?

Unquestionably there are considerable pressures on organizations today forcing management to take a serious, intense look at what OD can do to help them out of a serious bind. But there is still the ingrained pattern of response which looks for the short-term, high-payoff, magical, mystical solution to problems—problems which have been years in the making. In OD, there is no magic wand—and until this is widely understood and accepted, many organizations will continue to encounter the problems described earlier.

However, some organizations are beginning to recognize what it takes to create an OD success. These organizations have an opportunity to develop a tremendous edge on their competition over the next few years; ultimately they may well become the dominant companies in their respective industries.

Union leadership is more interested now than it was ten years ago in becoming involved in OD programs; witness GM's Quality of Worklife efforts and provision for employee involvement programs in the most recent United Steel Workers contract. These are significant steps forward in changing labor/management relations from adversarial to collaborative. Again, it is one thing to talk about it; it's a completely different matter to carry it out.

We are also seeing a new, younger generation of people gradu-

ally moving into middle and upper management ranks. Through the educational process and the cultural environment in which they have developed, their values and beliefs tend to support participation, collaboration, and involvement more than the older generation of managers. It remains to be seen whether, through the process of growing up in organization life, they will, in time, become more like their predecessors. This younger generation of managers will profoundly influence the future of OD. Because of these forces and pressures, it appears that over the next few years OD will begin to make a more significant contribution to organization performance and productivity.

However, there are other factors to consider. OD will succeed only if:

- Organization development is viewed as an integral part of the long-term strategic planning process—in effect, creating a new and better way of organization life supporting the long-term organization mission.
- An organization recognizes that OD must start at the top to insure that it will succeed at lower levels. Top management must have its act together before it can expect others to become full participants.
- OD is looked at in terms of the total organization—its technology, systems, and people, and the interaction of these elements to achieve the ultimate mission. It is not the province of a particular function or staff group; rather it is viewed as a multidisciplinary approach to long-term performance and productivity improvement.
- A “medical model” approach is used to determine the type of OD program(s) to be undertaken. Considerable information-gathering (surveys, interviews, direct observa-

tion, and analysis) is done before tactical improvement efforts or programs are selected—diagnosis before treatment. This assures that real, causal problems and opportunities are identified and that the improvement program is properly focused in areas where it can achieve useful results.

- Top and middle management are actively involved throughout the program. Program activities are assigned a high priority and results are systematically tracked and reviewed.
- The organization's reward system supports OD programs. Recognition is given for accomplishment, and the performance appraisal process assures that program participants receive credit for their involvement. Innovation, creativity, and risk taking are encouraged. Performance and contribution to the organization become critical factors in pay, bonuses, and promotion.
- Management doesn't panic when results are initially slow in coming. Rather than being critical of the process and blaming people for lack of results, efforts are made to identify additional resource requirements, or to determine how the process can be improved. Management realizes that complex, multidimensional, multifunctional problems are the hardest to solve, but that their solution results in the greatest benefits.

These elements can be put in place only with the understanding, support, and resolve of the top management group in an organization. Some organizations are already doing it, and are realizing substantial improvements. It is hard work, time-consuming, and a significant investment. But it's the only way to go—until someone finds a magic wand.

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When the Balloon Goes Up: A Communications Exercise

CPT Nancy L. Freebairn (WESTCOM HQ)
CPT Glenn M. Hulse (SETAF HQ)

GOALS

- I. To illustrate the effects of limited communication or poor communication flow within an organization.
- II. To study the process of trial and error problem solving.

GROUP SIZE

Two to four teams of 4 to 6 members each.

TIME REQUIRED

Approximately one hour.

MATERIALS

- I. One Team Instruction sheet for each team.
- II. One Leader's Instruction Sheet for each team leader.
- III. One Balloon Kit for each team containing: 25 balloons of assorted colors; five-foot length of string; one pair of scissors; one felt tip marker; one 3 x 5 card listing the contents of the Balloon Kit.
- IV. One Leader's Kit for each team leader containing two straight pins and a bag in which to collect approved balloons.

PHYSICAL SETTING

An area large enough to discourage teams from comparing notes and a separate area for each Leader to have an "office."

PROCESS

- I. The facilitator forms teams or asks participants to form themselves into teams of four to six members each. (Suggest minimum of one facilitator for each two teams.)
- II. The facilitator instructs each team to select a leader from whom they are willing to accept evaluation.
- III. The facilitator sends teams minus leaders to their assigned work areas and directs leaders to their offices.
- IV. Appropriate instruction sheets are issued to the teams and team leaders.

Team Leader Instructions

You have been selected by your team to evaluate their work. They have been tasked to submit balloons for your approval or disapproval. You may not reveal to your team your reasoning or rationale for approving or disapproving balloons.

You may approve balloons only if all of the following are true:

- a. They are handed to you one at a time by a member of your team.
- b. The team member uses only his or her left hand.
- c. The individual team member did not hand you the last balloon.
- d. The balloon is not the same color as the last balloon presented to you.
- e. The balloon is tied with a knot and has a string attached.


If balloons do not meet the above conditions, you must immediately pop them with the pin. No explanation should be given for your actions. Approved balloons should be retained, counted, and stored in the bag provided. Do not pop approved balloons.

V. The participants are given a few minutes to study the instructions. The facilitator answers any procedural questions.

VI. At the conclusion of twenty-five minutes of play, the facilitator has all participants return to one group for a general discussion.

Some suggested questions for discussion are:

1. What criteria did your team determine your leader to be using in selecting approved balloons?
2. What considerations were discussed before delivery of the first balloon?
3. How was the explanation modified after the first balloon was popped?
4. Did any one person become spokesperson for the group?
5. What was the impact on your team of having few, if any, balloons accepted?
6. Did your elected leader remain a part of your team?
7. What changes did you notice in your group during the exercise?
8. Describe communication between the leader and the other team members.



Note to facilitators:

This exercise is noisy and entertaining. You may expect that a group that gets a balloon "approved" will not understand why and will engage in superstitious behavior trying to duplicate the feat. Frequently teams will "punish" their leader once they become frustrated.

Team Instructions

1. Your team is to turn in inflated balloons to your leader for acceptance at his or her office.
2. Your goal is to have as many balloons accepted by your leader in the time allowed, twenty-five minutes.

Continuing Training

LTC Ronald A. Tumelson

(OECS HRM)

The following information was obtained from After Action Reports sent to the OECS HRM and is provided for the use of OE Consultants, program managers, MACOM representatives and any other interested personnel. The recommendations are those of OE Consultants who attended the workshops and *do not constitute endorsement or criticism* by The Department of The Army, OECS, or any other governmental agency.

Course title: *Influencing Skills*

Presenting organization: NTL Institute

Presenter(s): John Adams
Sheldon Hughes
Susan Colantuono

Tuition cost: \$722.00 (Number of days: 5 days and 4 evenings work.)

Synopsis: A basic course in consultation skills utilizing a familiar five point model. Role plays, lecture and feedback to participants were used to guide understanding of "Gaining Entry, Diagnosis, Change, Evaluation and Stabilization."

Level of training: Refresher, old material.

Specific recommendation(s): Not recommended. Absolutely too basic in content for a school-trained OEC.

Course title: *How to Communicate Under Pressure*

Presenting organization: The Institute for the Advancement of Human Behavior
P.O. Box 7226
Stanford, CA 94305

Presenters: Gerald W. Piaget, Ph.D.

Tuition cost: \$135.00 (one day)

Synopsis: Presentations on Communicating Under Pressure focused on dealing with difficult people in high-pressure situations. The conference sessions included the process of affective control strategies that optimize positive achievement in experienced workshops.

Level of training: Advanced

Specific recommendation(s): Advanced skills in communications for OE Consultants. The presentations give added perspectives in the teaching of advanced communication.

Course title: *'Performax' Consultant Certification Program (Phase I and II)*

Presenting organization:

Performax Systems International, Inc.
12805 State Highway 55
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55441

Presenter(s): Dr. Lew Russell

Tuition cost: \$250.00 (Number of days: 2)

Synopsis: The workshops presented a series of tools and instruments designed to help people improve their lives, their productivity and interpersonal relationships—both at home and at work. Attendance of each phase certifies consultants to administer a variety of learning systems (workshops supported by specific Performax instruments). Performax offers a wide variety of systems, books and manuals. Their creative learning systems include the following:

- (1) The Personal Profile System (a plan to understand self and others)
- (2) The Job Factor Analysis System (a view of one's job)
- (3) The Activity Perception System (a graphic task description)
- (4) The Action Projection System (a plan to understand the attitudinal expressions of self and others)
- (5) The Attitudinal Listening Profile System (a listening climate indicator)
- (6) The Climate Impact Profile System (a social or work climate analysis to understand personal impact modes)
- (7) The Personal Matrix (how others see you)

Level of Training: Advanced, New Concept

Specific Recommendations: Strongly recommended for Organizational Effectiveness Consultants. Extremely beneficial and worthwhile for the cost. All of the 'systems' introduced (workshops with supporting instruments) can be used in any military organization with a high degree of reliability.

Course title: *The Healing Potential of the Human Brain*

Presenting organization: The Institute for the Advancement of Human Behavior
Box 7226 Stanford, CA 94305

Presenter(s): William Kroger, M.D.
Richard Bandler, Ph.D.

Tuition cost: \$125.00 (one day)

Synopsis: Presentations on Self-Help Through Hypnosis (William Kroger, M.D.) and Neuro-Linguistic Programming™ (Richard Bandler, Ph.D.)

focused on advances in consciousness research and the mind-body relationship. The conference sessions included the process of using the five senses in imagery conditioning and the use of hypnotism in healing. The NLP portion of the workshops included techniques and methods to be more effective. Workshop was on a very basic level but geared at the professional user.

Level of training: Advanced

Specific recommendation(s): Recommended for advanced skills in Neuro-Linguistic Programming. The presentations give trainers added perspective in the teaching of advanced communication skills.

Course title: Team Building & Inter-Team Relations.

Presenting organization: University Associates, Inc.

Presenter(s): Dr. Tim Nolan Pam Ahrens

Cost: \$675.00

Synopsis: Theory to Understanding the Dynamics of Work Groups. Participants learn strategies for developing effective functioning within groups. Emphasis is on practice of designing team building sessions.

Information provided and training conducted is highly applicable to this OEC's organization and to OE in the Army. Training is comparable to training received at OECS and compliments the skills already acquired and reinforces training received at Ft. Ord.

Specific recommendation(s): Recommend this course, especially to OEC's that have been out of the network and to those that have been away from OECS for over two years.

Course title: *Influence Management*

Presenting organization: Forum/Schrelo
555 East Ocean Blvd Long Beach, CA 90802

Presenter(s): Linda Peterson

Tuition cost: \$750.00 (three days)

Synopsis: *Influence Management* was developed out of comprehensive research aimed at identifying the behaviors critical to high performance in complex organizations where influence management is important. The research identified 24 practices grouped into three areas: planning, conflict and support, which are linked to high performance by successful influence managers. The workshop utilizes feedback to the individual as obtained from associates, experiential practice of influence management techniques and development of an action plan for self-improvement. The complex organization of this unit lends itself to the utilization of influence management skills in improving interaction and work flow.

Level of training: Advanced

Specific recommendation(s): Recommended for OEC's. Action planning done in the group permits each individual to use the plan in their organization on a project of one's own choosing.

Course title: *Consulting for Organizational Effectiveness*

Presenting organizations: Organizational Consultants, Incorporated

Presenter(s): John J. Sherwood; Professor of Organizational Psychology in the Department of Organizational Behavior of the Krannert Graduate School of Management at Purdue University.

Tuition cost: \$590.00 (Number of days: 3)

Synopsis: This intensive three-day seminar increased the participants' abilities in the following areas:

- Increased conceptual knowledge of various models of consultation
- Expanded attendee's behavioral skills in implementing these models
- Offered experience with new consulting procedures
- Provided attendee opportunities to assess personal strengths/limits

Level of training: Refresher, Advanced

Specific recommendation(s):

This seminar should be favorably considered for attendance by other OECs and be recommended for attendance by key clients/commanders of all macro-level organizations that Organizational Effectiveness Consultants provide consultation effort for/with.

Course title: *Quality Circles Facilitator Training*

Presenting organization: Office of Personnel Management, Dallas Region.

Principal instructor: Diana Robinette, Director of Training Management Services of the Performance Improvement Center, OPM.

Cost: \$210.00 (Number of days: 3)

Synopsis: Quality Circles (QC) is a feasible method of gaining soldier support for ongoing activities as a direct result of base line soldier participation. Those perspectives of soldier activities falling into the support aspect that would appear to be most productive for this type of intervention are actions in the Motor Pools, Dining Facilities, and Supply Rooms.

Specific recommendations: QC appears to be another method/process to maximize the knowledge of the user in job/production improvement.

Course title: *Quality Circle Facilitator Management*

Presenting organization: Army Management Training Activities Rock Island, IL

Principle instructor: Mr. Don Garrison

Cost: None for military or DAC.
(Number of days: 5)

Synopsis: Topics included structure, development and operation of Quality Circle program within a military setting. Operation of the circle to include formation, training, problem identification, problem investigation and solution and management presentation were covered in detail. Overview of program organization to include the roles of management, the coordinating committee, circle coordinators and facilitators were included.

Level of training: Advanced

Specific recommendation(s): This is excellent training for QC facilitators, coordinators or program action persons. If a QC program is being planned or in effect, it is well worth the time.

Course title: *Design Skills - Small Training Theory and Practice*

Presenting organization:

University Associates

Presenter(s): Lawrence Porter EDD, Senior Consultant University Associates, Inc

Tuition cost: \$675.00 (Number of days: 4½)

Synopsis: The workshop was for consultants and trainers seeking additional knowledge in the art of designing a training workshop for a specific outcome. The model used was the "Experimental Model" for learning. Subject dynamics, communications, and leadership and management training. Participants worked in design teams during a major portion of the workshop. Designs and presentations were critiqued extensively by the participants and UA staff.

Level of training: Old & new concepts

Specific recommendation(s): Should be considered by all OEC's as an excellent workshop to increasing their design skill, abilities, and understanding of the "Experimental Learning" Model.

Course title: *The Art of Creative Thinking*

Presenting organization: The Negotiation Institute, Inc.

Presenter(s): Gerard I. Nierenberg

Tuition cost: \$250.00 (Number of days: 1)

Synopsis: The brochure says, ". . . a system whereby your creativity can be placed under your conscious control. At The Art of Creative Thinking™, you will learn his structured, organized approach to being an 'idea person'. You will gain specific, practical skills for getting the idea you need, when you need it."

" . . . take one of your own complex problems and devise multiple solutions . . ." and also, ". . . learn how to objectively evaluate the viability and practicality of new ideas against your past experience."

The initial activity was for every participant to state in writing a problem in their own life for which they desired a creative solution. Then, each person was to brainstorm a list of all the creative solutions they could think of to solve the problem. At the conclusion of the workshop participants would return to this activity as an evaluation mechanism to demonstrate the effectiveness of the process to be described during the day. The workshop would conclude by returning to this activity. Time ran out, so this activity was never accomplished. By that time, approximately 50 percent of those who had begun the workshop had departed.

I saw this as a left-brained approach to a right-brained activity. The workshop was mostly lecture, the workshop did not flow—difficult to fit one item to the next. Exercises did not make sense. They were poorly introduced, instructions were unclear and they were not processed. Most exercises left me with the question, "So what?" About 30 percent of the topics listed on the seminar outlined were not addressed.

Level of training: New concept

Specific recommendation(s): Run, do not walk, to cancel any reservation you have made to attend this workshop.

CORRECTION: Vol 6, No. 2, 1982, OE Communiqué erroneously reported the Air Force Institute of Technology at Wright Patterson AFB as the DOD proponent for Quality Circles. There is no DOD proponent.

Consultant's Flea Market: Tricks of the Trade

I am impressed with the way a critical career problem for OEC's has been solved in WESTCOM by use of the Memorandum of Understanding. I quote from it in order to disseminate its laudable technique:

"Evaluation of the Consultant: At the conclusion or termination of the study, the client agrees to provide the consultant's superiors (e.g., CG & C/S) essential evaluation of the consultant. Because of the confidentiality of the work, those superiors must have

some basis for evaluation of the consultant's effectiveness. The form of this feedback is at the discretion of the sponsor. No information relative to the study need be included, but this feedback should be directly related to the consultant's effectiveness in assisting the client and the consultant's behavior while conducting the study."

ALAN STANCHFIELD
UBAOECS

Sources and Resources

Lynn Dixon Herrick

FEEDFORWARD

In keeping with the theme of this issue, the subject of this section is the initial phase of the consulting process. Successful entry and contracting on the part of an OE Consultant paves the way for continued success throughout the consulting operation. So **Be All You Can Be**—read and heed the following!

ENTRY AND CONTRACTING—INITIAL PHASES OF THE CONSULTING PROCESS

Technical Aspects of Entry and Contracting

Bell, Chip R., and Nadler, Leonard, editors
THE CLIENT—CONSULTANT HANDBOOK. Gulf Publishing Company, c1979. The subject of entry is well covered by three experts in part three of this definitive work on consulting.

Berg, David N.
"Failure at Entry." Pp. 33-55 in FAILURES IN ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE, edited by Philip H. Mirvis and David N. Berg. Wiley, c1977. *Candid disclosures regarding an actual consulting operation which never got off the ground.*

Blake, Robert R., and Mouton, Jane Srygley
CONSULTATION. Addison-Wesley, c1976.
Chapter 32, "Theory and Technique of Consultation," links the type of contract with the specific type of intended intervention in the author's model of the Consulcube.

Collier, Jack W.
"Establishing a Consulting Agreement." *OE Communiqué*, Vol. 4-78 (Oct. 1978), pp. 57-59.
Provides a format for a working document that leads to the more formal contract appropriate for an OE operation.

Derr, C. Brooklyn
"Successful Entry as a Key to Successful Organization Development in Big City Schools." Pp. 41-52 in THE SOCIAL TECHNOLOGY OF ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT, edited by W. Warner Burke and Harvey A. Hornstein. University Associates, c1972.
Uses a case study to highlight important considerations regarding entry into an organization.

French, Wendell L., and Bell, Cecil H.
ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT: BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE INTERVENTIONS FOR ORGANIZATION IMPROVEMENT, 2nd edition. Prentice-Hall, c1978.
Chapter 17, "Issues in Consultant-Client Relationships," briefly discusses entry and contracting as well as other phases of the consulting process.

Emington, Pat
"Contracting—A Survival Skill." *OE Communiqué*, Vol. 1-78 (Jan. 1978), pp. 43-45.
Synopsizes Dr. John J. Sherwood's suggestions for designing an OD/OE contract as a preventive measure to preclude surprises or disaster.

Fuchs, Jerome H.
MAKING THE MOST OF MANAGEMENT CONSULTING SERVICES. AMACOM, 1975.
Deals with the client-consultant relationship from the particular concerns and considerations of the client.

Hobby, Thomas K.

"The Importance of Contracting in Organizational Effectiveness." *OE Communiqué*, Vol. 2-78 (Jan. 1978), pp. 40-42.

A tongue-in-cheek analysis of the reasons for "one-step" OE operations.

Hunt, Alfred

THE MANAGEMENT CONSULTANT. Ronald Press, c1977.

Advice on selecting clients is contained in chapter 7; portions of chapter 9 offer suggestions for beginning a consulting operation.

Kaufman, Roger

IDENTIFYING AND SOLVING PROBLEMS: A SYSTEM APPROACH. University Associates, c1976.

Potentially useful both in developing a personal strategy for entry and for refining contract objectives for maximum clarity.

Lippitt, Gordon, and Lippitt, Ronald

THE CONSULTING PROCESS IN ACTION. University Associates, c1978.

Entry, contracting and other phases of the consulting process are summarized in chapter 2 of this consulting handbook.

Weisbord, Marvin

"The Organization Development Contract." Pp. 321-326 in ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND RESEARCH, edited by French, Bell and Zawacki. Business Publications, c1978.

Maintains that an OD consulting contract should specify the process as well as the content of the prospective consulting operation.

Rapport Building Aspects of Entry and Contracting

Adler, Ronald B.

CONFIDENCE IN COMMUNICATION: A GUIDE TO ASSERTIVE AND SOCIAL SKILLS. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, c1977.

A workbook of theory and practice in establishing and maintaining a win/win environment based on a philosophy of interdependence.

Adler, Ron, and Towne, Neil

LOOKING OUT/LOOKING IN: INTERPERSONAL COMMUNICATION, 2nd edition. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, c1978.

Detailed and often entertaining exploration of the many ways communication (looking out) is linked to self-concept (looking in).

Becvar, Raphael J.

SKILLS FOR EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION: A GUIDE TO BUILDING RELATIONSHIPS. Wiley, c1974.
A self-teaching guide to behavior alternatives which can improve communications and interpersonal relations.

Bradshaw, Pete

THE MANAGEMENT OF SELF—ESTEEM. Prentice-Hall, c1981.

Remarkably complete and lucid explanation of the importance of building a strong self image.

Brammer, Lawrence M.
THE HELPING RELATIONSHIP: PROCESS AND SKILLS. Prentice-Hall, c1973.

A detailed source book of skills which are effective for understanding others, for comfort and crisis intervention, and for positive action.

Buening, Charles R.
COMMUNICATING ON THE JOB: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR SUPERVISORS. Addison-Wesley, c1974.
A refresher course in commo basics, with emphasis on related applications.

Combs, Arthur W., and others
HELPING RELATIONSHIPS: BASIC CONCEPTS FOR THE HELPING PROFESSIONS, 2nd edition. Allyn and Bacon, c1978.

Explores the practical application of humanistic psychology to the broad area of personal counseling and problem solving.

Dilts, Robert, and others
NEURO—LINGUISTIC PROGRAMMING, Volume 1. Meta Publications, c1980.

Comprehensive and relatively straightforward guide to the influence skills associated with NLP.

Fast, Julius
BODY LANGUAGE. Pocket Books, c1970.
Interprets the physical signals that consultants and clients send out both continuously and unconsciously.

Gibb, Jack R.
TRUST: A NEW VIEW OF PERSONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT. Guild of Tutors Press, c1978.

Expresses the author's personal belief in and experience with the advantages of expanding the level of trust in relationships.

Gordon, Thomas
LEADER EFFECTIVENESS TRAINING: L.E.T. Wyden Books, c1977.
A win/win approach to the leadership (and consulting) skills of problem solving, communication, and conflict resolution.

Harris, Thomas A.
I'M OK, YOU'RE OK. Avon Books, c1969.
A classic report on the aspects of Transactional Analysis theory that deal with self concept and impressions of others.

Henning, Margaret, and Jardim, Anne
THE MANAGERIAL WOMAN. Pocket Books, c1977.
Insightful and objective summary of the way it is for women in managerial positions, with suggestions for changing the way it is.

Ilich, John
POWER NEGOTIATING: STRATEGIES FOR

WINNING IN LIFE AND BUSINESS. Addison-Wesley, c1980.

Outlines tactics and techniques for proactively influencing the outcome of situations involving conflict.

Jourard, Sidney M.
THE TRANSPARENT SELF, revised edition. Van Nostrand, c1971.
Establishes a direct link between self-disclosure, healthy personality, and personal effectiveness.

Kellog, Mary Alice
FAST TRACK: THE SUPERACHIEVERS AND HOW THEY MAKE IT TO EARLY SUCCESS, STATUS AND POWER. McGraw-Hill, c1978.
A research based report on the personal goals and strategies of successful, young movers and shakers in business and industry.

Kleinke, Chris L.
FIRST IMPRESSIONS: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ENCOUNTERING OTHERS. Prentice-Hall, c1975.
Offers a guide to understanding the factors that determine what two people will think of each other when they meet for the first time.

Korda, Michael
SUCCESS! Ballantine Books, c1977.
Takes a how-to approach to climbing the ladder of success in the business jungle.

Miller, Sherod, and others
ALIVE AND AWARE: IMPROVING COMMUNICATION IN RELATIONSHIPS. Interpersonal Communication Programs, c1975.
A process overview of communications, with special emphasis on self- and other-awareness.

Nierenberg, Gerald I., and Calero, Henry H.
HOW TO READ A PERSON LIKE A BOOK. Hawthorn Books, c1971.
Suggestions for grouping elements of body language into clusters in order to more accurately interpret their meaning.

Nierenberg, Gerald I., and Calero, Henry H.
META—TALK: THE GUIDE TO HIDDEN MEANINGS IN CONVERSATION. Cornerstone Library, c1973.
Provides many examples of subtle, and sometimes subliminal, messages within commonly used words and phrases.

Zunin, Leonard, and Zunin, Natalie
CONTACT: THE FIRST FOUR MINUTES. Ballantine Books, c1972.
Tips on making powerful, positive first impressions in a variety of situations. □

ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS UPDATES

HQDA Updates

MAJ(P) Lew Flanders
8-227-3700

RAPC 82: The Annual OE Review and Action Planning Conference (RAPC 82) was held 17-19 August in Washington, D.C. The theme of this years RAPC was "OE in the Future."

The initial phase of the conference consisted of presentations by the DA OE program cell, OECs representatives, and MACOM OE program managers as to the present and future status of their respective programs and consulting activities. During the second phase of the conference participants were asked to brainstorm the OE communities vision of OE in the future. Several key issues were then action planned in small group settings and report outs rendered to BG Hugo, Director of Management, Office of the Chief of Staff. The HQDA program cell is currently sorting the issues into manageable groups and further defining responsibilities for future actions.

Tentatively a 2 day RAPC In-Progress Review (IPR) is being planned for March 83.

AR 5-15, Change 1: Change 1 to the OE AR 5-15 dated 1 February 1982 will be prepared in draft this fall. Recommended changes and additions to the OE regulation should be forwarded to this office; HQDA, ATTN: DACS-DME, Washington, D.C. 20310, in October. The changes will be staffed to the MACOMs and ARSTAF prior to publication.

OE Information System (OEIS): The OE Information System is being designed to provide the OEC an automated means of exchanging relevant case data. The overall goal of the OEIS is to improve the Army's capability to improve its units by enhancing the OEC's ability to research relevant case data and provide managers data on type and value of operations being conducted.

The OEIS was accepted under the auspices of AR 18-1 (Automation Management) and a Mission Element Needs Statement (MENS) was approved. For automation management purposes the OEIS will be treated as an element of a larger information system, also being developed. This process speeds staffing time and frees hardware for testing.

A Steering Committee has been appointed by the Director of Management and will meet soon after the RAPC. Their first tasks are to design and begin a prototype test.

Civilian Consultant Information: The Civilian Personnel Center has reevaluated the MACOM OE Consultant job description. The resultant series is GS 343, Management Analysis. Informal feedback from civilian consultants has indicated a preference for remaining in the 301 series. The 343 series appears to be the way to go in

the future, but because of several factors, including civilian consultant perception, other alternatives will be explored before any change is made. Keep your eye on this column. OEC's are encouraged to submit suggestions, ideas, recommendations etc. to DACS-DME.

HQDA OEC Operations: The following is a brief summary of major consulting operations of the HQDA OEC's.

- **Performance Management Army.** Developing objectives for Total Army Goals. Theme of the October Army Commanders' Conference. Linking objectives with budgeting and resource management systems.
- **HQDA Survey.** Workforce environment and productivity survey. Includes Army Secretariat as well. Feedback sessions begin late August.
- **"Corporate Fitness" (Stress Management).** Consulting to the Surgeon General. Army-wide application.
- **Strategic Planning.** (Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Policy.) Goal-setting and action planning.
- **Action Planning.** Assistant Secretary of Defense, Health Affairs) Institutionalize HA goals and define objectives.
- **Agency (i.e., DCSOPS, DCSRDA, etc) Consulting.** Goal-setting, objectives, planning. Linking to Total Army Goals.
- **Army Staff Council.** Consulting to redefine purpose, decision-making and information-sharing process.

Farewell: Farewell to LTC John Novotny and LTC Joe Momorella. Both will retire in October. John heads for the warm sunny climate of Leesburg, Florida and Joe will remain in Northern Virginia. We wish them success in the years ahead.

MACOM Roundup

FORSCOM
LTC Mike Adkinson
8-588-3537/3538

A Solid Core Of Experience

While new to this office, they are not new to the field of OE. Recent additions of Major John Selfe, Sergeant Major Wayne Davis and Captain(P) George Selin have provided the FORSCOM OE Office with a good base of second tour OEC's. They have enabled several on-going projects to maintain momentum and provide a fresh perspective for the future. We are really glad to have them on board with us.

OE '82

A continuing education workshop of the size and nature held in Atlanta last year (OE '81) will **not** be repeated this year. Due in part to tightening fiscal policy, but more to a rethinking of what we should and must accomplish, the FORSCOM OE Office has refocused it's workshop efforts to the design of methods/processes to assist FORSCOM commanders, in contributing to achievement of FORSCOM missions and goals.

The basic purpose of the workshop will be to provide mission-oriented training on current high interest items such as Force Modernization, Mobilization and other issues that directly support the five missions of FORSCOM. The workshop will capitalize on the current

experience and skills available in the FORSCOM and other MACOM OE communities.

A two phase workshop design is envisioned. The first phase will be a small working group comprised of selected OEC's from various command levels (CONUSA, corps, divisions, separate brigades, DA and other MACOMs). This group, assisted by working consultant(s) will develop the basic design packages to address each of the five FORSCOM missions. Invited non-OE personnel will be included to provide information and assist definition of the outcomes desired. This first workshop is planned for late November early December time frame. The second step will be a large conference (early Feb 83) consisting mainly of FORSCOM OEC's and other MACOM OE representatives. Outcomes for this conference will include the following:

- Understanding of the FORSCOM Missions and the challenges that exist.
- Awareness of useful methods that can be developed and used by OE personnel.
- Competencies required for these methods.
- Develop strategies and new technologies to assist FORSCOM Commanders in accomplishing their missions.
- Identify resources available.
- Techniques for gaining entry to work on these major issues.
- Provide uniformity of effort in FORSCOM.

More detailed information will be provided in September.

Performance Management Plan (PMP) for FORSCOM Headquarters

"WHAT'S IMPORTANT?" That was the question from many staff agency chiefs regarding what the FORSCOM staff should do to contribute to attainment of the overall FORSCOM Purpose and Missions. The answer was provided by the Commanding General after review of results from the beginning of the PMP process for the headquarters.

The PMP is a big process. It takes ideas from other successful processes such as Strategic Planning, HPP, MOP and others . . . in other words "The book is being written as we go." Basically it is a command and management tool that gives the CG and the staff direction, priorities and focus of resource allocation for accomplishment of the major "driving force" objectives for the headquarters as seen by the CG. At present the headquarters is involved in the analysis and planning phase which will start to clarify the "what must be done" actions to accomplish the Headquarter's objectives. The PMP process was briefed at the recent RAPC in August and a future OE Communique article is envisioned.

Occupation of Alternate Fighting Position.

The term "Change Agent" has real meaning here at Fort McPherson. The addition of a large command and control element for RDF and preparation for construction of a new headquarters building has required the juggling of office space. Our office will make a temporary displacement sometime in September-October time frame but the telephone numbers should remain the same. If you intend to visit in the fall, call and we'll give you our new coordinates.

Congratulations and Farewells

Former SGM John Gilson is now **Command Sergeant Major Gilson** and on top of that he has been assigned to

the CSM slot for the MP Battalion at Fort Dix, NJ. **Ms. Connie Boynton** was selected for appointment to a new job with the Post DIO. The contributions made by John and Connie to the effective operation of the FORSCOMOE Program and our organization's mission accomplishment cannot be adequately described here. If a single word could be used it would have to be "Outstanding." Good luck to both.

USAREUR

LTC Dave Windom
(2121) 7087/7286

Be All You Can Be seems a very appropriate theme for OE in USAREUR—but we aren't there yet. It almost seems like the "unique USAREUR time perspective" which essentially says that we've been here 35 years, one year at a time, gets an almost vise-like grip on many who come here. This situation manifests itself with results on my watch. It's basically a reactive mindset, or as **Jim Channon** might say, typified by the organizational slug. Sounds grim, and it is, but things are looking up thanks to a few farsighted commanders and some very aggressive dedicated OEC's. Here's what's happening that's good—

The CINC has adopted seven USAREUR goals that are unique to our situation; but support directly the TOTAL ARMY GOALS. These goals have been released to the field and will go a long way toward focusing this Theater. The USAREUR Theater Plan (UTP) has been published for the Theater. The UTP represents the first real attempt at strategic planning and at making the Program Planning Budgeting Executing System (PPBES) something that is real for everyone.

Up at Frankfurt, **MAJ Dan McGrew** and a few of his friends have taken the V Corps CG and all of his commanders and staff through the Performance Management Conference (PMC). Dan and his CG have the ball rolling on what could really be a "punch out to the future" effort. Super job, Dan.

Likewise, in Kaiserslautern at the 21st Support Command, **MAJ Bob Siepielski** has done a PMC for his CG and staff—another great effort to get large complex organizations focused and determining their own future while at the same time being supportive of the Theater.

Once the wisdom of these efforts begins to pay off, the USAREUR OE network will be faced with possibly its greatest challenge. In the face of increasing demands for more complex future oriented operations, how do we pull it off, when we are faced with officer distribution plan (ODP) cuts, rank reductions and growing misutilization by the organizational slugs. **The answer isn't clear, but probably centers around some form of regionalization or plan to centralize OE assets in specific geographic areas so that these things can occur:**

- We will have at least one 0-4 in each cell.
- We will have some "experienced" people possibly even some reutilized officer/NCOs in each cell.
- We can operate as teams when the situations demand.
- We can take advantage of synergism—an oft neglected aspect of our business.
- We can pool resources and establish a decent reference library for each cell.

And in turn, these things **won't happen:**

- A new OEC reports to an empty office with no references—sound familiar?
- Misutilization—The USAREUR misutilization rate is highest when the OEC is **not** producing results for the

boss. Usually he is not producing because he simply doesn't know what a result is—he is limited by his experience.

- A new or single OEC needing help but not having anyone immediately available to turn to.
- Underlap or a situation where a new OEC reports in and the old OEC has already departed, thus depriving him of the benefit of the OEC's experience.

You can look for the HQ USAREUR OE office to propose some type of plan that will enable the USAREUR OE network to project itself into the future on a more favorable footing. With Force Modernization and Division 86 already behind schedule and with both programs in dire need of resources, it is patently obvious that we all need to look at the future and our role in it.

DARCOM

LTC Lee Gragg
8-284-8532/8536

What's going on in DARCOM? Two issues ago we said *plenty*; at this writing the proper term might be *overload*. **General Don Keith's** DARCOM Direction Initiative is reverberating throughout the command. Here at the headquarters we are doing back-to-back workshops for directors and division chiefs as well as supporting subordinate commands who do not have an OEC. In the field, DARCOM direction workshops (a modified PMC process) are selling like cotton candy at a carnival.

DARCOM will be well represented at the OE Managers' Course in San Diego. We are not sure if the increased attendance is due to the California sun or an increased interest in the OE process. In either case, the experience will be useful to managers in improving the quality of use of their consultant(s).

Hails and Farewells: The DARCOM community has some of both. We are saying goodbye to three outstanding consultants in addition to the undersigned (How does one say goodbye to himself?). **MAJ Tim Bennett** who has done an excellent job at MICOM is headed for Fort Jackson to work in the Readiness Region—Best of luck, Tim; **Mr. John McNeil**, who has done an outstanding job at TSARCOM, is on his way to Washington, DC where he will be an internal consultant to the Department of Treasury. Careful what you pick up, John! **Mr. Stanley Shields** of HQ DARCOM is moving over to the Corps of Engineers to continue his consulting practice. We understand that Rubin needs the help, but we sure will miss you, Stan. As for myself, the OE community can't seem to get rid of me. I will be signing into the National Guard Bureau as an OEC and am looking forward to a new consulting experience.

On the inbound side of this ledger, **LTC Mike Mierau**, currently the OEC for the Transportation School at Fort Eustis (guess they needed some infantry help), will be taking the helm of DARCOM OE. Mike is an expert on stress and I predict that he will be able to put that expertise to good use as he continues to focus and hone the strategic direction of the DARCOM OE community. Other newbees will be **CPT Francis Tarpley** coming in to replace MAJ Tim Bennett at MICOM and **LTC Carl Stout**, who will be joining TECOM as the first OEC there in quite some time. You have fertile ground, Carl; plow it well.

Since this is my last DARCOM Update, I am taking the liberty to add a few sentences of personal babble—unbiased of course: When I arrived here in 1979, OE in DARCOM was in its infancy. The OE process was not well understood and use was spotty at best. Over the last

three years the consultant force has doubled in size, led the Army in the use of quality circles—in fact, ARRCOM has just published (June 82) three excellent handbooks for facilitators, leaders and members, respectively—(Want a set? Call Ms. Herbst at AV 793-4849), spearheaded the first Army use of sociotechnical system technology, designed and implemented the performance management process (HQDA now calls it the PMA), and provided executive development for general officers which continues to spread and receive laudatory comments. In my (unbiased) opinion you (DARCOM consultants) are the most expert experienced consultant force in the Army at this time. I am proud to have worked with you both individually and collectively and my departing challenge is for you to stay on the leading edge as you assist our new commander in shaping the future of DARCOM. Best of luck to all.

For your calendars, dates for 1983 DARCOM PD Workshop have been set as 4-8 April 1983. It will be held at Beckley, West Virginia. More information will follow next issue.

WESTCOM

CPT Nancy Freebairn
AV 438-1958/1124

OEC changes at WESTCOM

We bid "Aloha!" to **SFC Marvin J. Williams Jr.**, and **SFC John Tantlinger**. SFC Williams departed this office on 31 July 1982 for retirement. SFC Williams contributed greatly to the overall success of OE efforts here in WESTCOM over the past 3 years. SFC Tantlinger, CL #1-82, joins us from MILPERCEN.

Additionally, **Bob Walls** has joined the WESTCOM team and has undertaken the headquarters Management Systems Development project. Bob came to us from Human Resource Management teaching and consultancy positions in the University of Hawaii College of Business Administration, Rensis Likert Associates, and the US Navy. With Bob joining our staff, we have completed our 3-10 Year Plan objective of configuring the OEC staff to conform with the make-up of our client base.

Management System Development

A goals-oriented management system is being developed by Headquarters, WESTCOM. The effort is organized by the Management System Development Team (MSDT), which consists of the MACOM Deputy Chiefs of Staff. The objectives are twofold: (1) to directly enhance management through a systems approach to headquarters responsibilities, and (2) to provide the basis for identifying information needs, through the 1980's. The project was designed in three phases. The first two phases constituted a major OE project. In Phase I, OE assisted in the development of purpose, mission, and goal statements. Objectives were then developed to support each of the five MACOM-wide goals. During Phase II, programs and functions were aligned with specific objectives to produce coordination matrices. These show involvement across traditional hierarchical boundaries. The matrices were developed by OE through extensive coordination of the MSDT and action officers staff-wide. In Phase III, currently underway, information requirements are being developed by users and information automation specialists under the direction of Automation Management. Point of contact is Robert Walls.

WESTCOM Sponsors a Hawaii Military OD Practitioners Network.

Plans are now firm for the WESTCOM OE Office to sponsor the initial organizational meeting to establish an

all out military OD practitioners network in Hawaii. Membership and participation will be open to all 5Z's and other Services' equivalents in Hawaii. The purpose and objectives of the network are:

1. To initiate an OD network in Hawaii.
2. To exchange OE ideas and "lessons learned" for the purpose of mutual professional development.
3. To open channels for the purpose of sharing physical resources; i.e., books, films, video cassettes or meeting and training space.
4. To provide forum for collegial performance feedback.
5. To measure desires to attend future gatherings of a similar nature. (If survey indicates overall positive responses, expect to set tentative date for next assembly.)
6. To open channels for possible consultant exchange program between the Armed Forces in Hawaii.
7. TO HAVE FUN!!!

Initial responses have been extremely encouraging. Army POC's are Bob Walls and SFC Tantlinger.

TRADOC
LTC Bob Radcliffe
8-680-3312/3316

Civilian Substitution: All TRADOCers should have received my letter on civilian substitution and high grade ceilings. That letter has all the details. These initiatives have the potential for great impact in the OE program. We see the use of civilian consultants as an ideal way to gain continuity, increase available manpower, and provide another perspective on your organizations. Civilian substitution appears to be a way to get faces for these "impossible to fill" spaces, but before you leap into a major civilianization project, make sure you understand the implications, command climate, and nuances of such an effort.

Visits to TRADOC Installations and Activities: As part of an effort to get a feel for TRADOC trends, problems, and strengths, LTC Radcliffe is hitting the road more frequently. Most of these trips will be to visit the local OE Office and talk informally with you about what you're doing, and to find areas where we can help out. So far Ft. McClellan, Ft. Lee, Redstone Arsenal, and Ft. Gordon and LOGCEN have been visited and hopes are to get to many more. Other TRADOC OE Office staffers will be hitting the street to get wider coverage, so stand by... one of us could drop in tomorrow.

Goals and Objectives: In an effort to chart a course for us here at TRADOC HQ, and try to see beyond tomorrow, we have sat down and developed some goals and objectives. The process was painful, confusing, enlightening, and ultimately successful in giving us direction for FY83 and FY84. We briefed our plan to the Chief of Staff, MG Blount, got additional guidance, quite a bit of support, and just put the finishing touches on a written guide for the coming years. We will send this out to you to show our internal direction for consulting, program management and office development. If you have any questions or comments call CPT Howard Brosseau for details. For those who haven't tried it for themselves. . ."physician heal thyself". . .

Teleconference for TRADOC OEC: By the time this hits the newstands, we should have conducted TRADOC's first telephone conference involving all OE assets. Again the Chief of Staff "encouraged" us to move this way to model same for the Headquarters. We plan an information item for the *Communique* that will outline the do's, don'ts

and lessons learned for such conferencing. So that some of you Delta Forcers won't get confused, this is a telephone "talking" conference not an electronic teleconference a la TELENET. We hope that will be coming for us soon, but not yet. . .

Installation Contracts: The Installation Contracting System used by TRADOC is an interesting and very controversial subject area in the command. We have made a proposal to the Chief of Staff regarding integrating this process with the TRADOC Goals and Objectives process to try to make both more meaningful and useful. We encourage comments and suggestions from anyone familiar with the system and want all our folks in the field to start looking for clients in this area.

TRADOC Welcomes MAJ Kenneth A. Rice: MAJ Kenneth (Ken) Rice is on board and running. He has been with us since June and has worked on one reorganization, a transition, two planning conferences, and a couple of workshop implementations. Having come from OE duty at Ft. Carson we have given him a full case load immediately, and Ken has proven to be a real asset to the program and a hard worker. His education, experience, and tendency to "paint things green" is proving to be a real plus to the office.

EUSA (Korea)

CPT(P) Rita Csonka
YS 293-3895/8389 (Office)
YS 293-5549/5854 (Home)

Hello from the Land of the Morning Calm. We realize lack of easy access to OE Consultants here in Korea due to time differences and telephonic difficulties may lead to a limited awareness regarding our continued existence, needs, and accomplishment. The following hopefully will fill in the gaps.

Networking. While EUSA personnel status depicts a limited number of OEC's authorized and assigned, in actuality there are significant numbers of trained and experienced OEC's in Korea providing voluntary reinforcement, assistance, and independent interventions as backup to the assigned staff, while maintaining their respective specialty demands. This "network" appears to be maturing into a valuable arrangement.

Historically, EUSA OEC's have not had to publicly market OE. The expansive clientele is a result of successful OE performance. The OE demand is very high and is being met in a more timely, expeditious fashion due to expansion of limited resources through the responsive, cooperative, "NET" established. Our OE net also informs us that both professional and personal growth is resulting from "networking."

Operations. Included in the 1982 EUSA operations are:

- Mission, goals, objective setting sessions with linkage to budgetary cycles;
- Strategic (organizational) planning;
- Transitions. . . reduction of turbulence and down time through transition management of key personnel and top teams. (The turbulence of short tour areas necessitates a much greater recognition of the emphasis on the transition of key personnel (top team members) to facilitate organizational continuity and continued progress);
- Battle staff assessment;
- Annual General Inspection (AGI) planning sessions;
- Team building;
- Conflict management;

- Role clarification; and
- Design and development of the first USFK/EUSA Quality of Life (QOL) survey questionnaire. The questionnaire is to be used annually as the principal basis for systematically and formally assessing the QOL within USFK/EUSA. Results are to be used to support EUSA QOL initiatives and to link the survey process to the PPBES.

EUSA First. The HQ EUSA OE office was happy to see Mr. Y.T. Kim's return to the Command after graduating from the August '82 Class. **Mr. Kim represents the Army's first host-nation OE Consultant.** He provides a unique consulting service and capability which enables EUSA to more fully consider the total force (US and Korean personnel) when applying OE technology and approaches. The language and cultural gaps that significantly impact on organizational effectiveness in a non-English speaking, Eastern culture host-nation environment have been effectively bridged!

Another First. Major MIN, Geun Kee, the first Korean Army officer to attend OECC, graduated in August. Welcome home.

Eligible and interested in re-utilization? EUSA is looking for seasoned OEC's.

OECS Updates

Operations and Support Directorate

Major P.B. Longan

8-929-5919/4882

OECS is bidding farewell to LTC Ronald L. Sheffield in October. Most of you in the OE Community know LTC Sheffield from his more than four years in Operations and Support. He was one of the first staff members seen by new students when they arrived, and he gave them the final "lecture" on how the graduation exercise would be conducted. LTC Sheffield is planning to stay in the Monterey Peninsula area. We wish him well in his new endeavors.

The quotas for the Leadership and Management Development Trainers Course for FY-83 have been distributed by TRADOC to the MACOMs. If you want to send someone to the course, check with your MACOM for a quota. If they don't have any, other MACOMs may have ones they are turning back. The L&MDTC is quota-managed by TRADOC. TRADOC is now finalizing requirements for FY-84. Plan ahead. If you want quotas for FY-85, plan them now; TRADOC will soon canvas the MACOMs to determine how many they want to train. Quota development and class scheduling are done 12-13 months in advance.

Input for OE Consulting Course Classes 4 and 5 was up from Class 3. Total input for the fiscal year was 185—69% of the school's programmed load.

Training Developments Directorate

Dr. Mel Spehn

8-929-7058/7059

The Interactive Video Competency Training System pilot test has been approved. The necessary video tape coding for the **Competency Recognition Training** application will begin soon after the IBM equipment is received. Competency Recognition Training will be conducted during the Oct 82—Feb 83 time frame. Evaluation of the program, sponsored by TRADOC's Training Developments Institute (TDI), will be conducted by

McFann—Gray & Associates, Inc. Evaluation results are to be forwarded to TRADOC to assess training implications for other soft-skill courses Army-wide.

The OECC Program of Instruction was submitted to TRADOC for approval in late September.

Quality Assistance (QA) visits are continuing, with the SGM Academy, Air Defense School, and Academy of Health Sciences to be visited in September. Visits are planned for Ft. Rucker, Ft. Benning, Ft. Huachuca, Ft. Devens, Ft. Sill, and Aberdeen, Maryland in October and November. Information is also being gathered for the Service School Instructors Conference, planned for January, 1983.

Correction to OECS Updates

On page 62, *OE Communique* issue #2-82, the Training Developments Directorate update contains an error. A line of type was omitted. The corrected information is as follows:

Proposed QA visits for the remainder of 1982 include Chaplain School at Ft. Monmouth, Quartermaster School at Ft. Lee, Intelligence School at Ft. Devens, Aviation School at Ft. Rucker, Infantry School at Ft. Benning, AG/Finance Schools at Ft. Harrison, Armor School at Ft. Knox, Artillery School at Ft. Sill, Academy of Health Science at Ft. Houston, AD Artillery School/SGM Academy at Ft. Bliss, and Intelligence School at Ft. Huachuca.

Our apologies for the confusion, for omitting the Intelligence School and the Aviation School and for "relocating" the Quartermaster School!

Training Directorate

CH (COL) Marion D. Pember

8-929-3519/4021

OECC Classes 4-82 and 5-82 are presently in residence. Class 3-82 graduated on 27 Aug 82. It was one of our smaller classes for the year and went to three FTX sites, Ft. Polk, Ft. Lee, and Ft. Benning. Class 4-82 FTX sites are Ft. Devens, Ft. Campbell, Ft. Hood, Ft. Bliss, and Ft. Carson. FTX remains a highlight for the students. It is where they put it all together and transition from students to consultants. Client reports indicate their work is of a high quality and much in demand.

Since the last publication, three members of the faculty have departed for Germany. They are:

- MAJ Peter Bradley to Hq 5th Signal Command, Worms, Germany
- SFC Leendert Stuyt V Corps, Frankfurt Germany
- SFC Louis Pierre to US Military Community Activity, Munich, Germany

They have made significant contributions to Training and leave a big gap to be filled.

The last LMDTC for FY-82 was conducted at Ft. Ord during June. Two LMDTCs were conducted in addition to those regularly scheduled. One was in Germany, and one was for the National Guard at Little Rock, Arkansas. The FY-83 schedule is as follows:

1-83	Ft. Sill, Oklahoma	11 Oct - 5 Nov 82
2-83	Ft. Ord, California	29 Oct - 26 Nov 82
3-83	Ft. Eustis, Virginia	7 Jan - 4 Feb 83

4-83	Ft. Ord, California	11 Feb - 11 Mar 83
5-83	Ft. Gordon, Georgia	25 Mar - 22 Apr 83
6-83	Ft. Ord, California	13 May - 10 Jun 83
7-83	Ft. Stewart, Georgia	8 Jul - 5 Aug 83
8-83	Ft. Ord, California	26 Aug - 23 Sep 83

The last OE Managers Course for 1982 was held in San Diego, 13 - 16 September. The course filled very quickly and hosted the largest attendance to date. The OEMC is an important and appropriate course for supervisors of OE Consultants (OE Managers) and those individuals directly charged with complex, systemic responsibilities (CG, DCG, CofS, etc.). The probable schedule for 1983 follows:

1-83	24 - 27 Jan	Europe
2-83	14 - 17 Mar	East Coast
3-83	6 - 9 Jun	West Coast
4-83	26 - 29 Sep	East Coast

For information on the OEMC, contact **MAJ Dave Leslie, AV 929-2889**. For attendance contact your MACOM OE office.

Concepts Development Directorate

LTC Joe Black

8-929-7886/7106

The OE Research Management Committee will meet 16-17 November 1982 at Fort Monroe, Virginia. The purpose of this committee meeting is to coordinate current and future OE research activities, to conclude development of a long-range research plan, the prioritization of key OE research needs and a review of recent research results. Ultimately, recommendations will be provided on how the Army can utilize OE research results. Readers who are interested in providing input on future OE research needs should contact **Alan Stanchfield (Autovon 929-7106/7886)**. All input will be considered.

The Work Environment Improvement Team (WEIT) manuals should be reaching OECS soon after this *Communique* reaches your desk.

If you have an interest in quality circles, check with the CD Directorate. The results of the Phase I national survey on quality circles, conducted by International Research Development for the DOD, will appear in an Office of Naval Research technical report expected to be sent to CD. The results will also be published in the November 1982 issue of *The Quality Circles Journal*. Goals of the Phase I study include identifying essential components of quality circles in American companies, determining ways to evaluate QC's, and developing some measures of productivity in QC's. **SFC Wayne Reed** is the POC in the Concepts Development Directorate.

The Research Division of CD (CPT Barko, CPT Hungerland and Mr. Stanchfield) would like to know about innovative and/or highly effective applications of organizational development/effectiveness. Have commanders used something independent of OE that has

worked? Have OEC's broken new ground that looks exciting? Have you heard of innovative failures that might have worked under different conditions? Please talk with the Research Division people if you answered "yes" to any of these questions. We would like the information because there is some possibility of setting up decent research programs to look into the efficacy of OE approaches which might become common in the future.

Members of the External Operations Division (EOD) have been working on the development of a new model to implement strategic planning in Army organizations. Multi-session, strategic planning operations are currently ongoing at TRADOC Combined Arms Test Activity (TCATA), the Electronics Research and Development Command (ERADCOM) and the San Francisco Engineer District. Written material containing process, design and models for strategic planning will be developed as the operations progress.

Other consulting activities have found EOD members working with the National Guard, West Point and 6th Army Headquarters. Future activities will include work at Fort Lewis collaborating in the design of the transition of the 9th Infantry Division to a high technology light division.

EOD wants to work with organizational consultants to assist your work with senior leaders in developing visions of and plans for the future. Please call us with your ideas, opportunities and requests for assistance. **Our Autovon number is 929-7106/7108.**

Evaluation Directorate

LTC Tom Forsythe

8-929-4574/4312

Personnel Changes: The Evaluation Directorate and all of OECS bid farewell to **MSG Bill Cudger** who retired on 30 September after 20 years of military service. Bill will be remaining in this area.

Automation: We recently received TRADOC approval for the installation of ADP equipment within our directorate. This equipment will allow us to provide more timely feedback data to our clients. It will also give us an expanded capability for analysis of data and survey development.

Visit: On 24 June, Dr. David Bowers, President of ISR and Likert Associates, visited OECS at our invitation to discuss the future of the GOQ. That continued effort is being undertaken by this directorate.

We are continuing to conduct the internal evaluations of the 16-week course in six phases. The data continues to reflect a high quality of instruction at OECS. The analysis of the 1982 external evaluation data of the TRADOC OE community also continues. It is expected that a brief summary of the findings will be published in the *Communique*. □

There is nothing more serious in man than his sense of humor. It is the sign that he wants all the truth and sees more sides of it than can be soberly and systematically stated. —**Mark Van Doren**

It does not do to leave a live dragon out of your calculations, if you live near him. —**J.R.R. Tolkien**

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