Vol. 6-No. 4
1982

OE COMMUNIQUÉ

The Professional Organizational Effectiveness/Development Publication of the U.S. Army



Some OE Fundamentals

NCO: The Backbone of Any Unit

MSG Douglas E. King (USAREUR)

Reprinted from *ARNews*, where it was published under the title "Wanted: Strong Leaders."

WANTED: STRONG LEADERS

In past years it has been my experience that too often a new or inexperienced commander unwittingly takes responsibilities from non-commissioned officers.

He does this in the interest of efficiency, thinking he will assure things are done well and correctly, by shifting these responsibilities to himself and other officers. For whatever reasons, the non-commissioned officers passively allow this to happen.

SUPERVISION WEAKENED

When this occurs, the very essence of the supervision provided by tables of distribution and allowances and by tables of organization and equipment is weakened. NCOs are there to insure adequate and detailed supervision from the lowest level to the highest.

Perhaps the commander feels the NCO isn't competent to handle required tasks at that assignment level, or he may sincerely feel that "collectivizing" under an officer is necessary. What really happens is that he dilutes the strength of the supervision under his command.

Basically, every commander has more help and supervisory assistance than he needs. He should put this assistance to work for himself and his organization. If he will organize, train and use his NCO force, he will insure that the NCO Corps will become more competent by practice and actual performance.

NCO DUTIES NOT VAGUE

Many times it may appear that the duties and responsibilities of an NCO are overly vague or not too well defined. However, there are basic duties and responsibilities described in AR 600-20 that non-commissioned officers should exercise with only a modest amount of officer supervision.

If officers will follow those guidelines, they'll have more time to apply to the overall planning, organizing and managing of the total unit operation.

NCO: PRINCIPAL TRAINER

The non-commissioned officer should be the principal trainer of all enlisted ranks. This training can, in turn, be supervised by the command sergeant major through the first sergeant and through the platoon sergeant, often orally or without extensive written directions.

The senior NCOs of any organization must be responsible for assisting the commander in setting enlisted standards, and then enforcing and maintaining them.

The senior NCO must also be dedicated to the professional development of the soldiers immediately responsible to him or her. This allows the NCO to design and implement training in technical skills related to the specialty field as well as in such general soldier's skills as weapons qualification, military courtesy, wearing of the uniform and organizational training requirements such as physical training.

Officers must insure that NCOs have adequate opportunity to lead and command by actually conducting dismounted drill, physical training, inspections and classes. This helps in the development of other enlisted members as they are placed in positions of receiving commands and experiencing authority that an NCO must exercise in performing normal duties.

Experience has proven that allowing NCOs to conduct parades and ceremonies without officers verifies the trust and confidence in these positions that all NCOs deserve.

NCO EXPERIENCE SHOULD BE USED

All levels of command must insure NCOs have the opportunity to make recommendations to their commander as regards the unit mission and troop welfare. These recommendations are usually based on broad experience in similar or related tasks. The recommendations will involve such matters as assignment, reassignment, promotion, privileges, discipline, training, funds, community affairs and supply.

Commanders would do well to encourage and draw out this kind of support and thereby insure the NCO Corps has a sense of contribution and participation in running the organization.

Since we are in peacetime, we must strengthen, through professional development, all soldiers in positions of responsibility and authority. A real effort must be made to conduct frequent meetings with NCOs and officers in the form of conferences, seminars, workshops and classes to discuss these matters. This will strengthen subordinate leadership by encouraging acceptance of the basic responsibilities of an NCO.

Only with this acceptance will we be able to polish all facets of our leadership and make those leaders capable and competent to act if we are ever called upon to fight.

Our aim is to be combat-ready; let us be about the task. □

MSgt. King is the NCO of the Organizational Effectiveness Office, U.S. Army Europe, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel.

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

Organizational Effectiveness Center and School

Fort Ord, California

The *OE Communique* is published quarterly under the provisions of Chapter 5, AR 310-1. The Mission of the *OE Communique* is to provide state-of-the-art information on the application of the Organizational Effectiveness (OE) process in units and organizations throughout the Army. The *Communique* seeks to provide a forum for the exchange of innovations and lessons learned in the use of OE techniques and to foster the development of research and evaluation methods for determining the contributions of OE to combat readiness. The *OE Communique* endeavors to develop closer ties with all OE Consultants and to provide a supplement to their continuing training. A major objective is to provide commanders and military and civilian leaders at all levels with practical and timely information for use in initiating and sustaining OE operations.

The use of masculine pronouns to refer to both sexes has been avoided in the *OE Communique* whenever possible. An author's pronouns are used, however, when editorial changes might result in introducing unintended nuances.

Beetle Bailey cartoons are adapted and used with permission of the artist, Mort Walker.

CORRESPONDENCE

Direct correspondence with the *OE Communique* is authorized and encouraged. All enquiries, letters to the editor, manuscripts and general correspondence should be sent to: ***OE Communique*, U.S. Army Organizational Effectiveness Center and School (USAOECS), Fort Ord, CA 93941.** Telephone numbers for the *OE Communique* are: **Autovon 929-7058/7059,** or **Commercial (408) 242-7058/7059.**

CONTROLLED CIRCULATION POSTAGE RATE

Controlled Circulation postage paid at Sacramento, California.

OECS 24-hour answering service:
AUTOVON 929-2606
(Leave a recorded message which will be responded to during the next duty day.)

Table of Contents

Commandant's Comments
Colonel William L. Golden

"Back to Basics," the theme for this issue, serves as a reminder that, although our business is *change,* there are some fundamentals that are timeless. New vs. old is an ongoing tug-of-war, in and out of the business of OE; tradition vs. innovation, stability vs. change.

> "We are living in a period which all too readily scraps the old for the new. . .As a nation, we are in danger of forgetting that the new is not true because it is novel, and that the old is not false because it is ancient."
> **—Joseph Kennedy**

The author of *The Peter Principle* puts it in a slightly different light:

> "There are two kinds of fools. One says, 'This is old, therefore it is good. The other says, 'This is new, therefore it is better'." **—Dr. Laurence J. Peter**

At any rate it is time to review the bidding, to remind ourselves of some of the fundamentals underlying OE, the basics around which the OE Consultant Course is organized, the fundamental skills which OE Consultants apply and transfer to Army organizations. Here are a few: a systems approach, experiential learning, self-awareness, rapport and empathy, planning and problem-solving, and a results-orientation. I've organized a few quotes around these, mostly from *The Forbes Scrapbook of Thoughts on the Business of Life.* New York: B.C. Forbes and Sons, 1976.

SYSTEMS

> "Being 'educated' today requires not only more than a superficial knowledge of the arts and sciences, but a sense of *inter-relationship* such as is taught in few schools." **—Norman Cousins**

Such schools are rare, indeed. OECS stresses interrelatedness as part of all of our systems instruction. The challenge, of course, is to blend that systems approach with the appropriate interpersonal skills.

> "If a leader [or consultant] is seriously mistaken about the *systemic* requirements of the organization or the demands of its environment, his or her interpersonal abilities may become organizational liabilities."
> **—Katz and Kahn**

EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING

OE Consultants are not just *exposed* to a body of organizational knowledge; they *discover* it behaviorally.

> "In the deep, unwritten wisdom of life there are many things to be learned that cannot be taught. We never know them by hearing them spoken, but we grow into them by experience and recognize them through understanding. Understanding is a great experience in itself, but it does not come through instruction."
> **—Anthony Hope**

It is that same *experienced* learning phenomenon that OEC's offer to Army and other federal organizations.

SELF-AWARENESS

> "Ninety percent of the world's woe comes from people not knowing themselves, their abilities, their frailties, and even their real virtues. Most of us go almost all the way through life as complete strangers to ourselves - so how can we know anyone else?" **—Sydney J. Harris**

Before you can understand the behavior of others within an organization, you must understand yourself. The most competent OE Consultants have an accurate concept of where they leave off and the rest of the world begins. Such self-awareness lends itself well to establishing rapport and the ability to empathize with others, since defensiveness is minimized.

RAPPORT AND EMPATHY

> "The most distinctive mark of a cultured mind is the ability to take another's point of view; to put one's self in another's place, and see life and its problems from a point of view different from one's own. To be willing to test a new idea; to be able to live on the edge of difference in all matters intellectually; to examine without heat the burning question of the day; to have imaginative sympathy, openness and flexibility of mind, steadiness and poise of feeling, cool calmness of judgement, is to have culture." **—A.H.R. Fairchild**

OE Consultants are good (active) listeners, able to perceive and respond with all of their senses.

> "Every man is a volume, if you know how to read him."
> **—Channing**

Part of building rapport is earning the right to disagree candidly, to play devil's advocate, and to deliver "bad news" as required. Commanders can count on such candor from their OE Consultants.

> "The people to fear are not those who disagree with you, but those who disagree with you and are too cowardly to let you know." **—Napoleon**

PLANNING AND PROBLEM-SOLVING

Techniques to improve organizational planning and problem solving are staple items for OE Consultants. In most organizations, military and otherwise, the climate is such that everyone is too busy solving the present to plan the future. Organizational energy is diffused; efforts become omni-directional and often counter-productive, as individuals and small groups find themselves working at cross-purposes. That unifying sense of overall organizational purpose is often left ill-defined. Convenient targets of opportunity are not necessarily the most *important* targets, in terms of overall organizational impact.

> "Many of us are like the little boy we met trudging along a country road with a rifle over his shoulder. 'What are you hunting, buddy?' we asked. 'Dunno, sir, I ain't seen it yet.' " **—R. Lee Sharpe**

OE Consultants have a great deal to offer in the areas of performance management and long-range organizational planning. Both thought and action need to be brought to bear on organizational problems. Staying *busy* is not enough, for either commanders or consultants.

> "Failures are divided into two classes - those who thought and never did, and those who did and never thought." **—John Charles Salak**

RESULTS-ORIENTATION

The desired final *outcome* (that first key step in the fundamental O-M-R model) must always be kept in mind. Behavior is believable; *results* speak for themselves. A well planned and executed OE operation evaluates itself. Other efforts toward mere self-justification are doomed to fall short.

> "Do not waste a minute - not a second - in trying to demonstrate to others the merits of your performance. If your work does not vindicate itself, you cannot vindicate it." **—Thomas W. Higginson**

A more thorough treatment of OE Consultant competencies (which should be re-read from time-to-time by all of us) starts on page 40 of issue #3-81: "OE Consultant Competency Model: Development and Uses," by Dr. Mel Spehn and LTC Ronald A. Tumelson.

None of the above thoughts is new, of course. But, that's the point of this entire issue. ☐

Letters to the Editor



Dear Editor:

The concept of "Getting Back to Basics" is of considerable interest to me. It is, in essence, an opportunity to encourage commanders and supervisors to start at the beginning by properly utilizing all available resources. There are various methods of solving the unique problems in every endeavor to provide relief. The time is now to reemphasize the principles on which the OE concept was built; that its application supports commanders and managers. In organizations where OE has not really been sactioned from the top down, work of the OEC is made ten times as hard by taking smaller bites; when viewed from a total organization perspective, results seem very minimal. The OE program is still suffering from the perception that the use of OE reflects on one's inability to command, supervise or manage, and that it is a means through which commanders are evaluated. Organizational effectiveness does not evaluate the commander; it's merely a technology (if properly utilized) which can bring about many opportunities for improvement.

Recommended article for reprint: *The OMREN Model of Planning (OMR extended)* by Guy L. DeFurria, Vol. 5 - No. 4 1981; p. 54.

Curtis L. Knott
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Dear Editor:

Thank you for recently sending us 3 review copies of *OE Communique.* Our Editorial Advisory Board feels that we should index your publication in our **Index to U.S. Government Periodicals** and we here at the office certainly endorse this recommendation.

If you can add our name to your mailing list to receive issues (2 if possible) as they are published, it will facilitate our indexing and be very much appreciated.

On an exchange basis, we will be able to furnish you with microfiche (1 set-each issue).

Giles B. Robertson
Project Consultant
Infordata International Incorporated
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Chicago, Il 60611
(312) 266-0260

We would be honored to have you include our journal in your "Index to Government Periodicals" and are looking forward to the microfiche set with each issue.

*Two copies of the **OE Communique** will be forwarded to you with each quarterly printing, beginning with this issue.—**Editor***

Dear Editor:

Due to the increasing interface between the local OE office and the Directorate of Resource Management at Ft Benning, request that the following individual/activity be included in OE Communique circulation:

Commander
USAIC
ATTN: ATZB-DRM-M (Chief)
Ft Benning, GA 31905

The consistent high-quality of this publication makes it a valued educational and advertising tool for the OE community.

Gary R. Oldham
MAJ(P) INF, Chief, OE
HQ U.S. Army Infantry Center
Fort Benning, Georgia 31905

Dear Editor:

I recently saw an issue of the *OE Communique* and I was quite impressed with the content and quality.

As a Management Analyst at USAMETA, doing research, consulting and teaching, I could benefit from direct access to your publication. Request that you add my name to your mailing list.

P.S.—I took your LMDC Course this summer and found it to be very effective—content and method of presentation.

Thank you!

Dr. Jim Becker
US Army Management
Engineering Training Activity
Rock Island, Illinois 61299

Editor's Page: A Guest Editorial

Fundamentals Apply to OEC's, Too

CPT (P) George T. Selin (HQ, FORSCOM)

This guest editorial describes how "back to basics", not more technology, is the way to successfully implement OE at the highest level of a command.

As an OE community, we have earned a respectable reputation in assisting decision makers at all levels to make this a more effective Army. Our successes range from simple, yet powerful transition meetings to consulting on complex organizational issues such as the establishment and implementation of the Total Army Goals.

But based on my own experiences and from observing others, I've become convinced we don't do well at applying our OE techniques on ourselves. As I left my last OE assignment recently, it was rewarding to review the previous three years and remember the successes we enjoyed.

The toughest part of that nostalgic trip, however, was to admit that I had failed in some areas. One of which, I might add, was to publish an article in the *Communique* each six months. This synopsis of my lessons learned is the first such installment. And it is intended not as a panacea, but rather as a way to share my failures with others in hopes their learning curves will be reduced.

Coming out of OECS in late 1979, I arrived at my division size command with confidence in my consulting skills, full enthusiasm, and eagerness to get to work. My partner and I immediately began to work on marketing our services to whomever we could convince we could help. Although this sounded like the right approach, it took nearly a year to realize that we were operating at less than our capacity because we had failed to develop a *strategy*. More specifically, I had failed to insure that our office of four OE Consultants (OEC's) had created a strategy that reflected the commander's priorities and concerns.

In reality we were merely working very hard, and filling our time with things that didn't count that much—from a *command* perspective. I had allowed us to be caught up in a fervor of "implementing a successful OE program", without having first determined what success looks like. In essence we had fallen into that old activity trap, the end result of which was to work very hard on all the wrong things.

This was corrected by first determining the major problem areas in the command, and then developing a strategy to "get hired" to help on these issues. It became clear rather quickly that we had our work cut out for us, because in most instances we had had no prior contact with the key decision makers that were involved with these problems. Thus, the need for a marketing plan.

The marketing plan was nothing more than a detailed action plan outlining how we intended to sell ourselves over time to the key people involved. It was complete with specific objectives and deadlines, and it stated who was responsible for which action. This method of planning was useful in developing action plans for other areas also (e.g., improving administrative support, a professional development program, and developing a resource reference system).

The strategy was based on the theme of how to transition from the battalion level to the macro level and begin to work on systemic issues within the command. I was somewhat surprised when it survived (virtually unchanged) decision briefings for our boss, the chief of staff, and the commanding general.

It took some effort to learn how to say "no" to potential clients who wanted our services, yet we realized that helping them would have kept us from accomplishing our strategic objectives. It came down to a matter of priority—work on their issues, or work on problems that were adversly affecting the entire command. We chose the latter.

Thinking we had it licked, I didn't get my next real shock until we ran an in-house quarterly progress review. It was drastically disappointing to realize that we had worked hard on many key projects, but we had accomplished few **measurable results.** A closer look made us realize that our work weeks were being eaten up by "working on things" and "reacting", as opposed to having a *results-oriented* focus.

This situation was remedied by instituting a thirty minute weekly planning session each Monday morning. The secretary along with all OEC's got together to consolidate all activities and their expected results for each team member that week. This helped to prioritize our efforts to insure we were working on what counted the most, and it provided a framework so we could measure our results the following Monday. The first of these meetings took over three hours to complete, but within a month we had it down to a thirty minute meaningful session.

Sounds simple doesn't it? And it is a pretty basic principle, one that many OE staffs, and large organizations, frequently overlook. It's not enough to know the right answer—you've got to **apply the fundamentals,** if you expect the benefits. Hopefully, someone can learn from my mistakes without making the same ones themselves.

A challenge to my peers and their OE managers is to develop a strategy that fits your command's priority problems, and to design a system to measure your progress in implementing it.

Yes, we had some other problems that took time to overcome. These included some of the tough ones that we all face in our OE consulting roles, such as documenting our interventions, making evaluation work, and avoiding a win/lose situation with the OE manager . . . but those are topics for future ***Communique*** articles. □

Beetle Bailey—*by Mort Walker*

82D Airborne Division (All American) Management Conference '82

OE Consulting Team (Ft. Bragg)

We have received several calls regarding how we conduct our annual conferences, so we've compiled the inclosed data for publication in the *Communique.*

Lee C. Anderson
MAJ, IN
Chief, OECT

The 82d Airborne Division conducted its **annual Management Conference (AAMC '82)** during the period 4-7 August 1982 at the Foxfire Inn and Country Club, Foxfire Village, North Carolina. This **after action report*** will address the following areas:

- **Planning.**
- **Execution.**
- **Follow Up.**
- **Lessons Learned.**
- **Recommendations.**

Within each topic area, operational as well as administrative/logistical considerations will be addressed. Copies of all correspondence, instructions, feedback, etc. are at Inclosure 1.*

Planning:

General. Initial planning began in early March with a tentative time frame for the conference of July or August. The conference was planned during this time to allow most new battalion commanders to be on board. The initial dates selected were 27-29 July 1982. Price quotations were obtained from the following facilities: Sheraton Inn, Southern Pines, NC; Pine Needles, Southern Pines, NC; and Foxfire Inn, Foxfire Village, NC. Low bidders for the conference were the Sheraton Inn and Whispering Pines. Foxfire was next in order followed by Pine Needles and Mid Pines. The **Organizational Effectiveness Consulting Team (OECT)** recommended the Sheraton Inn because of the competitive price, accomodations and meeting room facilities. The CG rejected the recommendation and stated the atmosphere was too sterile. He had attended the 1975 management conference at Foxfire and preferred that type of atmosphere. The OECT then reviewed the facilities and prices and subsequently recommended Foxfire. Foxfire was available and a Purchase Request and Contract was initiated. A short time later it was announced that the con-ference would be delayed until both new ADC's were on board. The final date for the conference was set for 4-7 August 1982.

• **Concept and Scope.** During the planning phase of all previous conferences, adequate free time was scheduled to allow participants to relax, reflect, and enjoy the facilities available. As planning progressed, the free time was usually rescheduled as work time and little free time actually was available. This year's conference was no exception. In accordance with the CG's guidance, adequate free time was scheduled. In fact, the conference was originally planned for 3-7 August with the afternoon of 5 August as free time. During the first concept brief, the CG decided that this much free time might be perceived as wasteful by the commanders. The decision was made to begin at 1300 hours on Wednesday (4 August), work Thursday afternoon (5 August), and conclude just after lunch on Saturday (7 August). A social event and dinner was planned for Friday afternoon and evening. Wives were invited to join their husbands on Friday for dinner, remain overnight, and attend a communication workshop on Saturday morning, presented by the Division Chaplain.

In preparation for the conference the CG conducted several discussion groups with different grade structures of the command. Each group consisted of approximately 25 personnel and each meeting lasted around two hours. The groups were Captains, Lieutenants, E7's and E8's, E5's and E6's, and E1's through E4's. A copy of the data generated from these discussion groups is provided.* This data was provided to all participants at the conference.

Selection of work group topics and work group organization was delayed until the participant pre-work data was returned. The pre-work packet, attached,* outlined the focus of the conference and requested input on eliminating distractors from combat readiness and deployability. Twenty-two of fifty-one participants provided information. Based on the pre-work data, discussion groups, and review of the 1981 Management Matrix, the initial design was found to be inadequate to sufficiently address the major issues of concern.

The **final design** provided for a dynamic three-phased conference. **Phase I** consisted of the identification of those tasks required to maintain combat readiness. This was to be accomplished by categorizing those required tasks into "Must Do" activities. This was to be done by task organizing separate groups of like commands. Each category would then be prioritized. Then the activities would be placed on an available training time-line of approximately 21 weeks. Predictable, all the "must do" activities would not fit in available time. The groups would then present their time-lines and lists to the CG. Some of the groups' "don't need" activities would actually be on the CG's "must do" list. The groups would then be given guidance by the CG to include these new activities and re-prioritize their time-lines. This would complete Phase I.

Phase II would consist of reorganizing the work groups and tasking them to identify those activities which would be modified or stopped to gain training time. These groups were organized by level of command and subject matter

Original after action report has been reformatted to save space. All inclosures were omitted. —Editor

Not published.

expertise. The groups would brief those "stop" or " modify" activities to the CG. The groups would then be tasked to develop plans and programs to implement the "stops" and "modifies" and would brief them to the CG for decision. The groups would possibly be reorganized for this particular task. This would complete Phase II.

Phase III, time allowing, would be the development of the individual OER and SEER Support Forms in alignment with the CG's revised support form.

• **Participants.** The following personnel were indentified to attend the conference: CG, ADC-O, ADC-S, CofS, G1, G2, G3, G4, AG, IG, Chaplain, all brigade and battalion commanders. At the second design briefing, the CG added the CSM's of the five MSC's and the seven separate battalions and the Division CSM to the list of participants.

• **Consultants.** Four consultants planned the conference; **MAJ Anderson, CPT Clawson, CPT Abrahamson, SFC Laye.** Due to CPT Abrahamson being in the Sinai with the MFO, only three consultants were available to conduct the conference.

Facility Coordination. A total of three coordination trips were made to Foxfire to confirm all plans for lodging, meals, meeting facilities and other support. The entire staff at Foxfire was very professional during the planning and the conduct of the conference.

Execution:

• **The conference was conducted as planned and was a success.** The CG opened the conference, discussed several past conferences, and provided the focus for the 1982 conference. The Chief of Staff presented a review of the progress made on the 1981 Management Matrix. An OE consultant presented an overview of expected conference products and the agenda for all participants. *This was done in the form of an operations order.* Special administrative details were reinforced and the work groups were issued AAMC 82 Task #1, attached.* The groups were organized by level and type of command/staff as shown on the inclosure.* The groups were allotted four and one half hours to complete the task and prepare their presentation. All groups were prepared to brief one hour early and the schedule was advanced accordingly. Each group briefed their prioritized list of "must do", "would like to do", and "don't need" activities. They then presented their time-line briefings. The CG issued his guidance on what activities must be added to the "must do's" and AAMC 82 Task #2 was issued. The work groups were given until 1030 hours the next morning to complete the task. Each group presented a briefing on how to best use the available training time, and also discussed several major issues where training time could be gained through modification. These briefings completed Phase I of the conference.

• During lunch, the Command Group and the OEC's analyzed the data and sorted it into six major and two minor subject areas for further work. The *major* subject areas were: **FORSCOM Marksmanship Competition; All American Week/Division Review/Division Convention; Night Jumps; AGI/AGI Standards/DMET; BTMS and Job Books;** and **Integrated Training Opportunities.** The *minor* subject areas were Work Day and Pay Day. The task organization and mission statements for each group are shown on the Phase II Group Assignment and Mission chart attached. Upon completion of group work, the groups reported individually to the CG.

• Upon completion of the study of the six major topics, the work groups were reorganized to work on the minor subjects. Two groups were formed to study the work day and three groups to study pay day.

• Briefings on all subject areas were conducted on Friday afternoon and Saturday morning. In addition, the CG conducted an open discussion on the use of the SEER support form. He also discussed this topic with the CSM's as a group. The conference concluded with a luncheon buffet at noon Saturday. Phase III, OER Support Form development, was not conducted.

• On Friday afternoon 39 wives arrived for socializing and dinner that evening. Nineteen traveled by POV and 20 traveled by government bus provided. Thirty remained overnight and approximately 20 attended the workshop on Saturday morning.

• Prior to the wives' arrival, the men were billeted in two-bedroom townhouses, four men per townhouse. The CG and both ADC's were billeted in individual townhouse type villas, one in each. When the wives arrived, many individuals had to move to allow couples to move into townhouses with the other couple of their choice.

Follow Up:

Post conference follow up will include, but is not limited to, the following areas:

• Letter of Appreciation to the Foxfire staff.

• Publication of a listing of all decision and taskings made at Foxfire.

• Publication of the results of the Critique Sheet administered at the conclusion of the conference.

• Publication of the 1982 Milestone Management Matrix.

• Publication of this after action report.

• Scheduled IPR's, the first of which will be conducted in February '83.

Lessons Learned:

• If wives are to participate, couples should be allowed to select the couple of their choice for billeting.

• Not all townhouses at Foxfire have double beds in each bedroom.

• Times of daily courier runs and distribution pick up and drop off points should be established and published.

• A dynamic conference gets better results than a safely structured one. OEC's work much harder, too.

• Find out every detail about meeting room use while at the facility.

• Identify helicopter landing site at the facility.

• If the CG hosts discussion groups prior to the conference, reproduce enough copies for all to have one. Take them to the conference.

**Not published.*

• Don't delay or base design decisions on pre-work feedback data. You might be disappointed.

• Determine and mark running routes upon arrival the first day of the conference.

• If you are having a luncheon in the large meeting room at Foxfire, don't schedule a general session in that room just prior to lunch. It takes time (1 & ½ hours) to set up a luncheon.

• Ensure the facility has a good reproduction machine and that you have 24 hour access to it.

• One afternoon of free time or organized athletic competition (golf, swimming, tennis) should be scheduled.

• OEC's shouldn't remain with a work group too long. Enter, observe a few minutes, offer assistance, and depart.

• Don't take a video cassette player; no one will use it.

• Have a battalion commander discussion group prior to the conference.

• Don't play background music as the group assembles.

• Bring all CSM's next year.

• Command Group does much better floating than as members of work groups.

• Initiate the contract for five more participants than the maximum expected to allow for unscheduled strap hangers (new cdrs, staff, etc.).

• If you coordinate for a bus to go off post, you must have an E5 with the driver.

• A management conference is a superb way to bring new ADC's on board.

Recommendations:

• That an administrative specialist be taken to the conference to type, make copies, deliver conference distribution, coordinate and man the forward CP.

• That a battalion commander discussion group be conducted prior to the conference. This would eliminate need for written pre-work from them.

• That written pre-work, if any, be limited to 06 level and above.

• That all battalion and brigade CSM's attend future conferences.

• That wives be included in future conferences.

• That wives' social event continue to be held on Friday evening with conference closing on Saturday.

• That four hours be scheduled one afternoon for scheduled competition (golf, tennis, etc.) or free time for those who don't like the scheduled competition.

• That four hours be scheduled for like level commanders/staff to meet, choose their own topics, and brief the Command Group. □

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Transition from Peace to War (Division Staff Continuity Text)

COL Michael T. Plummer (82D Airborne)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 82D AIRBORNE DIVISION
FORT BRAGG, NORTH CAROLINA 28307

AFVC-GF-OE 13 AUGUST 1982

SUBJECT: Division Staff Continuity Text--Transition from Peace to War

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. This text has been compiled in order to provide continuity for the staff in our efforts to establish the capability for a smooth transition from peace to war. This summer there will be a lot of new faces on the staff. To ensure we are all marching in the same direction, staff principals should ensure that all personnel assigned have the opportunity to read and ask questions about the content and future direction.

2. The following road map outlines where we have been, where we are now, and where we are going in our efforts.

a. Purpose: Improve our capability to transition from peace to war.

b. How: Modify or change the present system and align it with the intended outcome.

(1) Where have we been:

(a) November 1980 - January 1981: Chief of Staff develops his goals. The number one goal is readiness. Readiness is defined as the ability to smoothly transition from peace to war.

(b) February - March 1981: CG assumes command and makes an assessment of the status of the Division through looking, listening, and conducting group interviews. From this assessment and guidance from the Army Chief of Staff, FORSCOM Commander, and XVIII Airborne Corps Commander, he determines a direction and formulates his initial OER Support Form (DA Form 67-8-1). The ability to go to war is a major goal.

(c) April - June 1981: Staff reorganization of the Comptroller section is the first step in beginning to align non-TOE personnel with specific peacetime functions. Realignment of the G1 structure brings the G1 family together as the 2d step in alignment of functions. Zero-base PAD scrubs begin to thin out the staff and get personnel back to the "street". The DSOC is formed to facilitate wartime admin/log plans and operations. DTOC/DSOC assessments are made, and configurations are changed for smoother operations. Zero-base reporting eliminates 20 percent of existing reports. The 1981 Division management conference is held. Subordinate commanders and general staff verify the CG's assessment and formulate a management matrix to address the specific areas of training, maintenance, cohesion, and the ability to go to war, then write their 67-8-1's to align with the CG's goals and objectives. If you have not reviewed the management matrix lately, recommend you do so. The concept of high performing systems is introduced.

(d) July - December 1981: Command climate analysis is briefed and the Trooper Preparedness Estimate (TPE) is introduced to keep commanders informed on developing trends. Periodic IPR's are held to check progress on the management matrix. Staff discussion meetings (Swim the Ardennes) are introduced to enhance staff and "street" communication.

(e) January 1982 - May 1982: Division Regulation 10-1 is staffed and completed; the third step in aligning people with functions as they relate to the transition from peace to war. Senior NCO 67-8-1's are introduced to align the goals and objectives from the CG to the Platoon Sergeant, an effort to get everyone operating on the same frequency. PAD and report scrubs continue; advanced communications technology is improved through the establishment of a MISO, expansion of word processing, introduction of a new telephone system, and introduction of computers in the DTOC. A second DTOC/DSOC evaluation is completed. Staff discussion meetings continue. Command climate trend data and the TPE continue to be developed and briefed to MSC and separate commanders. CPX/FTX after-action report matrix is introduced to assign responsibility for recommended changes to manage them. The Division moves toward transition to Division 1986 and the Airborne of the 1990's through force modernization IPR's and alignment of new systems with existing structure through FSOP/RSOP revisions. Information mapping is initiated to find the "black holes" in our communications flow from headquarters to MSC's.

(2) Where are we now: Sustaining, monitoring and adjusting the activities previously discussed. End-of-tour reports from staff principals help to measure progress. Desk top SOP's and continuity plans are being developed to maintain the focus. Refinement of the inprocessing briefings for commanders, staff and General Officers is ongoing to accelerate bringing them on board. We are continuing to revise the Division management plan. We are beginning to computerize the command climate and TPE trend analysis. One-on-one's have been institutionalized so that the staff principals are held accountable for their milestones and objectives.

(3) Where are we going:

(a) We will have another management conference in August to continue to build on the innovations, plans, and techniques of the past year. Additionally, we will make a concentrated effort in the forthcoming year to slow the pace.

AFVC-GF-OE
SUBJECT: Division Staff Continuity Text--Transition from Peace to War

(b) We need to tap the full potential of technology, not just computers (ADDS, Silent 700, TMAC, and Apple, etc.) but also interactive word processors, computer-based large screen video briefings, conference room and new headquarters designed to facilitate communications, video feedback, and state of the art communications equipment.

(c) We need to continue to improve communications. A follow-on study of communications flow from MSC to battalion and below needs to be done. Division Regulation 10-1 needs to be refined so the peacetime transition and wartime functions are clearly delineated. Personnel associated with only peacetime functions are identified and targeted for transition/wartime tasks or as fillers, and SOP's developed so when they assume their duties they do not start with a blank piece of paper.

(d) We need to focus more on cohesion and what we need to do to build cohesive units. Units must be developed to withstand the initial shock of combat and sustain until mission accomplishment. COHORT gives us a great opportunity.

3. The initiatives discussed in this text are intended to give a primary focus and direction toward an efficient and effective transition from peace to war. They are all in some way interrelated (see Incl 1) and have allowed us to make significant progress. There remain many other untapped areas which will allow us to make even more important advancements. Division Reg 10-1 has only scratched the surface. I challenge each and every member of the staff to become familiar with these ongoing projects. Make recommendations on them and develop other initiatives.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
as

MICHAEL T. PLUMMER
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff



Communications within the Command Structure

MAJ Vincent D. Basile

Reprinted, with permission, from *Army Communicator* Vol. 7, number 3, Summer 1982, p. 37.

Perhaps no interpersonal function is more often taken for granted than the ability to communicate. This capability, amplified by today's science and technology, allows man to communicate with points as distant as the moon and beyond. Yet, neither the uttering nor the publication of words guarantees the effectiveness of communications. This is true, unfortunately, even in the military, where each of us, at some time in our service has witnessed the failing of a task because the desire of the commander was either not transmitted; was not transmitted accurately; or was not understood.

Every officer has probably heard the anecdote about Napoleon Bonaparte and the mentally deficient soldier he kept in his retinue. This brilliant French general, in order to insure that everyone in his command understood the mission, would not authorize the publications of an order until the intellectually limited soldier could read and understand the order.

Thus, it becomes imperative that each and every commander and staff officer develop an effective style of communications to insure that all orders and directives are transmitted and understood. Everyone within the chain of command must strive to maintain effective interpersonal communications. Transmitted ideas must be checked for clearness, conciseness and completeness, and the response of the receiving party must be tested in order to measure whether the message was received and understood.

The field manual 22-100, *Military Leadership*, lists among the eleven leadership principles, the following two:

1

Keep your men informed.

2

Insure that the task is understood, supervised, and accomplished.[1]

Many other military publications also allude to the need for adequate and effective communications within the command structure, but with the exception of some general statements, they provide very few specifics to assist the individual in the development and the measurement of effective interpersonal communications. However, the need for effective, interpersonal communications has long been emphasized by business managers who have stressed the need for executives to possess communication skills. Charles M. Schwab, former president of U. S. Steel, once stated, "I'll pay more for a man's ability to express himself than for any other quality he may possess."[2] And, as Jones and Johnson point out, "Every business organization is dependent to a large extent on the ability of its business men to communicate intelligently, effectively, and swiftly with other people....The man who can explain himself may command what he wants; he who cannot convey his desires in an understandable way is left to his own personal resources."[3]

Therefore, by relating existing organizational practices to military needs, this monograph can provide the reader with an analysis of the communication process, some techniques on the development of effective vertical and lateral communications, and some guidance on the testing of the accuracy of the communication system within a command.

The role of communications

Communications within the command structure is an essential element of any organization's effectiveness. The role of communications in an interpersonal relationship is simply defined as "the process of passing information and understanding from one person to another."[4] Significantly, this process always involves a sender and a receiver. Effective communications involves both the passing of information and understanding.

From a military perspective, communications is the process by which leadership takes effect. For it is through communications that the leader: provides the information and understanding necessary for the organizational effort and provides the attitudes necessary for individual motivation, cooperation and job satisfaction.[5] It therefore, provides the skills to work and the will to work, both of which equal effective teamwork.

Lt. Col. Thomas J. Barnham, writing in INFANTRY, defines leadership communications as "the exchange of ideas, information, attitudes, and understandings between a military leader and his subordinates which results in the establishment of mutual confidence, trust, respect, and pride in themselves, their unit, and each other."[6] Ineffective communications leads to misunderstanding, lack of motivation, insecurity, conflict and an inability on the part of subordinates to make effective decisions.

In essence, through communication the commander keeps his men informed and insures that they understand their mission. By proper application of the communication process the commander can favorably influence morale, esprit de corps, discipline and proficiency.

The communications process

No matter which medium is employed, the ability to communicate is a six-step process. This sequence, from the conception of the idea by the sender, to its reception by the receiver, may be illustrated thus:

In the first step, the sender has an idea, some thought or fact he wishes to send to the designated receiver. He then organizes and transmits his thoughts into symbols that best fit the transmission medium he will use. While encoding this message, he checks for clarity, conciseness and completeness.

During the transmission step, the

sender decides for sure which medium he will use and selects the channel or chain of command his message will follow.

In the last three steps of the communications process, the receiver takes the initiative. He receives the message, then translates or decodes the words into thought.

During the fifth step, the decoding process, the message is most vulnerable. For it is here that the perception of the receiver will most vary with that of the sender. "The meanings of words are not in the words; they are in us," wrote S. I. Hayakawa.[7] The meaning the receiver gives to the message will not be exactly the same as the sender's. Thus, it is essential that in its original form the message be rational and coherent.



Figure 1

In the final step of the process, the receiver is expected to take some action, either by responding to the message, rejecting the message, asking for more information, or by storing the message away. The response taken enables the sender to determine if the receiver understood the message. This is especially true for messages which require some sort of feedback to the sender. The action of the receiver completes the six step communication process.

The commander is able to determine the accuracy and effectiveness of his orders and directives by measuring the responsiveness, including the response time of his command. For it is understandable that "men will respond more quickly to orders when they are clear, concise and easily understood."[8]

The use of symbols

Throughout the history of civilization, man has employed many means to communicate, from rudimentary pictures, sounds and letters, to the development of comprehensive, complex languages. Whatever the means employed, man communicates by means of symbols either words, pictures, or actions.

Obviously, man does most of his communicating through the use of words or language. We even think and rationalize with words. Yet, it is important to bear in mind that words are subjected to the reader's or listener's interpretation of them. A study conducted by William Sattler in 1957 discovered that the Oxford Dictionary recorded an average of 28 separate meanings for each of the 500 most-used words in the English language.[9]

Pictures, another type of symbol, are of extreme importance in the military. We use films, posters, maps, charts, television, and a multitude of other pictures as a means of communicating information. However, pictures also are subject to individual interpretation.

Finally, actions, particularly our own actions, are a means of communicating. Whenever the commander takes action, or fails to take action, he is communicating a thought to his subordinates. It is by his actions that the commander sets the example and transmits to the members of his command what is expected from them.

Readability

Since meaning is subjective and therefore difficult to transmit, it is imperative that the sender use symbols, whether written or verbal, that can be simplified so that the receiver can more easily understand them. A person communicates more effectively by adapting his words and style to fit the language level and ability of his receiver. Since the main purpose of communications is to transmit information, the commander should consider the target group of his communication and try to fit his message to the receiver's needs. Davis, William Himstreet and Wayne Baty stress the importance of readability, or the making of writing and speech more understandable. All three emphasize the importance of using short, simple words and phrases; of using familiar words; and of using words economically.[10]

Listening and cybernetics

Still another method of communicating effectively is listening and using cybernetics. Both parts of this method are very important in voice communications.

In verbal communications, the receiver's responses come back to the sender in the form of symbols. The result is a give-and-take situation whereby the speaker can adjust his message to fit the response of his receiver. This capability to adjust to the receiver is an advantage of voice communication. However, this advantage is lost if the speaker does not listen. Listening, then, is a dual responsibility of speaker and listener and is important to all participants in the conversational exchange.

Listening is made up of two skills, "the first being the ability to hear words and discriminate meanings; the second, and more important, the ability to identify feelings."[11] They further identify one of the problems in the communication process as the incompatibility of words and feelings. Thus, effective listening and insightful, non-threatening responses can compatibly match words and feelings.

From a military perspective, listening is essential to the flow of information between echelons of command and can insure the input of information from subordinates to the commander. In this article, "Let's Listen For A Change," Capt. Thomas Meyer points out "that any communication process that does not contain specific and constructive feedback is of little value."[12]

In conjunction with listening is the technique of cybernetics, which is the process by which the speaker listens to the effect of his remarks and then adjusts his continuing conversation to fit the needs of the situation. In short, the speaker listens to keep himself informed of the effect of his communication and then adjusts his response. Through cybernetics, the commander can keep the conversation directed to the subject matter under discussion. This is an especially useful aid in conferences and staff meetings.

In sum, listening with our full physical and mental abilities should be the norm in the communicating process — the means by which we can measure the effectiveness of our own communication style. As Meyer says, "By trying to receive and interpret every message, we can guarantee the most effective communication with our men and consequently develop a fruitful human relationship. The obvious result of a series of good individual relationships in any organization is a highly effective organization, be it a civilian firm or a rifle company."[13]

The science of semantics

In the receipt of any message, semantics, the science of meaning, plays an important role, for effective communication requires that meaning be transmitted. Since meaning is determined by our environment and emotions, it is often subjective.

The receiver has a frame of reference, molded by his environment and ego-related beliefs. A message which challenges these beliefs and values may be rejected or distorted. This distortion, called semantic noise, can be reduced if the communicator is careful to define his terms and adjust his vocabulary to the interests and needs of the audience he wishes to reach.[14]

Remembering that words are not things or qualities, but only symbols for them, the speaker must give careful consideration to the interpretation his audience will give to the word symbols he uses. "Precise meaning can be expressed only if words are precisely chosen."[15] Words must be chosen which express the exact shade of meaning the speaker wishes to convey.

Because of this difficulty with meaning, "it is helpful to separate in our minds inference from facts."[16] One should not read into the message that which is not really present. Davis concludes that it is easy to make inferences, but hard to be factual, though both are essential in most communications.

An effective leader will develop more effective communications when he has the wisdom to know the difference between fact and inference in both the transmitting and receiving of messages.

The responsibility for communication

The responsibility for developing interpersonal communications runs the full gamut from the chief of staff to the bottom man in the chain of command. The Army recognizes the communications problem and is presently emphasizing the importance of interpersonal communications.

Although the importance of communication has been stressed in both FM 22-100, *Military Leadership*, and FM 101-5, *Staff Officers Field Manual: Staff Organization and Procedures*, the Army, like any rigidly structured organization, is susceptible to a communications gap. This gap usually occurs when senior officers talk almost exclusively to other senior officers or to senior noncommissioned officers, and junior officers talk to only their peers or to junior noncommissioned officers and troops — with little cross-communication between the groups.

The commander

Commanders must foster an exchange of ideas and attitudes between the sub-groups found within the Army structure. Though communication is a command responsibility, it must be stressed that communication responsibility is a two-way affair.

The degree to which a higher commander makes his policies and decisions understood and accepted by his unit will greatly contribute to his effectiveness as a leader.

A soviet Army Col. I. Degtyarev observed, "Mastering command language is an irreplaceable part of the commander's occupation. And the main thing in this is a good knowledge of one's specialty and a high level of operational-tactical training."[17]

By his actions and his application of the leadership principles, the commander can develop, within his subordinates, the desire to contribute to the useful interchange of information. As a part of the Army's Organizational Effectiveness Program, the commander must often take the initiative to create a more free and open communication environment.[18]

The subordinates

Staff officers and junior officers are asked to interpret and disseminate the commander's desires throughout their assigned areas of responsibility. They should act as the channel by which communications flow vertically within the command structure. At the same time, they should be communicating with each other to insure adequate staff coordination.

One function of the staff officer that gets overlooked is his responsibility to insure that the message is passed along, either upward or downward. Far too often, staff officers have been content to issue verbal or written directives without following up to insure that the message was distributed or understood. We have frequently observed the commander or the staff officer who could not understand why the troops did not get the word; "After all, the order was published," becomes the stock reply. In actuality, they should be insuring that the order was distributed and was *understood*. As Donald Halbedl points out, "The most brilliant potential manager may be hampered throughout his career by the inability to express himself articulately. If we are to train and develop future leaders we must pay equal attention to their communicative skills as well as their managerial skill."[19]

Similarly, the individual soldier should be encouraged to pass on information upward through the chain of command.

Junior officers and noncommissioned officers must be willing to listen to the personal problems of the individual soldier. By having his fear of being criticized or penalized negated, the individual soldier can contribute immensely to the feedback process.

In summation then, the responsibility for interpersonal communications is found at every level of the command structure. However, the commander must always be cognizant of the fact that he is ultimately responsible for developing effective communications within his unit or organization. The commander who has the respect, confidence, and loyal cooperation of his staff and the members of his command will have little difficulty in effecting the interchange of ideas.

The communication system

Within the US Army, as in any other army or in any social structure, there are various sub-groups, such as senior commanders; senior staff officers; junior officers; senior noncommissioned officers; junior noncommissioned officers; Infantrymen; Signal Corps Officers and so on. Each of these sub-groups is engaged in intra-group and inter-group communications. It is primarily through inter-group communications that one observes the flow of communications both vertically and laterally. The military organizational structure provides for the flow of communications between commanders, from commanders to subordinates, and from subordinates to commanders.

Because of the chain of command, every echelon of the command is a link in the communication chain. In other words, in the upward and downward flow of communications, everyone between the sender and the receiver is tasked with the handling of the message, and thus acts as a communication link.

However, inherent within the chain of command is the potential for misinformation or a lack of valid information.

Organizational elements develop areas of self-interest that may result in a filtering of valid information to fit the needs of a sub-system rather than the needs of the total system. This filtering phenomena combined with the competitive nature of the Army's personnel rating system has the adverse effect of creating a lack of assertiveness among subordinates to provide critical feedback to superiors. Far too often subordinates tend to tell their superiors only what they think superiors want to hear. Since commanders must make decisions based upon the quality of information available, promoting and maintaining an open communication system is vital.[20]

Downward Communication

Downward communication in an organization merely means that the flow of communication is from a higher to lower authority. It might be directed from a commander to a staff officer, to a subordinate commander, to a subordinate unit or to an individual. "Downward communications are usually better than anyone realizes and frequently more accurate than those at higher levels want them to be."[21] He further points out that this is largely due to the fact that subordinates react most effectively to those matters that they judge to be of greatest personal interest to the boss. The same theory may be applied to the military structure, by substituting the commander for the boss. However, effective downward communications must insure that the subordinate acts in the best interest of the command and not just the commander. Furthermore, everyone should insure that the message being sent down is accurate.

In order to guarantee effective downward communications, the commander and everyone involved in the chain of command should be guided by the following:

1) Be informed. If the commander or communicator is not knowledgeable on the subject matter, he cannot effectively communicate information.
2) Develop a positive communication attitude. Take an interest in communicating with subordinates. Within the limitations imposed by security, be willing to share that information that the subordinates think they need. This also implies positive listening.
3) Plan for communications. Develop a suitable plan for communication so that subordinates can expect to be informed.
4) Gain the confidence of your subordinates. This can be achieved over a period of time by insuring that the information you pass on is accurate, complete, and timely.
5) Do not over-communicate. The commander sould communicate only that information which is timely and pertinent.

The commander should remember that people downward of the communication flow have a number of communication needs concerning their role and function in the command structure. Anxieties can be overcome if information which affects them directly comes to them as news, not as confirmation of what they already know.

Upward communication

Upward communications, or the flow of communications traffic from the bottom to the top is much more difficult to attain, especially in a system as rigid as the Army. "Upward communications are poor in most hierarchial organizations because perception downward is poorer than perception upward. Add to that the 'filters' of management levels that dilute upward communications. As you go higher, the word gets more garbled, edited, or even worse, eliminated entirely."[22] This, however, is not to imply that effective upward communication cannot be achieved.

Upward communications must be encouraged at all levels of command. The commander may accomplish this either by an open door policy, if this is his style and/or by seeing to it that the junior officers and noncommissioned officers of the command are communicating with the troops.

"An open door policy, while threatening to some officers and noncommissioned officers is not meant to dispense with the integrity of the chain of command. Rather, the junior officer must be willing to talk to the individual soldier to insure that the man does get passed up the chain when he so desires."[23] While adopting the open door policy, the commander must prod his subordinates into being more receptive to the information coming upward.

The commander's participation in discussions and encouragement of formal staff studies, together with frequently conducted staff meetings and conferences, are still other ways of insuring upward communications.

Similarly, staff officers should be encouraged to be candid in presenting their staff study to the commander. They should never consider telling the commander what they feel he wants to hear. Rather, they should be guided by what they honestly believe to be the best interest of the command.

Because of the unique role of the staff within the command structure, inter and intra staff communications are most important. The staff officer is more mobile than a line officer and thus has a greater opportunity to receive and disseminate information. He is also more easily motivated to communicate because his role forces him to coordinate with other staff officers. Also of importance is the fact that the staff officer has a shorter communication channel to the commander. Thus, because of these functions, the staff officer should: be trained in communication skill, recognize the importance of his communication role and make full use of his role in the communication chain.

Effective use of upward communications will insure a stimulation of the individual's interest and participation, the receipt of valuable information and a better understanding of staff problems and views. It will also serve to evaluate the effectiveness of downward communications.

Lateral communication

Because coordination is very important, cross or lateral communication is necessary, especially at lower levels in the chain of command.

To stimulate lateral communication, let us look at Henri Fayol's bridge for cross communications:[24]

Fayol's bridge illustrates that it would be senseless to have J communicate with K by going up the chain of command to A and then again to K. Rather, it would only tend to negate effective cross communications. The same condition would exist if J was required to communicate with I, or with someone else outside the chain of command. Fayol encourages direct lateral communication concerning a matter if the sender and receiver have the authority and the ability to handle the situation, and if two requirements are satisfied:

1

Each communicator receives in advance, the permission of his immediate superior.

2

The communicator keeps his superior appraised of all significant results of the lateral communication.



Figure 2

This theory does not present any difficulty for inter staff communications because it maintains in a practical manner, the integrity of the chain of command. To this end, commanders should be made aware of the practicality of lateral communication and should encourage it whenever possible.

This, then, summarizes the communication system within a command. It would be wise to remember that the communication system is so affected by human factors that it can never be perfect. Rather, the commander, the staff officer, and every subordinate within the command must continually work to improve and maintain effective interpersonal communications.

Applying the principles

As has already been demonstrated, the commander has the ultimate responsibility for developing an effective means of interpersonal communication within his unit. He should always be cognizant of his role as a communicator and should continually measure the effectiveness of the communication system within his command. As FM 22-100 states, "The degree to which a higher commander makes his policies and decisions understood and accepted by his organization will materially affect his effectiveness as a leader....Without effective communications, there can be no cooperative action."[25]

Every commander, therefore, should assess the situation in his organization to determine the effectiveness of the interpersonal communications within the chain of command. If the command is lacking in morale or esprit, is demonstrating a poor performance record, or is having a discipline problem, then the commander should take a closer look at his communications program. Certainly, a shortcoming in any one of these areas is indicative that the men are not getting the message. The result is that the effectiveness of the unit is impaired.

If and when this happens, commanders at all levels should review their communication style. Perhaps the commanders are not communicating, but over-publishing, thus burdening the subordinates with directives and memos they neither read nor understand.

Also, there is a tendency on the part of some communicators to depend more on verbiage than on substance. This results in "Gobbledygook ... a pretentious, wordy, involved, sometimes unintelligible jargon ... presently strangling all forms of communication."[26]

Moreover, the commander might not be communicating effectively with timely and informative messages, leaving the downward flow of communications susceptible to rumors or inaccurate information. Conversely, flow of upward communications might be subject to the "filtering out" by subordinates.

In sum, interpersonal communication is so closely allied with human relations that one cannot exist without the other. Thus, it is possible for a unit's short-comings to be traced to a poor communication system.

Developing a plan for improvement

Interpersonal communication is a human relation function, and several programs now being used effectively throughout the Army may be employed, including the use of junior officer and soldier councils, racial coordinating groups, rap sessions and so on.

An effective Command Information Program is vital to satisfy the communication needs of subordinates.

Equally important is the need for commanders at all levels to seek self-improvement in the area of interpersonal communications. Leadership and management classes should be established and utilized.

The commander should also use all available communication media to disseminate his message to the troops. This will also insure that the communication flow, either downward or upward is not impeded or filtered. Perhaps the most important function of the small unit leader is to mediate this flow of information. It cannot be taken for granted that because information is passed on, it has reached its ultimate destination.

Above all, the commander must be concerned about a positive communication program, and he must signal this concern to his subordinates by his actions. This positive attitude will make the subordinates feel informed and will insure the passage of communications upward. A commander must insure that every plan of command action should have a plan for communicating it to those who will be affected.[27]

Once the commander has implemented his program for improved interpersonal communications, he should continually test it for its effectiveness. If the commander has the respect, confidence and loyal cooperation of his subordinates, and if the unit's morale and performance are effective, then he can consider his communication program to be effective.

However, this does not mean that the commander should not continually strive to maintain and improve his communication system. As Emery states, "the communicator must continually work at making his message understood by his target audience. This is especially true in mass communications when little opportunity is afforded the receiver for feedback."[28]

Maintaining an effective interpersonal communication system is hard work that can produce excellent long range benefits. An effective unit *must* have good communications. As Thomas points out, "There is little doubt that the key to understanding and caring, to leading and motivating, is good interpersonal communications."[29]

Endnotes

[1]Pp. 21-23.

[2]Donald Halbedl, "To Be A Good Public Speaker Is A Help Toward Genuine Success In The Army," *C-E Trends*, (Ft. Monmouth, New Jersey), December 1970, p. 15.

[3]W. Paul Jones and Quentin Johnson, *Essays on Thinking and Writing in Science, Engineering and Business*, (Dubuque, Iowa, 1963), pp. 120-121.

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Some OE Fundamentals: An Address

Major General Kenneth E. Dohleman
CDR, ARMR IX
(Presidio San Francisco, CA)

Major General Kenneth E. Dohleman, Deputy Commander of the Sixth US Army and Commander of the Army Readiness Mobilization Region IX, Presidio of San Francisco, enlisted in the Army on December 4, 1944. He holds a BA Degree in Political Science from the University of Omaha and attended the Infantry Advanced Course, the Army Command and General Staff College, the Armed Forces Staff College and the Army War College. Major General Dohleman's many commands include the 82d Airborne's 3d Battalion, 325th Infantry; the 172d Infantry Brigade, Alaska; Director of Doctrine, Evaluation and Command Systems and later Director, Doctrine and Organization, Forces Development; Director, HRD, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel; Commander of MDW (Washington); and Chief of Staff, U.S. Forces Korea and Eighth Army. Major General Dohleman was promoted to his present rank on June 19, 1977.

The following comments were delivered to OECC Graduating Class 4-82 on 29 October 1982 at Fort Ord, CA.

I'd like to add my congratulations to the Graduates of Class 4-82 and to share in the anticipation that I know you feel as you head out into the real world of the Total Army, for your skills and your services are sorely needed. I can see by the patches that you're wearing on your left shoulders that you are indeed destined for the organizations of the Army around the world where you will have the opportunity to serve in the roles that COL Golden just mentioned. I'm also very pleased to see the members of the families and also friends of the graduates here.

I'd like to speak to you briefly this morning as a user of OE. It is true, as COL Golden alluded to, that this is a kind of nostalgic return for me to what used to be the OETC, the Organizational Effectiveness Training Center, where I was privileged to have the same role speaking at graduation to Class No. 2, which goes back some distance. Many things have changed since then but one of the things that I suspect has remained essentially the same is the focus of the instruction here on knowing yourselves, knowing those with whom you serve in your role, the importance of communications, and learning that not all of those communications are written or oral, but that there are many ways of communicating.

Communications are important, particularly in your business. They're important to all of us really, particularly to those of us who are in leadership roles. They don't always work as well as they might, and that's one of the reasons why there is such a great need, in my opinion, in the Army for Organizational Effectiveness and Organizational Effectiveness Consultants, such as you. I've used OE over the past six years (since I first became exposed to it) in every assignment that I've had—used it in a variety of ways and, in all candor, with a variety of results. From my perspective I believe I've used it with good effect—good effect for the organizations, which is really what it's all about. One of the most interesting applications of it that I've had and one which I think will be relevant for many of you, now or in the future, is in my current assignment in dealing with the **US Army National Guard** and the **US Army Reserve.** The **Army Readiness and Mobilization Region (ARMR),** as you know there are nine across the country, serve under the Continental US Armies. Our role is to serve with the Guard and Reserve and to supervise their training, and to assist and support them as they train and otherwise improve their readiness prepared for mobilization.

We've had OE sessions within ARMR IX, as we have shifted into managing by objectives for results; we've used it in the objective setting process; we've used it within our own Top Team which numbers some 17 or 18, who are, for practical purposes, my immediate subordinates. That's quite a span of control and spread over five states, and as you can imagine, is a real challenge with respect to gaining top effectiveness for that organization. We've used that in several team-building sessions, to say nothing of the one-on-one consulting in which I've engaged with one or more of our OEC's.

I expect most of you have never really thought very much about **Reserve Components** and of the fact that you're here and they're over there; but as you've been reading, the Total Army concept is now a reality, and those Guard and Reserve Units, upon mobilization, go to war alongside of the Active Component Units. As a matter of fact, many of them are mobilized and deployed overseas *before* our Active Component Units. So there's a great premium these days on having them trained, having them ready, and having them prepared for mobilization. And even those who are destined for duty with Divisions, and I see many of those patches on, or Installations, you'll find that those Divisions and Installations have responsibilities for, and relationships with, US Army National Guard and US Army Reserve Forces, and you'll have many opportunities and requirements to come in contact with them. That's experience that will serve you in good stead in the future because, in my judgement, the reliance on our National Guard and Reserve will increase, rather than diminish, in the future. It's also the nature of the activities that those relationships between Active Component Organizations and Guard and Reserve Units, whether in the Army Readiness and Mobilization Regions, CONUS Divisions, CONUS Installations, are not the traditional line and staff relationships that you study about in FM 101-5. They are much more complex—the lines of authority are not nearly so clear, and there is ever more reason for some introspection on the part of people involved to find out how that arrangement can be made more effective. In other words, there is plenty of **"sand in the organizational gearbox"** that OE can be very helpful in identifying and pointing the way towards some actions that might be taken to make the organization more effective.

OEC's are much more effective in seeing to the Army's needs than outside consultants. Six or seven years ago as this business was just starting, and we had very few OESO's at that time (OEC's now), there was a tendency to contract with outside consultants to come into various organizations. That met with mixed success, mostly on the poor side, at least initially, because the environment, the situation in which those consultants were operating, was so foreign to them. You *know* what it is to command, because most of you have done that. You *know* how military organizations operate, and you *know* that military authority is unlike any that exists anywhere else in our society. You also understand that commanding a division is done in a different way than the Plant Manager at General Motors operates. And in that regard I would caution that you should not be deceived by our tendency to adopt the terminology from the private sector—consulting, clients, etc. Keep very clear in your mind that *serving* in the Army is different than *working for* the Army, and that those for whom you are consulting have responsibilities and obligations and authority that transcends anything which exists anywhere in the private sector, and you have to understand that if you're going to be valuable to those leaders with whom you will consult.

"...The Army needs OE and you need to do what the Army needs you to do..."

Many of you, I suspect, are wondering what it will be like when you consult for a general officer or some senior person. You've had some slight taste of that but always in school here in somewhat of a structured environment, and you're about to "flex your wings" and try it on your own. A couple of thoughts in that regard that I would offer that I hope will be helpful—I think the single most important aspect of that is that you must **learn the person for whom you are consulting** and in that initial contact, and in whatever follow-up ones there are, either one-on-one with you, or in the presence of the members of that organization, you should devote major attention to *understanding that Commander* or that Section Head because that person and the way he or she goes about performing those duties has made more impact on that organization than any other element of the environment. And if you miss on figuring out the man or the woman who's in charge, you're certain to miss on figuring out what makes the organization tick and what you might be able to suggest, or help suggest, in the way of making things better. Recognize too that you're not consulting for a stereotype. Those commanders come in all varieties and you need to have an open mind with respect to what that person is really like as you begin that relationship.

You have been taught here *the basic skills* and I would urge you to keep current on them and to practice them. You may hear of some shortcuts and you may be tempted to try some of the things that are what I would characterize as a little "far out," and each of you can interpret that in whatever way it suits you, but I would urge you to **stick with those basics**—they work—the way in which you apply them depends on your own intelligence and your own assessment of the situation, but you need to really stick with them because those are the ones that are tried and true and work best in the military environment to which I referred earlier. And finally you need to be able to cope with what might be termed **the "spotlight" effect,** particularly in you're consulting for the Post Commander or the Division or the Corps Commander—the spotlight is going to be on you as much as it is on him, and you've got to be able to handle that. The pressure will come not only from your client but from those members of the organization with which you will interact in one way or another during the process. It all goes with the territory. You can handle that because you've been taught many of the basics here, but the first one or two experiences may seem to involve undue pressure and you need to prepare yourself psychologically for that—nothing that you can't handle. Those commanders, irrespective of their grade, put their trousers on one leg at a time and you can handle that, but you need to think a little bit about it before you go into that first situation so that you can figure out that you're going to pay major attention to figuring out that commander and you've got to do that before you can figure out what makes the organization tick and therefore help that client.

On a slightly different thrust I'd suggest that you keep in mind as you enter on your new duties that **the Army needs OE and you need to do what the Army needs you to do** and not necessarily what you'd **like** to do. All of you, in this exciting business to which you've been exposed, have developed new interests, new curiosities, new desires to experiment, and there's time for all that down the line. But what you need to focus on now, as COL Golden suggested in his remarks, is what the Army needs you to do, because the need was never greater. OE, to a certain extent, is a "pull" system—that is to say your product, your service will have to be pulled by the organizations—you can't go around and inflict yourselves on some commander or some organization, and therefore you need to **use your influence to encourage the pull—** the kind of missionary work to which COL Golden referred. And you need to ask the organization of which you're a part to help identify those **opportunities.** Ask for the **resources** that you need to do the job; ask to be **challenged;** ask to be **involved** and ask to be **supported.** In other words, you've got to be **a full-fledged member of the team**—a staff officer second, as your Commandant

"...If I were starting all over again...I'd want to start as an OEC. I think I would have done some things differently and better along the way had I had that experience."

expressed it, and if you *are* a full-fledged member of the team, you'll find that that helps a great deal in accomplishing the mission that you have before you.

And finally, I'd say to those members of the class that you need to ask and to give family support. You OEC's will deal with a great many tough situations, and you're going to need **solid family support** more than most. And I don't need to remind this audience that serving in the Army is a family proposition and therefore the OEC needs to have that support and those roots and to give that support which will enable him or her to have that kind of solid foundation which all of us need in order to function effectively.

I envy your challenge and your opportunity to serve, and as a group your professional future is bright. People who sat just where you do when I addressed Class No. 2 (back in the Fall of 1975 as I recall), **many of them have already had battalion command and are a considerable distance ahead of their peers with respect to their professional development.** One of the reasons is that **success** is part of the credentials required for admittance here. That's the first point. The second is that the skills that you learn here will stand you in good stead no matter what your assignment is from now on. And the third point is that, as an OEC, you will have an opportunity to observe lots of ways of doing it—you'll see lots of commanders and you'll find out what works and what doesn't work, and what it takes to make it work. Those are opportunities that most of your compatriots don't have, or at least they are not attuned to take advantage of those to the extent that you are. So I do indeed envy the opportunities ahead of you now, not only as an OEC, but whatever will come beyond that. And most of all you'll have fun doing it for the reasons that I've suggested.

I guess what I'm saying is that if I were starting all over again at this point, and had the opportunity to choose my course, I'd want to start as an OEC. I think I would have done some things differently and better along the way had I had that experience. You have it—you have a great deal going for you and I do indeed envy you the challenge and the opportunity that's yours. Again, my congratulations to all the graduates; my best wishes to all the families and friends—may God Bless You and may you have a successful assignment. Thank you very much. □

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Originality is the art of concealing your source.
—**Franklin P. Jones**

Originality, I fear, is too often only undetected and frequently unconscious plagiarism.—**William Inge**

A thousand and one problems arise daily in every field of endeavor. These problems cannot be overcome by adhering to old rules, old formulas, old devices. They call for original thinking, for resourcefulness and initiative. —**B.C. Forbes**

Management of Expectations

COL John M. Lenti (TRADOC)

Of all the theories of leadership and management that I consider applicable today, Labovitz has captured their essence when he said that today's management challenge is the management of expectations. This article is structured around this concept and its application to management and leadership in the Army today.

There's no better place to apply your accumulated knowledge about management and leadership than in command. That's where the rubber meets the road. It's the real world divorced from academia where your decision on "case study" means success or failure in the real sense of the word. Each command has its own unique set of variables. I have never found a set of common denominators that are easily transferable, one situation to another; though the coping skills may be the same, I am convinced that implementation is almost always different. From a system's standpoint, each organization has similar sub-sets—people, machines, resources, etc. Each system (command) has a varied set of external operating forces as well as a distinct set of internal forces, plus the natural tendency of the system toward entropy. The commander has to come to grips with all these forces, assess the impact of each, develop an action plan, and implement and adjust the system for change. To do this effectively, the commander must have the skills to manage and the desire to lead.

EVALUATION OF FORCES

From an organizational standpoint, I consider the organizational assessment the most critical phase of command and the precursor of success or failure. We each bring to command our own set of values developed over decades. In most cases the values will be markedly different from those of most of the people for whom we are responsible. Therefore, two things must happen. First, we must know our own values; second, we must determine the value set of those we are commanding. Experience has taught me to expect that the values will be as different as the needs of each person. I have found no way to accurately assess the value system in the trenches. That is, I see no advantage in giving a value instrument to be filled out and evaluated by the OE people. Rather, it is more direct and effective to quickly establish your own values and make sure everybody knows where the lines are drawn. I'll discuss this in detail in the implementation phase.

The external organization climate has to be quickly assessed by the commander, who has to be aware of the operational imperatives of higher headquarters as well as develop a sensing for the other real-world forces. Bill Onken has best described this situation with his organization "molecule." You've got to know who's on your molecule that can influence your operation and, in turn, whom you must cultivate to insure that scarce resources flow to your organization. All effective managers do this well. You can bet that the money people and the "people" folks will stand high on the molecule.

The internal forces are much more difficult to sort out. With some 400 officers, enlisted and civilians in the organization, my goal was to understand how the organization functioned and the parts interfaced. I made this one of my initial personal objectives. I spent as much time in the trenches as I could, observing and taking notes about how we were doing business. I expected not only to gain operational knowledge but also to create a Hawthorne effect. I perpetuated the Hawthorne glow by having the OE people conduct a formal organizational assessment as well as orchestrate a transition model with key people and myself.

This latter meeting proved to be the springboard to draw the lines for my operational imperatives (values) as well as get a good feel for the burrs under many different saddles. The leadership principle that I have always relied on was "reciprocity"—a simple and effective technique of leadership. Soldiers are always told what's expected of them—rarely does the leader tell the soldiers what they can expect of the leader. Patton's soldiers had no doubts: "His guts and our blood." A bit simplistic and overstated, but the soldiers' expectations were crystal clear.

At the conclusion of the meeting, there was an implicit contract made between me and my subordinates—all understood the operational imperatives. There were some unique facets of that "contract." Anybody who wanted out at the front end could leave without prejudice. I knew very few would accept the offer, but the offer would elicit support for my goals from those who remained.

I gave a great deal of thought to what I wanted to do with the organization. These ideas, discussed at the meeting, took their final form as my first year's objectives while in command. At the meeting I made myself vulnerable to my future subordinates, was open and candid with them, and listened carefully to what they had to say. Joe Batten states, and I fully agree, that a manager's effectiveness rests or falls in direct proportion to face-to-face skills. My people knew I cared what happened to the organization and to them as human beings. They were all looking for direction, full of high expectations and wanting to perform well. I wanted them to tell me if we were doing something dumb or that a policy or procedure had outlived its usefulness. I sent my officers and my subordinates back to the trenches not as subordinates but as apostles. They carried the good news that some of the things they and their subordinates felt were important would happen—and soon.

Within a week the result of the meeting appeared as the organization's written goals and objectives for the year. It was important to state the goals clearly. It was not a total Drucker MBO program but a modified "contract" between commander and the command. The goals were:

a) To provide an environment that will facilitate each organizational member's ability to attain both personal and professional goals.

b) To promote personal competence through instruction in new skills while enhancing already acquired skills.

c) To instill in each member of the organization a desire for consistent professional competence.

ACTION PLAN

I was well aware of Yankelovich's most recent studies on new job values for the '80s. I had within my organization almost all the parameters of the civilian organization. Within this microcosm I knew that my people's attitudes toward the nonmonetary reward, job security, flexible work hours, job stress, and discrimination would mirror the attitudes of their civilian counterparts. I was careful to recognize that the needs of my young soldiers were different from those of my civilians and more senior soldiers. Therefore, I structured my first year's objectives around the needs as I saw them and the feed forward I received at the initial meeting. My action plan, formulated into the yearly objectives, had a soldier and civilian component with some objectives cutting across the whole organizational spectrum.

THE SOLDIERS' PROGRAM

Soldiers are soldiers. They don't vary very much, volunteer or draftee. Their needs generally remain the same as their cohort group. I knew I had to get to each of my soldiers quickly and in a very personal way. They had to see me, hear me talk and understand what I expected of them and, just as important, what they could expect of me. To overcome the inertia, I brought them all together and explained to them my operational imperatives (values). Needless to say, the majority were not initially happy, particularly when I prohibited alcohol in the barracks and denied visitation between male and female rooms. The soldiers didn't like either rule, but accepted my explanation that the greater good would be served if the restrictions were enforced.

When I had taken command, only 3 out of 60 11B's had passed the SQT. One of my objectives was to turn this and all SQT results around. Iwas not going to fall into the trap of after-duty classes or a Saturday class. Nor would I allow officers to be responsible for junior EM instruction. I got together with my CSM and he and I laid out the responsibilities of the immediate supervisor. This was "sergeants' business" and I would not deny them their chance to exercise leadership. I demonstrated my interest and care by having the classes for SQT conducted during prime time, under the supervision of the immediate NCO supervisor in a dedicated SQT classroom. I committed my best NCO to set up the learning facility, develop schedules and pre-tests. Instruction, either self or on the Bessler system, was mandatory. Three no-goes on pre-tests required mandatory study hall in the evenings with the NCO supervisor present.

As I examined the SQT situation more closely, the common denominator of poor performance on SQT was a poor self-concept. These same soldiers were the ones I would see for disciplinary problems and the ones usually identified as the malcontents. If I could change their self-concept, not only would the soldier benefit (pass the SQT), but so would the organization and the Army.

Coincident with the program for the junior EMs was a similar program for the senior NCOs. Again, a self-concept recasting had to be done to make sure they were perceived by subordinates as capable leaders.

CIVILIAN PROGRAM

The average age of my civilian work force was 40 years, but no one was 40 years old! There were two groups—one group of newly entered civilians (20-30 years old) and the "old timers" (45-60 years old). Not only were the needs of this group different from my soldiers but there were also obviously different needs within the group itself. The most prominent difference that I observed was the difference in work ethic. The younger group saw work as a means to do what they really wanted—recreation time—and work gave them the means to support recreation. The older group embraced the traditional Puritan work ethic—a good day's work for a good day's pay. A conversation I overheard between two of my younger civilian workers talking in the snack bar brought this dichotomy into sharp focus. The young man said to his friend, "You know Pete, there's a $30,000-a-year job out there for doing nothing, and I'm going to find it." There was friction between these civilian groups; each had informal leaders and each was vocal. If Yankelovich was right, and I thought he was, a program was needed that would take into account the values of both groups.

I took this opportunity not only to expand flexitime but also to add another dimension—a 4-day week for those who wanted it. The "9-5-4" program allowed for each who wanted to work 9 hours per day for a five-day week—accruing 8 hours of extra time in a two-week pay period. This would allow the individual to take a day off the following pay period. The program meant a great deal of bookeeping for management but was well received, particularly by the younger group. Anyone could get in or out of the program with two weeks' notice (a pay period). Seventy-five percent of the work force had to be available each day. Very few of the older group with established work and social patterns wanted the 4-day plan. This was expected. When I left the organization, about 50% of the younger group were in the new 9-5-4 program, with all other civilians in flex or regular time programs. The initiative was a success and added to the productivity of the organization.

MACHINES

An effective manager must be sensitive to the dynamics of the organization. Change is constant, yet organizational structure is resistant to change, particularly a bureaucracy. Therefore, the management of change is a critical skill for today's manager. As work becomes more technical, it becomes more fractionalized and more machine driven by computers.

Computers and the magic paper that they spew forth can strike fear in the best of your work force. A manager must prepare for the introduction of computers and word processing hardware into the environment. I treated the introduction of a new technology in my organization as I would the news that my wife was pregnant. This gave me a year to prepare for the actual event. After the decision is made that new machines will come on board, the informal organization (grapevine) is in full operation. Most of the fears center around job security and fear of the unknown. Early on (9-12 months), I began to prepare the work force for the word processing equipment. The preparation took the form of classes with hands-on instruction with actual equipment. I made it personally clear at meetings that no jobs would be lost as a result of the computers and that it would be an opportunity to gain another skill. By the time the machines arrived on site, there was an air of excitement rather than apprehension. The work force believed, as I did, that the machines would help us do our jobs. They did.

COMMON PROGRAM

I took several initiatives that involved my organization as a whole. Our work schedule was fairly routinized, so I could plan better than most for the future. I began to get feedback from both sides of the house that formal instruction both on the computers and for SQT was well received. I decided to reinforce success. I contacted my education officer to see the availability of college-level courses that could be taught in my organization. It was possible, so we took a survey of courses that were desired. Within a month, we had the courses (for college credit) being taught. The program was a success and is continuing today.

In an attempt to develop group cohesiveness, I asked the chaplain to plan and be prepared to execute a "retreat" program—at least two a year—tailored to the needs of the oranization. I knew that this would be a hard program to sell for several reasons—the obvious religious overtones and the single/family-oriented soldiers and civilian breakout. The chaplain and I planned the program carefully. We knew the first effort had to be a success. We decided on a facility on a beach and a fairly unstructured program (minimum religious involvement on a voluntary basis) at a price that couldn't be refused. There were facilities for both singles and families. We planned 6-8 months in advance (which we found was barely enough time) for a 2-day (from noon Friday to noon Sunday) retreat. The program's success exceeded our expectations and became a model for other unit chaplains.

CONTINUING THE MOMENTUM

A basic tenet to my program was to keep the pressure on. I had to work through people, so I made it mandatory that within 48 hours of assignment to the organization I would personally brief all E-5s and above, all GS-6s and above, as well as all officers. I made up a series of briefing slides which included my organizational goals, yearly objectives and a detailed analysis of the organization from a system's standpoint. I briefed each of these people in my office as if they were VIPs. I prefaced my remarks by stating that in order to communicate, we had to share understanding and that when they left the office there would be no doubt in their minds what we were about—what I expected of them and what they could expect of me in return. I had decided to front end a Skinner approach because I didn't want to deal with deviant behavior on a large scale. It was important to front end my values because I found that most of the young soldiers I was meeting were looking for guidance—whether they knew it or not. I wanted to fill the values vacuum before the soldiers were left to their own devices. The older soldiers (E-7s, E-8s) had to have the values and confidence in the Army reestablished. Many of the soldiers in the latter group were shaken by an apparent softening of discipline in the Army during the '70s. They needed encouragement. When they left my office, they were convinced that if they followed my game plan, they would have my full support. My overwatch would both protect them from a harrassing bureaucracy and insure them my personal support. In retrospect, this initial confrontation and the laying out of realistic expectations proved to be a most rewarding technique with both civilians and soldiers. I was certain that no one went into the trenches without full knowledge of what to expect (gained from my organizational brief), what the environment of the organization would be, what I wanted to see happen, and what they could expect from me.

It was sobering to realize that I had more military service than all my officers put together. With the sobriety came the realization that I had a responsibility toward each of them to train them for their jobs. My initial assessment of this group proved true. For the most part, they were bright, articulate, all college graduates (some working on advanced degrees) and all wanting to do a good job—and they did. It was easy to see that a Theory Y approach was a must. They were smart and needed support and, above all, wanted to know where I stood on "duty, honor, country." Armed with this knowledge, they were ready to take on any task. I had periodic classes—not formal but rather informative—on how we were doing, what was going well, and where we needed to do better. The sessions became the medium for an exchange of information between people who, because of organization distance, rarely had such an opportunity for dialogue. The sessions became forums for policy changes philosophical exchanges all adding to overall productivity and cohesiveness.

SUMMARY

I'm sure that some who viewed my organization from afar thought that most of what I was doing had Machiavellian overtones. If so, it was not done consciously. I had spent almost 15 years in and out of management theory. I did make a conscious effort to be aware of people, to apply my management and leadership knowledge with care, and not to do anything dumb. Most theories and principles are not directly transferable without taking into account local conditions. This is why I consider the initial assessment to be of paramount importance and a task that one must prepare for before command. The "honeymoon" is over very quickly when you're in command. You really have to hit the ground running and have a game plan based on your assessment ready to implement. You have to meet your immediate subordinates early on and set your priorities jointly. Though you have the formal authority, you can't make it happen without the active support of subordinates. I found that it was imperative to give them a piece of the action—get them involved with the operation. Recognizing the needs of your people, developing a reward system that serves both intrinsic and extrinsic needs, developing programs for self-development and job enrichment are all old management concepts that work. But, I found that each needed to be modified to fit my organization. I found none of the leadership or management principles without some utility. In retrospect, any success I enjoyed was more a product of the fact I wanted to do what I was doing, had confidence in my abilities, and conveyed that message to my people—and they responded in kind.

EPILOGUE

Without my exposure to the Army's OE program, and equally some personal effort on my part to read the literature and to want to develop a more effective organization, none of the success I experienced during my command would have been possible. I am thoroughly convinced it just won't happen by chance. There is no such thing as luck in my book for a professional soldier. You make it happen as a professional by always preparing yourself until opportunity knocks, and that is not luck.

I have been served well by the Army's OE program, but it is not a one-way street. In my opinion you have to work at it yourself. The OE consultant can bring you the tools, but you have to know how to use them.

I would like to close by telling you that **Bob Radcliffe** and **Howie Brosseau** are doing a terrific job here at TRADOC Headquarters and **I think we have finally turned the corner in doing some good things in the OE area.** □

Today's Army: "Be All That You Can Be"

(Statistics as of May 1982)

Reprinted from *Speaking With One Voice*

Prior to mobilization for World War I, the Army had 108,000 active duty personnel. During World War II, Army strength peaked at 5,986,000 personnel. During the height of the Vietnam conflict, there were 1,570,000 personnel on active duty.

Today the Army has approximately 782,000 men and women in uniform. This includes 104,000 officers, 685,000 enlisted personnel and 3,300 U.S. Military Academy cadets. By the end of FY 82, Army strength should be approximately 780,000 personnel.

Approximately 63.9 percent of Army officers are lieutenants and captains. The rest are majors, lieutenant colonels and colonels. About 0.5 percent are general officers.

Of our officers, 8.6 percent are black, 5.9 percent are other minorities; and 9.8 percent are women. Of the enlisted force, 32.8 percent are black; 8.5 percent are other minorities; and about 9.7 percent are women.

More than 295,600 Army personnel are stationed overseas. Major concentrations are located in West Germany (214,000) and South Korea (30,200).

During FY 81, the Army met its recruiting objectives and achieved the best quality mix since FY 77. During FY 82, this trend in quality increases has continued. The Army projects that over 85 percent of its new recruits will possess a high school diploma compared with 74 percent of contemporary American youth.

The most populated enlisted career field is Infantry with more than 80,000 personnel; second is Communications-Electronics with 77,000; third is Administration with 55,300. The most populated specialty for officers is Infantry with approximately 12,200 personnel; the second largest is Aviation with just under 11,000; third is communications-electronics with 6,400; fourth is Armor with 5,700.

At the end of April 1982, our Army Ready Reserve Forces officially totaled more than 878,000 personnel, that included Selected Reserve strengths of 408,000 in the Army National Guard and 245,000 in the U.S. Army Reserve. The Individual Ready Reserve and the Inactive National Guard consist of 222,000 personnel. □

A Community Welcome and Clearance (In-Out) Processing Center: OE Produces Results (A Case Study)

CPT Alphonso Maldon, Jr. and SFC Roland McGee (USAREUR)

ABSTRACT OF CASE STUDY

This abstract provides a summary of the case study of the OE operation conducted with a USAREUR community Welcome and Clearance Center 2 March - 30 April 1982.

The Welcome and Clearance Center is a service oriented organization whose primary mission is to provide in and out processing services for military personnel within the community.

The initial problems presented to the OE consultants, prior to any assessment being conducted, centered around the amount of time it took to process military personnel, and a perception of a lack of services held by some customers.

The OE consultants used a systemic problem-solving approach through the application of the 4 step OE process.

The outcomes for the operation were:

- Redesign of organizational policies and procedures to substantially reduce "customer process time."
- Redesign of organizational structure to improve the work flow, work environment and increase productivity.
- Identification and resolution of other major problem areas impacting on morale and motivation.

BACKGROUND

During the period March through April 1982, the OE office responded to a request from the community commander to conduct an assessment of the community's Welcome and Clearance Center. The stated objective of the assessment was to improve customer services and the operation of the Welcome and Clearance Center.

The Welcome and Clearance Center operates under the control of the Director of Personnel and Community Activities (DPCA). The Center consists of a finance and travel section, personnel section, AER section and administrative section. The center is also augmented by a representative from the area club system and the transportation office. The total staff consists of 23 military and 6 civilian personnel. (Figure 1)

The initial contact with the Welcome and Clearance Center stemmed from a request by the commanding general (which immediately gave the operation front-end top management backing and approval). The OE consultants subsequently contacted the DPCA to determine if something could be done to provide meaningful and reasonable improvement in the organization. During this initial contact made in March 1982, the consultant obtained the indorsement of the DPCA concerning the use of OE to explore the situation.

Organizational Structure of Welcome and Clearance Center



Figure 1

CONSULTING METHODOLOGY

After gaining the DPCA's concern, an assessment of the organization was conducted. During this step of the operation, all civilian and military personnel who worked in the Welcome and Clearance Center were interviewed individually. Their general perceptions of the center's efficiency, and the quality of services that customers received, were solicited.

Randomly selected customers of the Welcome and Clearance Center were interviewed in an attempt to get a better picture of how the services were contributing to the command-wide mission, and to obtain their appraisal of perceived problem areas within the organization. Examples of questions used are: "What do you like least about this Welcome and Clearance Center? What do you like most about this Welcome and Clearance Center? What does the center do most effectively? What does the center do least effectively? What improvement do you recommend to increase customer satisfaction?" The OE consultants believed the information gathered during this phase would:

(1) Help corroborate or refute the suspected need for a redesign of the organization.
(2) Determine whether customer services needed improvement.
(3) Assist in formulating strategies to bring about desired changes, if required.
(4) Provide feedback regarding the quality of services provided.

ATTITUDE ASSESSMENT QUESTIONNAIRE (WCC PERSONNEL—28)

OVERALL ATTITUDE: Good

1. I think my job is better than most.

   Strongly agree 16
   Somewhat agree 5
   Disagree 1

2. When a customer visits me, I am happy to be of service.

   Strongly agree 17
   Somewhat agree 10
   Disagree 1

3. Most customers appreciate how hard we work.

   Strongly agree 5
   Somewhat agree 12
   Disagree 11

4. My bosses are knowledgeable and great people to work for.

   Strongly agree 10
   Somewhat agree 9
   Disagree 9

5. My co-workers are knowledgeable and great people to work with.

   Strongly agree 14
   Somewhat agree 4
   Disagree 10

6. Other people see me as cooperative.

   Strongly agree 15
   Somewhat agree 7
   Disagree 6

7. Most of the time I feel enthusiastic about my job.

   Strongly agree 8
   Somewhat agree 11
   Disagree 9

ATTITUDE ASSESSMENT OF CUSTOMERS — 100

OVERALL ATTITUDE: Above average

1. Services that are provided by WCC personnel are customer oriented.

   Strongly agree 74
   Somewhat agree 7
   Disagree 19

2. Clerks in the WCC are knowledgeable of their jobs.

   Strongly agree 82
   Somewhat agree 6
   Disagree 12

3. I was disappointed in the personalities/attitudes of the personnel working in the WCC.

   Strongly agree 7
   Somewhat agree 4
   Disagree 89

4. I had to wait entirely too long to get processed.

   Strongly agree 17
   Somewhat agree 15
   Disagree 68

5. Available facilities were adequate to accomodate me while I waited to be processed.

   Strongly agree 11
   Somewhat agree 18
   Disagree 71

6. The effectiveness of the WCC could be improved if all station activities were located on the same floor.

   Strongly agree 93
   Somewhat agree 7
   Disagree 0

Figure 2

The OE consultants also developed questionnaires which were used to assess the attitudes of both the Welcome and Clearance Center personnel and the customers (Figure 2). In addition, the OE consultants used personal observations and historical files to explore the nature of "perceived lack of satisfactory services" by the customers. Observations made by the OE consultants, more than any other factor, facilitated the acceptance of the final design recommendations.

ANALYSIS AND TRENDS

The results of the analysis showed that the problem is largely systemic. For example, the units being serviced were not properly coordinating in-out processing efforts with the Welcome and Clearance Center. In addition, a command policy, which directed that a unit commander or his designated representative must authenticate clearance papers, was not being followed. This caused problems for soldiers, for they were required to return to their units to have their clearance papers properly authenticated. Service members were reporting for processing without required documents. Service members were not meeting their in-out processing appointment without notifying the Welcome and Clearance Center.

There was little or no coordination between activities within the Welcome and Clearance Center. An example quoted is "We never talk to each other because of the bad relationship between sections." Personnel felt they were not recognized nor rewarded for the work they did. For example, one individual stated "This command does not recognize the work we do. We have never received anything for doing a good job." The structure of the organization was poorly designed. Workers perceived that there was an operational control problem between their assigned units and duty station. For example, some of the Welcome and Clearance Center military personnel were assigned to a personnel service company while others were assigned to a finance unit. One respondent said, "We do not know who is our boss, there is no specific person to tell us what we can or can't do." The work environment was poor, which impacted adversely on the motivation and job satisfaction of the workers. For example, there were no procedures for controlling customer traffic within sections. Wandering customers constantly interrupted clerical personnel while they were servicing other customers. Other specific examples were directly observed and collected; however, those mentioned here are indicative of why the morale of the workers was low and the services were perceived as unsatisfactory by some customers.

PLAN OF ACTION

The consulting methodology previously described was implemented as planned without difficulties.

The real "change agents" in any organization are the commanders and staff leaders, even though the OE consultants may be used to identify a potential need for change.

Therefore, as the next step, the OE consultants took the data that had been gathered and subjectively analyzed it for consolidation into trends (Figure 3). Once trends had been identified, the data was presented to the change agents (key personnel, DPCA and the community commanding general).

PROBLEM TRENDS

- Lack of team work.
- Unclear reward system.
- Lack of operational control.
- Units not enforcing outprocessing policies.
- Taking too long to process a customer.
- No recognition for good jobs.
- Conflict between section personnel.
- Lack of coordination within organization.
- Ineffective control of work flow.
- Inexperienced personnel.
- Low morale and job satisfaction.
- Inadequate facilities.
- Too many additional duties.

Figure 3

The role of the OE consultants in this operation concerning the pathway from assessment to results was to provide assessment data, feed it back to the leaders, make recommendations, and provide OE skills to assist in the implementation of organizational change.

In an attempt to overcome the previously mentioned major problem areas, the OE consultants made 17 recommendations concerning ***redesign of the organization*** and its way of doing business, all of which have been adopted and are being implemented.

The **first** of these recommendations was to renovate one of the floors in the building where the majority of the Welcome and Clearance Center now exists and have all activities of the center physically located on this floor. This allows sections to be co-located for better communication. It also helps control traffic by eliminating customers from wasting time trying to locate the applicable serving office.

The **second** recommendation was to clear a partially used property disposal area for abandoned privately owned vehicles which is located directly behind the Welcome and Clearance Center building, and convert it into a customer's parking lot.

The **third** recommendation was to place an E8/71L in charge of the center instead of the currently assigned lieutenant and civilian (GS-5). The military experience of a senior NCO makes him more suitable for the position. Since this position was not authorized an officer, and the assigned officer was officer distribution plan supported, he is available to fill another critical position in the community. The civilian position was transferred within the community.

The **fourth** recommendation was to provide a lounge with intercom system, comfortable furniture, TV, coffee, cola and snack machines, for waiting customers. This change psychologically reduces the waiting time of the customers.

The **fifth** recommendation was to give the NCOIC operational control over all personnel who work in the Welcome and Clearance Center. This eliminates what the workers perceived as problems with operational control. They are more apt to support the NCOIC when he is their rater.

The **sixth** recommendation was to publish a policy letter outlining awards and rewards policies. Personnel who did superb work and had the most satisfied customers are presented with an award or reward by the commanding general at staff meetings on a quarterly basis.

Although there were 10 other recommendations made, those mentioned here are the ones that facilitated the acceptance of organization redesign (Figure 4).

OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS

- That a military clerk/receptionist (E5) be placed in the lounge. This would help to control the flow of traffic for each section. Could show slides of GSMC, answer questions and help to ensure that SM has necessary documents in their possession.
- That the NCOICs of the finance and accounting section and the personnel section demonstrate more visibility in the front office. Many complaints by the customers could be resolved on the spot if the NCOIC was available to assist the customer when problems occur.
- That the main finance and accounting office provide backup support as required by the **workload.** Additional personnel from the main finance office would help reduce customer processing time during peak work periods (December — January & June — September).
- That an SOP be developed for WCC immediately.
- That **station signs** with numbers be displayed for each station.
- That a wiring diagram be prepared and displayed in each section for viewing by customer and WCC personnel.
- That ACS become a part of the WCC.
- That information on jobs available for **family members** be provided the **SM** as part of in-processing.
- That the Stuttgart Citizen (community newspaper) be required periodically to do a report on the WCC (selected topics).
- That a monthly report be published in the Stuttgart Citizen (community newspaper) showing the total number of personnel processed (in out) for that month by the WCC.

Figure 4

EVALUATION PLAN

DPCA'S ISSUES	DESIRED OUTCOMES	MEASURES TO BE USED	PRE-SCORE OF MEASURE	END-SCORE OF MEASURE
Officers not making appointments	Officers meet appointments	Maintain register Evaluate register monthly and report to DPCA	75% of officer appointments met	95% of officer appointments met
Military personnel unsure of who they work for	All personnel will know who they work for	Rating scheme Wiring diagram	Confusion and uncertainty	Increase communication flow
		Cooperation/communication between supervisors and subordinates		Complete knowledge of rating scheme
				Supervision given by rater
Location of Army Emergency Relief Section	Complete privacy for service member	Move to separate room	No privacy and inadequate enviroment	Separate office by 1 Jul 82
			Develop plan for upgrading current facility	100% privacy for service member
				Complete by 1 Jul 82
Inadequate facilities for customers who are waiting to be processed	Attractive and convenient facilities	Replace current and add new furniture and equipment	Current facilities are inadequate	Complete by 1 Sep 82
		Install bulletin board and large map of GSMC		Complete by 1 Sep 82
		Implement slide presentation, provide station signs for each section		Complete by 1 Sep 82
				Complete by 1 Sep 82
Lack of control over the flow of customer traffic	Make immediate contact with customers and direct to appropriate station	Establish SOP for processing customers	Customers control themselves	SOP established by 1 May 82
	Complete control of Traffic by section chief	Supervisor visibility Supervisor involvement	Supervisors do not get involved	Move supervisors up front by 1 May 82
	Complaints known and resolved on the spot	Increased percentage of complaints resolved on the spot	Minimum complaints resolved by supervisors	90% of complaints resolved on the spot
Bad working relationship between FAO and Personnel	Work together as one team	Increase communication within and between personnel	Poor working relationship	Decrease by 50% complaints by customers and WCC personnel
		Schedule meetings	No teamwork between sections	Meetings held at least monthly
			Bad impressions perceived by customers	
			No meetings	
OIC's working relationship with WCC personnel	Compatible and yet an effective working relationship	Application of situational leadership by OIC	Perception by WCC personnel that OIC is not supporting them	Immediate application of situational leadership
		Frequent meetings with WCC personnel		Subordinate's attitude changes toward WCC OIC
		Gather facts before disciplining subordinates		Facts are gathered and decisions made
		Counseling session by NCOIC of WCC	Conflicts with customers and subordinates	Immediate improvement by individuals involved or replace them with persons who are competent and courteous by 1 Jun 82
Derogatory perceptions that clerks and customers have of NCOIC/Travel Section and Personnel Specialist	Increased patience with customers and subordinates	Provide complete assistance to customers in a pleasant and professional manner		
	Demonstrate mature judgement	Provide professional directions to subordinates		
Rewards	Recognize people who do good work	Appreciative comments	Rewards are not given	Increase in number of Rewards
		Letters/certificates and medals		Change in attitude and morale by WCC personnel
		Monetary rewards for civilians		WCC personnel more proficient in their job
		Superior ratings		
		EERs		

Figure 5

IMPLEMENTATION

On the same day that implementation approval was granted by the community's commanding general, the deputy community commander, executive officer and the staff were tasked indirectly by the commanding general to support design of the Welcome and Clearance Center. The OE consultant provided basic information for the executive officer to develop a tasking document of major events which required command support. This document tasked those personnel who were directly responsible for each event occurring, through completion. The OE consultants developed, in conjunction with the DPCA, a milestone chart of key events that were to occur up until the final implementation. These milestones were designed to ease and facilitate the movement from the organization's present state to its future state and to allow the change to occur gradually and methodically (Figure 5). Significant events of the milestone plan include:

These milestones were started in May 1982 as planned, and full implementation is expected in October 1982.

(1). Maintain a daily register of names, units and date of appointment, evaluating it monthly and presenting a report to the DPCA on those personnel who failed to meet their appointments.

(2). Develop a rating scheme for all personnel working in the Welcome and Clearance Center, that would eliminate confusion and uncertainty as to whom all military personnel work for.

(3). Upgrade current lounge facility by adding new furniture and intercom system.

(4). Redesign the organizational structure to better control customer traffic.

(5). Increase communication within and between sections by scheduling more informal meetings for participation by all employees.

(6). Recognize people who do good work.

(7). Resolve customer complaints on the spot.

EVALUATION

After two months, the OE consultants revisited the Welcome and Clearance Center to see what progress had been made. Communication between and within sections has increased significantly (Figure 6). Action to eliminate two personnel spaces which was recommended was nearly completed. The amount of time it takes to process a customer is gradually decreasing. Awards are now being presented to personnel who do good work. Major evidences of success in the redesign of the organization are expected over the next 90 days (next evaluation date) because of the command-wide impact of the redesign effort directed by the community commanding general.

CONCLUSION

In this operation, the OE consultants facilitated planning and implementation by key personnel. In fact, they served as catalysts in the commander's efforts to transition the organization from the less desirable present state to the more desirable future state. This same concept can work at any level of command or leadership because the OE consultant is working for the organization by helping the leadership to become the change agents for the organization. In this situation the commander role-modeled to his subordinates that the use of OE in assessing the organization implied key "stake holders" can talk and take action to change aspects that are determined less than desirable. ☐

BENEFITS GAINED BY WCC

PERSONNEL

1. **Complaints**
   - Decrease soldier irritants.
   - Faster processing of personnel.
   - Fewer negative performance/personal counseling.
2. Turbulence
   - Less job stress for office personnel.
3. Team work
   - Roles clarified/defined, understood or supported.
   - Clearer responsibility/accountability.
   - Higher teamwork.
   - Increased commitments to goals, sense of involvement.
   - Improved image of Welcome and Clearance Center and personnel.
   - Improved work climate, peer relations.
   - Increased job satisfaction.
   - Increased morale, motivation, trust.
   - Increased number of awards, certificates of achievement.
   - More informal meetings.

TIME

1. **Conflict**
   - Reduced time on personal, inter and intra section conflict.
   - Less time spent by personnel clerks trying to resolve conflicts with customers.
2. Faster
   - Maximize time used.
   - Less duplication of efforts.

DOLLARS

- Savings cannot be realistically computed at this time.

Figure 6

Failure is only the opportunity to begin again, more intelligently.
—Henry Ford

New opinions are always suspected and usually opposed, for no other reason than because they are not already common.
—John Locke

When a true genius appears in the world, you may know him by this sign, that the dunces are all in confederacy against him.
—Jonathan Swift

Breaking Into Quality Circles
Implementation at a TRADOC Installation

Mr. Eugene Cottle, CPT Bert Frandsen, and MSG Karl Brandenburg (Ft. Benning)

Much has been written concerning the Quality Circle and WEIT concepts. Now is the time to share information on implementation procedures. Fort Benning has embarked on an installation-wide Quality Circle Program supported by top management and union leaders. The following article outlines the implementation procedure that has worked at this TRADOC installation and might be useful to others.

The OE Office provided consulting assistance on Quality Circles to the Directorate of Resources Management (DRM), who was interested in the implementation of a QC program. Our goal was to implement eight to ten QC's as a pilot project within various base operation organizations. A QC planning group was formed consisting of the DRM program coordinator and two OEC's.

This type organization capitalized on the program implementation experience of the senior management analyst, the consulting skills of the OEC's, and the group problem solving skills of both. An implementation plan was developed:

Phase I - Implementation Planning and Training (Jan 1982)

Phase II - Marketing (Jan-Apr 1982)

Phase III - Circle Leader Training (10-13 Apr 1982)

Phase IV - Circle meetings begin

Phase I - Implementation Planning and Training (Jan 1982)

In order to gather as much information and expertise as possible about Quality Circles, each member of the planning group attended different QC courses. These were one week in length and conducted by the QC Institute at Red Bluff, CA, (civilian), the Air Force Institute of Technology at Wright-Patterson AFB, and the Army Management Engineering Training Agency at Rock Island Arsenal. Materials and concepts from these courses, OECS WEIT publications, and ideas from those already embarked on Quality Circles enabled us to design an implementation package suited to Fort Benning that considered in detail marketing, training, conducting a pilot project, and later expansion.

Phase II - Marketing (Jan - Apr 1982)

To market the installation-wide pilot program required the approval and support of top management. A one-hour briefing was developed and presented to the Chief of Staff and to selected principal staff officers to obtain this support. The briefing consisted of the following:

- SLIDE PRESENTATION covering the QC concept, history and structure.
- VIDEO TAPE produced by Norfolk Naval Shipyard entitled, *"A Time for People Building."*
- PROPOSAL:

1. Brief the next lower echelon of management, and to brief "top-down" to all echelons, including the worker level.
2. Request volunteers at each level briefed. If a manager did not volunteer, no further briefings would be given to his organization.
3. Of first-line supervisors who volunteered, select eight to ten to participate as circle leaders.
4. Provide all training and assistance needed to ensure that each circle had ample opportunity to succeed.
5. Evaluate the program after a test period to determine whether the program should be expanded or abandoned.

The program was approved and permission was given to brief successively lower echelons of management. Significantly, a spirit of volunteerism was maintained — managers at all levels who were not interested were not pressured to try QC's.

AUTHORS

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Captain Bert Frandsen was commissioned as an infantry officer from Auburn University. His assignments have included duty with the 2d Infantry Division, 2d Ranger Battalion, and 9th Infantry Division. He is currently assigned as an OEC at Fort Benning, Georgia. He is a graduate of OECC 4-80.

MSG Karl Brandenburg, OEC at Fort Benning, GA. Graduate of OECC 1-80.

CPT Bert Frandsen

At the same time the concept was being marketed down the chain of command, a Steering Committee was formed which consisted of the Chief of Staff as Chairman and principal staff officers who had QC's in their organizations. Union representatives enthusiastically agreed to participate as non-voting members of the committee. A post circular on QC's was subsequently published, formalizing the program.

The total marketing process took approximately two months. From those who volunteered we selected nine initial circle leaders. Leaders came from both the "white collar" and "blue collar" areas. We have since determined that the selection of leaders is a critical aspect of the process. Though we have yet to develop specific selection criteria, we have learned some valuable lessons. Leaders must be enthusiastic about this participative management concept. Intellectually, they must have the potential to instruct and lead in group problem solving, after only a minimum amount of training. Avoid supervisors. Look for good listeners, self starters, and people-oriented supervisors. The old adage that OE makes a good organization better is also true for Quality Circles. Overall, we have found that success always occurred where the workers and supervisors expressed enthusiasm and genuine commitment after our marketing briefings. A most important aspect not to be overlooked during selection of leaders is the commitment expressed by their supervisors. Managers must be committed, not only to allowing time for group problem solving on a regular basis, but also to providing encouragement and timely implementation (or reasons for rejection) of circle recommendations.

Phase III - Circle Leader Training (10-13 Apr 1982)

A four-day training course was developed to train circle leaders. The first two days of training covered traditional QC problem-solving tools such as brainstorming, data collection, pareto analysis, cause and effect analysis, and the management presentation. Group leadership skills such as listening, synergy, consensus, conflict, and meeting management were also taught. The experiential learning model was used for all leadership skills and performance oriented training techniques (i.e., explain and demonstrate, student practice, and test) were used for QC tools. A majority of the time in the last two days of training was spent in a QC simulation with the class divided into two circles in which each circle attempted to solve a case study. Eight one-hour QC "meetings" were conducted. Leadership positions within the student circles were rotated for each "meeting" so that each student had an opportunity to teach a QC tool and lead the problem-solving process. The simulation culminated in a management presentation to the other student circle and the instructors. Critiques were conducted after each "meeting" and at the end of the simulation. The last afternoon of the fourth day included a written test, "a getting started" workshop, a test critique, and graduation, at which the installation Chief of Staff demonstrated his support and awarded the diplomas.

Phase IV - circle meetings begin

Initial meetings of each of the nine circles followed the same general outline:

- First Meeting: The circle leader briefed work center personnel on the QC concept, distributed member handbooks, and asked for volunteers. (Work group personnel had already volunteered during the marketing phase; this second request by the leader confirmed commitment and demonstrated his or her new expertise).
- Second Meeting: The circle leader taught brainstorming. Circle members used brainstorming to develop group norms and a circle name.
- Third Meeting: The Leader taught data collection techniques, reviewed brainstorming, and the circle members used brainstorming to develop a list of problems.

Each subsequent meeting included a lecturette on a QC tool as appropriate to the stage that the circle has reached in the problem-solving process. The QC facilitator monitors most meetings initially and coaches the QC leader on the problem-solving process and meeting management. When all instruction has been completed, the circles begin in earnest to identify, analyze, and resolve problems in the work place. The QC facilitators (more of a coordinator/consultant than the LMDC type facilitator with which OEC's are familiar) during the pilot project consisted of the OEC's and management analyst. As the program expands, successful circle leaders will become facilitators, or volunteers may be trained locally by the OEC's and/or sent to one of the various QC schools. We felt it important that all concerned understand OEC's would serve as facilitators for only the pilot project.

Evaluation of the pilot program will consist of an assessment of the work group before starting the QC process and again six months later. This assessment will include a review of historical information concerning the work force (sick leave, turnover, awards, etc.) and the circle (number of members participating, number of projects developed, number of circles discontinued, etc.) and an attitudinal (GOQ type) survey. The most important evaluation, though, will be made by the steering committee, supervisors and managers of organizations that have QC's. This evaluation will be based on their own day-to-day observations of the changes that occur in a QC work group.

CONCLUSION

Quality Circles is a concept that has been shown throughout the world to be of great benefit in a variety of work environments. We are confident that the approach outlined in this article can be successfully implemented at other TRADOC and FORSCOM installations. This program can result in a transformation of management style that will assist us in creating high performing organizations. □

Brainstorming: Guidelines for generating ideas

Reprinted, with permission, from *Training*, Vol. 19, number 9, September 1982, p. 114.

by Will Lorey

In the scramble to get everyone aboard the quality circle (QC) bandwagon, *brainstorming* is being recommended as a QC technique to use right now.

One of its appeals is simplicity. All that a brainstorming session requires is a group of people who have an active interest in the topic, and a stimulating leader. Brainstorming can be likened to a "bull session" in a relaxing atmosphere—but a bull session designed to generate ideas and inspire creativity. Frequently the end result of brainstorming is ideas that are truly ingenious, and one final idea that is implemented with everyone's commitment.

As used within organizations, brainstorming starts when a group of employees with similar work experience are asked if they would like to meet on company time for up to two hours to discuss some work-related issues. A conference room removed from the immediate work area is desirable, with the chairs arranged in a large semicircle or U-shape.

Depending on the size of the group, one or two people should take notes. In starting the session, the facilitator normally will:

1. Announce the time available for this meeting, and when and where the next meeting will be held.
2. State the problem area to be discussed in basic terms and ask the group to consider only one or two focal points.
3. Encourage each participant to set aside their logical, analytical and reasoning mind and to free-up their spontaneous self.
4. Insist that no evaluative remarks, either those of a critical or humorous nature, be made about any ideas, and inform the group that no idea will be explored in-depth until later in the session.
5. Encourage ideas that build upon another idea since they frequently are most helpful.
6. Open the floor to ideas from any group member. The more ideas the better.

After about 30 to 40 minutes, the facilitator can stop the session for a short break. Upon its return, the group can either separate the ideas contributed into two categories such as "immediately useful" and "potentially useful," or it may list ideas in order of usefulness, dropping those that are impractical. It is at this stage that ideas can be "massaged" for possible implementation. But a note of caution. Care has to be taken not to forget that many "weird" ideas may have value for later use. We can utilize all ideas, those thought possible *or* impossible, by listing the ideas both downward and across flip-pad sheets thus creating an Idea Matrix. By looking at each idea in various combinations, you can probably produce still more ideas.

For a group new to brainstorming, many experts recommend a *trial* session using fun exercises like the following to loosen up the flow of ideas:

You are single, living alone. Just before you have to go to an important evening party, a small fire breaks out in your closet. While the damage is not extensive, all of your clothes are destroyed. The stores are closed, your neighbors gone. What would you do to be able to attend the party?

Another brainstorming technique, similar to that already discussed, uses the round-robin method. Between 10 and 15 employees, all from the same department, meet in a conference room or similar area removed from the work area. The facilitator makes sure employees know each other and then sets out some simple guidelines:

We will be here for about two hours.

There will be no interruptions. Each of your bosses agreed not to call you out except in a real emergency.

I will act as monitor only to keep the group on track and to record your ideas on the chalkboard (flip pads).

At the outset no one should discuss or comment on anyone else's idea. If you do, I will have to stop you. Building on another suggestion or idea, however, is encouraged.

In about one hour we will take a short break and then come back and discuss each idea.

Starting with one member, the facilitator working around the group in round-robin fashion, asks for one idea on how *productivity* might be *measured* in the department. Starting with how to measure work has a twofold value in that it gets each member to start thinking about how standards of performance can be set, and it leads them to think of ways to improve/increase the work that they do.

At the end of this first session, the facilitator reviews all the ideas generated and combines similar ideas on one or two flip-pad sheets. Then the group members are asked individually to write down priority numbers for each idea now posted. After collecting that data, the facilitator develops a final ranking from the number of points assigned to each individual measurement. Now the facilitator can move on to generating new ideas on how to improve productivity or wait until another meeting.

In concluding this first attempt at brainstorming the facilitator must thank everyone for their ideas and their interest and stress that while all the ideas cannot be utilized, those that support department objectives will be evaluated for *immediate use*.

Still another variation is the Gordon Technique. In this method, the group attacks the underlying *concept* of the problem rather than the problem itself, and ideas are explored at length and examined from many perspectives—social, economic, financial and mechanical. For example, if an innovative sales approach is needed for a new product, the facilitator would introduce the subject of market shape.

Depending on how a session is conducted, brainstorming can be extremely effective—or a complete waste of time. Even *Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary* (Springfield, MA, G.C. Merriam Co., 1974) is of two minds about brainstorming and lists it as (a) a sudden bright idea or (b) a harebrained idea. But perhaps Thomas Paine had the final thought when he stated: "The sublime and the ridiculous are often so nearly related, that it is difficult to class them separately. One step above the sublime makes the ridiculous, and one step above the ridiculous makes the sublime again." Brainstorming will produce ideas; it is our job to determine which are ridiculous and which are sublime. □

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Learning To Diffuse The *Burnout Bomb* Before It Bursts

Jane E. Brody (The New York Times)

Reprinted from *San Jose Mecury News*, 8 Oct 82, pp. 1-2C.

Do you feel, in your job, your marriage, your life, as if you're banging your head against a stone wall, trying harder and harder but accomplishing less and less? After years of greeting each day with enthusiasm, do you now awake wishing the morning would go away, but force yourself to get up and face yet another day of hard work from which you derive little or no satisfaction? Are you no longer excited by the activities and accomplishments you used to find stimulating? Are you becoming increasingly drained, physically and emotionally?

If so, you could be on the verge of, or already suffering from, **burnout.** Dr. Herbert J. Freudenberger, a New York psychotherapist who popularized the concept in his book *"Burn-Out"* (Anchor Press hardcover, Bantam paperback), defined it as "a state of fatigue or frustration brought about by devotion to a cause, way of life, or relationship that failed to produce the expected reward."

The symptoms of burnout, which may occur in many different combinations, are becoming familiar to an increasing number of people: fatigue, reduced efficiency, boredom, apathy, sadness, anger, irritability, frustration, forgetfulness, disappointment, despondency, even despair.

The frequent victims are the people you'd least expect to falter—highly energetic, competent, accomplished and seemingly self-sufficient men and women. They tend to be idealistic and dedicated, the kind of people you could count on to get things done.

"The single most important step is to avoid making work the sole determinant of self-esteem."

Unfortunately, achievement in modern society is often rewarded by an increase in demands, both internally and externally imposed. (An editor once told me, "If you want something done quickly, give it to the busiest person.") Many people come to define themselves in terms of their accomplishments, which sooner or later can appear hollow. Relentlessly pursuing their ideals, self-aggrandizement or ever-greater accomplishments, while suppressing their inner beings, they grind themselves to a halt. As Freudenberger noted, they begin to hate their jobs and their surroundings and everyone connected with them.

Too often, instead of realizing the nature of the problem, slowing down and expanding their human contacts and interest, people suffering from burnout turn to potentially harmful sources of stimulation to restore their lost vitality: even more work, alcohol, drugs, illicit sex, gambling, or other risky or self-destructive behavior.

The Causes

In years past, burnout primarily afflicted people climbing the corporate ladder, people driven by a relentless creative impluse and people in the helping professions who became overly involved with their work.

People in the last group—nurses, social workers and the like—are especially prone to burnout because they tend to be highly idealistic, compassionate and committed but unprepared for the frustrations of their jobs, the constant pressures and the limited number of rewarding interactions with the people they serve.

Dr. J. Ingram Walker, a psychiatrist at Duke University and the author of "Everybody's Guide to Emotional Well-Being" (Harbor Publishing), describes the syndrome of overwork that can lead to burnout:

"Some people, seeking approval from almost everyone, may use work as a primary method to enhance self-esteem and gain social approval. Unable to say no to demands of others, these individuals cultivate few activities that bring pleasure or satisfaction to themselves. They eventually become burdened with fatigue, which in turn leads to decreased effectiveness. "Instead of taking a break, they eliminate exercise and recreational time in a desperate attempt to meet the demands placed on themselves. The increased workload causes a deterioration in their marriage and family life, undermining their main source of non-work-related support."

The Symptoms

Dr. Pamela Patrick, a nurse and clinical psychologist in St. Pertersburg, Fla., who wrote "Health Care Worker Burnout" (Inquiry Books), describes three sets of symptoms that are early signs of burnout:

Subjective—emotional exhaustion, feelings of failure or frustration, a decline in self-esteem, trapped feelings and boredom.

Physical—increasing levels of fatigue, sleep disturbances, changes in appetite and lowered resistance to infection and headaches.

Attitudinal—skipping rest and food breaks, delaying or canceling a vacation because of an unwarranted feeling of indispensability.

Freudenberger's list included exhaustion, detachment, boredom, cynicism, impatience, irritability, a sense of omnipotence, feeling unappreciated, paranoia, disorientation, psychosomatic complaints, depression and denial of feeling.

Prevention and Treatment

Self-awareness is probably the best defense against burnout. But someone living on a treadmill of work, work and more work is unlikely to stop long enough to analyze his condition. Sometimes the interception of a friend or relative or an associate is needed to avert a burnout.

The single most important step is to avoid making work the sole determinant of self-esteem. Freudenberger says that unless you can separate your being from your work, you will be vulnerable to any professional setback, rejection or criticism.

Some measures that can help protect you from burnout include setting realistic goals; regaining a sense of fun and frivolity; taking vacations and learning to enjoy time off from work; expressing your feeling to colleagues, family and friends; pursing regular exercise and activities that are very different from the demands of your job; cultivating friendships; getting closer to your spouse and children; avoiding abuse of drugs and alcohol; learning to say "no" sometimes; giving up some of your ideals and standards of perfection; learning to savor the small blessings in life. ☐

The ConSULTANT'S New Workshop

Re-told* by CPT(P) Lawrence R. Boice

*This parable is a parody, loosely based on Hans Christian Andersen's "The Emperor's New Clothes." It is offered in the spirit of "users metaphors and analogies," an identified consultant competency. (See *OE Communique,* issue #3-81, pp. 40-47, 82-85, and, if you like paradized children's fables, 36-37).

There once lived a Sultan who was very fond of organizational innovations. In fact, he spent most of his time seeking new ways to rearrange and redefine his dominion. His subjects claimed he had a new organizational technique for every week of each month; his only desired outcome appeared to be *change* itself.

One day two *quick-change* artists came by, claiming that they were the finest presentors in the world.

They said they could address untapped subordinate potential, inhibited communications and dysfunctional organizational climate unlike anyone else. Not only were the designs and graphics remarkably beautiful, but the presentation results were of a "special quality;" they were imperceptible to anyone who was exceedingly stupid or unfit for his or her job.

"I must have these presentations for my organization right away," said the Sultan. "Then I will be able to tell wise persons from fools, and I will know who are unfit for the positions they hold."

The Sultan had the change artists set up an office and gave them all of the personnel, materiel, dollars and time they requested.

They spent day after day preparing and conducting their special presentations. Each week they requested more resources.

The Sultan was very anxious to see the results; however, he remembered what the change artists had said: Anyone unfit for his position or exceedingly stupid would not be able to perceive the real impact.

"I know I am a good Sultan," he thought, "but it might be best to have someone else preview and truly measure the results first." He decided to send his wise and capable Executive sultan.

"Oh my," thought the executive as he gazed at the documentation, "I see no meaningful change at all!" He couldn't let anyone know, or they would think him unfit to be the Executive sultan. Besides, there *had* to have been results; the Sultan said so.

"What an impressive experience you have provided us," he said. "I know the Sultan will be delighted."

The next day the Sultan and several members of the top team went to review the results. The two artists pretended to display the measured changes.

"I see nothing at all," thought the Sultan to himself. "Can I be unfit for my position? I cannot let anyone know."

"Beautiful!" he exclaimed. "The organizational impact was just what I wanted."

The staff couldn't believe their eyes. They couldn't see any results either but echoed the Sultan's praises.

"You must feed these outcomes back to the entire organizational membership," they exclaimed.

The change artists worked on into the night discovering new organizational benefits accruing from the experience. They measured pre- and post-scores and computed the differences on a calculator which had no batteries.

In the morning they declared that the completed evaluation package was ready for the Sultan to announce to the entire organization. They pretended to highlight selected items with the most magical of markers.

"That's just beautiful," sighed the Sultan. "Let me have a magical marker." They helped him move the illusionary easel to the assembly hall. "Let the report-out begin," exclaimed the Sultan.

Two aides stepped up as if to flip the chart paper; they chose not to admit that they saw, felt, and heard nothing.

As the Sultan stood proudly beside the easel, the top team exclaimed of the impressive results; they couldn't let it be known (to one another) that they perceived none.



"The easel is empty," said one organizational peon, finally. "And there has been no impact in our daily organizational lives." The membership began to repeat it. "Nothing has improved at all!" The Sultan felt very uncomfortable, for he too realized that he had been *short-changed.* Meanwhile, the artists of quick change had moved on, leaving behind only the now not-so-magical markers....

...**AND THE MORAL OF THE STORY** is any one (or more) of the following:

1. Just because everything is different doesn't mean anything has changed. —**Irene Peter**
2. Where all men think alike, no one thinks very much. —**Walter Lippmann**
3. There are two kinds of fools. One says, "This is old, therefore it is good." The other says, "This is new, therefore it is better." —**Laurence J. Peter**
4. Fraud and falsehood only dread examination. Truth invites it. —**Thomas Cooper (1759-1839)**
5. The superior man understands what is right; the inferior man understands what will sell. —**Confucius (c. 551-479BC)**
6. Statistics are like a bikini. What they reveal is suggestive, but what they conceal is vital. —**Aaron Levenstein**
7. If the results aren't worth documenting, the work probably wasn't worth doing. —**An anonymous *Communique* editor**
8. If you wish to live wisely, ignore sayings - including this one. —**Laurence J. Peter**

Is Anybody Out There Listening?

Ann Baker
(Knight-Ridder News Service)

Reprinted by permission of the *St. Paul Pioneer Press.*

You're talking away, trying your darndest to explain what needs to be explained, and it's no use: The other person just won't listen.

You've a right to feel annoyed, and you're certainly not alone. Communications experts suspect more wars have been started and more marriages ended by failure to listen than by anything said.

Yet few people have even thought about learning how to become a good listener. When a message doesn't get through, we tend to blame the speaker. When we study communications, we study reading, writing, and speaking. We think of listening as something passive and weak, hardly worth our serious attention.

Ralph Nichols discovered the opposite 50 years ago while coaching high-school debaters in Iowa.

It was in the depths of the Depression, and, he recalled, "your job depended on how well you succeeded in doing the things you were assigned." He felt his teaching job depended on getting the students in Fort Dodge to win some debates, so he concentrated on building their skills to demolish the opposition.

Before long, Nichols began to realize it wasn't how fluently the debaters spoke that helped them win; it was how well they heard their opponents' arguments. Only when they listened carefully could they pick out the other side's flaws and overpower the evidence.

The Fort Dodge students went on to win the Iowa state championship, and Nichols went on to teach and investigate listening skills. While heading the rhetoric department at the University of Minnesota from 1944 to 1972, he introduced several listening courses and became known nationally as **"the father of listening."**

In turn, one of Nichols' disciples, Lyman "Manny" Steil, who started teaching the university's listening courses when Nichols retired, built an international organization and profitable business around the art of listening.

Listening has become "a hot topic," said Steil, that scores of self-appointed experts are finding plenty of audiences willing to pay plenty to listen to what they have to say about listening.

Still, most of the audiences are in boardrooms and convention halls. They're businessmen lending their ears to the cause of making more money.

"We spend the greatest amount of time teaching people to do what they spend the least time doing—**writing,"** Steil said. "And we spend the least amount of time teaching them what they do most in life—**listening.** It's lamentable, because listening is much more complex than reading. The message is written on the wind. It's transient. If we don't get the message the first time, there's usually no going back."

Back in the 1940s, when Nichols analyzed the listening habits of hundreds of students for his doctoral research, he discovered four main things separated good from poor listeners. The good ones:

- Overcome distractions.
- Detect the speaker's pattern of organization; if none is apparent, they weave a pattern of their own around what the speaker is saying. They look for the main ideas rather than assorted facts.
- Control their emotions—especially crucial in a conversation between two people. "Let the man talk and finish it," Nichols said. "Get angry afterwards, not in the middle of the discourse. It will throw you out of sync and you'll be a bad listener from then on."
- Take advantage of the fact that one generally thinks four to five times faster than the average 130-word-per-minute speech. Instead of day dreaming or getting impatient, good listeners use the lag time to make mental summaries and written notes of ideas to pursue later.

"All too often we tune out a speaker because we don't like his looks, voice quality or opening line," said Nichols.

Steil says we communicate on four different levels:

First is **small talk.** Though some people sniff at small talk as a time-waster, most of us find it essential for getting to know one another. Steil says it is the thing that develops binding relationships.

The second level is **catharsis,** venting feelings, sharing problems and frustrations. When someone expresses his emotions, he needs a listener with empathy who will just listen—nod, say, "I see," and not jump in with advice or criticism.

The third level is **exchange of information.**

Fourth is **persuasion.**

What often botches communication, Steil says, is that a speaker may be on one level and a listener on another. If you need to receive basic information quickly, it will be maddening to have to hear a lot of first-level talk about the weather or fourth-level pressure to change your attitudes.

Usually, *people start at the first level and work their way up.* If you realize that, it becomes easier to hear them out.

Another important thing for listeners to remember is to let the person speaking know your response. Steil says it is good form and good listening to say, "I didn't get that" or, "Would you say that again, please?" Even "That's ridiculous!" is better than saying nothing, showing no facial expression, just letting the talker drone on as if you understood and agreed with him when you don't. Only if you respond do you give him a chance to clarify or correct himself.

"Conversation may be an art, but listening can prevent wars."

Finally, for serious listening, Steil says he cannot overemphasize the value of taking notes. It amazes him that in most courtrooms, judges instruct juries not to take notes, on the assumption that it will distract them. Steil says all the research on listening indicates the contrary, that taking notes "heightens your tuned-in listening," helping you remember what seemed most important to you when you heard it. It also helps you avoid daydreaming or letting your emotions obstruct what is being said.

Steil tells people that you have to keep alert throughout a speaker's presentation or you will miss the gems he may utter when you least expect them.

Does that mean you need to listen intently to everybody all day long?

"I think it's justifiable to tune out someone, as long as you do it consciously," said Nichols. "Use a bunch of grunts, 'Um,' 'Really?', 'You don't say?' while you free your mind to think about personal problems. But with people you care about, that's dangerous. Better to say, 'I'm sorry, I've got to think about something else. Would you excuse me if I don't listen?' " □

No one can make a real masterpiece of life until he sees something infinitely greater in his vocation than bread and butter and shelter.
—Orison Swett Marden

There is very little difference in people, but that little difference makes a big difference. The little difference is attitude. The big difference is whether it is positive or negative.—**Clement Stone**

Converting stress from a liability into an asset is a complex—but not insurmountable—challenge to trainers. This article will help you focus your efforts in tackling the problem

Designing an effective stress-management training program

Reprinted, with permission, from *Training*, Vol. 19, number 9, September, 1982, p. 20.

by Darrell R. Griffin, George Everly and Calvin Fuhrmann

It is not enough to say that uncontrolled stress is one of the most debilitating medical and social problems in the United States today; that up to half of all general and corporate medical practice patients are suffering from stress-related problems; and that the annual cost of lost work days, hospitalization and outpatient care, diminished creativity and death linked to mismanaged stress totals tens of billions of dollars.

It is not enough because mere stress *reduction* often is not desirable or appropriate. It is now clear that stress can be a positive and highly desirable force when harnessed and positively controlled and directed. This is especially true in the work place. Properly channeled, stress can be a catalyst to help each worker perform at levels far superior to performance in unstressed conditions.

Converting stress from a terrible liability into a productive asset is a complex—but not insurmountable—challenge to trainers. Your focus should be on the *individual.* You should carefully plan a training strategy for fostering a feeling of *self-responsibility* and increasing individual self-esteem and perceived feelings of control over stressful conditions.

It is a disservice to focus exclusively on external sources of stress—especially the job. No one should be encouraged to put automatic blame on the work environment or the supervisor for an individual stress problem. Stress often cannot be avoided, but it can be *managed* successfully by anyone with proper guidance.

Introducing a stress management program to your organization can bring great payoffs. But if you don't devote considerable effort to determining your goals and objectives for a program, your chances of success are slim. Experience from a wide variety of organizational efforts at stress management lead to the following set of guidelines to help you set goals:

- Make your goals as specific as possible. Goals that are too general or simplistic—like "our goal is to reduce stress"—are not helpful if they do not state what kind of stressors—circumstances perceived as threats—are thought to be causing the excessive stress. Goals should list the objectionable manifestations of stress as things stand and should prescribe the reduction required to pronounce the training a success.
- Set measurable goals just as you would for any other kind of training. Measuring the results of stress-management training is essential to secure feedback on its effectiveness and determine where revision is necessary.
- Insist on realistic goals. Unmanaged stress has such far-reaching negative effects on the organization that it is tempting to promise an improvement in all of the dimensions potentially affected by stress. That is not possible in many cases, however.

The conclusions of the National Conference on Health Promotion Programs in Occupational Settings (1979) clearly support the notion that well-designed and well-implemented stress-management training can, in fact, have far-reaching benefits, but trainers should be cautious about promising too much. The problems are multidimensional, with roots beyond the reach of training departments. Most organizational managers would be very happy with an improvement in just one or two areas.

The key is to pick the one dimension of greatest interest to management—or one improvement that will do the most to alleviate or reduce the problem that management perceives as most serious at the time. Then determine what level of improvement is acceptable and achievable (based on previous accomplishments in similar organizations) and establish your goal or goals.

- Incorporate both individual benefits and broad organizational improvements into the goals of your stress management training system.
- Elicit the support and endorsement of upper management.
- Focus on specific attitudinal changes, modifications of behavior and skills to be acquired. We know that individual perception is a key factor in triggering the stress response; we know that perceptions can be altered through training. In addition, we know that both adaptive and maladaptive coping are learned responses. Consequently, stress-management training should guide the employee toward adaptive strategies suited to individual needs and away from maladaptive behavior.

The time you spend defining your goals and objectives for a stress management program will be worth the effort. But the next important step is even tougher: assembling the right mix of components for a successful training experience. The following progression of actions is drawn from results of stress-management experiments and studies of training outcomes. Perhaps they should find a place in your program.

1 Assess and measure each employee's stress level. Because stress-management programs are intended primarily for already highly stressed people, it is easy to assume that they're the only ones who can benefit. Not so: *Everyone* can benefit from behaviorally based stress-management training.

Even people with comparatively low levels of stress can learn to *maintain* that level of comfort. No matter who is chosen to participate, it is crucial to estimate individual stress levels before the training starts, and (as stated in the list of goals) to have some indication of what is causing or contributing to objectionable indications of stress. This provides important direction for the training system.

2 Assess adaptive and maladaptive coping strategies. Knowing how individuals cope with stress provides important insights into the participants' needs. Your job is to help them to unlearn maladaptive coping behaviors, without squashing any adaptive coping behaviors they may have. An assessment is necessary to determine realistic, attainable and precise goals for behavioral change. Calling for change that is too drastic in *any* behavior—including coping behavior—is in itself stress producing!

3 Determine the major stressors in the work place. Organizations have built-in stressors that vary with the nature of their business. Although it is unrealistic to expect major changes in work environments, it's possible to tailor stress-management strategies to fit the needs of individual workers. Consequently, it often pays to investigate adaptive coping strategies that are specific to the situation at hand.

4 Explain what stress is. Stress-management training begins with a lecture and group discussion designed to clear up misconceptions—for instance, that stress responses are signs of "weakness"—and provide a generally accepted and technically correct definition of stress. In addition, the discussion serves as a form of audience analysis. As the leader, you can get a feel for the level of sophistication and knowledge of the participants during this discussion and make any necessary revisions in your training strategy.

5 Explain the personal health implications for eustress (positive stress) and distress (negative stress). A clear distinction must be made: stress can act as a positive motivating force (eustress) as well as a debilitating, destructive force (distress). While it is desirable to keep this discussion understandable, it is important to promote the attitude that stress is a complex phenomenon that has very real—and potentially very serious—negative effects on the body. It is also very important to dispel the myth that physical and psychological responses to stress represent some sort of mental illness.

6 Identify each individual's symptoms resulting from excessive stress. This part of the training not only alerts each participant to the fact that the body signals the presence of the stress response, it also shows each individual how to identify the symptoms of stress and provides the opportunity to practice this very essential skill. Because the symptoms of stress are individualized and dynamic, recognizing them requires practice.

Attitude is important here. If the participants come to view the symptoms of stress as wholly negative (and frightening) in themselves, rather than as "warning signals" of stress that can have a very positive function, then positive feedback mechanisms are blocked. Your job is to help trainees recognize how symptoms can be controlled and used positively.

Certain stress symptoms warn of significant health problems. These symptoms—prolonged dizziness, prolonged gastrointestinal pain, persistent visual disturbances, persistent heart condition abnormalities or any generalized pain or prolonged dysfunction—should signal a visit to a doctor. Your emphasis of this part of the training should be based on the general level of stress reported by the participants and the severity of the situation. (Participants with high stress and significant maladaptive coping levels would have a greater need to learn about the warning signs.)

7 Identify personal causes of stress. To identify the personal causes of stress you must isolate environmental factors perceived as threatening, challenging or potentially harmful. These stressors will vary from one person to the next and even from situation to situation. Consequently, no realistic stress-management program will suggest that everyone has the same stressors or that stress-reduction techniques can be standardized.

There are a number of ways to identify personal stressors, but some of the most effective include self-assessment exercises that result in a personalized profile including stresses that arise from the job, home life, diet and personality. Often this personal assessment is a genuine turning point or breakthrough in the training. Once participants know the sources of their stress, they begin to explore specific stress-management strategies. The personalized stressor profile helps participants stay involved with the training.

8 Describe various stress-management strategies. Specific practice in stress-management strategies must be based on each person's unique stressors, characteristics, situation and behavioral preferences.

9 Develop a personalized stress-management plan. Because there is no one best way to manage stress, you should provide essential processes, knowledge, skills and attitudes for each individual to formulate a personalized stress-management strategy.

Like golf clubs, some strategies are useful only in very specific situations. Others have very broad usefulness. Alternative strategies are needed. Mastery of stress management—like the mastery of golf—requires training, coaching, concentration, feedback and practical experience. It is *impossible* for each individual to leave the training session totally prepared to manage all of his or her stressors. Stress management is a complex set of skills that can be mastered only through disciplined application over an extended period.

Trainers and participants should be prepared for changing their stress-management plans as individuals and the environment change. The only way to refine and develop the plan is through trial and error and systematic situation analysis.

All the evidence suggests that effective stress management is an on-going process, rather than a single-shot problem you can solve with a one-day seminar. The skills required to manage stress can only be mastered through experience and application with feedback and developmental guidance over time. People must learn to use different strategies for different situations.

Because of all this, it's essential to form a stress management *system*, complete with feedback and follow-up components. To be truly effective, stress management should become part of your organization's culture. ■

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Some Thoughts on Combat OE

CPT Jeffrey T. Paulding (USAREUR)

OE In Peace and Combat

At present, US Army Organizational Effectiveness doctrine is ambiguous, especially in respect to the transition from the peacetime role of OE to a wartime role. But it is not unusual for such a dynamic concept as organizational effectiveness to be in a state of flux. Since OE was created after the Vietnam war, its applicability in a combat environment has not been tested. Therefore, it is not surprising that there are many unanswered questions concerning OE's use in combat. Nor is it known what ramifications the development of a combat OE doctrine will have on its peacetime use.

My feeling is that whatever OE's use in combat turns out to be, it should be congruent with its peacetime operations; one integrated mode of operation that allows us to "train as we would fight." To do otherwise means educating both the OEC and his user in a new doctrine under the stress of wartime conditions. Thus, the purpose of this essay is to present some rudimentary thoughts on an integrated OE doctrine applicable in war or peace.

The Role of the OEC

In combat, the need for effective action becomes paramount. As with peacetime operations, the OEC can assist the command to achieve the high performance necessary to obtain assigned objectives with as little cost as possible. The environment in which OE operates changes with the onset of war, but the role does not. It is the responsibility of every officer and non-commissioned officer in the United States Army to increase their organization's effectiveness. It is a duty that many of them take quite seriously. The difference between the OEC and the other officers and NCO's is that the OEC has organizational effectiveness as his sole duty. He is not encumbered by a daily routine of operational duties and loyalties that, in many cases, prevents the officer or NCO from devoting the necessary time to increasing the effectiveness of his organization. Aside from the training the OEC receives, this difference in assigned tasks is the key difference between him and his contemporaries. It is a difference that will become more pronounced in combat, as the battle involves the energies of all to the highest degree. Yet someone should be charged with sitting back and looking at the effectiveness of the organization as it engages in the tumult of combat.

What the OEC Does

The concept of OE, as per the new regulation, AR 5-15, is to transform the US Army into a high performing organization through a total systems approach. The OEC does this by assisting in: (a) leader and management development, (b) goal and objective setting, (c) long-range planning, (d) organizational design, (e) conference design, (f) problem-solving, and (g) linking individual performance objectives to organizational objectives. The aim of all these activities is to bring about a unity of action and purpose, which is the fundamental basis of organizational effectiveness. In wartime that translates into combat power and prowess in battle.

The Dynamic Battlefield

The modern battlefield is of unprecedented depth. With the advent of long-range munitions delivery systems, chemical, nuclear and electronic warfare, the chaos of battle will be spread further into the rear areas than ever before. More units of the Army, in particular combat support and combat service support units, will be subjected to the destructive dynamics of hostile action. No longer will only front-line units be disorganized due to enemy action, but many rear area units will also be subjected to the same process.

The emphasis in combat is on innovation and what works. Such an environment presents rich possibilities for the use of OE. This will be especially true on the modern battlefield, when so many units will be going through the transformation process of combat. There will be a lot of change taking place, a lot of commanders forced to take the initiative and innovate, when before they could rely upon regulation and routine. The transfer of information, about what works and what does not work, will be crucial. As will be the necessity of weeding out those incompetent leaders who have been hiding under the veil of regulation and routine, and replacing them with the self-confident, innovative leaders necessary to motivate the soldiers and get the mission accomplished. The array of problems to be solved, organizations to be designed and redesigned, leaders to be developed, and planning to be done in such an environment will be awesome. **The potential value of OE in such circumstances is beyond imagination!**

OEC: Organizational Effectiveness Consultant or Commissar

The concept of how the OEC should interface with the organization has been carefully designed and, for the most part, works well. Under the pressure of combat, there will probably be some changes along the lines I have already discussed.

During peacetime, specific provisions of AR 5-15 protect the integrity of the OEC, the user, and the project itself. By guaranteeing the anonymity and confidentiality of the information collected by the OEC, as well as by making it the property of the assessed organization, both the OEC and higher unit commanders are exempt, for the most part, from reactive bureaucratic pressures to use OE as a fault finder. Moreover, AR 5-15 specifically prohibits the use of OE to evaluate subordinate commands. The exception to all of the above is in the case of illegal activities. The question then becomes, what is illegal? Is a violation of the non-punitive regulation, AR 600-50, the Standards of Conduct, an illegal act? My JAG officer says yes, but I dare say that that is a question which must be answered individually by each OEC. But now consider the case of simple incompetence. By the regulation, discovery of incompetence within an individual or an organization by the OEC, even if severely detrimental to the functioning of the organizational system, should not be brought to the attention of superior commanders, but should only be used as data around which planning is conducted with the user organization. What happens in wartime when that same incompetence leads to the death of a number of men? Will the same constraints apply, or will the OE consulting process be subject to change when confronted by a hostile environment: that is to say, a change from *bureaucratic* norms, where the emphasis is on standardization and regulation, to *organic* norms where the emphasis is on what works and informality. I suggest that the OEC in the combat environment will undergo this change process. And in doing so, the OEC becomes more like an organizational effectiveness commissar and less like a consultant.

Work at the Top

For OEC's to be of much value in combat, they must work for the highest level commander of the unit to which they are assigned. In combat there should only be one contract and that is with the highest level commander. It is he who will most need the type of information gathered by the OEC. And by the same token, it is only through the commander that the OEC can appreciate the overall significance of operations and events. The OEC must know what is important despite the mayhem of the battle, because he will be talking to a lot of people; and in doing so, he will unavoidably impart a sense of what is important.

The OEC should be ready to see the firing line, and participate in combat in the event of an emergency. It is only through direct observation, that the reality of the frontline situation will anchor itself in the OEC's mind. Plus by moving amongst the troops, the OEC establishes the rapport necessary to gain the troop's confidence and learn what he needs to from them. Moreover, the OEC should thoroughly understand the tactics, weapons and operations of the unit. Thus the OEC can offer expert opinion, and more importantly, *ask the right questions.*

As Major Zais points out in his article on "Leadership, Management, Commandership and OE" *(OE Communique* issues #1-82 and 2-82), the OEC must, in order to perform well, possess the qualities of a good leader, manager and commander plus social-scientist. People of that caliber are not common. Perhaps only 20% of the possible officers and NCO's would have all of the necessary qualities. Putting these people into OE slots instead of putting them in charge of operational units is a tremendous luxury; one that perhaps our army could not afford. Putting less qualified people into the slots, and or ignoring those who are assigned to the OEC positions, could be even worse than shelving the program.

The potential increases in organizational effectiveness are great for the OEC's in combat and would work on those things which are the largest force multipliers: leadership, training, C^3 (Command, Control, Communication), and morale. The payoff would only come if commanders put good people into the OEC slots, let them do their job, and listen to them. Otherwise the OEC's would be more effective commanding units.

Organizing for Combat

War will involve large scale transformation and reorganization for the Army. Other changes in the Army, such as force modernization and the new manning system, will also involve massive changes throughout the Army. At present, the Army's change experts, the OEC's, are poorly organized to be of significant help. Reorganizing the OEC's relationships with commanders and themselves may be the answer.

At present, the OE network is in name only. Sure, some consultants coordinate and help each other, but it is an informal relationship that often takes a back seat to the formal demands the system places upon the OEC. At present it is nearly impossible to use the OEC's within a major command, or Army wide, in a coordinated fashion to work on systematic problems which span the entire command or Army, like force modernization. To allow such a coordinated effort, as would be necessary to deal with the problems created by a war, the OE network needs to be formalized.

The OE network could be formalized by tying the OEC's together through their rating scheme. There would be many different ways of doing this, each with its own benefits and problems. But considering the current grade structure of OEC positions, perhaps the easiest way would be to designate the OEC as having a dual chain of command with letter input from the OEC at the next higher echelon, as per AR 623-15, para 3-21. However, no matter how the network is specifically formalized, such an action should allow the coordinated management of change throughout the Army, a function which should be a valuable force multiplier in peace or war.

More on What the OEC Does

What the OEC does in peacetime and combat should be more or less the same. The techniques of interviewing, direct personal observation, and the reviewing of documents to gather data, are just as useful in wartime as in peace. This was proven by **S.L.A. Marshall's** studies on innumberable small unit actions during WWII, and the Korean and Vietnam wars (See article by **MG Augerson,** *OE Communique* issue #2-82). However, in wartime, the focus will change as the Army's mission becomes clear cut and unambiguous—defeat a belligerent force. Supporting the mission by helping units to develop into effective fighting forces will then become the OEC's job.

Time is crucial in combat. This fact puts pressure on the OEC to assess the situation as rapidly as possible. This will only be possible if the OEC has high level command involvement, expert knowledge of the unit's operations, and the ability to intuit trends from often fragmentary bits of information. The OEC must be able to develop hunches and take the risk of playing them. And when he feeds back information, the OEC should present recommended courses of action so that the planning process can be shortened as much as possible. Such skills must be developed in peacetime so that they are ready in wartime.

Tasks the OEC Performs

Ensure information is flowing above, below, and sideways. There are liaison officers whose specific mission is to coordinate actions and facilitate communication. The OEC can help too. **S.L.A. Marshall** points out in his book *Men Against Fire:* "Out of speech or from the written word which is its substitute comes all unification of strength on the field of battle, and from the latter comes decisive action." Analyzing the activities of staffs and their interface with other staffs and line units is one approach. Checking out information collection and processing systems, and designing effective alternatives in the face of a determined electronic warfare threat is another task. Physically going to units and headquarters and talking to the leaders and troops in an effort just to find out what is going on, and then telling those who need to know, will be invaluable. In physics, **information** is the measure of order within a given system; it is the opposite of **entropy.** The OEC needs to think in these terms, and work on keeping a high level of information flowing throughout the system, to counteract the destabilizing effect that hostile action will have upon the organization.

Discover why one unit succeeds and another unit fails; then disseminate the information. Often weapons do not perform to standard, or some type of terrain presents unique problems not anticipated, or some article of doctrine fails to take into account enemy weapons or tactics, etc. When confronted with these problems in combat, some leaders and units will come up with innovative solutions, whereas others will fail miserably. **S.L.A. Marshall** again points out: "A good company idea in tactics is likely to remain confined to one company indefinitely, even though it would be of benefit to the whole military establishment. Such omissions are not due usually to excess modesty or indifference on the part of the officer, but to his unawareness that others are having the same trouble as himself. Combat is a business in which every man's horizon is greatly foreshortened." It is the OEC's job to broaden the combat soldiers' horizon by finding out what works and why, then telling others about it.

Coordinate change. When changes in the way an organization functions are decided upon, and a plan to implement these changes is developed, it is often assumed by the organization's leaders that this is enough. It seldom is. Until the new actions are repeated a few times and anchored, someone needs to watch over the *process.* This should be the OEC's job. The OEC should not be responsible for *implementing* the changes.

Instead, the OEC should monitor the series of actions that make up the change process, reminding leaders of the roles and commitments, coordinating changes in the change, and looking ahead for road blocks.

Maintain OE network. The OEC can use the OE network that is spread throughout the combat, combat support, and combat service support units and higher level headquarters to increase the level of communication of innovative ideas throughout the Army. The network should facilitate the flow of information on how to integrate weapon systems, logistics and tactics effectively. The coordination with the other services plus supporting civilian agencies, would be another task of the OE network.

Monitor overall system's effectiveness. Each OEC feels the pulse of his own organization and passes his observations on to his own commander. Moreover, through the OE network, with contacts ranging from installations in the rear to combat units in the front, a systems wide look at the Army's efforts is developed. Periodic conferences of OEC's are used to collect and exchange information about what the entire army is doing. This data is then fed to appropriate commanders. It is a fast check on the system's status.

Look to the future. The tactical commanders will be focusing on day to day operations, but at the same time maintaining an eye to future operations. The OEC helps in this by maintaining an orientation on the future and making sure this perspective is accounted for in the plannning process. By being able to draw upon resources from the OE network the OEC should be well informed on potential problems and solutions that may confront the unit he supports.

Conclusion

The doctrine of OE is embodied in its consultants. To be prepared to deal with the challenges of peace or war, the OEC's must be: expert consultants who can play a hunch, or confront incompetence; capable of improvising and coordinating changes and solutions to problems arising in the system they support; able to work with the highest level commander in their organization, but also respond to Army-wide concerns through a responsive OE network.□

Beetle Bailey—*by Mort Walker*



Leadership and the Human Minds

Dr. Waino W. Suojanen and LTC Nils P. Johannesen
(Georgia State University)

The ultimate test of any military organization is combat. The military exists, as Sir Ian Hamilton so picturesquely put it, "to grapple with the enemy and seize his vitals."[1] It is only in combat that command comes into its own. The train of decisions to be made comes so rapidly, and is so inextricably linked, that only one person—the commander—can know, and glory in knowing, what to do next. (Sir Ian understood the essence of command, even if his practice of it at Gallipoli left much to be desired.)

Why do some people excel in command and others function better in staff, support or research and development activities? This article examines a management model and recent advances in the study of human brain physiology and function. Brain function and leadership behavior tend to have large *genetic* components, whereas training is more *environmental* in nature. It is our contention that effectiveness and efficiency require that the Army identify and train individuals in a way that will maximize both *innate attributes* as well as *acquired abilities*. Officer training is addressed, although the concepts apply equally to all military training.

Crisis-, Routine-, and Knowledge-Oriented Organizations

Military organizations may be broken into three general categories based upon their usual function. The catergories are not rigid and form a spectrum of purpose from *crisis*-oriented, through *routine*-oriented, to *knowledge*-oriented organizations.

The first of these, the tactical combat unit, is **crisis-oriented.** The combat unit, whether it is an infantry platoon, artillery firing battery or tank battalion, exists solely to accomplish its mission in combat. All peacetime training is aimed at success in the combat mission. A tactical unit is steeled for combat through the exercise of individual leadership by its commander. Responsibility for unit performance in the crisis-oriented situation falls squarely on the commander. The commander alone is responsible for what his unit does or fails to do; he cannot delegate this responsibility.

The second type of unit may be termed **routine-oriented.** Routine-oriented organizations provide combat support or service support to other elements. An important point about routine-oriented activity is that people must be paid, equipment maintained, personnel fed, and supplies requisitioned during peacetime *and* in combat. Routine-oriented activities are *homeostatic;* mission accomplishment requires a high degree of internal predictability. Maintenance, personnel, administration, finance, and supply functions are best managed within a relatively rigid system of standards. Homeostatic systems, whatever the activity or its form, function better to the extent that crises and surprises are minimized. Minor adjustments help to reduce tensions and to rebalance the system.

Combat is quite different. No matter how well plans are developed, *surprise* is an integral part of every military operation. Combat is *heterostatic;* both internal and external stability disappear once the action begins. The true test of military effectiveness is mission accomplishment—no matter what, or how many, the surprises. Heterostasis might appear, at first glance, to be less satisfying than routine-oriented homeostasis. Depending upon individual psychological make-up, this may or may not be the case. A number of individuals are tension seekers; their "adrenaline afterburners" thrive on the crisis of the heterostatic situation. Individual suitability for homeostatic (stable) or heterostatic (unstable) situations and organizations will be examined later in this paper.

A third type of organization is **knowledge-oriented;** it is heterostatic in nature and bears a much closer relationship to crisis-oriented structure than to routine-oriented structure. In common with combat, development *thrives on change.* Knowledge-oriented change, however, is quite different from the stresses and strains, the fears and fantasies, the anxiety and the adrenaline that are earmarks of human crisis wherever it is found. Knowledge-oriented organizations, whether in the general staff or in the laboratory, exist not so much to support the commander in the heat of battle, but rather to make better plans or equipment *before* the battle.

The Integrative Model

The first author of this article (Dr. Suojanen) has brought together a number of management approaches into what is described in other publications as the integrative theory. All organizations and leader/managers operate somewhat in a spectrum that includes crisis-, routine-, and knowledge-oriented activities. Various roles and styles of leadership, command or managership may be graphically described by the **Integrative Model** as presented in Figure 1.[2]

The Integrative Model



Figure 1

Waino W. Suojanen has served as a consultant in the offices of the Assistant Secretary of Defense—Comptroller; Assistant Secretary of Defense—Installation and Logistics; and Assistant Secretary of Defense—Manpower and Reserve Forces. He served as a member of the Management Advisory and a consultant to the Administrator, NASA. He retired as a Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force Reserve. Dr. Suojanen presently serves as a consultant to the Army Management Engineering, Training Activity and as a professor of Management, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA.

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In order to better understand the integrative model, let us discuss the location on the model of various members of a hypothetical ***Division 86*** command and general staff group during crisis management. As the Threat Force tanks roll toward Frankfurt, everyone will be coping with a crisis but not every Army member should be operating in the crisis-oriented portion of the integrative model.

Certainly, the Division Commander, as well as the G-3 and various operations personnel, have minute-by-minute crises, committing resources and maneuvering units, to include deep interdiction with air and artillery. In the meantime, the G-2 and CEWI battalion routinely gather all-source intelligence and employ every knowledge-oriented analysis tool to decipher its meaning. The G-3 plans section uses the intelligence data to develop contingencies for the commander, based on probable enemy actions and available resources. These initiatives are strongly knowledge-oriented. The G-4 attempts to maintain a routine POL, ammunition and equipment resupply operation along with evacuation of equipment and casualties. All around him, a crisis is building with each disabled vehicle and destroyed depot. The G-4 must continue to conduct fairly routine operations while fully appreciating and supporting the crisis situation. The G-1 assesses casualty reports and directs replacements to critical areas. The G-5 coordinates with civil authorities to process and control refugees. In each case the G-1 and G-5 try to maintain a routine or homeostatic operation,while a crisis or heterostatic situation threatens to engulf them. Obviously, these are only a few of the duties conducted, but this does provide some guidance into how the model applies to military operations.

The Officer Manager

During the 1960's and 1970's, it became quite fashionable for Army officers to view themselves as managers. Numerous training programs were initiated to bring education and training in management skills and theory to the officer corps. Gabriel and Savage have pointed out that this view presented serious incompatibilities between crisis-oriented combat leadership and routine-oriented corporate management, particularly in the Vietnam environment.[3]

The issues explored by Gabriel and Savage were part of the motivating force for this article. We agree with them that leadership and management apply both to the military organization and to the business enterprise. We also agree with them that the two forms of organization are virtually polar opposites insofar as the exercise of leadership is concerned. A disservice has been done to the Army and to the country by emphasizing managment, the basis of corporate activity, to the virtual neglect of command, a military function. Actually, this issue is far more fundamental than whether the Army places too much emphasis on training commanders to be managers rather than leaders. **Both are required in modern combat.** What must be determined is how best to *identify*, *select* and then *train* the required number of commanders, staff officers, support personnel and scientists. In order to understand the "biohavioral" antecedents of this approach, a review of some of the literature on human evolution and brain development is necessary.

"Elite" Decision-Making

Many aspects of corporate managment are similar to those which are applicable to the military. Decision making, problem solving, and opportunity finding share much in common. Prior to the publication of the article *"The 'Elite' Decision-Makers: What Makes Them Tick?,"* Charles Ford observed eight executives over a several-year period and carefully analyzed their decision-making processes. Before Ford analyzed the problem-solving and decision-making processes of these executives, he focused on their problem-finding processes. He found that these elite decision-makers had an approach to problems different from that of their subordinates. They started with a "crux-sensitivity" in which their metal radars cut through the peripheral issues and locked in on the important, the crucial and the relevant.[4]

The first key to understanding elite decision-makers is to realize that they initially evaluate a situation, not in terms of the "apparent problem," but rather in terms of the effect of the problem, or the "problem impact." The second key is that they are not constrained by precedents. They have a sense of freedom in their thinking and can see various options which are viewed as too drastic by their subordinates. The third key is the element of time. They make situation analyses in a matter of minutes and express them in a few brief sentences. Patience is not one of their strong points. When locked in on a problem, they waste no time on tangential conversations or minor issues. The fourth key is their use of positive thinking, which makes it possible for them to view situations for their "opportunity-impact" rather than looking upon them as problems. Ford hypothesizes that elite decision-makers engage their brains differently from their subordinates. They appear to be in touch with a capacity of their minds which run-of-the-mill managers seem to lack.[5]

The Human Minds

Recent advances in neurophysiology suggest that the human brain is **triune** (three in one) both in physiology and function. It can be divided into the following three principal parts: (1) The old or **visceral brain (VB),** (2) the left side of the neocortex, or the **Left New Brain (LNB),** and (3) the right side of the neocortex or the **Right New Brain (RNB).** These three subsystems are shown diagramatically in Figure 2. [6]



The Human Minds
Figure 2

An important aspect of human evolution was the gradual functional and physical separation of the new brain from the "old," or visceral brain. Over time, higher or more human functions such as cognition and creative thought came to be located in the new brain.

The visceral brain regulates the kinds of behaviors studied extensively by ethnologists. Most important of these are the six "F's"—Fight-or-Flight, Freeze, Feed, Feel, and Flirt. These are activities that mediate survival and reproduction; ultimately they contribute to the higher probability of survival of both the individual and the species. The strongest instinct of the living being is to survive, to preserve one's own life. In this sense, patriotism may be viewed as the transfer of this natural impulse for self-preservation of the group.

Many combat veterans can recall instances in which a person "instinctively" acted in battle in such a way as to save the life of another soldier or member of the team. Wilson points out that human beings often make extraordinary decisions that tend to a fatal end. He continues:

> Such altruistic suicide is the ultimate act of courage and empatically deserves the country's highest honor. But it is still a great puzzle, what could possibly go on in the minds of these men in the moment of desperation?[7]

Group awareness and the human brain evolved hand-in-hand. As the cerebral cortex evolved, the more "intelligent" group came to possess an advantage. Those hominid groups which developed a cognitive consciousness were able to move ahead very rapidly.

It is now widely accepted that many specific functions are controlled by either the Right New Brain or the Left New Brain hemispheres of the neocortex. Research reveals that the speech centers for most people are located in the Left New Brain. The LNB mediates the **A QUIVER** functions as shown in Figure 2, whereas the **SCANS** behaviors are controlled by the RNB.

Common folk wisdom separates feeling from thinking, and instinctive programs from the learned aspects of behavior. Those aspects of demeanor which seem to be instinctive, or part of the framework on to which the human being is fashioned, we call "human as animal" behaviors. Other aspects of human demeanor are obviously learned or acquired; we call these "human as human" behaviors. This distinction maps "human as animal" behaviors with visceral brain functioning and with the requirements of the crisis-oriented situation in which the "fight-or-flight" response is evoked.

It is apparent that the functional balance among these three "minds" varies from person to person. The actual balance determines how an individual responds to various situations. It is not realistic to think that every person is mentally or physically capable of being a symphonic composer, a theoretical mathematician, a prima ballerina, a professional basketball player, or a marathon runner. It is equally unrealistic to think that every individual can be a great or even a good military commander. On the other hand, the outstanding commander—the natural leader—may perform poorly as a staff officer, administrator or technician.

Through study of the integrative model, the reader can better understand the relationship of the triune brain to the three general types of managerial situations—crisis-, routine-, and knowledge-oriented. Different minds are predominant during crisis-, routine-, or knowledge-oriented activities. Various military functions can be located on this model and they will tend to relate to the several minds of the human being.

Command and tactical operations rely heavily on trained responses that are stored in the visceral brain. High level planning, or research and development, taps the creative and synthetic output of the Right New Brain. Finally, support activities require the analytical, rational, often quantitative, intellectual skills found in the Left New Brain. Every individual possesses each of these capabilities in some proportion; however, each person has



The Human Minds

Figure 3

a preferred area of interest and ability. A few people work well in all of these functional areas and frequently rise to four-star rank. Mission success and maximization of brain function dictate that our recruiting effort should pay more attention to the inherent "behavioral" background of individuals who join the Army. It is not enough to "join the people who have joined the Army." **In simple terms, we presently attempt to train pegs to fit existing holes.** Equally important, we maintain, is selecting square pegs to fit into square holes and round pegs to fit into round holes.

Attainment of military knowledge is cumulative and developmental in nature. Education, both civilian and military, usually begins with the study of concepts, proceeds to the analysis of concepts, and ultimately moves on to the synthesis of new concepts. Military training and on-the-job experience are very much bound to this protocol. The cadet and lieutenant are initially overwhelmed by the masses of technical and professional material which they are expected to learn and remember. Given a set-piece encounter, the lieutenant responds from a repertoire of previously programmed reactions. The training and development of the captain, major and lieutenant colonel place much emphasis on LNB readiness concepts and RNB development philosophies. **Synthesis and creativity of the total system tend to be reserved to the War College level.**

Creativity and innovation at the right end of the integrative model are institutionalized only at the ranks of colonel and general. This ensures stability in routine-oriented contingencies and predictability in crisis-oriented situations. However, the approach tends to stifle creativity and innovation in the junior ranks. This may account for much of the dissatisfaction at lower levels of the Army and perhaps plays a major role in the early retirement phenomenon. Further, it is extremely wasteful of talent. A person doomed to twenty years in the trained responses of the VB and the routine activities of the LNB frequently becomes incapable of behaving as an opportunity finder at the RNB level of the Army. This may explain why Generals Eisenhower, Patton, Grant and many other successful leaders were well known for their frequent flouting of the rules. Their success and obvious creativity developed in spite of a system that emphasizes the routine-oriented mentality of the technical manager and downgrades the role of the heroic leader. We have attempted to summarize this part of the discussion in Figure 4 below.

Dominant Military Function	Crisis-oriented situations	Routine-oriented situations	Knowledge-oriented situations
Command	Evaluate and select one from a number of possible alternative courses of action		
Readiness		Repeatedly follow a prescribed course of action.	
Development			Formulate and develop new courses of action
	VB	LNB	RNB

Figure 4

Military Organization

Basic military organizations are as old as the human race. The hunting team became, on occasions of revenge or territorial trespassing, a hunter-killer team that very much resembled a modern rifle platoon or infantry company deployed and on the move in the open savanna.[8] U.S. Army basic training doctrine is based on the "behavioral" repertoire of the triune brain. It appeals to both the survival instincts of the human animal and the patriotic behaviors of the human being. Basic training activates the "6 F's" of the visceral brain (Fight-or Flight, Freeze, Feed, Feel and Flirt). The focus of basic training is a repertoire of very simple responses that are role-modeled, practiced, and then rehearsed with many repetitions at all hours of the day and night. In a "behavioral" sense, this is the best way we now know to train a person to react properly to crisis situations. The simple models and actions of basic training become "imprinted" in the deep structures of the VB and will tend to dominate a time of crisis in a reactive fashion, with virtually no recourse to the conscious, rational thought of the new brain. This is not different from **learning the "fundamentals"** of football, baseball, basketball, or cycling. Airborne, Ranger, tank gunnery and mortar drill are other examples of training protocols that rely heavily on VB responses.

The VB response pattern suggests that the sine qua non of combat leadership is the calm, controlled presence of the commander. It is important to remember that success in battle and the presence of the commander clearly in view of the troops are basic to traditional concepts of military leadership. This doctrine has been used with success by armies from the time of Alexander the Great through

MacArthur, Rommel, Ridgeway right on to Abrams in Vietnam.

What about the other faces of Army life besides combat? There is the routine-oriented garrison life in peacetime. There is also a need for the general staff and for research and development, both knowledge-oriented activities. It would appear that our fascination with "management" is best adapted to the routine-oriented Left New Brain, A QUIVER situations of training, garrison life in peacetime, and logistics activities at any time. Traditional management theory and organizational development theory deal with the homeostatic. Exceptions to the routine must quickly be corrected, for they represent a threat to the tension-reducing behavior that maintains system stability and predictability. The traditional approach says that the manager plans, organizes, staffs, directs and controls, always with the end in view of repeatedly following a prescribed course of action. Hardly as exciting as combat, the routine of readiness constitutes the very life blood of the baseline from which combat must always begin. What it lacks in glamour, it must make up in muscle. **Readiness** is the potential energy that sustains every fire fight.

Conclusion

So far the discussion has considered the integration of management theory and the grouping of military organizations as crisis-, routine-, or knowledge-oriented. We have considered human development along with physiological and functional separation of the brain. But where does this all lead?

Over the years,the U.S. Army has fallen into a syndrome of believing that "Leaders are—not born." We have also, too often, equated leadership with managment. Perhaps it is now time that we face the truth that each officer should not have to prove him-or herself in all areas of command, staff and branch immaterial assignments in order to have a successful military career. Some individuals have an evolved advantage to be combat leaders. Leadership traits and techniques can be developed and polished, but the basic "biohavioral" make-up is probably there from birth. Other individuals are inherently better prepared to function in support, staff, or research roles.

Improved policies of identification, selection and training of personnel to fill specific jobs must be developed. In addition to managerial skills, modern combat requires great physical courage, daring, a sense of timing, and the audacity to make the bold thrust at the opportune time. The great captains of history often had trouble meeting all of these requirements; can more be expected of the officer corps that presently populates the Army?

"Improved policies of indentification, selection and training of personnel to fill specific jobs must be developed."

Perhaps the leaders and the managers are presently available, but they are often there in the wrong mix, or more likely, are being asked to dissipate their talents. An objective observer will note that there are problems in the system as it is presently constituted. Command refusal is a vivid example. Many individuals are selected who are unsuited for command, by their own admission, or for whom command carries a price tag too high for them to pay.

It is probable that a solution lies within the Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) and the promotion system. There must be a recognition that an individual cannot and should not be expected to be a "person for all seasons." Everyone has strengths and weaknesses, likes and dislikes. The Army must identify, train, develop and nurture the strengths. Each strength is necessary, and many individuals would be pleased to specialize in a particular area that suits their talents. However, it is essential that there be present equitable opportunities for advancement, commensurate with responsibility and service needs.

Computer technology and advanced weaponry are making the "generalist" obsolescent. Every soldier is expected to retain and use more detailed information about an increasingly complex world. It only stands to reason that **the person who works in a situation that best fits his or her optimum "biohavioral" pattern** will be **efficient, satisfied** and **effective.** In order to upgrade military training, it is imperative that selection procedures for specialization programs employ recent advances in brain development. Right New Brain creativity must be fostered at every level of experience and education. The company and battalion commanders who could face hordes of Warsaw Pact tanks and BMP's must be ready to draw from both programmed VB reactions and RNB ingenuity and daring.

A first step is to insure that the program of alternate specialties is working. The fact that recent boards are promoting by specialty lends credence to the system. Much more, however, is required before we can truly put the square peg in the square hole.

The natural, visceral-brain leader, who thrives in the crisis-oriented situation, must be identified early and then polished, promoted, and given repeated opportunities to command. The same is true of the Left New Brain logistician and administrator and the Right New Brain project manager. Each must be given the opportunity to excel in those areas where he or she may possess an evolved advantage.

NOTES

[1] We have heard this statement attributed to Sir Ian Hamilton but have been unable to locate the source despite extensive research.

[2] The original version of Figure 1 appeared in Waino W. Suojanen, *the Dynamics of Management*, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1966, p. 104. Subsequent versions can be found in Waino W. Suojanen, "Evolution, Ethology and Organization," *Southern Journal of Business*, October, 1970, pp. 107-116; *California Management Review*, Fall, 1971, pp. 17-23; Waino W. Suojanen, "Motivation and Leadership," *Modern Office Management and Administrative Services*, Carl Heyel (ed.) McGraw Hill, New York, 1972, Section 8, pp. 14-27, and Waino W. Suojanen, "The Minds of Man and the Uses of Management Science," *Clemson University Review of Industrial Managment and Textile Science*, Spring, 1975, pp. 51-66.

[3] Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L. Savage, *Crisis in Command: Mismanagement in the Army*, Hill and Wang, New York, 1978.

[4]Charles H. Ford, "The 'Elite' Decision-Makers: What Makes Them Tick?" *Human Resources Management*, Winter 1977, pp. 14-20.

[5]Ibid.

[6]A detailed discussion of the triune brain may be found in Waino W. Suojanen, "Creativity, Management, and the Minds of Man," *Human Resources Management*, Spring 1976, pp. 19-27. Other excellent sources on brain function include: M.C. Wittrock, et al., *The Human Brain*, Prentice-Hall, New York, 1977; Stuart J. Dimond and J. Graham Beaumont (eds.), *Hemisphere Function in the Human Brain*, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1974; and Stevan Harnad, et al (eds.), *Lateralization in the Nervous System*, Academic Press, New York, 1977.

[7]Edward O. Wilson, *On Human Nature*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, pp. 149-150.

[8]A highly readable treatment of the evolution of the human as a hunter may be found in Robert Ardrey, *The Hunting Hypothesis*, Atheneum, New York, 1976.

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OE Reference Network

This issue marks the beginning of a new regular feature. The purpose of OE Reference Network is to serve as a quick reference guide for OEC's. OE Reference Network is a compilation of people who have expertise in a particular area of OE and want to share it with others. We strongly encourage you to be a part of the network by sending your name, autovon number, and area of expertise to the editor. (If you feel you are an expert resource in any of the already listed areas, also send your name and autovon number).

AREA	NAME	AUTOVON
AirLand Battle 2000	MAJ Hopkins	929-7886
Combat Related OE	MAJ Bridges	929-2889
Change of Command Transition	CPT(P) Barko	929-7886
Conference Management	CPT(P) Barko	929-7886
Data Reduction and Feedback	Mr. Nolan	929-4574
Organizational Design/Redesign	MAJ Hopkins Mr. Roberts	929-7886
Management of Organizational Transitions	LTC Berg LTC Klein MAJ(P) Macaluso	929-7886
Performance Management Army	LTC Adkinson	588-3537
Performance Management Conference	MAJ Leslie	929-4021
Quality Circles/Work Environment Improvement Teams	MAJ Olson	929-7886
Socio-Tech	MAJ Olson	929-7886
Stress Management	CPT LeRay	929-7886

The worker whose heart is in his pay envelope is little likely ever to become a filler of pay envelopes for others. It isn't our position, but our disposition toward our position that counts. **—B.C. Forbes**

Do not look back. It will neither give you back the past nor satisfy your daydreams. Your duty, your reward, your destiny are here and now.
—Dag Hammarskjold

To try and to fail is at least to learn; to fail to try is to suffer the inestimable loss of what might have been. **—Chester Barnard**

Voices From The Past
(Selected Reprints From Previous *Communiques*)

ON ENSURING A WELL-INFORMED WALRUS

MAJ Tom Fahey

Reprinted from *OE Communique* issue #2-78, pp. 53-55.

The purpose of this short article is to describe a little trick I recently used to prepare a commander and his people for a feedback session of assessment data.

But first a little story by an unknown author.

The Ill-Informed Walrus

"How's it going down there?" barked the big walrus from his perch on the highest rock near the shore. He waited for the good word.

Down below, the smaller walruses conferred hastily among themselves. Things weren't going well at all, but none of them wanted to break the news to the Old Man. He was the biggest and wisest walrus in the herd, and he knew his business—but he did hate to hear bad news. And he had such a terrible temper that every walrus in the herd was terrified of his ferocious bark.

"What will we tell him?" whispered Basil, the second-ranking walrus. He well remembered how the Old Man had raved and ranted at him the last time the herd caught less than its quota of herring, and he had no desire to go through that experience again. Nevertheless, the walruses had noticed for several weeks that the water level in the nearby Arctic bay had been falling constantly, and it had become necessary to travel much farther to catch the dwindling supply of herring. Someone should tell the Old Man; he would probably know what to do. But who? And how?

Finally, Basil spoke up: "Things are going pretty well, Chief," he said. The thought of the receding waterline made his heart feel heavy, but he went on: "As a matter of fact, the beach seems to be getting larger."

The Old Man grunted. "Fine, fine," he said. "That will give us a bit more elbow room." He closed his eyes and continued basking in the sun.

The next day brought more trouble. A new herd of walruses moved in down the beach, and with the supply of herring dwindling, this invasion could be dangerous. No one wanted to tell the Old Man, though only he could take the steps necessary to meet this new competition.

Reluctantly, Basil approached the big walrus, who was still sunning himself on the large rock. After some small talk, he said, "Oh, by the way, Chief, a new herd of walruses seems to have moved into our territory." The Old Man's eyes snapped open, and he filled his great lungs in preparation for a mighty bellow. But Basil added quickly, "Of course, we don't anticipate any trouble. They don't look like herring-eaters to me—more likely interested in minnows. And, as you know, we don't bother with minnows ourselves."

The Old Man let out the air with a long sigh. "Good, good," he said, "no point in our getting excited over nothing, then, is there?"

Things didn't get any better in the weeks that followed. One day, peering down from the large rock, the Old Man noticed that part of his herd seemed to be missing. Summoning Basil, he grunted peevishly, "What's going on, Basil? Where is everybody?"

Poor Basil didn't have the courage to tell the Old Man that many of the younger walruses were leaving every day to join the new herd. Clearing his throat nervously, he said, "Well, Chief, we've been tightening things up a bit. You know, getting rid of some of the dead wood. After all, a herd is only as good as the walruses in it."

"Run a tight ship, I always say," the Old Man grunted. "Glad to hear that everything's going so well."

Before long, everyone but Basil had left to join the new herd, and Basil realized that the time had come to tell the Old Man the facts. Terrified, but determined, he flopped up to the large rock. "Chief," he said, "I have bad news. The rest of the herd has left you."

The old walrus was so astonished that he couldn't even work up a good bellow. "Left me?" he cried. "All of them? But why? How could this happen?"

Basil didn't have the heart to tell him, so he merely shrugged helplessly.

"I can't understand it," the old walrus said. "And just when everything was going so well."

Moral: *What you like to hear isn't always what you need to know.*

Two of my fears prior to feedback sessions have been either that the boss would roar at the bad news and intimidate his people from saying more, or that the people would be under the illusion that he'll roar and keep their mouths shut out of fear of awakening him. In either case, silence will destroy a critical element of the feedback session: discussion and ownership of the data by the people who generated it.

This article jumped out at me a couple of hours before the individual feedback session with a boss, and I decided to use it as an experiment.

We opened the session by asking him to read the story. He did. . .with a smile. I then stated that I saw as part of my role, as well as the goal of the assessment, to make sure that the walrus was well informed about the bad news as well as the good news. He got the point and a fruitful session ensued.

Later, in coaching him for the feedback session with his team, I reminded him of the traits of a good walrus. He got the point on that one too.

Finally, we opened the feedback session by passing the walrus story out to the team. They too, read it with a smile. The only comment I made was that the best way they could harm the boss would be to be less open with him about the data than they had been with the two of us when we collected it.

The climate for the next three hours was lively and sometimes heated, but open. Besides that, the herd didn't disappear.

Did that little story do the trick? You might try it out yourself and let me know what happened.

P.S. *My thanks to the author of the story for the inspiration and my apologies for being unable to identify him or her.*

CONFIDENTIALITY

Dr. Mel Spehn

Reprinted from *OE Communique* issue #1-80, pp. 9-10.

The following timely thoughts on the subject of confidentiality are offered by **Dr. Mel Spehn, Director of Training Developments Directorate, OECS:**

Imagine that you are an instructor of OE in a service school. You are teaching the role of the OESO. Topic: Confidentiality. "And, of course, all the information the OESO gathers remains confidential," you confidently tell the students.

"Oh yeah?", groans a captain in the front row. "I wish the OESO at my last post knew that."

Another voice in the back of the room joins his, "I got called in by my CO. He pointed to a computer printout and said, 'Captain, your company has a figure here I'd like to hear you explain.' "

Several other voices all with the same complaint are added to theirs and you the instructor are definitely on the firing line. What do you say? Do you accuse the students of misunderstanding what their COs were saying? Do you try to make a subtle distinction between confidentiality and anonymity? Blame the OESO? It is a very sticky situation to be in. And, unfortunately, many OE instructors are currently finding themselves in this bind. It is not fair to them, or helpful to the whole OE effort in the Army.

There is no easy solution to a breach in confidentiality. Like an ocean oil spill, it is messy and hard to control once it happens. All we at OECS can do is once again reiterate our concern to students taking the 16 week course and to our graduates in the field.

We encourage the exercise of extreme caution and common sense in the handling of data gathered in a unit. The amount of data a commander gets and the way he gets it is the OESO's responsibility. The initial memo of understanding should make clear to the user what he will get and the limits of his use of the data. General trend data can be distributed on a "need to know" basis. Particular people and units must be protected unless their explicit, free release is given.

The regulation establishes the policy: "The initial results are reported on a confidential and anonymous basis to the commander of the assessed unit." (AR 600-76, F.L.). The words "confidential" and "anonymous" have a common usage in the OD/OE community. **"Confidential"** means: (1) Restricting the availability of aggregate command data to persons within the command; (2) Restricting the availability of unit, division, and work group data to the respective unit commander, division chief, and work group supervisor and their respective subordinates. **"Anonymous"** means protection of the individual's responses to surveys and interviews by (1) suppressing work group or demographic data when a work or demographic group has few members and (2) exercising maximum care in coding and in handling completed survey response sheets. These are mere words on a piece of paper; but their spirit must be exercised sensitively in each and every OE effort.

Speaking Properly Means Never Having To Say "Input' or "Feedback" or "Bottomline"

John McCall

Originally reprinted courtesy of *Flightime* Magazine carried aboard Allegheny Airlines.

Reprinted from *OE Communique* issue #4-79, pp. 41-43.

Art by Bob Smith

A few months ago I started a campaign to clean up campus language at the University of Cincinnati. In a memo to college deans and other officers, I asked for fines of twenty-five cents for any use of ***input*** or ***feedback*** apart from appropriate technical usage. Each office was to appoint a collector to deposit the income in the Library Book Endowment.

Although it may seem silly to assess charges against language litter, the idea has caught the fancy of many people. Some have voluntarily paid for slips in speech as well as writing, and one scrupulous dean has contributed a dollar in conscience money. Some people have hooted at ***input*** and ***feedback*** during meetings, and one wag has suggested that we use gongs or buzzers to punctuate verbal faux pas.

Since the program calls for designating a few "dirty words" each month, suggestions have come pouring in. In addition to the "Coming Attractions" listed in the original announcement—***proactive, facilitate, utilize*** and ***bottom line*** (or is it ***bottomline?***)—contributors have sent a load of other items that I am keeping in large plastic bags.

Interface leads everyone's list: Whatever we say or do has to interface with something or other. I had thought that ***hopefully*** was dying (like ***at this point in time***), but my informers claim that they step or slip on the word all the time in contexts of utter hoplessness, absolute despair. "Out of the depths I cry to thee ***hopefully,***" and so forth.

Apparently people are no longer thinking when they can ***ideate*** and no longer effecting or affecting anything when they can be ***impacting.*** Boundaries and limits are coming down, and ***parameters*** are being set up everywhere. (Although I am not sure why ***parameters,*** like ***linkages,*** always appears as plural; perhaps this happens so that we can ***plug into*** them from any direction.)

The overused and empty words pile up—boring, colorless, puffy and apparently damned important. They are an odd lot, but they have one thing in common: They cannot be tasted or smelled. They appear to none of our senses except sight: ***to maximize, to interact, to be viable*** and so forth. And, among other uses, ***viable*** is always needed to prop up ***alternatives.*** These junk words fill pages and pages of dead prose, yet they have an attractiveness, for to use them or to nod knowingly at their appearance means that you are part of the crowd.

When I became a department head a few years ago, one of my first jobs was to create a long-range-plan or LRP. Thinking it best to adopt the lingo of planners and budget makers and to show that I knew my business, I asked a kind colleague, "How do I spell ***prioritize?***" The answer came back with a sad shake of the head, "No, John. You don't." I didn't, and I haven't, but the temptation to master jargon and to sound officious or official can be very strong. In fact, jargon can be a big help on the job. Pages of it can be compiled as ***output*** without any thought at all. *Indeed, a good jargon* **requires** *that there be no thought.*

There is another attraction as well: We can invent our own jargon, spread it around and then enjoy watching it crawl home. Last week, for example, a friend wrote to me about a sloppy, new verb, ***redecal*** (a term intended to mean the renewal of campus parking stickers). "I only recently came across this in a communication from the (also questionably named) Parking Services. I can't resist wondering who it was who ***decaled*** me in the first place, since the word implies that that had happened. Its conjugation would be entertaining: 'He, she, it ***redecaled*** me' or 'By January, I shall have been ***redecaled.***' I wonder if it works only in the passive, or can I say, 'I ***redecal*** him' (not to be confused *with 'I ridicule it').*"

Ridicule may actually be our best means of temporary survival. Certainly we should not hope for salvation, because jargon is a familiar and perpetual problem, but we can and should rally forces from time to time in behalf of clear thinking, plain English, some logic and perhaps a glimmer of understanding. We might even enjoy making each other aware of our barbaric verbal ornaments. I suspect, for example, that the department head who wrote to me last month that his program is ***result-oriented*** did not mean what he said. He would never have used such language in front of his children, and he would appreciate a warning lest he slip again.

It is easy to ridicule people who are going out of their way to impress others with their language. It may be only pleasant and educational, but it might even be necessary for the preservation of "professional ethics."

Consider the following scene described by a correspondent who had worked with psychologists and social workers, counseling alcoholics. "After the patient had laid all of the garbage—the grief-stricken, guilt-ridden problems—at the feet of the ***specialist,***" she says, "he would hear something like this:

> 'I hear you saying that you don't feel that you can identify with your peers, and I know where you're coming from when you express your lack of communication in relationship with your input when you attempt to reach a bi-lateral decision with your siblings. I hear you saying that you feel a need for feedback, but for you to know where your head is, I feel you must cease this power struggle within yourself and identify as a recidivist.'

After that, who *wouldn't* head to the nearest bar for a belt of courage or a grip on sanity?"

Professionals who depend on jargon can be dangerous, and as part of their education they should be taught some manners. They should learn to talk right and behave themselves, so that their words are not the equivalent of a wet baby in one's arms or a dog's "mistake" on the carpet.

It is one thing to agree with Edwin Newman and to cheer *The Underground Grammarian.* If someone on the NBC Television News uses the word ***pre-select,*** as happened this morning, we should flood our local stations with complaints. Foul obscenity! *Pre-select,* indeed! Whoever chose something after the fact?

And the next time you receive junk mail stuffed with ***meaningful*** non-sense, return it to the sender with a mark—X-rated—and ask the feds to investigate.□

John McCall is Senior Vice-President and Provost of the University of Cincinnati and a professor of English there. His book, *Chaucer Among the Gods,* was published by the Pennsylvania State University Press after this article first appeared.

Failure is instructive. The person who really thinks learns quite as much from his failures as from his successes. **—John Dewey**

Blessed is the person who sees the need, recognizes the responsibility, and actively *becomes* the answer. **—William Arthur Ward**

Retrospect: Two Years with the Army Reserves

MAJ (P) George A. Iler (RG Fort Sheridan)

As I reflect on the last two years of my work as an OE consultant working with the Army **Reserve Components (RC),** I am struck with the unique aspects of the job. I've decided to chronicle my experiences and hope that this paper may benefit other consultants newly assigned to an Army Readiness and Mobilization Region **(ARMR)** or Readiness Group **(RG).**

Upon graduation from OECS, I was assigned to an RG colocated with an ARMR HQ and found I was the first OEC in the ARMR. As such, I was the "new kid on the block" with a brand new program that few people knew about or understood.

My first meeting with the Chief, RG, had two goals. First, to start educating the boss on OE and the role of the OEC and second, to establish my rating scheme. I took the position that I should work directly for the Chief, RG and not be layered in a lower level, such as the Administration Team or Training and Management Development Office (TMDO). We finally agreed that I would be rated by the RG XO and the Chief would be my senior rater. This approach would enable me to have free access to the Chief and still keep the rating "in-house." When I found that neither my rater nor senior rater had attended the OE Managers' Course, I contacted the FORSCOM OE Officer to schedule both of them as soon as possible. Both have now attended, and their understanding and support have proven invaluable.

Since I was the first OEC in the ARMR, I knew I would have to start "selling" myself as soon as I could. My first step was to put together a briefing on OE, highlighting the program, the role of the OEC and, most importantly, what I, as an OEC, could do for unit commanders. I prepared charts to illustrate the briefing and had my local Training and Audiovisual Support Center (TASC) convert these charts to both 35mm slides and overhead transparencies. I also put a set of the charts in a three ring binder and thus had the capability to brief in all situations, from large conference rooms to one-on-one "Jeep hood" situations. I also ordered 300 copies of ***TC 26-1, "Commander's Guide to Organizational Effectiveness,"*** dated Sep 78. I included my name and address in the back of the pamphlet and left copies with each person I briefed.

My first act of selling was to compose a letter of introduction, over the Chief RG's signature, to all supported MUSARC Commanders. The letter was intended to give these prospective clients a little background information about me, OE, and it suggested they call for more information. End result—**zero;** no calls or even a flicker of interest.

My next effort was much more successful. I asked for and received permission to brief the ARMR Commander and his staff, to include some advisors, at a weekly staff meeting. Fortunately, several of the Colonels in attendance had previous favorable experience with OE and quickly realized its applicability to the Reserve Components. They returned to their units and convinced several of the MUSARC Commanders that they should avail themselves of OE, at least to be briefed on it. My foot was in the door, several clients resulted from this effort.

One of my most important and immediate contacts within the RG was the individual responsible for the budget. Since OE was a new program, it was unfunded; required resources had to be diverted from other areas. I estimated that a library was of prime importance and would initially cost around $500.00. But the money was not available, so I had to prioritize. My first choice was to go for a set of the "Annual Handbook for Group Facilitators" from University Associates, and order other books as money became available. I also found that I could work through my post DIO and use impress funds to purchase needed texts and references from local book stores.

Other valuable allies in the RG were the **Branch Assistance Teams (BATS).** These teams (Armor, Infantry, FA, etc.) all had very close working relationships with the units they supported. During a RG Professional Development session, I briefed members of all the teams on OE and let them know I would be available to help them and "their" units. Response was favorable and several contracts developed.

Next, I went to a local printer and had some business cards made and paid for them from my own pocket. The outlay was small but proved invaluable during initial contacts with potential clients. Most RC clients are successful, professional people, and, as such, expect to exchange business cards for future reference. Having such cards added a degree of professionalism that did not go unnoticed.

A typical RG works with both **Army Reserve** and **National Guard (NG)** units. However, the NG has its own OE support system operating from three regional centers. It is very important to establish and maintain contact with the Regional Center, since they are chartered to provide OE support to the NG. They are usually more than willing to have you work with NG clients, but must be kept informed of operations within their area, due in part to politics involved. One of the most important things an OEC working with the RC must know is the personalities involved in each unit. Every RC unit is composed of service personnel who have been associated with the unit, or others in close proximity, for a number of years. These "ole boys" are formed into a network or clique that is a formidable force; it must be recognized and worked with. This is true of both civilian technicians and "green suiters." Every unit has formal and informal chains of command which encompass the military, civilian, and sometimes the advisory structures. Each one operates independently, and often, not for the same boss, ultimate goals and purposes. Needless to say, these groups frequently work at cross purposes and some conflict exists at all levels. One of the greatest contributions an OEC can make is the identification and resolution of this conflict. As in any complex organization, conflict does exist and must be dealt with in order to become more effective.

Civilian technicians are perhaps one of the most important forces within the RC. They are the people who effectively run the organization on a day to day basis and wield an unbelievable amount of power. Working in conjunction with the military leaders, they formulate, execute and supervise all RC operations. It is vitally important for an OEC to recognize this power base and have its support; without it, any intervention will simply not work. The majority of these technicians are highly competent and dedicated, and they strongly identify with the units they support. The OEC's must make them realize that they (the OEC's) are not a threat but an adjunct, who can and will make their jobs easier and more effective. If OE is an unfamiliar concept, it must be explained in detail, in a very non-threatening manner.

The advisor of an RC unit is a great aid to the OEC, if they are on the same side. The advisor is the RC unit commander's link to the Active Component and is his aide and confidant. If the advisor is pro-OE, the commander will at least be receptive to the OEC. Even if the advisor is not an advocate of OE, he can still help the OEC get a foot in the door, if the OEC is a good "salesman" with a valid product to sell.

The future of OE in the RC is promising. Full-scale 4 step OE operations, strategic planning, transition workshops, PMC and various classes are but a few of current and future operations. The implementation of the Full Time Unit Support (FTUS) Program will require more OE involvement and assistance. New OEC's assigned to an RC support position will face challenges never before imagined, but will also find themselves in a position to affect the future of an integral part of the **Total Army.** □

Leadership, Plus A Lesson On Writing Memos

MAJ Jaxon Teck (USAR)

This letter is used to accompany an article, reminding people of what they may have learned about leadership style in a recent workshop. Perhaps others could use it.

To: Situational Leadership Workshop Participants.

Memo Using **STYLE 1: TELL**	Read the enclosed article. It covers the basic concepts of situational leadership quickly, and then describes how the concepts can be used throughout the performance management process. After reading the article, let me know what specific ideas you got from it.
Memo Using **STYLE 2: SELL**	The enclosed article is a good course refresher. You will be reminded of what you already know, and I believe you will find some additional ways this knowledge can be put to use. Please read it and see if you agree. We'll discuss it when you are done.
Memo Using **STYLE 3: PARTICIPATE**	I have read the enclosed article several times, and have found it a useful addition to the leadership course we took together. Have you found any ways I might help you or your unit to use these ideas? Would you like to receive more articles like this one? Please let me know what you think?
Memo Using **STYLE 4: DELEGATE**	The enclosed article may be interesting and perhaps even useful to you. If there is any way I can help you or your unit to use these leadership concepts, or if other organizational effectiveness activities might be useful, please contact me to explore the situation.

THE LESSON: Memos can utilize various phrases to reflect the maturity/performance level of the individual receiver, to express the style of the sender while ignoring the reader, or to be consistant with the style of the organization as a whole.

PRACTICAL EXERCISE:

1. Review the memos above to find the statements which reflect the task and relationship balance necessary to express each style. UNDERLINE KEY PHRASES.
2. Review the memos you receive from your boss, and from your organization's top managers. What hidden messages can you find there when you look for indicators of leadership style? Again, underline key phrases. If you are asked to draft memos for others, this deliberate analysis of past memos may help you. What style does the Army seem to favor, as an organization?
3. If you write memos to others, especially to subordinates, get out your file copies—if you dare. Are you sending the leadership messages which are correct for each situation? Are you consistant within each memo? Underline key phrases to check yourself.

Effective leaders are likely to vary the style of their memos to fit each situation. Many people tend to write the same style of memo all the time, perhaps because they are not aware of the possibility of deliberately varying their style to improve the results. For a memo going to several people, or to the whole organization, deliberate attention to the leadership style it conveys may assist the effectiveness of the memo. □

Facilitative Football: X's and O's

SFC Dennis Byerly (USAREUR)

In an effort to use graphics to represent the flow of a group discussion and focus it on the major issues, I have used football diagrams and terms to facilitate meetings.

In football, there is an endless supply of plays. Subtle changes can drastically alter the outcome. Most meetings follow the same track, and the outcome can vary, depending on the discussion that takes place. Graphic football plays can "take the heat" off of the interpersonal conflict and focus it on a piece of paper until they decide to resolve the issue or move onto another one. Of key importance, in using this sports-related system, is that the group **must have** a basic knowledge of football. I am sure, however, that basketball, baseball and other sports could be adapted to this system. In figures I thru III, I have listed some examples. "X's and O's" can be used as a "hip pocket" intervention, when a communication problem becomes evident in a group.



Figure I

CDR - The team is QB'd by the CDR. (QB)

XO - Coordinates the passing/running by protecting the CDR (blocking) and clearing the way for the Running attack. (BB)

UNIT CDRS - Run with the ball. (RB)

STAFF - Catches ball and runs with it. They are the receivers. Block when required. (SE/WR)

CSM - Operates as both line blocker and receiver, depending on needs of team. (TE)

Scenario Application

a. Tie Football positions (QB,TE) to military positions (CDR,CSM).

b. Formation/structure can vary. Does this formation fit your structure?

c. Mission is to score, thru team effort; how does your team coordinate its efforts to score?

d. Are roles stable? How does change affect team? (New center/QB-usually causes fumbles in football.

Figure II



Application: Levels of Maturity in Communications

a. In high school the coach teaches the RG to fill the inside hole on a sweep right running play. 

b. In college the coach teaches the RG to block a man or an area. 

c. In the PRO's the coach teaches the RG to look to the outside and lead out. 

- In a., if no one moves to that hole, the block is wasted.
- In b, the RG may find himself chasing the X all over the field.
- In c, the RG rolls to the outside and blocks whoever breaks through the line.
- For each level of football, the above tactics are effective. However, the key is to assure that the players are receiving/understanding the instructions and are capable of completing the mission in the manner the coach is teaching.

Figure III



Application: Goal setting/clarity

- RG's job is to block X - his goal is to move X to the left.
- RT's job is to block X - his goal is to move X to the right.
- If RG blocks left and RT blocks right, both hit the target but X moves forward and stops the play/mission even though two players are blocking him.
- If the goals are defined and agreed upon then RG and RT block straight and cause the play/mission to go forward.

☐

SFC Byerly is the OEC for 59th Ordnance Brigade.

An Approach to Professional Development Which Box Do *You* Enter?

CPT Glenn Hulse and CPT Robert Venci

This past March the University Associates of Europe, a branch of University Associates, conducted a conference called ***OD'82, London.*** The conference centered on *OD skill development* and used the familiar *Weisbord model for organizational diagnosis.*

The intent of this conference, presented by Dr. Leonard D. Goodstein, was to use the Weisbord model to analyze what the participating consultants knew about each part with respect to theory and theorists. Through this experiential process, the participants were to become aware of areas in which they were in need of further research and learning.

The model is familiar to military consultants in that the Organizational Diagnosis Model (ODM) is an expansion of the Weisbord model. It is an excellent approach to systematic analysis of an organization and how its parts fit together to produce a desired outcome. The question raised at the conference to the consultants was "When ***you*** begin to assess or enter an organization, which box do ***you*** start with?"

Let's look at the model for a moment (Figure 1). The Purpose box provides clarity for the commitment to the roles, reasons, causes for the existence of the organization; the Structure box identifies how people are related to the machines of the organization as well as to other people; the Rewards box shows the company payoff for work performed or initiative and achievement recognized. The Helpful Mechanisms box is a look at what practices, procedures, and techniques contribute to the effective operation of the organization. Finally, the Leadership box, considered the most important and so placed in the center, monitors what is working to keep the organization in balance.

Figure 1



Participants in the conference were asked to answer some questions about their consulting style with respect to the model. These questions led the group to the base question: "From which box do ***you*** enter an organization to begin ***your*** consulting operation?"

To answer the question of which box you enter, try completing the following: "When I work as an OD consultant, the three most important things that I look for in examining the client system are ______________ .
At this point you have reduced the boxes to three possibilities. Of those three you can probably determine which one you use the most often to start an assessment.

Now look at the model in terms of what you know about each box. Can you list the theorists who have written about organizational structure, for example? What are some of the theories on structure? As an example, your notes for the Structure box might look like this:

Structure Theorists

- Nadler
- Tichy
- Weisbord
- Doyle/Strauss
- Kast/Rosenzweig
- Ivancevich
- Perrow
- Likert

Theories on Structure

- Normative vs Contigency
- Centralization vs Decentralization
- Hierarchal vs Lateral
- Differentiation vs Integration
- Certainty vs Uncertainty
- Functional vs Task
- Myth vs Reality

Now repeat this process for each of the boxes.

What you may find is that you are well read and have a sound understanding of the theories of certain parts of the model and that you are not quite so knowledgeable in other parts. If that makes you uncomfortable, rest assured you are not alone. What it should do is provide you with an analysis of your shortcomings on readings and theories.

From these exercises you can develop your own plan for a continuing education/professional development curriculum. Here are some helpful hints to get you started:

a. Try entering an organization from a different box to get a different perspective.

b. Utilize resource book RB 26-2, which you received from OECS. It is an annotated bibliography that is an invaluable source.

c. Get out the brochures from publishers to see what latest writings are available.

d. Contact some other consultants to share information and knowledge.

e. If you are in an office with a partner, have the partner fill out an Organizational Effectiveness Management Consultant Competency assessment on you (It was a handout at OECS).

[Editor's note: See also "Interested in Self-Assessement?" *OE Communique* #3-81, pp. 82-83.]

We have shared these ideas, with the hope that you will take the time to analyze ***your*** needs and then devise a plan for professional development. As one of our instructors once said, "You have to paint your own flower." In order to do that, you need paint on your palate and the know how to use the brush. Using the approach to skill development presented at the London conference, you should have a much better idea of which "know how" you need to strengthen. □





More Handouts for Success

MAJ Darry D. Eggleston
NGB's OE Eastern Regional Center

The response to the article "Handouts for Success" in the *OE Communique*[1] has been overwhelming. We have provided information and copies of the handouts to all who have asked for either.

This article is designed to continue where that article ended. Its primary intent is to pass on lessons learned and design improvements. It will cover new uses for handouts, single side extensions, visual effectiveness, brevity's rewards, and the criticality of proponent identification.

New Uses

"Handouts For Success" dealt mostly with the use of handouts as extensions of briefings. Since that time we have had some success with handouts as mailouts, fillers, and vugraph transparencies.

Whenever I receive an inquiry from a National Guard unit[2] I tend to respond to the inquiry with both a short note and whatever handouts are relevant. Client feedback has indicated that the format and content of those mailouts have aided in decisions to use Organizational Effectiveness. Being results-oriented, if it works, I use it.

Whenever I conduct or facilitate a workshop, such as a Transition, I have all the attendee-generated data typed, assembled, and reproduced for the user. These pamphlets are assembled by chapters. In a Transition, for example, chapters include Organization's Mission, Organization Strengths, Organizational Concerns, and others. All pamphlets are reproduced using two-sided reproduction. Whenever a chapter ends with a blank side remaining, I simply place one of these handouts at that place in the pamphlet. The result has been requests for additional workshops (those advertised in handouts used as fillers).

[1]Eggleston, Darry D., "Handouts for Success," *OE Communique*, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1982, pp. 60-62.

[2]"Based upon the National Guard OE Planning Committee's recommendations, OE Regional Centers were established in May 1980 at Portland, Oregon; Little Rock, Arkansas; and Edgewood, Maryland." See Halus, Michael B., LTC, "Organizational Effectiveness in the National Guard." *OE Communique*, Winter 1981, pp. 21-24.

Finally, handouts with simple designs and few words make appealing visuals for briefings. Beyond their use in briefing on Organizational Effectiveness, I find they have special appeal if used during workshops. In workshops, they are not normally used during the instruction, but rather during breaks.

Most facilitators at the end of one period simply do a summary, turn off the vugraph machine and take a break with everyone else. I do it a little differently: I summarize, announce the break, turn *on* the machine, and take a break with everyone else. **I leave the visual to do its own talking throughout the break.**

I have had many successes with this technique.

Single Side Extensions

As reported in "Handouts for Success" I have found that two-sided handouts seldom have the second side even glanced at. This is particularly true when all but one or two handouts are single sided. There is one major drawback to using one-sided handouts, however: when laid face down, the back is blank—like so many other letters and handouts left lying about.



To overcome this problem, I have discovered that by using a simple, visual representation of organizational effectiveness on the back of all handouts, no matter which side faces down, the upward facing side calls attention to the handout. an advertisement that is not seen cannot elicit a response.





Visual Effectiveness

"A picture is worth a thousand words." This statement accurately summarizes the important impact of visual representations.

As can be seen in the illustrations to this article, one need not be an artist to create appealing visuals. It is my experience that the more simple the illustration, the more likely it is to draw a response. Complicated and intricate designs, for some reason, do not gain the attention of managers in higher headquarters. This may be due in part to the urgency in which so many top managers deal with everyday activities: simple designs can be viewed, considered, and acted upon rapidly; complicated and intricate designs cannot.

Brevity's Rewards

I stress the need for brevity in handouts; the fewer words in the handout the more words will be in the questions for more information on it. Frequently we try too hard to describe Organizational Effectiveness techniques and, as a result, confuse the intended audience. Often, this results in disagreement before understanding. When so much information is provided that the audience thinks one thing and you have intended another, perhaps you have not been brief enough.

Remember that the intent of a handout is to whet the appetite, not quench the thirst.

Proponent Identification

During my travels, I see countless articles, flyers, and other such papers which do not allow the reader to know who the proponent is. If you are going to advertise that you are alive and available, it behooves you to place the proponent upon the page.

Note that all of my handouts have the mailing address, the AUTOVON, and the commercial telephone number. I recommend you consider including such information on your handouts.

Conclusion

In this article, I have attempted to pass on lessons learned and design improvements in handouts for success. I invite you to exchange your lessons learned and designs with me. If Organizational Effectiveness is to be successful, we must market it successfully. Sharing is an extension of caring; no one cares how much you *know* until they find out how much you care. Let's all care enough to share. ☐



Major Darry D. Eggleston serves as an Organizational Effectiveness (OE) Consultant with the National Guard Bureau's OE Eastern Regional Center. This Alabama Guardsman is a graduate of USAOECS Class 1-80 and of the Command and General Staff College.

Destiny is not a matter of chance, it is a matter of choice; it is not a thing to be waited for, it is a thing to be achieved.
—William Jennings Bryan

If it is done once without a chance to repeat it, it is art. If it can be duplicated endlessly, then it is technology. —Dominick Labino

It is the nature of a man as he grows older ... to protest against change, particularly change for the better. —John Steinbeck

Nothing gives one person so much advantage over another as to remain always cool and unruffled under all circumstances.
—Thomas Jefferson

Improving Customer Service

CPT James A. Honeychuck (NATO/SHAPE)

OE Consultants called upon to help "do something to improve customer relations" in service organizations might like to try the following workshop, developed for a personnel office in USAREUR.

As pre-work, we did a mini-assessment of the office's public image by interviewing division chiefs to surface their concerns, and by generally listening to what the grapevine had to say about service being provided there. As a result, we chose several activities likely to be of benefit to a workshop composed of all workers and managers of the personnel office who deal directly with the public. The morning of the one-day workshop, then, was taken up with ten lively rounds of "Win As Much As You Can" (UA Handbook II-62), followed by a lecturette on going for "Win/Win" (UA Annual '73-105). Role play was used to check for understanding of the concepts with the roles being the most obnoxious or difficult customers participants deal with. A module on Active Listening with practice was presented next (UA Annual '78-119 and Handbook VII-39).

But the real meat of the workshop is the sub-group analysis of what, in their system, helps produce or helps destroy an atmosphere conducive to good service. This part begins with the results of the Organizational Norms Opinionnaire, (UA Annual '78-81), which, in the interest of time, was administered in the morning and scored over lunchtime. Although people are reluctant to fill out a long survey, short ones with quick feedback on results seem to be irresistible. Even a rough indicator of norms like the Opinionnaire is received with great interest by groups, and even if it is received with cries of, "That's not true!", the stage is set for the sub-group work. A note for overseas OE consultants: half of our audience were US citizens and half local nationals, some of whom reported confusion over terms like "confronting the boss" and "the operation is running smoothly." For maximum effectiveness, we should have had a translation available.

Next comes an analysis of each of the elements required to create a "climate for service." The theory and model used comes from Benjamin Schneider's article, "The Service Organization: Climate is Crucial," in the Autumn 1980 *Organizational Dynamics*. Dr. Schneider suggests:

> Consumers would be better served if service organizations were structured to meet and satisfy the needs of their employees. The logic for the hypothesis is quite simple: Employees in service organizations desire to give good service and when those desires are made easier by management's support, both employees and consumers are likely to react positively. . .

These elements of employee desire for good service and management support of it come together in the framework of organizational practices and procedures that create a "climate for service."

After a walk through the theory, a check, for understanding and modeling of what the groups were to do next, was done by having the facilitator develop a force-field analysis (UA Handbook II-79) for each element of the model in the context of fast-food hamburger restaurants. What makes employees want to give good service? Keeping their job, personal pride, etc. What discourages them? Low pay, working on weekends, no tipping allowed, etc. Management was the next topic, followed by organizational practices and procedures. Sub-groups were formed according to duty sections and turned loose to analyze their own systems.

After the sub-groups report out, we focused on the restraining forces and getting the group to do something about them by using an action-planning model. The participants took back to their duty sections concrete and specific things to be done to improve their "climate for service." □

CPT Jim Honeychuck is the OE Consultant for the US Army NATO/SHAPE Support Group (US) at SHAPE, Belgium.

Beetle Bailey—*by Mort Walker*



HQDA Updates

Update of recent events in OE at HQDA

LTC Lew Flanders
8-227-3700

OE, Future Planning Committee: Subsequent to the RAPC, the HQDA OE cell sorted the long range issues into manageable groups. On 9 September 1982 the HQDA OE cell presented **MG Hugo** with a conceptual model of the **OE Future Plan** and a recommendation that a planning committee be established. Such a committee would ensure a coordinated planning effort, establishment of realistic implementation times, and clear definition of responsibilities for completion of the tasks. As a result of this briefing, MG Hugo approved the formation of an **OE planning committee.**

The purpose of this committee is to conduct detailed planning on the future of OE in conjunction with outcomes from RAPC '82. The first meeting of the committee was held from 15-19 Nov '82 at Beckley, W. VA. Participants were from HQDA, FORSCOM, TRADOC, DARCOM, MILPERCEN and OECS.

OE Information System Steering Committee (OEIS): The first OEIS steering committee meeting was held on 27 September 1982 in the Pentagon. The purpose of the meeting was to determine the functional requirements of OEIS and establish a firm commitment from all steering committee members to move forward.

The five functional requirements identified for OEIS were: data bases for case study, resource and Command Summary information plus survey and networking capability.

The first three requirements were previously designed by the contractor (Arthur Young & Company). However, the steering committee did recommend changes to the resource and Command Summary data bases to include program management issues, and a library of workshops and other professional development activities. The thrust of the meeting centered on the survey capability of OEIS. The committee determined that a survey capability was desired and must possess the following capabilities: (1) immediate turnaround; (2) easily processed/interpretable data elements; (3) a normative data base (for research pruposes only); (4) a pool of questions (number to be determined) grouped to provide OEC's with the capability of developing their own unique survey; (5) a capability for OEC's to process their own question; (6) a display of high quality visuals; (7) a standard survey which could be used in part or total; (8) two rating responses (what it is and what it should be).

Networking capability was also identified as another desired functional requirement. The following benefits of an OE network capability were discussed: (1) Provides research data through the synergistic effect received from multiple responses to a complex issue. (2) Provides immediate assistance to OEC's as a means of clarifying case study data or dealing with new problems not previously documented. (3) Allows MACOM managers easy access to subordinate organizational elements and the DA cell.

Corporate Fitness (CF): The Corporate Fitness of any organization is dependent upon two factors. The first is Individual Wellness (IW). This can be defined in both psychological and physiological dimensions. The second factor, Organizational Wellness (OW) is a measure of how efficiently an organization uses its resources. When IW and OW are combined, and organizational effectiveness is produced. Thus we have an organization that does things right and does the right things. The sum total is CF. Restated the formula is IW + OW = CF.

A new paradigm has been created to facilitate the management of both individual and organizational stress. This philosophical shift includes a model for stress analysis and a framework for action. The Stress Models Integration and Linkeage Effort (SMILE) is a non-medical, practical plan developed (**Coke and Mierau, 1982**) over a three year period of conceptualizing and testing. The author of the CF formula is **LTC Al Coke.** The model is being adapted for consulting and use on the Army Staff.

WELCOME: Welcome to **MAJ(P) Joe Mangino** who is joining us from an Artillery Group in Greece. Joe will be assigned to the consulting team. We also welcome **MAJ Sam Morton.** Sam recently returned to the area from Europe and will be working on the program management team handling the research and evaluation actions.

MACOM Roundup

TRADOC

LTC Robert F. Radcliffe
8-680-3312/3316

HQ TRADOC OE Office Update: The 1983 TDA for the TRADOC HQ reflects our recent plus-up action.

Para/Line	Description	Gr	Auth/Req	Incumbent
005 01	CH, OE OFC	05	1	LTC Robert F. Radcliffe
005 02	OE CNSLTNT	04	2	MAJ(P) Kenneth A. Rice MAJ H. Dan Goodman*
005 03	OE CNSLTNT	03	2	CPT(P) Howard W. Brosseau Vacant*
005 04	OE CNSLTNT	E9**	1	MSG Isaac L. Curry III
005 05	SECY (STENO)	GS6	1	Mrs. Dottie Buxton*

* - Position Added
** - Grade Change (Upgrade E7 to E9)

Teleconference: The TRADOC OE Consultants conducted a series of joint telephone conferences during the period 13-15 October 1982. Two conferences were held using AUTOVON circuits and one using FTS circuits both at "no-cost" to user (us). The method was generally acceptable to all participants. We feel this method is a useful tool and are planning on having a series of follow-on conferences using FTS as the primary channel. The FTS system allows for almost interruption free conferencing (no preemptions, priority bumping, etc.). We recommend this method to other MACOM OEC's and plan to get more mileage out of our future teleconferences.

Total Army Goals/PMA Integration: TRADOC Headquarters is involved in an effort to analyze the relationship between the Total Army Goals, the Army functions and the TRADOC Goals. This long term goals process, based on the long range planning in complex system model, will eventually result in a unified direction for TRADOC as reflected in revised goals, objectives and tasks. The process will be enhanced by linking the TRADOC contracting, budgeting and command performance review systems to the goals process.

FORSCOM

LTC Mike Adkinson
8-588-3537/3538

HQ FORSCOM OBJECTIVES BOOKLET

The FORSCOM OE office has been busy for the past several months assisting the Commander and staff in identifying the purpose, mission areas, goals and objectives of the headquarters and planning for their accomplishment.

This process has resulted in the Commanding General's guidance to the staff and a Performance Management Plan (PMP) for the headquarters that provides:

- A common focus for linking Total Army Goals and FORSCOM initiatives into a single, living management tool for measuring staff progress in achieving what the CG has identified as being most important.
- Clear identification of responsibilities and fixed accountability for staff actions.
- Organizational objectives from which individual performance objectives can be derived for staff agencies.
- A guidance system that relates daily staff activities to the established direction of Forces Command.

To aid in maintaining focus and understanding, a booklet is being prepared as a ready reference for the staff. The booklet describes the process used, actions taken and what integrated staff actions are required to support the purpose and mission areas of Headquarters, Forces Command. At present, distribution will be limited only to the FORSCOM staff, but the booklet may become a part of future educational materials to describe the PMP process to fellow OE consultants.

SCRATCHIN' IN THE DIRT BEHIND THE WATER COOLER!

We find ourselves taking the title role more and more! Working behind the scenes to assist the key leaders and managers to accomplish major programs/projects. This role has enabled us to assist those who want to maintain a central focus of where the command is going.

Examples of some of the major tasks we have been involved in which do this are:

- Design of the PMP process for establishing purpose, mission areas, goals and key objectives for the headquarters.
- Design of briefing format for FORSCOM CG's use at the Army Commander's Conference.
- Development of suggestions for conduct of the FORSCOM Commander's Conference and formats for previewing and discussing issues.
- Design and facilitation of planning groups to develop action plans for accomplishment of headquarters objectives.

These actions required an agreed upon strategy (not always easy to stick to), pro-action (think ahead—help make it happen), and the painful, but required reality of having to say "NO" to some requests that didn't ultimately contribute.

NEW POSTER

A new FORSCOM poster depicting the purpose and five missions of US Army Forces Command is now in distribution.

An automatic distribution was made to all FORSCOM field activities. The poster measures 16" x 14" and is dated 1 Nov 82. Additional supplies of the poster can be obtained from your publications center. The number of the poster is 102.

FUTURE CHIEF OF FORSCOM OE OFFICE SELECTED

The FORSCOM Chief of Staff has selected **LTC Walter O. Stowell** as the future chief of the FORSCOM OE office. LTC Stowell, a 1977 graduate of OECS, is currently serving as a Brigade XO, 4th Infantry Division (M), Fort Carson, CO, and is scheduled for arrival at Fort McPherson on 6 Feb 83. He will replace **LTC Mike Adkinson,** who will retire.

NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU

By LTC Lee Gragg
8-289-1041/1042

Things are buzzing in the National Guard OE community. The new leadership at Bureau level is supportive: the new Chief of NGB, **LTG Emmett H. Walker, Jr.,** is a user of consultant services, as is the new Director of the Army National Guard, **MG Herbert R. Temple, Jr.**

Here at Bureau we are putting together a design to provide High Performance Leadership training for division chiefs; working on how OEC's can support the National Guard mobilization effort (something that might be considered a wartime role for NGB OEC's); and, in cooperation with the eastern center, providing consulting support to the AMEDD's recruiting folks.

The Western Regional Center has been focused internally for the past few months, working on goals and future planning with the assistance of OECS Consultants. In addition, they have several ongoing consulting efforts with state Adjutants General and one very interesting effort with a state Sergeant Major. In addition, they are involved in the process of tracking an organization through the CAPSTONE process to find the glitches.

The Central Regional Center is also heavily involved with CAPSTONE, following lessons learned from several clients who have experienced a lack of coordination with active units. Central is into providing some firsts for the Guard also; they put together the first National Guard LMDTC which was well received by all (including two Air Guard folks). They have installed a quality circle operation in the maintenance section of the two Air Guard units, and **CPT Bruce Hood** was successful in operationalizing the Interaction Associates meta plan in one Guard unit.

The Eastern Regional Center is into some interesting stuff also. For instance, they are establishing a consulting advisory group in one state headquarters. This august body is composed of five senior people who will assist the consultant effort in that command. **MAJ Ron Lattanzi** is heading up another major project called the "Cold Turkey" battle staff assessment package, which is based on living systems theory and focused on quick reaction assessments of exercises such as MOBEX, CPX, FTC, etc. The eastern folks also continue to deliver PMC work in several state headquarters with the emphasis pointing toward integrating state efforts to Army PMA efforts and the language of AR 5-15.

Finally, there are the hellos and goodbyes. At Bureau we said goodbye to **LTC Mike Halus,** who wandered off into the sunset of retirement to set up his own consulting business—enhanced Management Consulting Service. In the East, bye went to **MAJ Peter W. J. Onoszko,** who left the consulting cell to become the Assistant Professor of Military Science at Georgetown University. And then there is Central, where *everyone* is leaving: **CPT Bruce Hood** and **MAJ Ralph Kelly,** both departed to go on tour with the Professional Education Center, where they will continue to use their skills. The final goodbye goes to **SFC Millie Doyle** (also from Central) who had car failure in Washington, D.C., and was seen lurking about bus stops trying to understand the process. A hearty Bon Voyage to all.

On the Hello side of the list is an old timer with a new job: **LTC Wally Davis,** who now heads the NGB OE Office; **MAJ Teddy H. Plyant,** who is joining the eastern center; **SP5 Terrie E. Hunter,** who has joined the Bureau Office as Admin NCO, and **LTC Lee Gragg,** who is still wandering around NGB attempting to find out what purple means.

There are also some additions to the OE effort in some of our several states: **MSG Jimmy G. Pendergast** has joined **MAJ Vern Watts** in his attempt to warm up the Alaskan tundra, while two of his classmates—**CPT Jay R. Penndorf** and **CPT Joanne R. Jensen** are starting up OE efforts in Indiana and Florida respectively. A hearty welcome to all new slaves.

In sum, OE is progressing in the National Guard and we can say that you can all sleep well tonight—Your National Guard is awake.

OECS Updates

Concepts Development Directorate

LTC Joe Black
8-929-7886/7106

Concepts and Studies Division

The 3-volume sets of WEIT manuals are currently being printed under contract through the Government Printing Office. Direct questions to **SFC Reed or MAJ Olson** (AV 929-7886). **MAJ Hopkins** and **Dr. Roberts** have put together a twelve hour presentation on Organizational Design and Theory that they presented to the Force Development Division, Combined Arms Center, Ft. Leavenworth. For further information contact Dr. Roberts (AV 929-7106).

External Operations Division

The EOD focus on strategic planning continues as operations at TCATA, ERADCOM and San Francisco Engineer District have progressed from the "get started" stage into the development of goals and objectives and the creation of organizational processes to reach the desired end state. In addition, a new operation has commenced with the MX missile project at Norton Air Force Base, CA. This project is especially exciting as it affords the opportunity to participate in the design of a totally new organization.

EOD has recently been given the go-ahead to fully develop High Performance One (HP-1), a workshop for combat leaders. This workshop was previously delivered to the officer cadre of two infantry battalions at Ft. Lewis, WA. **LTC Jim Berg** and **Bob Goodfellow** are currently working on the next phase, the development of a trainer course. Current expectations are that the trainer course will be presented for the first time in the Feb-March '83 time frame.

Although our calendar remains full most of the time, we enjoy hearing from our friends in the field. Please call us with your ideas, opportunities and requests for assistance. Our Autovon Number is 929-7106/8.

Research Division

Research Division is in the process of final preparation of the handbook on management of change and the exportable package on organizational design/redesign. **CPT Hungerland** prepared a paper titled "The Army 2000: Implications For The Psychologist and The Organizational Effectiveness Consultant" for presentation at the AMEDD Psychology Symposium held at Dwight David Eisenhower AMC in November.

Mr. Stanchfield has attended conferences dealing with the changing conditions of man into the next century and production of knowledge which has utility for industrial, nonacademic society.

LTC Black and members of the Reserarch Division of Concept Developments did long range and basic planning for OE and related Army research at the Research Management Committee meeting held in mid-November at TRADOC headquarters. MACOMs and organizations who designated attendees included OCSA, TRADOC, FORSCOM, DARCOM, HSC, NGB, ARI, Training support Center, Concepts Analysis Agency and unofficial observers. The prognosis for getting a much firmer handle on research programs of importance to the OE community seems to be quite positive. Much work still needs to be done in the area over the next few years.

Training Directorate

CH(COL) Marion D. Pember
8-929-3519/4021

OECC

Class 5-82 graduated on 10 December. They went on FTX to Ft Mead, Ft Stewart, Ft Polk, and Redstone Arsenal. The next classes will be 1-83, reporting 6 January 1983, and Class 2-83, reporting 24 February 1983. In the time between Classes 5-82 and 1-83, the staff and faculty will be quite busy revising and updating classroom material as well as spending a week on in-house professional development.

Since the last publication, three new members have joined the staff and faculty. They are:

MAJ James W. Carmack, arriving from Korea.
MAJ(P) Lucille B. Hayward, also from Korea.
MSG Warren D. Green, from Germany.

LMDTC

Six LMDTCs remain for FY83. Dates and locations are as follows:

3-83	Ft Eustis, Virginia	7 Jan - 4 Feb 83
4-83	Ft Ord, California	11 Feb - 11 Mar 83
5-83	Ft Gordon, Georgia	25 Mar - 22 Apr 83
6-83	Ft Ord, California	13 May - 10 Jun 83
7-83	Ft Stewart, Georgia	8 Jul - 5 Aug 83
8-83	Ft Ord, California	26 Aug - 23 Sep 83

OE Managers Course (OEMC)

The year 1982 was a good year for OEMC. There is a lot of interest in the field around this course and it fills very rapidly. Some Navy personnel attended during 1982 and were very much impressed with the course. This course is important not just for OE Managers, but also for those individuals involved with complex, systemic responsibilities (CG, DCG, CofS, etc.). **AR 5-15** requires that all **OE Managers** attend the course. The schedule for 1983 follows:

1-83	24 - 27 Jan	Europe
2-83	14 - 17 Mar	East Coast
3-83	6 - 9 Jun	West Coast
4-83	26 - 29 Sep	East Coast

For *information* on the OEMC, contact **MAJ Dave Leslie, AV 929-2889.** For *attendance,* contact your MACOM OE Office.

Colonel William L. Golden (right) congratulates SFC Dik Belasto for receiving the Meritorious Service Medal.

LTC Ron Tumelson (left) congratulates Allen L. Roach on his promotion to Major.

US Army TASC Photos by Robert [illegible]

Colonel William L. Golden (center) with LTC Ron Sheffield (left) who recently retired, and SFC Dik Belasto, who has been reassigned to Germany.

LTC Joseph W. Galloway (left) presents SFC Michael Morris with the Meritorious Service Medal upon Mike's retirement from the Army.

Training Developments Directorate

Dr. Mel Spehn
8-929-7058/7059

The 5th Annual TRADOC OE Service School OE Instructors Conference will be held 17-21 JAN 83. Point of contact at OECS is **MAJ Bill Hink.**

A draft program of instruction for the OE Consultant Course (OECS) has been submitted to TRADOC for approval. Point of contact for copies is **LTC Joe Galloway.**

SFC(P) Dik Belasto departed TD and OECS on 18 NOV 82 for assignment to the USAREUR OE office. He will be replaced by **SFC David Smith,** who joins us on 21 JAN 83 from the US Army Armor Center OE Office at Ft. Knox.

CPT Chuck Marashian joined TD as of his graduation with OECC #4-82 on 29 OCT 82. Chuck is the **editor of the *OE Communique*** as of next issue. □

Misfortunes are like knives, that either serve us or cut us, as we grasp them, by the blade or by the handle.
—James Russell Lowell

Daring ideas are like chessmen moved forward. They may be beaten, but they may start a winning game.
—Goethe

For an idea that does not at first seem insane, there is no hope. —Albert Einstein

OECS Sendoff: LTC Ronald L. Sheffield

The following interview was conducted for the *OE Communique* by **2LT Mary A. Smith,** Operations & Support Directorate, USA OECS.

LTC Ronald L. Sheffield retired from the Army on 31 October 1982. His distinguished career included command of an attack helicopter in the last of three RVN tours; Deputy Director of Plans, Training and Security at Fort Wolters, Texas (1969-1971); Adjutant, 2d Bde, 82d Airborne Division, and Assistant Division Aviation Officer (1972-1975); and Tactical Officer, U.S. Air Force Academy (1975-1978). For his last four years plus (1978-1982) he has been the Director of Operations and Support, Organizational Effectiveness Center and School. During his tenure as Director, Operations and Support, he processed more than 900 civilian, military and foreign students; coordinated visits for over 500 VIP's, refurbished four OECS buildings (one more in the process), acquired four additional OECS buildings, and managed OECS $1.3 million annual Budget. LTC SHEFFIELD is an Armed Forces Staff College graduate. He received his Bachelor of Science degree from Oklahoma University and his MPA from Colorado University, Colorado Springs.

Looking back over your four-year period as Director of Operations & Support, what changes have taken place for OECS and for Army OE?

Over the last four years, I have served in the position under four of the six OECS Commandants. The only time I was not serving as the Director of Operations and Support was when I attended the course. There have been many significant changes in the OE program and OECS in the last four plus years. A few of these are the name and mission change from *OETC* to *OECS,* the change of the name of *OESO* to *OE Management Consultant* to *OE Consultant,* the redirection of OE from working at company to division and higher levels, and the more general acceptance of OE in the Army. The move of the DA OE staff responsibility from DCSPER to the Director of Management on the Army Staff sent a positive message to the Army that OE could help in *all* staff areas, not just personnel. In addition to the name change, OECS has had the LMDTC accredited by the American Council on Education, upgraded the OE Managers Course, had the *Communique* approved as a DA periodical, established an External Operating Division, and integrated the NCO's into the OE program.

What accomplishment or occurrence gives you the most satisfaction as you reminisce about this assignment?

There are numerous events that gave me satisfaction in this assignment. The passage of three TRADOC IG's, the successful annual battle by OECS to keep from being subsumed by other organizations, and the graduation of each OEC class from OECS—all were gratifying. If I was held to one thing, it would be the fact that no class has returned from FTX without a place to stay.

If you had the opportunity to begin again as Director, Operations and Support, what (if anything) would you do differently?

I really don't know if there is *anything* I would do differently. There are the usual small things but nothing major.

The theme of this *Communique* issue is "Back to Basics; Some OE Fundamentals." What does that theme mean to you?

This is an important issue for me. Every spring and fall baseball and football teams start out teaching their members the basics of the game. The Oklahoma University football team was clobbered during it first two games this year. To get back on the winning track, they went ***back to the basics*** of blocking, tackling, running and thinking. Sometimes, OE Consultants forget why they are consultants. They get to be so wrapped up in everyday problems that their primary purpose is forgotten. To me, the fundamentals are: be a good soldier, be a good staff officer, be systemic, and, most important, work with the Commander to improve the effectiveness of his unit. Just like the Oklahoma football team, OE Consultants need to ***return to the fundamentals*** occasionally to validate their goals.

"Just like the Oklahoma football team, OE Consultants need to *return to the fundamentals* occasionally to validate their goals.

From your perspective, what do the next five years look like for OECS, OE, and for yourself?

OE and OECS will continue to grow in the next several years. The approval of the war mission of OE opens the door for OE and OECS to continue to expand to meet the Army's needs. In late summer, OECS had a strategic planning session that produced a mission for OECS in the 1990's. This concept was briefed at the RAPC, so I won't expound on it here. It is, however, realistic and will fill a key vacuum in U.S. Government. OECS is training Navy and other federal agencies at present. I would envision that role expanding as OECS is recognized more and more as developing the cutting edge of OE and OD.

Is there anything that you would like to convey to *OE Communique* readers that hasn't been covered during this interview?

My parting comment is this. Remember, the individual soldiers are our reason for being. If we can make them and their unit more effective, we are doing our job. They and the Army have problems that you can help them overcome. The only other thing I wish to say is thanks to all and God Bless You. □

Sources and Resources

Lynn Dixon Herrick
OECS Librarian

This issue of the *OE Communique* comes just as I was beginning to pride myself on my superficial understanding of complex, long-range, strategic planning and to sprinkle my conversation with words like matrix, equifinality and Theory Z. In short, I was so busy riding the "cutting edge" that I wasn't prepared for the theme of "Back to Basics!" In giving the subject some thought, however, it occurred to me that the willingness to reconsider basics is a sign of healthy maturity, whether in an individual or in a discipline. So in this section I'm happy to offer a reprint of an insightful article on feedback that originally appeared in 1974, a model that deserves wide acclaim and these words attributed to Kurt Lewin: "There's nothing so practical as a good theory."

"IT'S *YOUR* CHOICE. . ."

The deceptively simple model, "Only Two of the Three", was conceived by OE Consultants **MAJ Joe Riley** and **Dr. Jerry Eppler** for the purpose of establishing clarity regarding a commander's commitment to and expectations of an OE activity during its planning stages. Inherent in the model is the stark reality that the choice of any two of the elements establishes the impossibility of the third; e.g., if the desired outcome is to be good and fast, it won't be cheap. MAJ Riley and Dr. Eppler first used this basic assist to



planning in their complex system intervention at LOGCEN, Ft. Lee, VA in 1978 and continue to find it effective in raising the awareness level of commanders with whom they consult.(*)

*__Editor's comment:__ An account of the LOGCEN activity appeared in the Spring 1980 issue of the *OE Communique*.

A LONGER LOOK AT FEEDBACK: SKILL-BUILDING FOR SENDERS AND RECEIVERS

Larry Porter*

*Reprinted from *Social Change*, Vol. 4, No. 3, 1974. This material is taken from **Porter, Larry and Mill, Cyril R.**, READING BOOK FOR HUMAN RELATIONS TRAINING. NTL Institute, c1979. Reproduced by permission.

During the last few years of staffing a variety of workshops, I have observed considerable similarity in the way feedback issues are dealt with. It usually goes something like this: Presentation of the Johari Window (disclosure/feedback); brief lecture on "helpful feedback" ("well timed," "descriptive," "not imposed,"); perhaps some assessment of written feedback examples to increase participants' grasp of concepts; use of this information in T-Group interactions. These activities almost always produce some payoff for individuals, at least with respect to conceptual gains and, in some instances, with respect to improved feedback skills.

Still, there doesn't seem to be much helpful feedback going on in the world at large or, even, in the smaller one in which I walk about (with my own not-insignificant Blind Quadrant!). I've been pondering why this is so and have concluded that perhaps we should continue doing what we've been doing, but pay greater attention to—

- *Continuing* development of knowledge and skills related to feedback—
- Increased emphasis on *receiver* skill—
- Acknowledgment of the fact that, despite skillful delivery, feedback can still *hurt*.

> **". . .as though to do something twice is a capital offense against all experience-based learning theory."**

In my experience, most people are introduced to feedback skills and concepts at their first workshop. After that, participants see themselves as "experienced" and therefore in no need of further work on aspects already "covered"—a view first learned in traditional education, a process which chops content into pieces, to be learned the first time through or never. Moreover, many trainers (including, until recently, myself) do not want to ask participants in their second or third lab experience to review or practice one of the building-block concepts of laboratory education or think there is no need for review. (I *did* do this recently, in an advanced professional development workshop, to the disbelieving horror of a colleague; but I thought it was needed, and—though participants resisted it somewhat—for many it was useful, as evidenced by the ways in which groups worked after the "review.")

This assumption of expertise on the subject of feedback is produced by a collusion between "sophisticated' participants (in some instances, they've been through a 5-day workshop—or less) and trainers, who function as though to do something twice is a capital offense against all experience-based learning theory. This, despite the fact that giving/receiving helpful feedback, which requires knowledge, skills, and behaviors that fly in the face of much of what we've learned as we've grown up, can be an enormously complex and threatening activity.

Perhaps one thing we need to do, then, is to assess thoughtfully the level of feedback skills existing in any group and, where they appear to need upgrading, to spend some time reviewing "what everybody already knows." For a profession which prides itself on innovation, this is risky behavior; but, then, we pride ourselves on risk-taking too, and in this instance I think the need is justification enough.

Secondly, I think we need to modify the way in which we try to help people deal with the issue of feedback. Typically the emphasis has been on how to *give* helpful feedback. That seems a logical emphasis, but it may not be useful for many, particularly back home, away from "giving-helpful-feedback" norms. I now find myself making the fairly standard comments about "helpful" feedback, but focusing more on the implications for the **receiver.** The point I try to make is that giving feedback, however helpfully intended and skillfully delivered, may be risky or destructive in many situations; nevertheless, there are many situations in which knowledge about helpful feedback can be used to "manage" feedback *received* from others. For example, I may not be able to tell my boss that I feel frustrated when he makes judgmental comments about me. What frustration! I know what to do, but can't do it, because he'll think I'm weak ("hurt") or that I'm retaliating against his comments by calling them "judgmental." (My boss, you see, like many bosses, hasn't had any T-Group experience.) What to do?

"For a profession which prides itself on innovation, this is risky behavior; but, then, we pride ourselves on risk-taking too."

This is where "receiver skills" come in. Instead of *giving* my boss feedback, I try to exert some control over the feedback *he* gives *me,* using the same "helpful-feedback" concepts: "Could you give me an example or two of what I do that makes you uptight?" or "Next time you feel like that about me, I hope you'll let me know right away" or "Are there any *other* things I've been doing that make you see me that way? If so, maybe we need to talk about them."

This will almost certainly not deal with all the issues I have with my boss (wife/peers/subordinates), but it may help me deal with *some* of them. In addition to providing me with information, it sends some messages to my boss: 1. "I am interested in your perceptions of me." 2. (more subtly) "If you'll give me your perceptions in particular ways, it will help me and will probably be easier for you." Eventually, if this kind of modeling changes the way my boss gives me feedback, it may enable me to begin *giving him* feedback too.

Taking on responsibility for "managing" both the style and the content of the feedback that comes to me is also likely to increase my control over what happens to me in this kind of interaction—I am much more apt to learn and grow in situations in which I feel I have some share of the control. I have often been surprised, in T-Groups and out of them, at how "beholden" the recipient of feedback seems to be to the person(s) giving it, even when the feedback is delivered in nonhelpful ways. How rare to hear a "receiver" refuse to answer a leading question, indicate that it is useless because nothing can be done about it, or demand specific behavioral descriptions. In fact how rare to hear the recipient *demand* anything! The trainer may point out what is going on and thereby get things back "on track," but this is more likely to focus on the *sender's* lack of feedback delivery skills than on the *receiver's* lack of control over what is happening to him in the interchange.

Lastly, I think—by omission rather than intent—we minimize, overlook, or casually dismiss the **pain** connected with feedback. The unspoken point seems to be, "If you learn these 'rules' and practice them, you will be able to give negative feedback so effectively that it will help the recipient without hurting him."

The effect of this on participants as **recipients** of feedback is largely to confuse and sometimes to diminish them. "If the feedback is being given according to the 'rules,' and if it hurts me anyway—and wow! does it!—then there must be something wrong with me." Poor fellow! He's getting negative feedback, which hurts; but he also has doubts about himself *because* it hurts! Two problems for the price of one, and all because it's so difficult to connect "helpful" with "hurtful," even though they sometimes do go together.

The effect of this on participants as **givers** of feedback is just as confusing: the feedback is given, the recipient behaves in ways which reveal his acceptance of it, but also transmit some pain, frustration, or even anger. "Well," worries the sender, "I've done it the 'right' way, but look at the pain on Mary's face. Something must be wrong—either with the method or with Mary." And then—one of the worst things that can happen at this point—the giver responds to the recipient's pain with impatience rather than with empathy. In addition, he may begin to see the concepts which he has just started to practice as phony or ineffective.

The way in which we commonly help people develop feedback knowledge and skills is based on sound ideas about **ownership, trust,** and **openness,** and it can have extremely positive effects on individuals' interpersonal competence and growth. But I believe that, as trainers, we can make these learnings even more useful. While admitting that the most "helpful" intended feedback can carry pain and hurt, I believe we must take greater responsibility for assessing the level of skills existing in a group and for spending time reviewing, practicing, and developing sender skills, as well as concentrating on the skills a receiver must develop in order to have some control over what happens to him in the interchange. □

Organizational Effectiveness Managers Course 4-82

13 - 16 September 1982 San Diego, California

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Index to *OE Communique* Articles Issues 4-81 through 3-82

The following is a listing of articles and authors which were featured in the *OE Communique,* Issues 4-81, 1-82, 2-82, and 3-82.

OE Communique
Issue Number 4-81

Advisors in the Reserve Component System
by MAJ Lawrence J. Gomez and CPT Steven J. Messman

DOD States '82 Reserve Component Goals
by MAJ Dick Crossland

Managing the Future: A Process for Dealing with the Possible
by Bob Goodfellow

Division '86 = Transition Management
by LTC Ron Tumelson

The Future of Human and Organization Development: Visions of Things to Come
by David W. Jamieson and James Ross Warren

The Congruent Leadership Frame
by COL Roger C. Bunting

Resistance to Change: A Historic Example
by Horace S. Mazet

Assessment Center Technology Invades ROTC
by MAJ Alexander Hogg

Communique Interview: Kast and Rosenzweig
by CPT Bill Barko and CPT Larry Boice

OMREN: A Model of Planning
by Guy DeFuria

How Can We Emphasize the "E" in "OE"?
by Laurel W. Oliver, PhD

What to Do on Loss or Projected Loss of IBM 1232 Optical Mark Reader
by SGM John Cato

Managing Organizational Effectiveness: An Address
by MG James S. Welch

Praise and Criticism: Giving and Receiving
by Janis Day

Organization Development: Casual Careers in a Precarious Profession
by Daniel L Keegan

OE Communique
Issue Number 1-82

A Time of Change
by GEN Edward C. Meyer, Chief of Staff, US Army

Force Modernization—Our Toughest Systemic Challenge
by LTC Bob Radcliffe and MAJ Mary Mudd (TRADOC)

"Man, You Ain't Seen Nothing Yet!"
by Joseph Coates (futurist)

Combating Ineffective Communications
by CPT(P) David J. Ozolek (NTC)

Socio-Technical Systems Intervention in an Army Transportation Company
by MAJ Erwin T. Villagomez (CDEC) and CPT John E. Price (OECS)

WEIT: An Improved Training Approach to Quality Circles
by SFC Wayne Reed (OECS)

Quality Circles and Arsenal Productivity
by Maureen Gour (PAO)

Communique Interview: COL Howard T. Prince
Conducted by CPT(P) Lawrence R. Boice, OECS and MAJ Mitchell M. Zais, USMA)

Leadership, Management, Commandership and OE (Part 1 of 2 Parts)
by MAJ Mitchell M. Zais (USMA)

A Four Hour Transition?
by CPT Jim Davis (MEDDAC)

"Brainwriting" for Priorities
by MAJ Darry D. Eggleston (NGB)

Handouts for Success
by MAJ Darry D. Eggleston (NGB)

Marketing OE
by MAJ Eddie Mitchell and SFC Tommy deGrom (OECS)

Transition Meeting: Mod. #37
by LTC Ray Zugel (DA)

HEROES PACT
by SFC Leo Stuyt (OECS)

Visitors to OECS
by LTC Ron Sheffield



OE Communique
Issue Number 2-82

Force Modernization: An Interview with MG Richard D. Boyle
Conducted by CPT Howard Brosseau and LTC Robert Radcliffe (TRADOC)

Force Modernization: An Inside View
COL Mike McAdams

Organizational Effectiveness and Force Modernization
CPT William F. Barko and MAJ Elwyn V. Hopkins (OECS)

NETTs and NOTTs: A Force Modernization Overview
MAJ John Buckley (Fort Knox)

Visions of the Future: FORSCOM 1990
LTC Jim Channon (HTTB)

Moving into the 21st Century
MAJ Elwyn V. Hopkins (OECS)

82d Airborne Division: Significant OE Activities
COL Michael Plummer and CPT David Abrahamson (Fort Bragg)

What SLA Marshall Tells Us About OE in Combat: An Address
MG William S. Augerson

Communique Interview: MG Richard Wm. Anson
Conducted by CPT(P) Lawrence R. Boice and LTC Michael W. Rodier

Leadership, Management, Commandership and OE (Part 2 of 2 Parts)
MAJ Mitchell M. Zais (USMA)

One Clear View
(Focusing on RG Assistance Efforts to Reserve Components)
CPT Steve Messman and MAJ Larry Gomez (RC)

Skill Assessment
(A Model for Maximizing Mission/Training Match)
CPT Roger W. Pietz (18th ENG BDE)

Organizational Design and Redesign: An OECS Workshop
Dr. Ben Roberts, CPT Jacky Hungerland, and CPT Bill Barko

Conferences As OE Targets
Dr. Jack Collier (FORSCOM)

Effective Use of OE: An Address
LTG Julius W. Becton, Jr.

OECS Sendoff: An Interview with LTC William R. Fisher
by CPT Gayle Fix



OE Communique
Issue Number 3-82

Implementing the Seven Total Army Goals
MG Victor J. Hugo, Jr.

Total Army Human and Leadership Goals (An introduction)
LTG M.R. Thurman (DCSPER)

The Human Goal MAJ Barry A. Berglund (ODCSPER)

Army Leadership Goal LTC Norman L. Grunstad (ODCSPER)

The Materiel Goal LTG Richard H. Thompson (DCSLOG)

The Army's Management Goal LTC James E. Thomas (COA)

Toward a High Performing Fort Dix
MG Robert H. Forman (USATC and Ft. Dix)

Managing By Goals (Problems for the Army Organization)
CPT Louis P. Cantolupo (Korea)

Goal-Setting and Implementation (A Training Model)
CPT Louis P. Cantolupo (Korea)

Battle Staff Process of Dispersed Command Post with SPADS
MAJ Dan McGrew and Ms. Martha Jutte (V Corps)

A Commander's Guide to Division 86
MAJ Elwyn V. Hopkins (OECS)

Recruiting the Future (Management Development in an Army National Guard Recruiting Force)
MAJ Darry D. Eggleston (NG)

Mind, Body, Spirit: Total Soldier Wellness
LTC John Alexander, MAJ Jeff Anthony, MG William S. Augerson, Dr. Jerry Eppler, LTC(P) Tom Johnson, MAJ Mark Olson, Ms. Lilith Ren, and John Le Bourgeois

Androgynous Behavior in Leaders and Consultants
Dr. Janis Day and Dr. Jerry Eppler (OECS)

Management and the Sexes: Toward a Middle Ground (book review)
Marc E. Miller (Management Review)

How Women are Recasting the Managerial Mold
Genita Kovacevich-Costello (San Jose Mercury News)

OE Program Management Model
LTC Warren I. Klein and LTC Thomas K. Forsythe (OECS)

OE Consultant's Guide to Implementation of WEIT
SFC Wayne Reed (OECS)

Doubling Your Consulting Impact
MAJ Eddie Mitchell (CGSC)

How to Make OD Work Better For Your Organization
Robert W. Bauer (Management Review)

When the Balloon Goes Up
CPT Nancy L. Freebairn (WESTCOM) and CPT Glenn M. Hulse (SETAF)

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