OE COMMUNIQUÉ

The Professional Organizational Effectiveness/Development Publication of the U.S. Army

High Performance

DRCOE   14 December 1982

General Edward C. Meyer
The Chief of Staff
United States Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

Dear General Meyer:

I am most pleased this year to provide you with the DARCOM Organizational
Effectiveness Command Summary. This has been a year of expansion and growth
in the use of Organizational Effectiveness (OE).

I am using the DARCOM consultants to assist the headquarters and the command
in supporting the Army Goals through a process we call DARCOM Directions. We
have developed 21 thrusts which support the goals and guide how we do our
work. The thrusts are outcome oriented and provide the connection between
future planning and our daily operations.

Throughout DARCOM the OE consultants are involved in strategic planning,
quality circles, management training and the more traditional activities such
as teambuilding and transition workshops. Specific details are attached. The
payoffs are greater productivity and quality of life.

I will continue to use the organizational consultants to improve our everyday
operations and to more effectively prepare us for the future. My concerns for
this next year include continuing to emphasize strategic planning and improved
matrix management. I will also use our DARCOM consultants to assist in our
Force Modernization efforts to include improving interfaces between the other
major commands. We will work closely with your OE office in these latter
efforts.

P-190538 U.S. Army Photograph by Russell Roederer

GENERAL DONALD R. KEITH

Respectfully,

DONALD R. KEITH
General, USA
Commanding

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Commander/Commandant

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Executive Officer

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Command Sergeant Major

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Colonel William L. Golden

"Our continuing use of Organizational Effectiveness will prove an integral factor in both achieving and maintaining an Army of Excellence."
—*General Edward C. Meyer, 1983*

ex-cel-lence n. 1. The state, quality or condition of excelling; superiority; preeminence. 2. Something in which a person or thing excels; a surpassing feature or virtue. (The American Heritage Dictionary, 1971.)

In the last issue, I briefly touched upon the Army's pursuit of excellence. I take this opportunity to elaborate on the intracacies of excellence as they pertain to you as Organizational Effectiveness Consultants.

The foremost quality of excellence an OEC should possess is being an outstanding soldier in all respects. Sharp appearance, flawless military bearing and professional attitude will open many doors and maintain your effectiveness as a consultant. Your sense of duty to the Army and honor to your profession should be apparent in all of your endeavors. Your ability to influence decision-makers and help implement change within the Army is directly proportional to the pride you possess and exhibit as a professional soldier.

The old saying, "it takes only a nickel more to go first class" applies. All of your work—whether it be the development of a strategic planning process, a staff study, planning a conference or doing a battle staff assessment—should be on the cutting edge of excellence. Continue to invest the necessary planning time, effort, and research to ensure that your work approaches perfection.

Avoid timidity in your pursuits. Aggressively seek out complex challenges within your organization. Actively look for and capitalize upon strategic opportunities to work on major issues at the highest levels.

Market your consulting skills by *doing* and *doing well*. It is extremely more effective to show, rather than tell, decision-makers what OE can do for their organizations.

Achieve excellence through the use of systemic analysis. Continue to use a systems approach in all of your work. Maintain your proficiency in the systems approach to change by studying recent journals and books that discuss the subject. Mastering the art of systems approach to organizational change is paramount to the establishment of excellence.

Finally, approach your job with a strategic perspective and a futures orientation. To really help the decision-maker, you must assist him to articulate and clarify what his organization is now and what it is to be in the future. Never lose sight of the intended outcomes of your efforts: the effective management of change in Army organizations and the enhancement of battlefield effectiveness.

As I conclude these final comments to you, I leave you with these thoughts: You have the ability to help change the Army for the better. You have the legitimacy of recognition and position to do so. Moreover, you have a professional and moral obligation to do so. Do it to the best of your ability. □

Editorial Page

Guide to Contributors

The *OE Communique* publishes manuscripts that (a) provide ideas and methodologies to assist OECs in the field, (b) disseminate new theoretical concepts, and (c) provide a forum to exchange innovations and lessons learned in the use of OE techniques.

The *Communique* depends upon your quality input from the field. The criterion for being published is the content of your article, not your writing ability. We seek articles that share first-hand consulting experiences with the OE community, as well as articles that deal with state-of-the-art concepts in organizational development. And, we encourage you to submit all other articles that pertain to organizations.

Send two copies of the manuscript, typed and double spaced, to the editor. Leave ample margins, at least 1½ inches on each side and about 2 inches at the top and bottom of the page. While there is no specific limit for manuscript length, an article should be about 2000 words. Make sure your manuscript is original work not under consideration elsewhere at the time of submission. The manuscript should contain no classified material and be completely cleared for publication before submission. References should be pertinent and kept to a minimum. Put all charts, graphs, tables, and references on separate pages at the end of the article. Photographs and artwork are welcome.

Enclose a short biographical sketch and a black-and-white photograph, if desired. Send all submitted material to:

USA OECS
ATTN: OE Communique
Fort Ord, CA 93941

If you have any questions, please call **AV 929-7058/6014** or **Commercial (408) 242-7058/6014.**

Letters

Dear Editor,

As a 1978 alumni of the school and an ex-OEC in the 8th Infantry Division, I have been receiving quarterly copies of the *Communique* and using it as my primary means of staying current in OE. I also maintain personal contact with several active OECs in the local area and follow with interest the transition OE has made in the few years since I was practicing in Germany. We (my partners and I) practiced what we called "Foxhole OE," which was really "Combat OE" and focused on interventions at battalion and brigade level. Given the shortage of available assets, we felt the severe frustration of trying to provide coverage and continuity without the manpower capability to do so. We then began to reorient our efforts at Division level in an effort to provide change where it might become institutionalized. From what I read in the *Communique,* it seems the entire OE effort is now focused at the policy making level rather than the execution level for many of the same reasons. Until the system provides an OEC for each brigade or equivalent sized unit, I see no other alternative.

Several years later, I find myself assigned to a Reserve Division as the SGS under provisions of the Full Time Unit Support Program. As you know, the Army Reserve units do not have OEC personnel as part of the TO&E/TDA and must rely upon their supporting Army Readiness Mobilization Region to provide assistance. We are fortunate in the 91st Division to have a Commanding General, MG Robert S. Holmes, who is a management consultant in his civilian profession. As a firm believer in MBO, General Holmes had us develop a Division Management system which we call the Internal Planning and Control System (IPACS), which we implemented through a series of weekend workshops with primary staff and MSU commanders. While still suffering some growing pains, the system is in place and working very well. I think it is unique to the Reserves to operate under such a clearly defined set of missions, goals, and objectives and have a viable system to monitor progress.

As one of the officers involved in the development of the system, I found myself having to dust off many of the old skills and search through the kit bag to find the materials I needed to design a program which met the specific needs of a Reserve Division. Once again, the *Communique* proved to be a valuable resource, and I provided several copies to MG Holmes when I thought he might be interested.

Ronald R. LaFleur
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Dear Bill,

I recently read *"A Commander's Guide to Division 86"* by MAJ Elwyn Hopkins in the *Communique (Vol. 6-No. 3, 1982).* The article immediately caught my eye because of the Division 86 title. As I started to read the article I began to compare in my mind the key points outlined by the author and how they applied to the transitioning of the High Technology Light Division which is currently ongoing at Ft. Lewis. I must say that the real world problems which we are encountering daily were almost 100 percent identified by MAJ Hopkins. I find his article to be the best roadmap to the transition process I have yet read, and I assure you that we have been intently interested in the transition process with a 1985 prototype objective given to the 9th ID by the Chief of Staff of the Army. In particular, the comments which described the demands operating on a changing unit were totally on target. The resistance problem was on target as well and is highlighted as one within the division. At any rate, I would highly recommend that MAJ Hopkins' article be made available to every force modernization element in the United States Army, particularly those at division level. I am sure that most of those organization elements probably do not receive nor read the *Communique,* but the power of the article put together by MAJ Hopkins should be distributed to the executors in the field to assist them in understanding the problems that they are going to face with the modernization and transition missions. Again, my compliments to the *Communique* and MAJ Hopkins for a very timely article.

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HIGH PERFORMANCE

Profile Of A High Performing Individual
Lieutenant Colonel Jim Berg

What makes a high performer? Native abilities ... luck ... connections ... dedication? Yes, these are all part of it. But in all walks of life, high performers share common mental skills and habits, all of which are teachable and can be learned by anyone. You can increase your productivity, enhance your strong points, eliminate personal barriers to peak performance, and sustain high levels of motivation. Be a high performer and achieve your potential!

This profile of the high performer is adapted from the work of Dr. Charles Garfield and Dr. Peter Vaill. Dr. Garfield, of the Peak Performance Center, Berkeley, California, has studied 1500 outstanding achievers from nearly every walk of life, and he has provided many of the bibliographic references at the end of this article. Dr. Vaill, of George Washington University, has done considerable research and writing about high performing individuals and systems, and other related topics.

Workstyle

A high performer *works smart* rather than works hard. The high performer also is committed to purposeful results, unlike the workaholic, who is addicted by work and motivated primarily by fear of failure.

Work for the high performer is not everything. A workaholic, however, often works obsessively to stay busy, or to escape those aspects of life that cause pain. Quantity of hours is confused with quality of results. The high performer, on the other hand, seeks *results,* not perfection. Almost always free of the compulsion to do it just right, the high performer doesn't see mistakes as failures, but learns from mistakes and tries to do better next time.

Able to skillfully indentify core competencies needed to achieve excellence in a chosen field, the high performer:
- Finds out what works and produces results.
- Finds out what doesn't work and what blocks high performance.
- Modifies and corrects behavior through self-development and skill-building.
- Transcends previous levels of accomplishment.

When presented with a problem, the high performer doesn't ask who or what caused it, but asks: What's the existing situation? ... Where am I going? ... How do I get there?

With commitment to purposeful results and a very personal set of goals—*a vision with heart*—the high performer achieves his potential.

Time Management

The high performer chooses work by preference, cares for it deeply, and spends more than two-thirds of his time doing it. Internal satisfaction is the goal, not just external rewards like raises, promotions and power. But all these aspects are usually gained because the high performer enjoys what he's doing. The work is better and the resultant rewards are higher.

Skilled in the art of time management, the high performer divides possible activities into three

categories:

Category A All those activities that *fit the game plan* (purpose and goals) and only the high performer can do.

Category B All those activities that *fit the game plan* and that can be delegated or postponed.

Category C All those enticing 'opportunities' and diversions that don't *fit the game plan.*

Tending not to be seduced by all possibilities, the high performer almost always says "No" to Category C activities. Category B tasks are dispensed with; the high performing person is an extraordinary delegator. And the vast majority of time is spent doing what the high performer is 'turned on' to: Category A activities. Time and tasks are structured for potentiality and enjoyment.

Risk Taking

The high performer always pushes the "comfort zone" limits. Viewing new or stretching situations within a framework of dangers and opportunities, the high performer puts considerable emphasis on the opportunities rather than dwelling on negative fantasies about the dangers. The art of educated risk-taking is applied when analyzing personal adjustment—how to salvage a situation—if the high performer fails. Basic questions are routinely asked, like: *What are the benefits and costs of the possible outcomes of the risk? ... What's the best thing that could happen? ... The worst?* These kinds of questions allow rational choices. When one remains immobilized by the fear of the dangers, there are no choices at all.

The high performer—seeing the opportunities and committing to risks that spur growth and enhance potential—goes for it!

Holistic Fitness

When the high performing individual is fit—mentally, physically and spiritually—performance increases and remains high.

Aware of personal stress indicators, the high performer monitors them. When under stress, operating at severely reduced capacity, people are susceptible to the potentially dangerous impacts of stress. The high performer uses the following techniques to help reduce stress and maintain physical, mental and spiritual fitness.

A high performer practices *systematic relaxation* at least three times a week, by exercising, enjoying hobbies and leisure activities, meditation, yoga, deep breathing, progressive relaxation techniques, tune-up and the like. Leave and vacations are also taken more frequently than by others.

Some form of systematic *physical fitness* is performed at least three times a week. This is exercise such as running, strenuous individual sports,

martial arts, and yoga.

The high performer also practices *mental fitness,* routinely exercising the mind with creative activities like puzzles, meditation, visualization, memory retention and concentration techniques.

The high performer knows his mind-body-spirit system and enjoys the increased potential experienced by keeping the system fine-tuned.

Self-Image and Confidence

It should come as no surprise that the high performer has a very positive self-image and a great deal of self-confidence. This stems largely from genuine self-acceptance—*I'm really OK*—as well as deep self-love and true belief in one's self.

A high performer doesn't waste any time being down on himself, knowing that negative self-talk directly affects self-image which, in turn, affects performance. The circle is kept positive and spiraling upward to new levels of performance by positive affirmations and self-talk.

The high performer understands that how you view yourself and your level of confidence is an *assumption.* The high performer constantly tests and challenges such assumptions that act as temporary barriers or ceilings to increased performance. The basic theme is to believe first, next create positive visions and images of what will be, and then commit energy and excitement to make it happen.

Networks

Family, personal friendships, and personal and professional relationships are vital to the high performer's highest-level achievements. The quality of relationships influences self-confidence and well-being.

A sustained lack of supportive contact with other people or sudden loss of important relationships can result in a sense of loneliness, alienation and reduced personal effectiveness. Support networks provide encouragement, moral support, high-quality feedback on performance and development, and a safe, comfortable place to relax and rejuvenate.

At another level, the high performer is generally not a loner, but a team player. Groups can solve certain complex problems better and quicker than individuals, and the high performer is eager to let others do part of the work.

A high performing individual shares information through structured information networks. Often these are linked with electronic mail, computers, and high-speed information systems. The creativity and synergy that result from such networks empowers the high performer to achieve greater levels of effectiveness.

Visualization and Mental Rehearsal

The capacity to visualize, to develop lucid visions or images of the achieved end-state, is perhaps the

supreme unique talent of the high performer. This person uses this easy-to-learn technique to hone skills used in a difficult or important situation and to crystalize short- and long-range goals. Visualization may be brought about in this way:

1. Put yourself into a relaxed, receptive state.

2. See the image of your visualization, what you want to obtain or achieve, a clear, sharp detailed image. Concentrate, and if your mind wanders, bring it gently back to your image.

3. Now become yourself in the image, aware of the feelings you associate with the pictured goal. Experience the sounds, feelings, touch, smell, etc. as you feel yourself in the image.

4. Tell yourself in words, or send into yourself the thoughts, that you deserve to achieve the goal or state you are imaging.

5. Trust and believe that you will have a successful outcome. It is essential that you believe, that you put your will and energy behind your image.

By repeating these steps over and over, the high performer consistently achieves whatever he believes and wants to achieve.

Belief

The high performer gets energy, motivation and will power from a clear sense of purpose, in which he believes deeply. Coming full circle, these forces follow and flow from what one cares deeply about; there is *a path with heart.*

In the quest for purpose or most important goal—what's worth dying for—the high performer often gets answers through intuitive channels, the non-rational skill of our consciousness. There is a huge reservoir, or hidden reserve, of potential available for excellence in life and work.

The Keys

These trigger-words and phrases will help you remember the attributes and skills of the high performer:

- Work Smart
- Holistic Fitness
- Visualization
- Fit the Game Plan?
- I'm Really OK
- Belief
- Go For It
- Networking

Through training, these can be learned by anyone. The high performer has developed these attributes and skills doing something he really cares about ... following a path with a heart. Out of this pursuit flows the will and energy and commitment to achieve excellence. ◻

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CLASSES AND TRAININGS

Lozanov Learning Institute, 325 West Washington St., San Diego, CA 92103, Tel. (174) 298-3790.

Lozanov Learning Institute of Orange County, 4029 Westerly Pl., Suite 201, Newport Beach, CA 92660, Tel. (714) 752-0098.

Learning in New Dimensions (LIND), 2470 15th St. #2, San Francisco, CA 94114, Tel. (415) 552-2819 or 626-0874. A systhesis of suggestopedia, visualizations, sensory-awareness exercises and multimodal learning.

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Profile Of A
High Performing Organization
Lieutenant Colonel Jim Berg

What characterizes the high performing organization and distinguishes it from the others? What are the reasons for the consistent excellence in performance that prevails in this type of organization, be it public or private, product- or service-oriented, young or old? This profile of the high performing organization identifies key qualities and characteristics that set it apart from the rest.

This profile is a synthesis of the key qualities and characteristics of organizations that have been identified as "excellent" or "top" or "high performing" in a variety of research studies. It includes the work of Dr. Peter Vaill, George Washington University, on High Performing Systems; Ken Gold, U.S. Office of Personnel Management and Penn State University; Tom Peters, Stanford University and McKinsey and Company (a large management consulting firm); and others (see bibliography).

PURPOSE

A key characteristic of every high performing organization is that it has a **lucid, shared, felt vision** of why it exists...its essence...its valued, enduring direction: its purpose.

The members of the organization—top to bottom—have common understanding and agreement about this purpose, and they are committed to it. It is the primary focal point for the organization's leadership, providing the basis for strategic decisions, allocation of resources, and meaning to daily activities.

High performing organizations are really **clear about purpose** because it provides the common focus for individual and organizational energy.

INNOVATION

High performing organizations are known for their continued innovativeness, either from a technology-product-service standpoint, or in terms of management and leadership practice.

They encourage and support creativity and innovation in the leadership and work force, within the scope of the task or work. Organizational members are encouraged to experiment with new ideas and approaches, to develop new methods, and they are rewarded for it.

In high performing organizations, the mission orders are "do it, fix it, try it," not "analyze it, complicate it, debate it to death." They avoid this analysis paralysis and complicated procedures for developing new ideas. The leadership/management philosophy is to "get some data, do it, then adjust it" rather than wait to get a perfect plan.

High performing organizations **try it.**

FEEDBACK SYSTEM

High performing organizations place great value on and work hard to get feedback, both internal and external to the organization. They create and

maintain reliable, effective processes to ensure that this feedback is timely and accurate.

The external focus has been characterized as "staying close to the customer," and involves continuous assessment of the environment and how the product or service is being received. Is the organization "answering the mail?" These organizations view the "customer" as an intergral element of their operations.

High performing organizations foster a climate for and promote self-assessment of leadership, the work and how it gets done, and management processes and results. They know that the organization can be self-correcting when people listen and then take action where appropriate.

They have learned that the payoffs resulting from these feedback mechanisms far exceed their costs.

High performing organizations **listen.**

GOALS

In high performing organizations, the work is managed against clear, well defined goals. These goals are based upon the missions of the organization, and both, in turn, support its purpose. From these goals, organizational objectives are derived.

The goals and objectives are the basis of work, and organizational members are expected to develop their objectives against those of the organizations. They become the measures of individual and organizational performance, and are rewarded accordingly.

The use of missions, goals and objectives as a management device is kept simple and effective, rather than a cumbersome MBO program which often falls from its own weight. They are also updated and revised frequently.

High performing organizations **set goals.**

LEADERSHIP

The leadership in high performing organizations is strong and clear. There is no fuzziness or uncertainty; rather, there is reliability and predictability. Leadership style often varies widely in different organizations—there is no one best style—but within an organization, it is remarkably consistent.

The leadership is value-based and consistantly focuses the organization and it membership on these values and on the organization's purpose. It also has a strong inspirational dimension.

Leadership is future-oriented and spends less time on day-to-day operational concerns (they hire good managers for that).

Leadership in high performing organizations is **strong, clear, future-oriented** and **inspirational.**

PROCESSES

High performing organizations develop and refine processes—planning, decision making, management information, management of conflict, problem-solving, etc.—to deal with their work and their challenges. Rather than reacting to and solving present problems each time they arise, these organizations create a process to deal with them. These processes get used routinely, not just written up in voluminous policy and procedures manuals. They are valued and used because they are simple, understood, and work.

The entire organization, not just the leadership and management, seems to have a process orientation, and spends time tending to **how** things happen, and how to do it better.

High performing organizations **create processes.**

COMMUNICATIONS

Communications, both *vertical* and *horizontal, internal* and *external,* are open and clear. The organization and its leadership place great value on being able to "tell it like it is," and that kind of communication is rewarded, formally and informally.

People simply talk to each other, clearly and frequently. The work and work areas are designed so that people have direct access to each other. The communications processes are continually assessed to ensure they are working properly. When blockages occur—between people or in processes—they are immediately cleared.

The leaders and managers spend a great deal of their time talking with people in the organization. One CEO in a high performing organization characterizes his leadership style as "MBWA" (Management by Wandering Around).

Even though communication in these organizations is very good, when one asks organizational members about it, their perception is "our communications need improvement." High performing organizations have clear, frequent, honest communications.

CONTROL

High performing organizations maintain *tight* control over two or three critical issues, prescribed by "rigidly held and enforced critical business values." These are managed intensely and are the principal focus for the senior leadership. The attention to customers, primacy of the cost orientation, emphasis on quality, and focus on innovation are all examples.

On the other hand, these organizations are *loose.* They are informal with lots of informal communications, lots of informal get-togethers, and great room for individual initiative and autonomy. Much of the work is managed through goals; decision-making is pushed down at or near the sources of information; and organizational members are involved and participate in key decisions. Top leadership is concerned only with results.

Subordinates are encouraged to be creative, to take initiative, and are blessed with great autonomy. They are also charged with the responsibility to "make things happen," and to produce results. When they don't, the boss comes down...hard!

High performing organizations are able to maintain this delicate balance of loose-tight, avoiding the extremes of either one. They **tightly control 2-3 things and turn 'em loose on the rest.**

TEAMWORK

High performing organizations understand the meaning and importance of **interdependence** and act it out daily in the work place. There is a series of formal and informal attitudes and rewards that encourage and support teamwork; teamwork focused on task. The organization and its members tend to look at themselves as a system, with all the pieces fitting and working together, and the organization, in turn, fitting together with its environment.

Within this team, there is a high clash of ideas, with the focus on tasks, problems and situations, not on people or organizations. One of the reasons the team "fits" is because the pieces are kept simple and lean. The staffs are small. The structural form is kept simple. Temporary task forces are formed to deal with issues or problems as they arise and then are disbanded.

High performing organizations **work as a team.**

PEOPLE

The high performing organization places very high value on its people, and acts it out. Organization members are treated with dignity and integrity; they are listened to; they are acknowledged, recognized, and rewarded for their work and contributions to the organization and to each other. They are actively and routinely involved in the decisions which affect them and their work.

The payoffs to leadership and the organization are highly motivated, very productive people; members who have pride, esprit, loyalty and a sense of commitment to the team and family (they often feel the organization is like family). There is a shared sense of "we're special."

High performing organizations **care about their people.**

SUMMARY

High performing organizations:

- Are Clear About Purpose
- Listen
- Set Goals
- Have Leadership That Is Strong, Clear, Future-Oriented and Inspirational
- Create Processes
- Have Clear, Frequent, Honest Communications
- Tightly Control 2-3 Things, and Turn 'Em Loose on the Rest

- Work As A Team
- Care About Their People

The 'good news' is, adherence to this set of basic attributes can transform an organization to high performance. The 'bad news' is it takes some key ingredients and a lot of very hard work to get there:

BELIEF....VISION....COMMITMENT.

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LTC Jim Berg is the senior OE Staff Officer, Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe. His current interests are the applications of OE in managing change in large, complex systems, strategic planning, and individual and organizational excellence.

He recently completed a four-year assignment on the faculty of OECS, first training OE consultants, and for the last two years, as Chief, External Consulting Division, where he consulted to complex Army organizations. Prior to that he was the senior OE Staff Officer, Headquarters, V Corps, U.S. Army Europe.

He is a graduate of CGSC, holds an MPA, with specialty in Organizational Behavior, from the University of Missouri, and has completed the Columbia University Advanced Program in OD & HRM.

Consulting To Complex Systems
Using The
Strategic Management Model
Lieutenant Colonel Warren I. Klein

This is the first in a series of articles that will share the technologies and methods used by the OECS's External Consulting Division when consulting to complex systems—generally characterized as higher-level organizations with multiple, simultaneous missions, sophisticated technologies and independent subsystems. These articles will discuss our evolution in consulting to complex systems, the philosophies behind our approach to this type of consulting, an indepth look at the Strategic Management Model and how we use it when consulting to complex systems. We'll begin with an overview of the Strategic Management Model—its evolution, its content, and the process.

OECS's External Consulting Division (ECD) began working with the idea of consulting to complex systems in 1980. The focus of ECD consulting was organizational strategy, organization design, and results. Essential to achieving organizational effectiveness is common understanding of organizational strategy: clarity of purpose, well defined mission, clear goals, specific objectives and an evaluation plan to measure the organization's output or results.

By working with senior Army leaders, we uncovered a need for an in-depth process they could use to develop organizational plans. This led to action research and developing a technology for strategic planning in complex organizations. **Strategic Planning** further evolved into **Strategic Management,** a process for managing the actions required by the strategic plan, as well as those actions required to set the plan in motion and sustain it.

Strategic planning, as implemented by ECD, is based on the Strategic Management Model (see figure). This model is unique in that it is both **static** and **dynamic.** It is static because it depicts a system and serves as a framework for organizing organizational data. It is dynamic because it depicts the actual consulting process and serves as a guide for the strategic planning exercise.

When using the Strategic Management Model, the first step is strategic planning, incorporating environmental considerations, organizational values and the vision of the leader in developing an organizational strategy. Organizational design components (subsystems) are then tailored to fit the strategy and the vision of the desired future state. Following the flow of the planning process, each element is considered in sequence. When completed, participants will have developed a future vision of

Strategic Management Model

Feedback

excellence and identified the milestones to accomplish the tasks necessary to achieve the vision.

The unique aspect of this process is its future focus. The consultant does not address the present state of the organization until the desired future state has been clearly articulated. Then the present state is considered only to determine what should be carried forward to the desired future state. Problem-solving skills, essential in planning, are no longer used to solve past problems; rather, they are used to overcome obstacles or impediments to achieving the desired future state.

A positive mind-set is important in such a planning activity. The consultant's role is critical in helping participants recognize organizational potential; discarding self-imposed limitations on organizational capacity; creating a common, shared vision of high performance; and developing individual commitment to achieve that vision.

The sum of these components—accurate assessment of the environment, clear vision of the future, organizational strategy, and an organization design tailored to fit the strategy—provides senior leaders with a strategic management process by which they will achieve desired results at the organization, work group, and individual levels.

☐

NOTE: Contributions to the evolution, philosophy, content and process of the ECD Strategic Management Model will be acknowledged in upcoming articles.

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High Performance One

Bob Goodfellow

A look at the non-fiction best sellers in early 1983 shows what may be a shift in American reading habits. Titles like *Megatrends, In Search of Excellence, The One-Minute Manager,* and *Jane Fonda's Workout Book* reveal a growing focus on excellence, increased productivity, high performance and the future.

In line with this emphasis, and as the result of an external consultant's special request, the Organizational Effectiveness Center and School has developed a 3½-day workshop. Currently being field tested, the workshop is designed to enhance individual and organizational excellence. This intense, fast-paced training, called *High Performance One,* employs experiential learning and recent educational technology breakthroughs.

The entire officer cadre of a TOE battalion attends the workshop together, while the battalion is run by the assigned NCO cadre. We encourage officers to stay away from the battalion during the workshop. This distance from their daily environment permits them to devote full attention and concentration to the training and reinforces their confidence in the NCO cadre.

The workshop comprises five modules: Power, Influence, Cohesion, Organizations As Systems, and The Future (Figure 1). Each participant is asked to develop a self-profile as a high performer. The profile, reflecting both personal and professional viewpoints, defines skills and abilities applicable to the individual, the team, the group and the organization.

The workshop focuses first on personal power, identifying relevant characteristics, traits and attributes of high performers. Often, people limit their potential through distorted views of reality, faulty belief systems, and negative self-talk. This module teaches students to create strong self-images, make choices, take responsibility, and accept the consequences of personal choices.

Influence skills, possessed by all high performing communicators, are taught in the second module. An overview of communication techniques is combined with giving and receiving feedback, listening effectively, and personal and performance counseling. Advanced communication techniques help build students' rapport with others to achieve communication excellence.

Figure 1

Cohesion is the topic of module three. The notion that motivation comes from within the individual is the basis for discussing how to create an environment in which the soldier can become motivated toward high performance. A task-focused exercise allows participants to use the skills they have learned and examine the behavioral dynamics of a typical work setting.

After exploring skills and behaviors appropriate to high performing individuals, teams and workgroups, the focus shifts to organizations. In module four, students analyze their own organization, using a systems model and reviewing the characteristics of high performing systems.

Having developed diagnostic data about their organization, students are ready for module five, managing change in the organization. Individual and organizational action plans are developed, providing a roadmap and strategy to achieve individual and organizational excellence.

The high point of the workshop is a special ceremony after formal instruction has ended. On the first day of the workshop, trainers and the battalion commanders select several students who are tasked to design the ceremony. By providing a powerful bonding experience that evokes commitment to high performance and enhances group cohesion, the ceremony is intended to become part of the culture of the organization.

High Performance One shows promise of providing Army organizations with high-impact training, fostering both individual and organizational excellence. To date, it has been presented to two light-infantry battalions at Fort Lewis, Washington, and to a maintenance battalion at Fort Hood, Texas. Participant reaction has been highly favorable. Long-term evaluation data designed to measure lasting impact of the workshop are still being assembled and studied.

The future of High Performance One will be determined by HQ TRADOC after evaluating its potential for the Army. If adopted, the next likely steps will be to designate a proponency and design a prototype train-the-trainers course. Watch for further developments in upcoming issues of *Communique*. □

Mr. Goodfellow is an original member of the OECS training faculty and has been involved in the Army's Organizational Effectiveness program since the school was activated at Fort Ord in 1975. As Chief of the Consulting Skills Division of the Training Directorate, he was instrumental in developing and refining the course curriculum around a systems framework. Currently, he is a member of the External Consulting Division, a traveling consulting team whose mission is to develop concepts and technology for managing and consulting in large, complex systems throughout the Army.

Mr. Goodfellow is a former Army officer and a graduate of the University of San Francisco. He holds a Master's Degree in Consulting Psychology from Ball State University and a Master's Degree in Human Resource Management from Pepperdine University.

An OE Management and Evaluation System

Major Robert Siepielski

This multi-purpose Management and Evaluation System was designed to provide a cumulative, historical record showing the number of hours spent and different activities performed by each Organizational Effectiveness Consultant (OEC) in a given office. The system also provides a comparison of Army OEC activities against the cost of contracting the same work to a civilian consulting firm. In this way, it is a reference for justifying "inhouse" consultant resources, and can also be used for performance rating, cost-benefit analysis, manpower surveys, and the like.

Activity Cost Sheet

The heart of this system is the Activity Cost Sheet. It provides the basis for a monetary standard against which OE operations can be compared. Figure 1 is a sample OE Activity Cost Sheet with instructions (format from OE Office, Fort Belvoir).

Figure 1

ACTIVITY COST SHEET

OEC __MAJ SIEPIELSKI__
MONTH __MARCH 1982__

	OEC Activities					Client Activities					
1 Date	2 Time	3 OE Activity Code	4 OEC Hours	5 OE/CIV Cost/Hr ($)	6 Total OE/CIV Cost	7 Client (Name/Position)	8 Client Grade	9 Client Hrs	10 Client Cost/Hr ($)	11 Total Client Cost	12 Remarks
1	0730-1630	IW	8	$200 PER PERSON	$1400	CDR ASG & STAFF	1-06	8	$39.67	$317.36	TRANSITION
							4-05	8	32.84	1050.88	TOTAL 52
							2-GS10	8	20.58	329.28	$16.91 OE-220.56
2	0730-1630	LP	8								OE CONFERENCE
3	0730-1630	IW	8	$200 PER PERSON	$1,000	ACSPER STAFF	1-GS10	8	20.58	164.64	GOAL & OBJECTIVES WRITING
							4-GS8	8	10.68	341.76	TOTAL $506.40
4	0730-1000	IT	2.5	$50	$125	SGM	E-9	2.5	23.80	59.50	GOAL WRITING
	1000-1200	OM									
	1200-1630	RD									COMMUNIQUE ARTICLE
5	0730-1200	ER	4.5	$50	$225	HQ STAFF	1-06	4.5	39.67	178.51	BRIEF OW
	1200-1500	OA									
	1500-1630	C	1.5	$50	$75	SPO	1-06	1.5	39.67	59.50	PERF. MGMT. CONF.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR ACTIVITY COST SHEET

To Determine Client Cost

Column

1   OEC should date the form daily.

2   Indicate the range of hours during the day when OE activity has taken place.

3   Enter code that matches OE activity performed.

4   Enter time spent performing each activity.

(5-6)   (Use for military/civilian monetary comparison; see below.)

7   Enter name and position of client(s), and different staff or subordinate personnel if applicable (workshop, for example).

8   Enter grade for client, and others.

9   Enter number of hours spent in the OE activity.

10   Enter dollars spent per hour per person attending OE activity. (See Figure 2 for wage guidelines.)

11   Multiply the client's hourly rate (col. 10) by the number of hours (col. 9), and enter total client cost.

12   Use as needed for reminders or special addenda.

To Determine Cost Comparison

The average charge for civilian consultant services is about $50 per hour (assessment action planning). For conducting workshops or conferences, most consultants offer a 'package deal' for about $200 per person per day, not to exceed $2000 per day. Complete columns 5 and 6 based on this information.

The following civilian consultant notes were developed for use in our office. Estimates are based on fees obtained from Arthur Anderson and Company, and updated from fees quoted in Daniel Kegan's article "Organization Development: Casual Careers in a Precarious Profession" (*OE Communique,* Vol. 5, No. 4, 1981).

All Workshops   *$200 per day per person (not to exceed $2,000 each day)*

General Consulting   *$50.00 per hour*

The military OE cost was established from the *USAREUR Resource Factors Handbook and Planning Guide,* obtained from our Resource Management Office. Based on 2,080 military workhours per year, a monthly cost to the government for each of our office OECs was determined:

0-4	$4,295.00
0-3	$3,583.00
E-8	$2,979.00

The USAREUR Guide was also used to determine hourly costs for military, civilian, and local national personnel (Figure 2). This information is used in the client activities section of the Activity Cost Sheet.

Statistics on the sample Activity Cost Sheet (Figure 1) reflect one week of OE activity using these monetary standards.

The Evaluation

The OE Evaluation form provided OE clients for feedback is shown as Figure 3. The first section deals with the *OEC-Client relationship;* the second section *formulates the outcome,* which leads the client to *cost analysis.*

Section I is rather standard and may be modified to fit local needs. Section II questions 1 and 2 were adapted from an evaluation method used by U.L. James in his study of OE effectiveness for the Army. The last four questions in Section II use the cost figures from the Activity Cost Sheet. For example, the transition conducted for the ASG Commander cost $1,697.52 (Figure 1, col. 12). After adding the OEC cost of $220.56, the total client cost is $1,918.08. This amount is entered in Section II statements 3 and 4. The Evaluation form is then sent to the client.

Client information is compiled and reported monthly using the format shown in Figure 4. The completed report, given to the program manager,

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Figure 2
PERSONNEL PAY RATES*

Military		**Local National**		**Civilian**	
Rank	$/hr	LN	$/hr	GS	$/hr
0-10	41.66	C3	19.02	1	5.05
9	41.17	C4	20.63	2	5.63
8	40.77	C4a	22.24	3	6.20
7	39.84	C5	24.85	4	6.96
6	39.67	C5a	26.03	5	7.78
5	32.84	C6	27.52	6	8.68
4	27.57	C6a	30.28	7	9.64
3	22.50	C7	33.53	8	10.68
2	17.55	C7a	37.43	9	18.69
1	14.05	C8	41.44	10	20.58
		C8a	45.40	11	22.61
W-4	25.81	C9	51.96	12	27.10
3	20.97	C10	58.20	13	32.23
2	18.33			14	38.08
1	16.17			15	43.76
				16	50.16
E-9	23.80				
8	20.09				
7	17.00				
6	14.36				
5	12.13				
4	10.34				
3	8.97				
2	8.37				
1	8.21				

*Resource Factors Handbook and Planning Guide

Figure 3

ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS EVALUATION

Type _____

SECTION I

1. Generally, how do you feel about the OE operation?

2. What was the most effective thing the Organizational Effectiveness Consultant (OEC) did?

3. What was the least effective thing the OEC did?

4. To what degree did the OE effort meet your objectives?

1	2	3	4
Not at all			Highly

5. How did the OE operation fit with normal unit/organizational operations (scheduling conflicts)? How could this be improved?

6. Generally, how did you feel about the competency of the OEC who worked with you?

7. Was there anything about the OEC that hindered you in working with him/her?

8. Would you invite the OEC to return and continue working with you? Why or why not?

9. Please rate the following, if used, in terms of usefulness to you during this OE effort:

	Not Useful				Highly Useful
a. General Organizational Questionnaire	1	2	3	4	5
b. Individual Interview Data	1	2	3	4	5
c. Group Interview Data	1	2	3	4	5
d. Other Data (Observations)	1	2	3	4	5
e. Organization and Presentation of Data by OEC	1	2	3	4	5
f. Action Planning Assisted by the OEC	1	2	3	4	5
g. The Way the OEC Assisted You in Evaluating the OE Effort	1	2	3	4	5

SECTION II

1. As a result of this OE operation, what did or do you believe will happen? List both pluses and minuses.

2. Thinking back to the specific outcomes you hoped to achieve by requesting this OE operation, what evidence of achieving these outcomes is available to you? Please list below.

3. The approximate cost of presenting this OE operation was $ _____ This figure is based on standard Army hourly pay rates and includes computations for OE staff personnel and your organization's personnel.

4. Considering the improvements realized or anticipated within your organization as a result of this OE operation, do you feel that the $ _____ expended to conduct this operation was well used? _____

5. Based on realized or anticipated organizational improvements, how much more or less would you say this OE operation was worth using the figure in question 3 as a base?   + $ _____   − $ _____

6. Please rate the following in terms of realized or anticipated improvement as a result of this OE operation:

No Improvement   Highly Improved

    1   2   3   4   5

    a. Personnel climate: (Consider team work, self improvement, turbulence, complaints, etc.) _____

    b. Material readiness: (Consider maintenance, losses, equipment uses, etc.) _____

    c. Dollars saved: _____

    d. Time saved: _____

Figure 4

OE Evaluation Results, Example for November

serves as part of the data source for our command OE briefs and program evaluation.

When you use this Management and Evaluation System, it is important to understand that there is no direct correlation between cost and effectiveness of an OE operation. This idea must be reinforced everytime the data is used. Be sure your program manager understands this clearly so you can avoid a number vs. production game. The number of operations conducted should not be the deciding factor in measuring the effectiveness of any OE program.

A Helpful System

This system, used within the 21st SUPCOM for more than a year, has been extremely helpful. It has come through numerous modifications to make it more effective and results-oriented. The system has been indispensible in capturing information for a variety of needs. When used with discretion, it may also serve as a tool indicating trends of inefficiency.

□

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To Change An Army

General Donn A. Starry, U.S. Army

This article is adapted from an address made by General Starry, 10 June 1982, to the U.S. Army War College Committee on a Theory of Combat, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

Reform of an institution as large as our Army is problematic under the best of circumstances. The recent history of change in military systems of the world is instructive. Let us examine the story of Sir Ernest D. Swinton's invention—the tank—as well as the history of the development of concepts for mobile all-arms warfare to illustrate the challenges that would-be reformers face in trying to introduce new ideas.

In the British army, where the idea had its genesis and was the subject of much early development and experimentation, a succession of single-minded tank and mobility enthusiasts persisted in developing the concept of mobile all-arms warfare built around the tank striking force. They did so in the face of persistent opposition by most of their less imaginative peers and superiors. Most of these reformers were "loners." For the most part, they were argumentative, assertive and hardly ever in agreement—even with one another.

Despite support from Winston Churchill, they were forced to work around an organizational system which abhorred change. In frustration, many went public with their arguments and, by doing so, incurred enmity among their superiors sufficient either to bring on their early retirement from the active ranks or to relegate them to some inconsequential posting.

Although field trials were held to demonstrate the new concepts, those who benefited most from the trials were the Germans. They spawned the blitzkrieg based largely on their own study as well as their study of the writings of the British reformers, J.F.C. Fuller and B.H. Liddell Hart, and the record of the trials on the Salisbury Plain.

As war came to Europe in 1939, the British army found itself with an imperfectly developed concept of all-arms combat based on the tank, to include inadequate tactics, organizations, equipment and training to implement a state of warfare they themselves had invented.[1]

In the U.S. Army, the pioneers were fewer in number, and the institution proved considerably more resistant to change than even the British army. Therefore, the development of a concept of mobile

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[1]Kenneth Macksey, *The Tank Pioneers*, Jane's Publishing Co., N.Y., 1981, gives a first-rate account of this whole train of events.

General Donn A. Starry is commander in chief of the U.S. Readiness Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. He received a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy, an M.S. from George Washington University and is a graduate of the USACGSC, the Armed Forces Staff College and the U.S. Army War College. Assignments include serving as commander of V Corps, U.S. Army, Europe, and as commander of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia.

warfare fared even less well. A succession of Army chiefs of staff rejected the idea out of hand. Even such future practitioners of maneuver warfare as General of the Army Douglas MacArthur testified before the Congress that one should not buy too many tanks for they were terribly expensive and quickly became obsolete. Strongest among the opposition was that bastion of mobile thinking—the U.S. Cavalry. Its last chief, Major General John K. Herr, was the most strident, outspoken opponent of the idea of all-arms warfare which was built around the tank.

The need to change will ever be with us. We may have analyzed the process, framed in its essential parameters, and made some considerable progress toward arming ourselves with systemic mechanisms to permit change to take place.

There were really only two heroes of this drama in our Army: Major General Adna Chaffee and Lieutenant General Daniel Van Voorhis. Without Chaffee, the U.S. Army quite likely would have had no tanks at all in 1940. And, without Van Voorhis,

there would not have been an operational concept for armored formations in World War II. As Edward Katzenbach concludes in his fascinating paper, "The Horse Cavalry in the 20th Century," the Army of the most mechanized nation on earth came to the threshold of World War II firmly wedded to strategy, operational art and tactics deeply rooted in the 19th century.

On the other hand, the Germans seemed to have developed, in what retired Colonel Trevor N. Dupuy calls their "genius for war," a much more impressive willingness and ability to adapt to change. Captain Timothy T. Lupfer describes well the German army's ability to change operational concepts and tactical schemes in a matter of months in World War I.[2]

Heinz Guderian, reading reports of the armored force trials on the Salisbury Plain, demonstrated the concept with a small force for Adolf Hitler at Kummersdorf in 1934.[3] Kenneth Macksey describes well how the German tank pioneers seized on and matured the preliminary British work on all-arms warfare built around the tank.

With Hitler's blessing of the concept, Guderian, in 18 short months, produced an all-arms panzer division. The division operated within a fairly well-spelled-out doctrinal framework. It included the strategy for mobile warfare; a general operational scheme for how the larger forces would fight; and the organization, tactics and at least a preliminary array of the type of equipment needed to bring the concept from theory to reality. In his new book, *The German Army, 1933-45*, Albert Seaton describes the German army's remarkable ability to adapt to change in those very turbulent years.

How did they do it? How were the Germans different from the British or the Americans? Several facts stand out which frame the answer and outline a set of requirements necessary to effect change.

First, the Germans had a general staff element whose primary function was to examine the need for change and, when change was decided on, to draw up the necessary programs to make it happen. True, this capability became diffused as Hitler fragmented his army command into the OKW (Armed Forces High Command), an overshadowed army headquarters. Indeed, some of the bitter antagonisms that arose between those two organizations in World War II survived until recently even in the *Bundeswehr*. Nonetheless, for the critical developmental years, there existed an institutionalized framework for examining the need for changing doctrine— strategy, operational art, tactics; describing the

equipment, organizational training and other changes needed; and producing the impetus for change through the office of the *inspekteur*.

Second, the German mavericks were all products of the enormously demanding and rigorous officer selection and training system characteristic of the German army to this day. Mavericks they may have been, but all had been taught to think logically about tough problems. They were all taught in the same way, in the same schools. Compelling logic to one was, therefore, equally compelling to all. This made arriving at a consensus much easier. And change simply cannot be effected without a consensus by some means.

There must be an institution or mechanism to identify the need for change, to draw up parameters for change, and to describe clearly what is to be done and how that differs from what has been done before.

Third, the principal instigators of reform remained for years in positions related to implementation of the changes they espoused. For example, follow Guderian through the evolution of the blitzkrieg in Macksey's book on Guderian.[4] Change was further facilitated because the senior leadership, to include most importantly Hitler himself, was quick to seize on the strategic advantages Germany could gain over its potential foes by changing the basic ingredients of its military system.

Finally, trials had been conducted—by the Germans in Russia, by the British on the Salisbury Plain and by the Germans and the Russians in the Spanish Civil War. And these closely observed lessons were fed back into the system for the further refinement of their mobile striking forces. Recounting, then, we have a set of generalized requirements for effecting change:

• There must be an institution or mechanism to identify the need for change, to draw up parameters for change and to describe clearly what is to be done and how that differs from what has been done before.

• The educational background of the principal staff and command personalities responsible for change must be sufficiently rigorous, demanding and relevant to bring a common cultural bias to the solution of problems.

• There must be a spokesman for change. The spokesman can be a person, one of the mavericks; an institution such as a staff college; or a staff agency.

• Whoever or whatever it may be, the spokesman must build a consensus that will give the new ideas, and the need to adopt them, a wider audience of converts and believers.

[2]Captain Timothy T. Lupfer,*The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War*, Leavenworth Papers, Number 4, Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kan.,July 1981.

[3]See Kenneth Macksey, *Guderian: Creator of the Blitzkrieg*, Stein & Day Publishers, Briarcliff Manor, N.Y., 1976.

[4]*Ibid.*

• There must be continuity among the architects of change so that consistency of effort is brought to bear on the process.

• Someone at or near the top of the institution must be willing to hear out arguments for change, agree to the need, embrace the new operational concepts and become at least a supporter, if not a champion, of the cause for change.

• Changes proposed must be subjected to trials. Their relevance must be convincingly demonstrated to a wide audience by experiment and experience, and necessary modifications must be made as a result of such trial outcomes.

This framework is necessary to bring to bear clearly focused intellectual activity in the matter of any change, whether in concepts for fighting, equipment, training or manning the force. Such a framework was recently institutionalized in the U.S. Army. Let us briefly describe how this came about.

The Army reorganization of 1973 was aimed, in part at least, at the institutional side of the problem we are examining. In those years, the Army needed many changes. Some were purely managerial, reflecting our apprehension of a lot of structure and too little manpower. More importantly, however, the Army realized it needed to change its concepts of war-fighting. It addressed the strategic problems of fighting outnumbered and winning; the matter of the operations of larger units, which units perforce would be fewer in number; and the revision of tactics, organizations, equipment and training to bring the Army out of the Vietnam trauma and to make it an effective fighting force in the last quarter of this century.

In the process of bringing about change, there must first be a conceptual notion of what must be done to fight successfully in the battle environments of today and tomorrow.

The Army found itself confronted by principle antagonists, who were almost always sure to outnumber it, and by a growing militarization and modernization of conflict in the Third World. The Soviets, impelled by their obsession with numbers, were obviously in possession of a maturing operational concept embracing mass, momentum and continuous land combat in a nuclear, chemical or conventional environment. Convinced by the realities of our then and impending resource constraints, we could not afford a like concept. We set about to look for ways to win even though fighting outnumbered. This was a crucial first step. (Russell F. Weigley might argue that that was more of a radical departure from our antecedents than others might agree.)

However, some analysts suggested history clearly endorsed the idea, and the 1973 Arab-Israeli War

provided a fortuitous field trial of useful concepts. The lessons drawn from this conflict, as well as other analytical study, led to the Army's conclusion about the requisite strategy, operational concepts, tactics, organizations, equipment and training. The outcome of this intellectual activity and theoretical study was set forth in what became the 1976 edition of Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Operations*. Its primary emphasis, at least as viewed by its critics, was on an operational concept the Army called the "active defense."

However well or not so well that work may have been done, it met with considerable criticism from

Someone at or near the top of the institution must be willing to hear out arguments for change, agree to the need, embrace the new operational concepts and become at least a supporter, if not a champion, of the cause for change.

within the Army and without. Some of this simply reflected institutional resistance to the notion of change. Some of the criticism, however, reflected unresolved intellectual and theoretical concerns. But the experience demonstrated that all too little consensus building had been done and that the concepts set forth in the 1976 edition of FM 100-5 needed additional maturing. The results of that realization were several-fold.

First, the Army re-examined and revised its principles of war and published them in a new book, FM 100-1, *The Army*. An early criticism of the 1976 edition of FM 100-5 was that it was not firmly founded on enduring principles and did not even recount our principles of war. This new book began to build that theoretical foundation. The principles of war, as set forth in FM 100-1, spell out fundamental principles on which we must base our military strategy, operations and tactics in order to be successful today and to meet tomorrow's needs.

While that development was under way, the Army's operational concepts evolved through a succession of changes known as the Corps Battle, the Central Battle, the Integrated Battle, the Extended Battle, and, finally, the AirLand Battle.

One lesson of that experience was that we had imperfectly designed the institutional framework to accomplish change. In 1973, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) absorbed the old U.S. Army Combat Developments Command. There were several good reasons for that amalgamation—some related to resources and others related to preceived shortcomings with the output of that command. In any event, while strong on equipment development and organizational matters, the new combat developments directorate of the TRADOC

staff was weak on conceptual work. Therefore, the bulk of the concept work reflected in the 1976 edition of FM 100-5 was done by a handful of people, none of whom was assigned to the combat development staff at TRADOC Headquarters itself or in the schools.

The realization of this omission in our original concept of how TRADOC was to do its business caused us to create a principal doctrinal development staff element at TRADOC—a deputy chief of staff for doctrine. This officer was responsible for identifying the need for change and for describing the conceptual framework of the change itself. Without that orderly process at the beginning and without one agency directly responsible for it, the need for change would always be ill-defined, and the conceptual direction of change would be cloudy at best.

Whoever or whatever it may be, the spokesman must build a consensus that will give the new ideas, and the need to adopt them, a wider audience of converts and believers.

Now, back to the beginning. The post-1973 reforms were presented to then Chief of Staff of the Army General Creighton W. Abrams. He made many amendments but supported the general direction of the changes. After Abrams' untimely death in 1974, General Frederick C. Weyand gave his support. That support from the top has continued with both of their successors, General Bernard W. Rogers and General Edward C. Meyer.

The reformers then set about designing tactics, organizations, equipment and training systems to support the new concept. This resulted in, among other things, the division restructuring study and field trials of resulting organizations and tactics at Fort Hood, Texas. Because the concept was not yet mature, and because, in the trials, an attempt was made to measure performance differentials at the margin with an instrumentation system and a test scheme not adequate to that degree of precision, the trial outcomes were much too ambiguous to gain widespread acceptance.

At this point, it was apparent that the reformers had to begin anew. It became apparent that considerable internal consensus building would be necessary as organizational development proceeded. So, for two and one-half years, school commandants, representatives of the Army staff, major command, supporting organizations and other services were gathered at frequent intervals, and what we now know as Division 86 was hammered out at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Consensus building in the Army was difficult for several reasons. In the process of bringing about change, there must first be a conceptual notion of what must be done to fight successfully in the battle environments of today and tomorrow. That conceptual thinking can only result from close,

detailed and reflective study of a wide spectrum of technology, threat, history, world setting and trends. That kind of thinking can only be done by imaginative people who have trained themselves or have been trained to think logically about tough problems. That kind of intellectual development is one of the most important functions of our Army school systems, especially at the staff college level.

It is perhaps here that we have not yet fully equipped ourselves with the requisite means to achieve change. The U.S. Army lacked that great strength of the German system—the intellectual prowess and staff brilliance of its general staff officer corps. U.S. Army officers lacked the cultural commonality that was brought to bear through the process of the German General Staff system, and that was the most impressive, if not the most effective, catalyst in making it possible for them to change quickly—even under the pressures of wartime.

Even though our Army has begun working on this dimension of the problem at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (USACGSC), in both the long course and the course now styled as CAS (Combined Arms and Services Staff School), some years will be required before the results of this effort bear fruit. The question has been raised as to whether we should consider a second year at Fort Leavenworth for selected officers to learn more about how we should prepare and plan for war and to hone the military judgment necessary to fight and win.

The USACGSC was a two-year course from 1929 to 1936 during which time some of our most brilliant staff officers and commanders in World War II were produced. The need to train more officers more quickly caused us to reduce the course to one year. Since then, subject matter related to fighting has been reduced to fill the many demands of our increasingly complex world environment. The time to logically think through tough military problems and to develop logical thought patterns was greatly reduced. But the complexities of war have increased greatly, and it is time to give the matter a new hearing.

While much remains to be done, the U.S. Army does have in place today most of the ingredients which history suggests are necessary to effect orderly change. And we are in the throes of changes produced by that system—changes designed to move us into the last two decades of this century. We would be well served in the future if that process could include more sound thinkers in uniform and fewer academic and amateur military strategic gadflies.

We would be better served as the process matures if we could somehow focus the intellectual prowess of the operations analysis community on our fundamental rather than our peripheral needs. We would be much better served, in the long run, if we could learn how to change our institutions from

within instead of creating the circumstances in which change is focused on us by civilian secretaries of war, defense or whatever.

We would be much better served, in the end, if we could develop and refine, in our institution, the cultural commonality of intellectual endeavor and the ability to think logically about tough problems. These are necessary to develop new ideas, mature them quickly and chart relevant action programs which effect change in an efficient, orderly way.

In short, we need institutional leadership as well as individual leadership. Without a requisite combination of both, history instructs us that the need for change is difficult to define. What is to be done—the goalset of change—is virtually impossible to circumscribe, and the whole process takes so long that not much ever happens. In today's and tomorrow's worlds, we simply cannot afford the luxury of that kind of inefficiency.

The need to change will ever be with us. We may have analyzed the process, framed in its essential parameters, and made some considerable progress toward arming ourselves with systemic mechanisms to permit change to take place. But that in no way ensures either that change will occur or that it will be an easy, orderly process. And so the intellectual search, the exchange of ideas and the conceptual maturation must continue and be ever in motion. □

V.I.P. Visit

General William R. Richardson, Commanding General, U.S. Army TRADOC, made an official visit to the Organizational Effectiveness Center and School, Fort Ord, California, where he met and was briefed by key members of the OECS Staff.

Lieutenant General John B. Blount Addresses OEMC 2-83

OE Managers Course
Williamsburg, Virginia
March 14, 1983

U.S. Army Photograph

As managers, commanders and leaders, you are here for the next few days to learn how to manage Organizational Effectiveness personnel. And I can tell you right now, you don't know how to do it! You don't know how because the Army does a poor job of managing this tremedously significant and important asset. And I can put myself right in the middle of that equation after 3 years at Ft. Jackson and nearly 4 years as Chief of Staff of the Training and Doctrine Command.

As managers and leaders, why aren't we managing our OE folks better? It's because all of us are so damn smart that we know the answers ourselves, and we don't need anybody to help us out. We've been through it *all!* In the Army 20 or 25 years, we've seen these problems arise time after time, and we know how to fix them. Imagine, though, if we would ask somebody to help us fix the problems, maybe then we'd come up with better solutions, better ways of doing things.

But we don't like to ask OE folks to help us because they tend to get under our skin. They ask very tough questions, like "What is the purpose of this?" and "What do you, Colonel or General, want to get out of this?" And those kinds of questions make us uncomfortable because they force us to think. You know, of course, that we have plenty of time to waste, but we don't have any time to *think!* And here, amid the busy day-to-day workings of the Army, the OECs are asking us "What do you want to get out of this?"

How many times have you irritably thought, or even said, "I don't know what I want to get out of it. *You* figure out what *I'm* supposed to get out of this meeting (or whatever) that I want to hold." Now, that's kind of dumb, isn't it? But it's happened to me; has it ever happened to you?

I think that mangers in the Army, like you and me, are reluctant dragons on Organizational Effectiveness. The purpose of this course, however, is to make you unreluctant, to make you realize that you have a resource here that is drastically underused in the United States Army. You and I don't really understand the OE people, or Organizational Effectiveness for that matter. We haven't been to that very fine Organizational Effectiveness Center and School that Colonel Bill Golden runs at Ft. Ord, California. So, when you don't understand something, what do you do? You give your OECs something that *you* understand, something kind of easy. You ask OECs to run conferences, for instance. Afraid to give them the tough jobs, you continue to give them the easy jobs.

What the senior or experienced OE consultants should be looking at is integrating new equipment and technology; assessing organizational capabilities; enhancing operational readiness; and improving battlefield-related operations. The Army is begging for solutions to these problems, but we're not using OE—the most significant management tool we have—to help break loose the solutions we need.

You and I, as managers, need to understand OE better, and give OECs tougher roles in the Army. I think the OECs need access to the boss, which, incidentally, is why I keep my OECs at the Chief-of-Staff level and don't let them be subjugated or buried in the staff. Also, they have to be properly resourced. Plan a year ahead to fill the spaces you need and get the right OE people in there, properly trained and financially bolstered, so they can become increasingly more professional.

By the way, I suspect you noticed that I was late getting to this meeting. As managers of OECs, that ought to tell you at least one thing: You can have the best plan in the world, but if you don't keep the boss under control, you have a problem! So there's a first lesson for you in this OE Manager's Course. Have a good plan, be flexible, and keep the boss under control! □

Organizational Effectiveness Managers Course

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OE Reference Network

OE Reference Network, a quick guide for OECs, is a compilation of people who have expertise in a particular area of OE and want to share it with others. We strongly encourage you to be a part of the network by sending your name, autovon number, and area of expertise to the editor. (If you feel you are an expert resource in any of the already listed areas, also send your name and autovon number.)

AREA	NAME	AUTOVON
Battle Staff Process Performance	MAJ Bridges/SGM Cherry	929-2989
Combat Related OE	MAJ Bridges	929-2989
Computer Assisted Instruction	Dr. Ferrier	929-6014
Conference Management	MAJ Carmack	929-4021
Data Reduction and Feedback	Mr. Nolan	929-4574
Organizational Design/Redesign	Dr. Roberts	929-7896
Management of Organizational Transitions	LTC Klein	929-7896
	MAJ Smith, MAJ Leslie	
Meeting Management	Dr. Eppler/LTC Emmons	929-4021
Performance Management Conference	MAJ Carmack	929-4021
Quality Circles/Work Environment Improvement Teams	SFC Reed	929-7896
RETO	CPT Easter	929-7058
Socio-Tech	Dr. Roberts	929-7896
Stress Management	CPT LeRoy	929-7896
Systems	Dr. Guido	929-4021

Would you tell me, please, which way
I ought to go from here, said Alice.

That depends a good deal on where you
want to get to, said the Cat.

I don't much care where ...

Then it doesn't matter which way you go.

... so long as I get somewhere, Alice
added as an explanation.

Oh, you're sure to do that, said the Cat,
if you only walk long enough.

<div align="right">

Lewis Carroll
Alice's Adventures in Wonderland

</div>

A Guide
For Writing Meaningful
Performance Objectives

Major Craig E. Geis and Captain(P) John D. Richards

Scenario: You walk into an organization as an Organizational Effectiveness Consultant ... and meet Alice! You know from experience that organizations often head in different directions simultaneously, all the while unmindful of specific objectives. Like Alice, the organization asks you to help identify what direction it should go, how to get there, and how to know when it has arrived. You assess the situation, then develop a set of objectives to help the organization establish and stay its course.

But while we OECs are skillfully developing objectives for our *clients,* I wonder if we are also developing objectives for *ourselves?* Recall, for example, the last workshop you presented. Did you, in fact, take time before the workshop to write performance objectives, defining such aspects as the level of understanding you expected from the participants? And, how did you measure the outcome? We so often take for granted the various aspects of our work, like level of understanding, that we become accustomed to focusing on the 'usual' audience characteristics and achievement goals. Consequently, we fail to do for ourselves what we do so well for our clients: develop specific objectives.

An objective is a "a description of a performance you want learners to be able to exhibit" (Mager). It defines the outcome of a process, and is important for these reasons (paraphrased from Mager):

- A clearly defined objective gives you a sound basis for selecting or designing instructional material, content, or method.

- Stating an objective clearly will help you evaluate whether you have accomplished the objective.

- A clearly defined objective helps students or organizations organize their own efforts toward accomplishing that objective.

Learning objectives can be categorized as *cognitive, affective,* or *psychomotor.* When we de-

velop objectives for a workshop, we are primarily interested in cognitive domain, which deals with "the recall or recognition of knowledge and the development of intellectual abilities and skills" (Bloom). Affective domain is concerned with "changes in interests, attitudes, and values and the development of appreciations and adjustment;" psychomotor is concerned with "muscular or motor skill, manipulation of material and objects, and neuromuscular coordination" (Mehrens and Lehmann). Each domain comprises degree-of-difficulty classifications for various skills, as shown in Figure 1 for the cognitive domain.

An objective consists of three parts. Whereas the Army refers to these parts as task, condition, and standard, Mager calls them **performance, condition,** and **criterion.** Performance is the behavior expected of the student during or after the training. Condition is the circumstance or environment in which the student is expected to exhibit the performance (task). Criterion (standard) is the level of performance, or how well the student is expected to perform. An adequate objective should have all three parts. Often, however, the conditions are understood (a classroom, for example) and need not be specified. Although the criterion should be clearly defined, some authorities suggest that it be omitted from the objective and, instead, be included in the instructions that precede the exercise (Gagne and Biggs; Dick and Carey).

About the Authors

Major Graig Geis is Chief of the Organizational Effectiveness Division at Fort Rucker, Alabama. He received his BBA from Long Island University, an MBA in Management from Georgia Southern College, Statesboro, Georgia, and an MA in Psychology from Austin Peay University, Clarksville, Tennessee. Major Geis is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and has commanded an aviation platoon in combat and an aviation company in Korea. He has served as a Management Analyst at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, and an Assistant Professor on the faculty of the Department of Behavioral Science and Leadership at the United States Military Academy, West Point, New York. He is a graduate of the OECC, 4-82.

Captain(P) John D. Richards is Chief of the Analysis and Technical Management Division, Academy of Health Sciences, Ft. Sam Houston, Texas. He has an MS in Psychology and Education, and a Doctorate in Education. Previous assignments have included duty with III Corps Artillery, Ft. Sill, the 25th Infantry Division, Hawaii, and the United States Military Academy.

Figure 1

Skills Classification For The Cognitive Domain

Source: United States Military Academy, 1981.

LEVEL OF UNDERSTANDING	KEY WORD	EXPECTED RESPONSE
Knowledge Requires recall of specific information, concepts, and theroies from reading assignments, films and classes.	Identify	Select an object of a category in response to its category name or a description of the category.
	List	Write an itemized set of principles or things, usually in a prescribed order.
	Define	State the meaning of a word.
	Describe	Give a detailed account of a concept or event with words, pictures, diagrams, etc.,**defining** appropriate terms.
Comprehension A type of understanding that requires students to demonstrate, in addition to recall, awareness of implications of reading assignments, films, and classes.	Summarize	Restate briefly or in abstract form without losing key ideas. Summarize subsumes listing key terms necessary for understanding.
	Explain	Describe a word, variable, concept or theory and state its significance to the field of inquiry without requiring reference to a specific situation.
	Illustrate	Explain by means of figures, examples, comparisons, etc.
	Differentiate	Indicate the specific differences between two or more concepts, terms, etc.
Application The use of abstractions from reading assignments, classes, and films in particular situations. Includes the ability to predict the probable effect of a change in a relevant variable.	Relate	Bring into logical or natural association by showing the connection between concepts, theories, terms, situations, etc. Relate subsumes **describing** each of the associated elements.
	Classify	Place concepts, terms, objects, words or situations into categories according to specific criteria.
	Predict	Use a concept, theory or principle to forecast an outcome. Predict subsumes **describing** the idea used in prediction.
	Apply	Use learned material such as rules, concepts, principles and theories to solve a problem in a given situation. Apply subsumes **describing** the applied idea.

Now, let's develop some performance objectives. We will design a workshop that will demonstrate the efficiency of group decision-making, while allowing participants to work on individual and common objectives. The method we have selected is a workshop allowing:

- individuals to solve a problem
- the group to solve the same problem
- the group to analyze what took place
- the facilitator to analyze what took place
- the facilitator to provide additional instruction on problem solving and group dynamics.

To state our expectations for the workshop, we will write performance objectives, using a systematic process.

STEP 1
Determine the type of domain the objective will deal with: cognitive, affective, or psychomotor.

[Cognitive domain, in this case.]

STEP 2
Review classification of skills for appropriate domain, and determine level of understanding you wish to address.

[All three levels of understanding: knowledge, comprehension, and application.]

STEP 3
Write performance objectives for each level, including: (1) desired performance, (2) condition under which performance will be exhibited (may be understood), and (3) criterion by which you will measure performance (may be stated in earlier instructions).

[See examples in Figure 2.]

Figure 2
Sample Performance Objectives For A Decision-Making Workshop

These performance objectives are not intended to include everything that would take place during the workshop, but they serve as an example of what can be written after you determine the desired performance, as well as condition and criterion if applicable.

- Describe orally during group discussions six variables affecting listening behavior.

- Describe three methods a group uses during problem solving to arrive at a decision.

- Explain the concept of synergy as it relates to group decision-making.

- Identify four potential problems a group encounters in the decision-making process.

- List three differences between group decision-making and individual decision-making.

- Apply five techniques of active listening to resolve conflict during group decision-making.

STEP 4
Evaluate each performance objective at the level of understanding selected in Step 2 to ensure that proposed learning outcomes will be achieved.

Following this process should produce performance objectives that are on target. But to help you avoid errors, ask an impartial bystander to read them for an understanding of what is expected of both *you* and the *students.* Put the objectives aside for awhile, and reconsider them later to see if they are as pertinent as they seemed initially. Finally, be aware of the common pitfalls in writing performance objectives:

- The level of understanding is too high or too low for the intended audience.

- Objectives are too complex and lengthy.

- You have too many performance objectives for one theme.

- The performance objectives don't have measurable and verifiable criteria.

- You fail to evaluate the objectives to find out what learning has taken place.

As OECs, we should ensure that performance objectives are carefully prepared for all instruction, both as examples during the workshop and to chart our course properly. With a copy of the performance objectives in hand, workshop participants can acknowledge the level of understanding necessary and the outcomes they are expected to achieve.

Don't be like Alice, not knowing where you want to go or how to get there. Give performance objectives a try for *your* next workshop!

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Operation Desert Raider:
A Case Study in Battle Staff Assessment

Editor's Note: This article, written by a Brigade Commander and his OEC, provides a detailed case study of a Brigade undergoing intensive simulated combat training at the National Training Center.

A Commander's Perspective

Colonel John C. Heldstab

Using the Red Devil OE Staff in the "combat" environment of the National Training Center (NTC) was a logical extension of its involvement in the brigade's home station training program at Fort Polk. Members of the OE staff had previously accompanied the brigade to the field on several field training exercises. They had observed TOC operations, HQ operations and the operation of the brigade support area. As a result of their previous work, each area had become increasingly more efficient.

During the home station training phase, the subject of OE involvement at the National Training Center emerged. The OE consultants were willing to go but needed to clarify expectations. The question was "How could the combat readiness of the brigade be improved in the *near term* while at the NTC, and in the *long term* following the NTC? Following discussions with OE personnel, we settled on two separate tasks. The first focused on near-term combat readiness during the exercise itself. It envisioned continued interaction with the brigade TOC, brigade HQ and brigade support area. The goal was to provide feedback in the field to improve onsite operations. The second task looked to the post-NTC combat readiness issue. Specifically, we wanted training feedback from various levels in the brigade. This feedback could be analyzed and worked into future brigade training programs. This organizational focus, squad- through company-level, is one typically omitted from most "after-action reports."

The training feedback from the lowest organizational levels was accomplished in two ways. First, immediately following the field phase of the NTC exercise, the OEC would conduct a series of small-group interviews addressing training. These training issues were: What did we do well and not so well at NTC and in preparing to go? What should we do about it in the future? The interviews were grouped according to rank and job positions in order to maintain a homogeneous grouping. The second method of obtaining feedback was a questionnaire. This was administered to personnel during the return flights. Questionnaires focused on the same general questions as the small-group interviews, but the population sample was greater.

Results

OE assistance during the field training exercise proved useful to all elements of the brigade HQ. The OEC as an outside "set of eyes" was able to see situations that were overlooked by personnel within their respective areas. Actions taken upon issues surfaced by the OEC resulted in improved readiness, better information flow, and enhancement of soldier morale.

The most valuable contribution, however, was in the training feedback area. The interviews were completed at the NTC and the questionnaires administered on the return flight just as planned. A week after returning to Fort Polk, the data were presented to the Brigade Commander. The results proved not only most helpful, but most interesting. There was virtual agreement among all respondents concerning what went well and why. There was also nearly total agreement among respondents as to what could have been done better. The focus was on why we had been successful and what we should retain in future training programs. Then the focus changed to what should be done to improve in those areas identified as having significant room for improvement.

Examples of "done good" areas included the brigade's ability to hit what we shot at, our ability to maintain our equipment in the field, and our ability to maneuver. Examples of "needs improvement" areas were that we need more time to train at small-unit level, and that platoon sergeants and platoon leaders need to better understand one another's roles and functions.

Followup on the outcome is already underway. The annual training program for the next home station train-up for the NTC is written. It includes a change in how time is managed to enable the small-unit leader to get remedial training. He has this time even after completing the task force ARTEP. Role-resolution and problem-solving workshops involving platoon sergeants and platoon leaders in the battalions are currently ongoing. Other implementations are planned for the future. Taking action on issues that surfaced in both the group interviews and questionnaires is contributing to enhanced combat readiness of the brigade. Soldiers are not only receiving better training, but more efficient and effective training.

OE and the Future

The results of this limited OE effort were extremely significant for future training in the brigade. Based

on the significance of the results, Organizational Effectiveness Consultants will be incorporated into any future exercises of this type. The feedback provided was invaluable. Data presented confirmed impressions and highlighted areas that were problems at all organizational levels. The net result of the OE effort at the NTC will be better-trained, more combat-ready units for the future. □

Operation Desert Raider

SFC(P) Dennis B. Shelley

The 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), stationed at Fort Polk, Louisiana was given this mission: train and prepare for deployment to the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, deploy to Fort Irwin, conduct combined arms training, and redeploy to home station during the period November 1, 1982 through March 4, 1983.

Organizational Effectiveness Consultants (OECs) from Fort Polk were involved in Operation Desert Raider from the onset. Based on the results of the NTC rotation and the comments of COL John Heldstab, Commander of the 1st Brigade, this particularly useful operation is perceived as a model of combat-related OE in action.

This 4-phase operation, code-named *Operation Desert Raider,* was acclaimed as a highly successful training mission by both the soldiers and commanders of the 5th Infantry Division(M). This article provides ideas for other OECs and commanders about how OE can be useful not only to prepare and participate at the National Training Center, but for actual warfare as well. These combat-related OE strategies can be helpful for upgrading the level of combat readiness for a brigade-sized element before, during and after a National Training Center rotation, as well as any other major training maneuver.

Entering the Organization

The 1st Brigade requested a transition workshop for the Commander and an Armor Battalion staff from the 2nd Brigade which was to be attached to 1st Brigade. During initial planning for the transition workshop, battle staff assessment was discussed, and CPT William Page and SFC(P) Dennis Shelley (Fort Polk OECs) were invited to conduct a battle staff assessment of the Brigade S1 and S4 section during a task force ARTEP in December. The two OECs performed the battle staff assessment December 12-15, 1982 and conducted the transition workshop on December 20.

A feedback session reporting the battle staff assessment was conducted with the Commander on January 3, and another feedback was presented to the Executive Officer on January 10. Future OE assistance and the Commander's outcomes were discussed in detail during the feedback session, and definite plans were made for SFC(P) Shelly to observe

the predeployment phase and go to the National Training Center to capture and retain lessons learned from the NTC experience. The lessons could then be used to improve the 1st Brigade's performance in the future and assist the overall performance of the Division.

Phase I: PREDEPLOYMENT TRAINING AND ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICAL PREPARATION

During this phase, the OEC attended numerous meetings and briefings to plan and coordinate the exercise and provided observations to the commander. The OEC went through the POR board review as well as the CIF equipment draw and special training meetings. Although the OEC was only used for periodic subjective observation during this phase, there are numerous implementations that could be of value to the commander during this crucial phase. For example, a considerable sum of money was saved on this operation by carefully coordinating the rail planning and shipping; this area poses many possibilities for OE assistance.

Phase II: DEPLOYMENT TO THE NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER

The deployment phase consisted of the Brigade and supporting forces conducting an Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercise (EDRE) and deploying by road, rail, and air. The Brigade then moved by bus and truck to Battalion staging areas, drew NTC vehicles and equipment, and moved out on mission orders. On-site observation and personal interviews were conducted at Fort Polk, while enroute and upon arrival at Fort Irwin. The deployment is a crucial phase and offers many opportunities for the OEC to identify specific as well as general areas of improvement, especially regarding time, people and monetary constraints.

Phase III: TRAINING AT FORT IRWIN

The Brigade conducted two weeks of combined arms training during this phase. Each battalion task force participated in 10 days of a force-on-force FTX and 4 days of live fire exercise. This phase gave the OEC numerous opportunities to assist the Executive Officer as well as the Commander.

Upon arrival at Fort Irwin, the OEC was based in the Brigade support area (BSA) and reported directly to the Executive Officer. In addition to gathering information concerning lessons learned, the OEC was asked to conduct a battle staff assessment of the S1-S4 sections. On-site battle staff assessment pointed out reconstitution of personnel and equipment problems, which were then corrected. Those corrections played an important role in the performance of the Brigade. A valuable part of the OEC's time at the BSA was listening and observing the flow of communications.

After 5 days in the Brigade support area, the OEC went to the Brigade Tactical Operations Center

(TOC). The OEC was instructed to observe the TOC, conduct a battle staff assessment, and report any specific, urgent problems to the person in charge of the TOC.

The S1, S2, S3, and FSO subsystems were examined during this period, noting responsiveness, timeliness, and completeness of each of these systems, as well as specific and broad-based areas of expertise or areas which required improvement. The daily command briefings and communication and information flows were examined. The daily rigors of the field environment also provided and opportunity for the OEC to use systems training. The chow lines, mail call, transportation needs, and the Brigade shower point all offered potential for OE analysis. Force-on-force encounters, live-fire exercise, and personal interviews with participants offered valuable lessons.

Of prime importance to the commander, as well as the OEC, was assurance that the lessons learned were obtained from the soldiers themselves. On-site observations gave the OEC a better knowledge of the larger system and verified or supported whatever the soldiers portrayed. The next phase was the culmination of the experience.

Phase IV: REDEPLOYMENT

This phase included returning to the staging area, conduct of range police, turning in vehicles and equipment, and the final movement to home station. This phase constituted the bulk of the OEC's information-gathering process.

Group Interviews

Group interviews had been previously determined to be a key element in obtaining vital data concerning specific areas of performance, such as weapons, tactics, and other training. The commander and OEC scheduled eleven groups of officers and NCOs for individual group interviews. A tasking letter was distributed to the battalions, and the commander stated his interest in the group interview data at a command group meeting. Arrangements were made to use the Fort Irwin Organizational Effectiveness office conference room, near the assembly area.

Each group was told the purpose of the interviews, the importance of confidentiality and anonymity, and that the interviews were being tape-recorded for the Brigade Commander. The interviews were structured similarly; each group was asked:

- WHAT WAS THE *BEST TRAINING* YOU RECEIVED AT FORT POLK WHICH PREPARED YOU FOR THE NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER?

- WHAT *TRAINING* SHOULD YOU HAVE RECEIVIED, OR SHOULD YOU RECEIVE IN THE FUTURE, AT FORT POLK *TO BETTER PREPARE* YOU FOR THE NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER?

The following list shows how many officer and enlisted positions were involved in the group interviews. Each interview lasted a minimum of 45 minutes, with several lasting nearly 2 hours.

Position	Rank	Quantity
Armor Platoon Leaders	01/02	6
Armor Platoon Sergeants	E6/E7 19E	6
Armor Tank Commanders	E5 19E	6
Infantry Platoon Leaders	01/02	6
Infantry Platoon Sergeants	E6/E7 11B	6
Infantry Sergeants	E5 11B	6
Infantry Tank Sergeants	E5/E6 11H	12
Company Commanders 3 Armor, 3 Infantry		6
Fire Support Team		9
Long Range Reconnissance Patrol		9
		72

NTC Survey

The other major task conducted during Phase IV was administering the National Training Center Survey (see p. 33). The survey was designed at Fort Polk by the Commander and the OECs to solicit the perceptions of the Brigade soldiers concerning their training both at Fort Polk and during the NTC exercise. It was believed the combination of the group interview data, the survey data, and the overall observation by the OECs and Commander could provide insight for future organizational improvement. It was felt that the environment aboard the civilian aircraft enroute to Fort Polk would be the most ideal for the soldiers and officers to complete the objective, essay-type survey. Nine separate packets of surveys, pencils, and letters of instruction (LOIs) were provided to nine aircraft commanders. Of 600 surveys distributed, 330 surveys were completed; 300 had been determined to be a statistically adequate 10% Brigade slice.

Data Analysis

The interview and survey data would be presented to the commander to enable him, instead of the OECs, to determine trends.

The OECs sorted the surveys into groups by Armor, Infantry, Artillery or Support. Those surveys were placed in order of rank, and the key points of officers and enlisted personnel for each of the nine questions were charted; 36 charts of soldier perceptions were formed from this data. Key points from each group interview were also charted, constituting 11 more charts.

The key points of both the survey and group interviews were identified by the OECs with as small an element of personal bias as possible. The OECs' personal observations and intuitive analyses were not charted.

Category	No. of Surveys	Officers	E6/E7/E8/E9	E4/E5
ARMOR	52		14	25
INFANTRY	87	14	18	55
ARTILLERY	60	11	15	34
SUPPORT	89	8	26	55
OTHER	42	4	8	30
Total	330	50	81	199

NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER SURVEY

Please circle your rank and duty position. Write your answers to the nine questions on the front and back of this paper. Answer the questions from the perspective of your job as a unit leader (squad leader, platoon sergeant, etc.). This information will be used to identify lessons learned from the National Training Center (NTC) experience. The results of the survey will be used to better prepare for future NTC training or to go into actual combat. Do not write your name or unit on this survey. Thank you for your cooperation.

Circle the following information which applies to you.

E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 01 02 03

Tank Commander   Squad Leader   Platoon Sergeant   1st Sergeant   Platoon Leader   Company Commander

1. What did your unit **do well** during preparation at Fort Polk for the NTC exercise?

2. What did your unit **do well** during the participation at the NTC exercise?

3. What did your unit **not do well** during the preparation at Fort Polk?

4. What did your unit **not do well** during participation at the NTC exercise?

5. If you were the commander, what would you **have done differently** during the preparation **at Fort Polk** for the NTC exercise?

6. If you were the commander, what would you **have done differently** during the **participation at the NTC exercise?**

7. Based on your experiences during the National Training Center exercise, **how well is your unit prepared to go to war today?** (Circle your answer)

1	2	3	4	5
Definitely not ready	Somewhat not ready	Don't know	Just about ready	Good to go

8. What does your unit **need to do** to be prepared to go to war in the near future?

9. What other information would you like to provide?

The Feedback Session

The feedback session, scheduled with the Commander prior to return to Fort Polk, would require as uch as 4 hours. SFC William Mullins and SFC(P) Dennis Shelley planned and presented the feedback session. The charts showing the perceptions of the personnel from the Armor Battalion were shown first. As the Commander viewed and analyzed each chart, he made notes on each for future use. Next the Infantry perceptions were analyzed, then Artillery and Support perceptions. Then, the perceptions of each of the groups which had been interviewed were shown, using the same method. After the group interview, perceptions were examined, the Commander, XO, SFC Mullins and SFC(P) Shelley discussed *specific aspects* as well as *broad trends* concerning the data.

At this time, the discussion centered on obvious *trends* revealed by the information accumulated and various aspects of future implementations. The feedback session was concluded, and the OECs were asked to be ready for future work. Two days later, SFC(P) Shelley and SFC Mullins were asked to plan and conduct a multiphased series of Brigade-wide *role clarification workshops*.

The first workshops were designed to identify more precisely the roles and responsibilities of the *Armor and Infantry platoon sergeants and the platoon leaders* in the Brigade. Nine officers and nine NCOs were scheduled to attend the Infantry workshop and eighteen officers and eighteen NCOs were scheduled to attend the Armor workshop. Additional workshops for other positions in the Brigade are in the planning phase at this time.

Chronological Schedule of OE Process

In review, the following schedule shows the milestones of Operation Desert Raider.

14 Sep 82	Initial request for transition
12-15 Dec 82	CPX Battle Staff Assessment of BSA
20 Dec 82	Armor Battalion transition exercise
3 Jan 83	Battle staff assessment feedback to Bde Cdr
10 Jan 83	Battle staff assessment feedback to Bde XO
11 Jan - 31 Jan	Phase I
24 Jan - 9 Feb 83	Phase II
9 Feb 83	Depart to NTC
10 Feb - 23 Feb 83	Phase III
10-15 Feb 83	Battle staff assessment of S1-S4 and BSA
15-22 Feb 83	Battle staff assessment of Bde TOC
24 Feb - 4 Mar 83	Phase IV
24-26 Feb 83	Personal interviews and group interviews in assembly area
26 Feb 83	Depart to Fort Polk
5 Mar 83	Feedback session Bde Cdr and XO
7 Mar 83	Planning session concerning implementations derived from trend data
22 Mar 83	First implementation

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COL John C. Heldstab   **SFC(P) Dennis B. Shelley**

COL John C. Heldstab began his military career in 1962 upon graduation from the University of Oregon, where he was commissioned a Second Lieutenant of Armor. Colonel Heldstab has served in a variety of command and staff assignments, including: Commander of the 2nd Battalion 37th Armor in Germany; Staff Action Officer, in the Program Analysis Directorate, Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army; Personnel Management Officer, Majors Division, U.S. Army Military Personnel Center; and Advisor with the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.

COL Heldstab graduated from the Army War College, the Command and General Staff College, and the Defense Language Institute. He has a Master's Degree in Public Administration from the University of Missouri at Kansas City. He has been awarded the Bronze Star with "V" Device and 4 Oak Leaf Clusters, the Meritorious Service Medal with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters, the Air Medal, the Army Commendation Medal, and the Combat Infantryman Badge.

SFC(P) Dennis B. Shelley entered the Army from Stockville, Nebraska in July 1967. Previous assignments as a medic (MOS 91C) include five CONUS posts, Germany, Republic of Vietnam and Okinawa. A graduate of OECC 4-82 and currently an Organizational Effectiveness Consultant at Fort Polk, he holds a B.S. in Management from Park College and an M.B.A. from Southwest Texas State University.

CPT(P) Victor B. Bako Jr., Chief of the Fort Polk OE staff, CPT William R. Page Jr., and MSG(P) John Lord, OEC, also contributed to the development and success of this project.

TRADOC Goals Process

Lieutenant Colonel Robert Radcliffe and Major Kenneth Rice

Last August, as part of the Performance Management process, the Department of the Army announced that the 1982 Army Commanders' Conference would be structured around Army Goals. The Program Analysis Office of the ODCSRM was given the task of organizing, with assistance from the OE Office, TRADOC's preparation for the Army Commanders' Conference.

The initial plan was to analyze the Army Goals and list the efforts that support each of the goals. Condensing, comparing and analyzing the staff input proved an impossible task due to the time constraint, lack of response parallelism, and the obvious need for integration among staffs. The decision was made to discard the unmanageable staff input and have representatives (generally 0-6s) from each of the General Staff attend a Junior Board meeting and generate the required information.

The "Long-Range Planning in Complex Systems" Model was selected for the Junior Board process. The Model was modified as shown in Figure 1 to accomplish the immediate task of identifying TRADOC's significant contributions (labeled roles to avoid semantic problems) to the Army Goals.

The Junior Board, assisted by OE facilitators, met for 2 days. After reviewing environmental influences, the Board developed a purpose statement, revised the TRADOC missions, and initiated the tedious process of identifying TRADOC roles and sub-roles (Figure 2). The group brainstormed a list of roles for each of the Total Army Goals, discussed the roles, and by matrix checked the eight Army Functions for applicability. Each role was related directly to one Army Goal and one Army Function. It was recognized, and in some cases footnoted, however, that a particular role often supported several Army Goals and Functions. After reaching consensus on the roles for each Goal, participants reviewed their own functional areas to ensure that significant TRADOC efforts were not being overlooked.

Figure 1

Goals Process Model

Figure 2

Definition of Terms

PURPOSE:	General definition of the organization's reason for being in existence. A succinct description of the desired outcome of the organization's total efforts.
MISSIONS:	General areas upon which the organization focuses its efforts. The missions identify the areas of major focus for members of the organization.
GOALS:	General statements of effort, based on the organizational environment and support of its missions, that specify long-term expectations. Goals don't specify time constraints, assign responsibility for accomplishment, nor require frequent change.
OBJECTIVES:	Statements of efforts of individuals and groups in the organization. They are directly related to the organization's missions and goals. Objectives define work that must be performed to accomplish each goal.
ROLES:	Significant things that TRADOC does in support of the Total Army Goals. Roles have become objectives.
SUB-OBJECTIVES:	Sub-elements of objectives, statements of actions that must be performed to accomplish each objective. Sub-objectives define how the objective is to be achieved, and provide the basis for assessment.
SUB-ROLES:	Significant actions that must be performed to accomplish each role. Sub-roles have become sub-objectives.
TASKS:	Specific actions required to accomplish a sub-objective. They are measurable (performance indicators), time-specific (milestones), and designate responsibility and accountability.

Sub-roles were developed by describing the logical sequence by which each role was being or should be accomplished. Primary and supporting responsibilities were assigned for each role. And how well the sub-roles were currently being accomplished was assessed by the staff element having primary responsibility for the sub-role, based on this scale:

+ = Going well or on track

0 = Has been a deficiency, but corrective action has been taken. Moving in right direction.

− = Significant problem area. Deficiency exists; no corrective action yet.

Results of the Junior Board meeting were provided as a strawman to the Chief of Staff and Deputy Chiefs of Staff before their Senior Board meeting.

The Senior Board meeting paralleled the Junior Board meeting, except that sub-roles were not a topic. After environmental influences, purpose and missions were discussed, the Senior Board developed its own list of roles—strongly influenced by, yet significantly different from, the Junior Board input. Because the focus was on Army Goals, roles were developed that often cut across staff lines, reflecting the horizontal integration required to provide meaningful results for the Army.

Efforts of the Junior Board on developing sub-roles was salvaged by rearranging sub-roles under the new roles developed by the Senior Board. Junior Board members took that rough conversion, added or modified sub-roles appropriately, and reconvened to discuss the revisions.

Realizing that the future vision for TRADOC was based solely on the Junior and Senior Boards' reading of the Draft Army Plan, one concept for TRADOC's future was presented, followed by future-vision discussion. Keeping the future vision in mind, the group members reviewed and modified the revised roles, sub-roles and assessments. Reaching consensus on the revisions, the group prioritized the roles based on the average rank orderings of roles as submitted by the Junior Board members before the meeting. During the meeting, the averaged priority list was discussed, tradeoffs identified, and compromises made. All participants were able to support the group's prioritized listing of the roles. A second Senior Board meeting then expanded upon the future vision and reviewed Junior Board results. The expanded future vision was used to check the roles and sub-roles, resulting in several significant changes and a directive to continue refining and improving the results.

A Goals Team, comprised of action officers from the Program Analysis Office and Management Division of DCSRM plus an OE consultant, was formed to accomplish the tasks directed by the Senior Board. This team served as the focal point for the process, advisors to the project officer (ODCSRM PAO), and primary *doers* for the remainder of the goals process. Staff work continued on the goals process, but the emphasis shifted to the Program Analysis and Resource Review (PARR).

The PARR, based on the goals process per the CG's guidance, enabled TRADOC to accurately portray its long-range planning and resources to fully support the Total Army Goals. The PARR was submitted based on the roles, sub-roles and assessments, and in the same priority developed by the Junior and Senior Boards and approved by the Commanding General.

The goals process continued, with changes incorporated from lessons learned in the PARR process. The roles and sub-roles were converted to objectives and sub-objectives, and existing TRADOC goals were modified to fit the goals process model. Another day-long Junior Board meeting was held to review the purpose, missions, goals, objectives, and sub-objectives hierarchy. As a result of this meeting, significant changes to the missions and goals were made to more accurately reflect General Staff efforts, as they currently exist. The revised goals process

Figure 3
Converting Roles To Objectives

TRADOC Mission ——→ MISSION: Conduct and Guide the Army Combat Development Effort

TRADOC Goal ——→ GOAL: To Develop Force Design and Materiel Requirements That Insure Operational and Technological Superiority.

Army Goal ——→ FUTURE DEVELOPMENT (Structure) ——→ DEVELOPMENT A STRUCTURE TO SUPPORT DOCTRINE (DCSCD, DCSDOC)   TRADOC Responsible

Army Function

TRADOC Objective

Identify Doctrinal Requirement   +   TRADOC Responsible

Design Unit to Support Doctrine to Include Integration of Personnel and Logistics Requirements   +

TRADOC Sub-objective

Develop Documentation (AURS and TOE)   0   TRADOC HQ Assessment

Manage the Army's Manpower Authorization Criteria (MACRIT) Program   0

Analyze (Logistics) Force Structure Impact   0

document, with objectives arranged under the TRADOC hierarchy of purpose, missions and goals, was reviewed by the Chief of Staff and Deputies. It was then submitted to the Commanding General, who approved the document.

The General and Special Staff have developed tasks for each sub-objective of the approved results, in accordance with the following criteria: TRADOC-wide focus; logical description of how the sub-objective is being or should be accomplished; and the highest level of measurable detail.

For each task, a performance indicator, target or milestone, acceptable range of performance, and responsibility had to be identified. Some staff task development efforts were aided by workshops facilitated by the Goals Team, which appeared to improve those organization's acceptance of the contribution to the process. Staff inputs were reviewed by the Goals Team and mutually-agreed-upon changes were made. The results of the goals process and the task analysis will serve as the basis for the Command Performance Review (CPR) and will be published in TRADOC Pam 5-1.

The TRADOC Goals Process has led to the development of a management philosophy called Performance Management in TRADOC (PMIT). The concept, depicted in Figure 5, links the following disparate management processes: goals document

(TRADOC PAM 5-1); Command Performance Review (CPR); extended planning guidance; programming (PARR); budgeting and execution (POM and

Figure 5

Army Goals

TRADOC Goals & Objectives

Command Performance Review

Assessments

Performance Management In TRADOC

Accountability

Priorities

Contracts

Resources

Figure 4

Detailing The Tasks

MISSION: Command Installations and Organizations

GOAL: To Command, Support, and Efficiently Manage Operations of TRADOC Installations and Activities in Peace and War.

Army Goal (Army Function)	Objectives and Sub-Objectives	
MANAGMENT (Sustain)	PROMOTE STEWARDSHIP OF TRADOC RESOURCES	(DCSRM, STAFF)
	Allocate and Control Funds and Manpower	+
	Strengthen Internal Controls	0
	Maintain A Strong, Responsive Procurement System	0
	Evaluate Resource Management Effectiveness	0
	Provide Resource Management Services for TRADOC	0
	Provide Management Information Systems Planning and Support Within TRADOC	0
	Improve the Efficient Use of Resources	0

TASKS:	TARGET/ MILESTONE	APR:	RESPONSIBILITIES	ASSESSMENT
Provide management consulting services using the OE four-step process (assessment, planning, implementation and evaluation) to support TRADOC Goals and Objectives. *performance indicator: % of installation/activity OE offices in support of priority goals and objectives.	60% FY83 85% FY84	25-75% 50-100%	TRADOC HQ, Installations, and Activities	0

Figure 6
Concept Translated To Individual Performance

HQ TRADOC	DCS	DIRECTORATE AND BELOW
PURPOSE ↓		
MISSIONS ↓		
GOALS ——————→	MISSIONS	
OBJECTIVES ——————→	GOALS ——————→	MISSIONS
SUB-OBJECTIVES ——————→	OBJECTIVES ——————→	GOALS
TASKS ——————→	SUB-OBJECTIVES/TASKS ——————→	OBJECTIVES
	TASKS/SUB-TASKS ←——————	TASKS
		SUB-TASKS

*NOTE: Installations Will Generally Track With The Same Scenario With The Installation Filling The TRADOC Column.

Broken Down To Lowest Measurable Level, Ideally, To Individual Performance Level With Entries On 67-8-1 And SKAP Documents.

COB); installation requirements (contracts); and management information system. In summary, PMIT will provide a central focus, a common direction, and common language for all TRADOC management processes.

Several staff sections are developing internal management processes derived from the TRADOC Goals Process. The basic theory of the TRADOC Goals Process (Figure 6) provides a stair-step relationship from the top of the organization down to the individual. It is envisioned that the staff efforts to develop internal management processes will: result in clear and concise individual objectives supportive of organizational efforts; be based on the values of that particular organization; and be reflected on OER support forms and general performance appraisal system (GPAS) support forms. In this way, individual efforts can be traced through the organization to the TRADOC Goals in support of Army Goals and functions.

It is further envisioned that TRADOC installations and activities will pattern their own goals processes similar to TRADOC's use of the DA Goals Process (PMA). Just as the TRADOC process focused on the entire command's efforts, major installations should find that their efforts mirror the TRADOC missions, goals, objectives and sub-objectives, but with a limited scope. Smaller installations and activities should find several goals, objectives and sub-objectives that describe their major efforts. By the linking of goals processes, in addition to reinforcement provided by the resource processes and the installation contract, a top-down coordinated effort should result.

What are the lessons learned for OE Consultants who would support this type of process?

Perhaps the most significant lesson is to align with the staff elements responsible for managing and programming functions on the installation activity. Only in this way will the goals process truly be linked to the PPBES process and become more than a philosophical drill on priorities.

A second major lesson is the need to involve top leadership in the effort to determine the Command Purpose, Mission, Goals and Objectives (PMGO). By their actual involvement in developing the PMGO, versus just approving them, the process has a much better chance of success. The keys are commitment to the goals process, acceptance of the results, and incorporation into the PPBES process and regulatory guidance.

And finally, for goals and objectives to be effective, they must ultimately be linked with individual performance standards in a quantifiable way. This, enhanced by process to measure and report on progress, provides the linkage from organizational purpose to the work performed by individuals. The result is command-wide effort, directly related to those things that the CG has identified as important to TRADOC, and the CSA has identified as important to the Total Army. □

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Managing Conflict in the Army Reserve

Major Alan L. Wilgus

The U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) has a difficult job. Given a mission of being prepared for mobilization and commitment to a war zone, they have about 38 days a year to attain a minimum state of readiness necessary for success.

Many obstacles frustrate the USAR unit in attaining their goal, several of which are beyond the unit's ability to influence. One significant obstacle is the inability of many USAR units to effectively manage internal conflict. This condition creates organizational and personal stress, adversely affects staff coordination, and ultimately results in inefficiency. This is my conclusion after 18 months of Organizational Effectiveness consulting to USAR units from Division to Battalion level.

Conflict is a natural part of life. And, like cooperation, it is *essential* to a healthy organization. When *constructively managed,* conflict tends to energize an organization, enhancing creativity and improving the quality of decisions.

Unfortunately, conflict in many Reserve units carries with it negative connotations. The confrontive person is often perceived as an agitator, a power-seeker, cynical, or not a team player. In the rush to meet a suspense and react to crisis, dealing with conflict is just one more problem; for expedience, we don't rock the boat. The unresolved conflict contributes to an undercurrent of tension which breeds anxiety, frustration and superficial relationships.

Fearing Conflict

The prospect of managing conflict can be frightening for many people. This is generally true where conflict is viewed as *destructive* rather than *constructive.* Once this attitude is accepted, the organization establishes behavioral norms that support conflict avoidance.

Many people are threatened by what may occur as a result of confronting another person. There is a tendency to imagine the worst possible results. This fantasy may take the form of lost status, esteem, friendship, or perhaps suffering verbal abuse ... even ducking a left hook! I suspect that these fears would seldom be realized. But they provide more than enough incentive to avoid conflict.

Many people fear repercussion. The person who is confronted may feel personally attacked, become defensive, and react covertly. When the S3, for example, confronts the budget analyst with a problem, the S3 fears that the long-awaited new office equipment might never materialize. Or, essential information might be withheld as a way to "get even."

Avoiding Conflict

People spend a lot of energy avoiding conflict. Unit

Major Al Wilgus is currently assigned as an OE Consultant to Readiness Group, Fort Sheridan, Illinois. He is a 1971 graduate of Infantry OCS. During his 16 years in the Army he has served in command and staff positions with Infantry, PSYOPS and training units. He is a graduate of OECC 2-81. MAJ Wilgus, has a B.S. in Social Science and an M.S. in Management and Human Relations.

members, perhaps due to the limited amount of time they spend together, fool themselves into believing they can operate effectively in spite of conflicts. And, in fact, avoiding conflict is easy. People simply try to deny its existence. In extreme cases, staff officers isolate themselves entirely; by staying busy, with paperwork perhaps, they create both imagined and actual barriers between self and others. Not only is the object of conflict avoided, but "being too busy to deal with it" is a convenient scapegoat.

Avoiding conflict often results in activities that run counter to the mission of the organization. Competition can become intense if someone drives to accumulate personal power and influence within the organization. When the efforts of a unit are not focused in a common direction and goals and values are not agreed upon by the leadership, resolving conflict becomes difficult, at best. Unfortunately, avoiding conflict does not make this condition go away.

Identifying Weaknesses

Conflict is effectively managed in an environment of *open communication, cohesive effort,* and *trust.* This is not, however, the common characterization of USAR units.

To develop cohesion and trust, communication must be effective. Managing conflict successfully depends on the quality of interpersonal communication skills. Having overcome the fear of confrontation, nothing is more self-defeating for a person than failing to resolve the conflict due to

communication that is ineffective. Poor communication often leads to argumentation, with each side determined to 'win.'

Learning to give negative feedback to avoid a defensive reaction is a necessary leadership skill. Negative feedback is not bad. In fact, both negative and positive feedback should be viewed as helpful, and any perception to the contrary must be overcome.

Effective feedback is the basis for performance counseling. When used correctly, it is not vindictive, nor does it sanction "squaring people away." Indicative of the lack of understanding about feedback is the limited counseling that occurs in the Reserve, and Officer Evaluation Reports seldom reflect performance. Often, conflicts are addressed only after a situation has deteriorated extremely.

Resolving Problems

Resolving conflict demands mutual agreement by the people involved. Conflict can be *apparently* resolved when a person of senior rank uses power and authority to impose his will on a subordinate. But this style of 'persuasion' may bring only temporary results with no genuine resolution. Resolving conflict is most difficult between staff officers and technicians who have equal power and authority. Both people must recognize the consequences of their conflict. For the individual, there is normally anxiety, frustration and ulcers, while the organization suffers decreased efficiency.

Resolution demands that the source of disagreement be identified. Is the conflict about facts, methods, or values? Each person must actively listen and provide feedback; the goal is not 'to agree' but to *understand*. After mutual understanding is achieved, most of the battle is over. What remains is a negotiation process to modify behaviors and enhance the relationship. Finally, the people must make a commitment to manage differences in a constructive way and be sensitive to each other's needs.

The process described above can be used effectively with two people, or with groups of people in conflict. Where emotions run high, a third party can facilitate the encounter.

Achieving Goals

Inability to resolve organizational conflict is not unique to the Reserve. With limited time available for training, however, the negative impact of unresolved conflict is magnified and performance is adversely affected.

Before the Reserve accomplishes performance goals, leaders at all levels must understand conflict and have confidence in their ability to effectively manage it. Conflict must be viewed as a positive force rather than a negative force. Unit members must overcome the fear of confrontation and learn to communicate effectively. Then the goal of high performance for the U.S. Army Reserve will be significantly more attainable. □

Quotes

All great ideas are controversial, or have been at one time **—George Seldes**

We think of tolerance as a virtue, but there are times when people speak of tolerance, and the word they ought to use is apathy. **—Robert J. McCracken**

Honor lies in honest toil. **—Grover Cleveland**

Logic is the art of going wrong with confidence. **—Joseph Wood Krutch**

Activation: Startup Of A New Organization

Captain H.L. Frandsen

Activating a new organization is a special task that requires its own organizational structure, systems staffing, and management style. The commander faced with this unique task has to understand what is happening and be able to influence and lead this process of birth.

The process of activation necessarily involves moving into unfamiliar territory, where the only certainty is change. Many more things than usual will fail to go according to plan. Roles and responsibilities will seem unclear or be disputed. Tasks will not be carried out as expected. Human and material resources won't be available when needed or perform as expected. In short, all the provisions that already exist in an on-going or *steady-state* organization for problem-solving are both inadequate and non-existant during *activation* or *startup*.[1]

Vision and Strategy

In the Army, a new organization is usually designed well in advance of its activation. Although the design includes a mission and manning-and-equipment table (TOE, TDA), it remains skeletal. The commander of the new organization has great flexibility over the detailed facets of organizational design, and clarifying the organization's mission or purpose is no exception.

The commander's initial task, then, is to think strategically about the purpose and mission(s) of the organization. This is the glue that will eventually hold the rest of the organization together.

Only with a clear understanding of purpose can there be a vision of what the goal, the ultimate organization, will look like and how it will work. From the very start, therefore, strategic planning—a process of determining mission, objectives and strategy—is of prime importance. This process helps the organization become closely aligned with its mission and eliminate activities and objectives that the organization is capable of doing but that have no relation to its purpose. "One of the biggest problems in organizations today is that there is little relation among the purpose, mission, goals, and objectives."[2]

Many different models have been developed for the "how-to" of strategic planning. Most, however, incorporate a similar form, as shown below:

STRATEGY: PURPOSE
▼
MISSIONS
▼
GOALS
▼
OBJECTIVES

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
[1]Roger Harrison, "Startup: The Care and Feeding of Infant Systems,"*Organizational Dynamics,* Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 5, Summer 1981.

[2]Gerald Pike. "Long-Range (Strategic) Organizational Planning: A Model," *OE Communique,* Vol. 5, No. 2, p. 21, 1981.

"It is our thesis," say Tregoe and Zimmerman, "that strategy should provide a picture of the organization as it wants to look in the future. Strategy is vision. It is totally directed at what the organization should be rather than how the organization will get there."

With a clear vision of the desired future state, the commander can issue to his subordinates general guidance on the criteria that the new organization must meet.

Startup Design

As mentioned, change and uncertainty will exist everywhere in the startup, and far more intensified than that in a steady-state organization. In his book on *Designing Complex Organizations,* Jay Galbraith says, "the greater the task uncertainty, the greater the amount of information that must be processed among decision makers during task execution in order to achieve a given level of performance."[3] Task uncertainty can be handled by providing additional resources or by redesigning the organization to increase its information-processing capacity.

People, money and materials, and time are the most obvious resources that can be added to an organization:

> **Add human resources.** Typically, startups should be overstaffed; additional technical personnel should be available, and extra personnel should be kept on call as needed. Sometimes a *startup team* of highly qualified people will start the organization and later hand it back to the normal operating staff when it is operational.

> **Add money.** Budgetary restrictions and controls may be relaxed, procurement procedures streamlined and simplified so that needed *materials* may be quickly ordered.

> **Add time.** If all else fails, the startup will simply take longer, because time is the resource that requires the least planning and creativity to make it available.[4]

If you are unwilling to pay the costs of task uncertainty, then you must recognize that startup for an ideal organization does not have the same structure as that of the steady-state organization. This can be demonstrated by superimposing a temporary modified matrix form of organization over the steady-state structure. The accompanying figure shows how the modified matrix (startup team) would differ from the normal organization. The thrust of these matrix designs is to (1) free the commander to focus on overall coordination, (2) to provide both tangible support in the form of needed human and

[3]J.R. Galbraith, *Designing Complex Systems.* 2d ed.; Mass: Addison-Wesley 1977, p. 4.

[4]Harrison, op. cit., p. 6.

Temporary Startup Organization
(Alternative 1)

*planning groups

(Alternative 2)

material resources and psychological support when the going is rough, and (3) to manage the boundaries between the startup system and its environment.

In both of the cases illustrated, the planning groups or special task forces are made up of personnel from various parts of the normal organization, representing all steady-state functional elements. This is the great benefit of the modified matrix. It reduces information overload by shortening the linkage between the origin of a problem and the points at which a decision can be made and implemented. It thus reduces response time, and thereby permits the organization to stay on top of a rapidly changing situation. It also fosters cooperation, mutual influence, and cohesion between functions. Individuals have more authority and responsibility than they would normally have, so jobs are more satisfying and fulfilling for ambitious, achievement-oriented personnel. It works well when people understand and are well prepared for their roles, and when higher management adopts the facilitative and supportive style the startup team needs in order to take initiative and personal responsibility.[5]

Both alternatives include a startup manager subordinate to the commander. His role is to facilitate implementation of the startup by developing and overseeing the Master Startup Plan. He maps out strategies and actions necessary for the startup by insuring:

- Effective identification and use of resources
- Coordination of activities
- Monitoring of progress and feedback

[5]Ibid., p. 8.

His job is to set up the various planning groups and manage the startup team. He stays in control by monitoring all major tasks and focuses on obstacles to progress. He acts as the information and resource center during the startup process.[6]

Managers within the planning groups must have a positive attitude toward problem solving, actively participate, and be willing to translate ideas into specific actions. A positive attitude is critical, because the planning groups should not only identify problems but also develop feasible alternatives that can be staffed and implemented.

Roger Harrison, who has participated in many startups as a consultant, recommends that the following questions be considered when designing the interim organization:

- What sorts of problems, communications and decisions are we likely to encounter during startup that are different or more pressing than those encountered during normal operation?
- In the normal organization, where does information about these problems originate?
- Can we shorten communication pathways, or bring problem-owners together with problem-solvers to speed resolution?
- What procedures and systems can we invent to accomplish our information processing tasks?
- What roles, responsibilities, and authorities must be assigned and accepted so that these procedures and systems will work?
- What kinds of training, briefing, team building, or intergroup negotiation must take place so that people will know and be motivated to perform their roles?[7]

Steady-State Design

Using the modified matrix organization allows you to form interim management roles and processes, which facilitate building the new organization. The operational design, resulting from the work done in the planning groups, should define the basic work across and in each unit of the organization. The design criteria should include:

- Task and work flow
- Formal structure
- New sub-unit startup
- Management processes and systems
- Reward/incentive system
- People and available skills
- Political realities
- Coping with environmental demands
- Organizational constraints[8]

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[6]Linda S. Ackerman, "Transition Management Process." Lecture presented at Army Organizational Effectiveness Conference, National Mine Health and Safety Academy, Beckley, W. Va., 24-28 May 1982.

[7]Harrison, op. cit., p. 13.

[8]Ackerman, loc. cit.

With these criteria in mind, members of planning groups can assess similar organizations, review published material, or draw on their own experience to formulate alternatives within the given criteria. Once all alternatives have been developed and compiled, the planning groups meet with all identified stakeholders in a series of problem-solving meetings to arrive at the final design.

When the new subsystem design is approved, it should be time-phased along with other subsystems in coming on-line. The development of critical-path techniques or time charts will ensure that all facets of the startup can be monitored by the startup manager. In developing such graphical representations of the plan, milestone charts and the backward planning sequence are a must. Such graphical representations should exist at all levels within the startup and indicate:

- Person responsible for completion
- Methods being used
- Resources necessary
- Person to whom the action is reported

These graphical representations can be easily communicated throughout the organization. Periodic updates to all people involved ensures smooth coordination and decreases apprehensions. Feedback channels must be developed and encouraged to operate so that problems can be quickly identified and solved before they turn into major catastrophies.

An excellent way to build acceptance for recommendations, ensuring continuity, and testing feasibility stage-by-stage is to require decision papers and fact sheets. These force the planning groups to think through their recommendations in writing and provide an excellent means for bouncing their ideas off others in the organization. They also allow the commander to stay abreast of what is going on and issue further guidance if necessary. Finally, anxiety and concern are minimized when everyone interested knows what is happening.

The Human Organization

When you staff a startup system from the ground up, everyone is new. Even the head of the startup does not know exactly how to use his authority to get things done. Everyone has expectations of everyone else, but each person's expectations are at least partly based on prior experiences unshared with others. Roles and responsibilities are ill-defined, and because people do not know exactly what their limits are, there is continual testing and jockeying for power and influence.

In contrast to the care and attention given to other aspects of the startup, the people who will make the system work are given a quick briefing and plugged into the organization. If the system does not function well, the tendency is to blame people who do not seem to be doing the job well. Obviously, the integration

and orientation of new people is even more critical in the startup where institutional knowledge has yet to evolve.[9]

The Performance Management Conference (USAOECS RB26-12) and the Performance Objectives Workshop (USAOECS ST 26-150-5) can help clarify roles and modify them as necessary to best fit the organizational purpose, objectives, and structure. Other team building activities allow team members to explore their operating characteristics, establish mutual expectations, and develop norms of behavior that will become the organizational culture.

Operating under much greater task uncertainty than normal, members of the startup will be required to solve many more problems and deal with much more conflict. Therefore, people must be trained in methods of dealing with conflict that will ensure open lines of communication. Formal training in problem-solving methods will give people a common approach to assist in understanding and depersonalizing disagreements. It is necessary also that planning groups understand the principles of group problem-solving and meeting management to make the most effective use of their time.

Leadership
The focus of the startup organization begins with learning and gradually shifts to efficiency. The appropriate initial management style for the commander may be called facilitative. Facilitative management focuses on providing the condition under which people will be motivated to perform:

> Instead of managing the startup from the top, higher management's energy is devoted to selecting and developing people, inspiring them to their best efforts, planning the organization and the startup process, assuring the flow of needed resources into the startup, managing boundaries with the parent organization, and monitoring performance against targets.[10]

To members of the larger organization, a startup organized according to the principles of modified matrix and dealing with one crisis after another will appear disorderly and inefficient. To the startup people, the larger organization may appear bureaucratic, rigid, and oriented toward tight control at the expense of high performance. These differences will lead to conflicts and misunderstandings that will be further exacerbated by the unclear roles of the new startup organization. Also, since the startup system is a learning system, it can be expected to make quite a few mistakes necessary to the process of learning. From the point of view of the parent organization, however, they are more likely to be regarded as signs of incompetence and failure.

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[9]Sam Volard and Peter Day, "Creating the Human Organization for a New Company," *Journal of General Management,* Vol. 6, No. 1, p. 11, 1980.

[10]Harrison, op. cit., p. 19.

Though these sources of conflict cannot be eliminated, they can be planned for and managed:
- Select a person who has credibility in both the startup and the parent organization to act as a liaison between them.
- Formalize contacts with the startup organization.
- Establish in advance how progress is to be reported and by whom.
- Establish a norm for resolving conflicts and disagreements with the parent organization through confrontation, problem-solving, or negotiation.[11]

Conclusion
...A period of change is all about us, and the way in which we go about managing change over the next decade or two will determine whether or not we arrive on the 31st of December 1999 with our Nation's values intact. —Gen. Meyer
Chief of Staff
U.S. Army

The difference between a startup organization and a steady-state organization may be likened to the difference between a peacetime military unit and one engaged in combat. The fundamental difference has to do with learning. Its central purpose is to learn to *operate,* in contrast to the steady-state organization concerned with control and efficiency. Management decisions that must be made about the structure, systems, staffing, and management style of a startup are made from the point of view of creating the most productive learning system.

Across the Army, senior leaders are currently grappling with complex issues concerning how to most effectively manage force integration. Over 400 new systems will be introduced into the Army with 18,000 military and 16,000 civilian spaces appearing in the force structure. General Glen Otis, Commander of USAREUR, has described force integration as a "reorganization of the Army." Information concerning the learning that occurs as new organizations are formed must not be discarded nor forgotten, but must be assimilated into a larger body of knowledge to shape our military units into high performing organizations. It is in hope of stimulating the creation of these more powerful systems that this research was conducted. □

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[11]Harrison, op. cit., p. 26.

CPT Bert Frandsen was commissioned as an infantry officer from Auburn Unversity. His assignments have included duty with the 2d Infantry Division, 2d Ranger Battalion, and 9th Infantry Division. While assigned as an OEC at Fort Benning, Georgia, he assisted in the activation of a Training Brigade Training Center Headquarters. He is a graduate of OECC 4-80 and is currently assigned to the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.

OE and Military-Civilian Contracting

Legal and Ethical Guidelines For OECs Working With Government-Owned Contractor-Operated Installations

Mr. Patrick Hardy and Lieutenant Colonel Gary Joyner

Traditionally, Organizational Effectiveness (OE) has operated within government organizations. There is, however, an OE application that crosses this boundary and enters the private sector.

The U.S. Army Armament Materiel Readiness Command (ARRCOM) has a built-in working relationship with the private sector of our economy, clearly demonstrated by our 27 ammunition plants throughout the country. The majority of these plants are **Government-Owned, Contractor-Operated,** commonly known as **GOCOs.**

A formal government contract delegates responsibility for operating an ammunition plant to the private contractor. Responsibility for administering the contract lies with a small government staff known as the **Contracting Officer's Representative (COR).** The COR staff is usually led by a military Commander (Lieutenant Colonel), a Civilian Executive Assistant, and an Executive Officer (Captain), with 20 to 70 civilian personnel. The private contractor, in turn, usually employs 800 to 3000 civilians.

OE services offered to GOCO ammunition plants have thus far been provided only to government COR staff. This changed, however, in November 1982 with LTC Robert Girard, Commander of Longhorn Army Ammunition Plant, Marshall, Texas. He asked for OE assistance to his COR staff, to enhance what he considered an already good working relationship between his staff and the contractor's staff.

Needing knowledge and understanding of the legal ramifications for what would be a new and unusual situation, we consulted the HQ, ARRCOM legal staff, who gave us these facts:

- Private contractors are under government contract, but they are also in business to make a profit. If they seek behavioral science consulting services for internal operations, Organization Development (OD) consultants are available from the private sector.

- Private contractors compete within the private sector for government contracts. OE consultants cannot in any way provide one contractor with a competitive edge over another contractor.

- OE consultants cannot place themselves in a position where they might assume, directly or indirectly, legal liability for any contractor actions.

- OE consulting services can be offered to the COR staff to improve the working relationship between the COR staff and contractor staff. These OE services will be limited to the inter-relationship between the management and supervisory personnel of both staffs.

We told LTC Girard of these legal constraints, and we all agreed that they would be strictly followed. Next, we developed a strategy for gaining contractor acceptance of our OE operation designed to improve relationships between the government and contractor staffs.

We anticipated several major factors that might discourage the contractor's General Manager from volunteering for an OE workshop. First, we felt that because most contractor staffs undergo heavy inspection from a variety of government inspection teams, the contractor's staff would initially have strong negative perceptions of OE. Second, due to time constraints and the legal restrictions mentioned above, we knew that trust, rapport, and voluntary committment had to be established in the initial meeting with the contractor's General Manager. Third, we anticipated it would be hard to get full committment from the General Manager unless all agreed on a specific workshop agenda.

To resolve these problems before the initial meeting with the COR staff Commander and contractor's General Manager, we developed these operating guidelines:

- The initial meeting would include the COR staff commander, his Civilian Executive Assistant, the contractor's General Manager and his representative, plus two OECs.

- The positive nature of OE must be clarified and will include a discussion of confidentiality of information.

- That OECs are not inspectors must be clearly stated.

- Both the Commander and General Manager must volunteer for the OE workshop.

- The Commander and General Manager will have equal status during the workshop.

- The sole objective of the workshop will be to improve communications and working relationships between supervisory personnel on the COR staff and supervisory personnel on the contractor staff.

• The legal restrictions (cited above) will be discussed and agreed to by all parties.

Our meeting was a success. The Commander and General Manager reacted positively toward the proposed workshop and all operating guidelines. The General Manager, moreover, would not only participate in the workshop but also would sell his top management staff on the concept of OE and the workshop content.

During our four days at Longhorn, with support from both the Commander and General Manager that we critically needed, we produced a successful OE workshop. Completing three steps of the four-step process with the COR staff, the effort culminated in an 8-hour team-building and goal-setting session. A second 4-hour session designed to improve communications and working relationships between the COR staff and the contractor's staff followed this agenda:

• Opening comments - Commander and General Manager
• Ice Breaker - OEC
• Explain workshop design - OEC
• Expectations and ground rules
• Get acquainted exercise (Peter/Paul with counterparts)
• Subgroups develop Action Plans around issue of improved communications
• Subgroup spokespersons present Action Plans to total group
• Group discussion of Action Plans and workshop
• Closing comments - Commander and General Manager

The "magic" of synergy and creativity that occurred during this workshop is familiar to practicing OECs. And the legal and ethical precedents used in this operation will no doubt benefit other OECs confronting similar situations. Hopefully there will be future opportunities for OE in this arena. Carrol Fletcher, Director of Finance and Administration, Thiokol/Longhorn Division, summed it up well by welcoming the opportunity to make new "footprints" in establishing better relations between government and industry. □

Mr. Patrick G. Hardy, OECC-78 graduate, is Chief, OE Office, Headquarters, U.S. Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command, Rock Island, Illinois. With a B.S. in Political Science from Loyola University, Chicago, he began his civilian career at Rock Island Arsenal in 1962, and has also served as Personnel Management Specialist and Management Analyst.

LTC Gary W. Joyner, OECC-82, is an OE Consultant with the U.S. Army Armament Materiel Readiness Command, Rock Island, Illinois. A Command and General Staff College graduate, this Armor Officer, Master Army Aviator, has commanded at company level and served as a staff officer at corps and Army level. His B.A. in History is from the University of Tampa, Florida.

Inside Look At
A Balanced OE Program
Fort Stewart and Hunter Army Airfield, Georgia

Captain Robert L. Decker

No two OE programs are alike. Each Organizational Effectiveness Consultant brings individuality and special skills to the job. Also, OE offices are structured quite differently among the many commands. And each command climate has its own quality, specifically in degree and type of support that it gives the OE effort.

Our OE program at Fort Stewart and Hunter Army Airfield is unique, and we're proud of it. This balanced and viable program has four major elements: *individual skills, teamwork, office leadership,* and *command climate* (Figure 1). When all four elements are synchronized, the program flourishes and successfully helps the command accomplish its goals.

Figure 1.
OE Total Program Model

The 24th Infantry Division was reactivated as a light infantry division in 1975. Within the past few years, the Victory Division has completely transitioned to 'totally mechanized.' Not only is the 24th a FORSCOM unit, it is also the heavy element of the Rapid Deployment Force. Some 40 miles away is the subpost, Hunter Army Airfield. It is the home of some divisional units and many non-divisional organizations, primarily aviation units and the 1-75th Ranger Battalion.

What with the many activities involving the recent facelift, coupled with complex logistics, the pace around here often gets hectic. Optimistically, however, we like to think that means more opportunities for OE intervention.

Covering both the Division and Installation organizational activities, we have two captains, two sergeants-first-class, and a staff sergeant. Although the TOE authorizes two people to each function, we feel that pooling our assets expands our capability and flexibility. The fact that we all work for the Division/Installation Commander helps us focus our direction and goals.

Individual Skills

The selection process for choosing an Organizational Effectiveness Consultant is critical to the success of the OE process. Anyone who has attended the Organizational Effectiveness Center and School at Fort Ord would probably agree that we have many high-caliber officers and NCOs in the OE field. If a chain is only as strong as its weakest link, then each player—complete with individual skills—is vitally important to the OE team.

At Fort Stewart, we are fortunate to have five top-notch consultants. Although most of our assignments lend themselves to teamwork, there are also many individual tasks, such as: conducting a quality-of-life survey, scheduling a Battalion Commander's day with the Commanding General, analyzing dial-the-boss responses over a four-month period, and conducting a company four-step operation.

We help promote OE with our Victory Division Honorary OE Award (Figure 2). Conceived by Steve Nally and designed and authored by Bob Decker, the award reinforces the positive relationships that we've created with a client through a successful OE operation. We are prudent about giving this honor to a deserving client, though. All four team members have to agree on the nominee, then in a gesture of accord, we all present the award to the client.

Although individual skills and talents vary, and no matter how creative or gifted a particular consultant is, we have found nothing to replace good old hard work. It can be both time- and energy-consuming to continuously plan off-site conferences, conduct endless workshops, hold countless interviews, analyze tedious survey results, or prepare

Figure 2.
Honorary OE Award

recurring briefings and reports. Although it may be a challenge to get a foot in the clients's door, it is the hard work and application of individual skills that brings success. And, through our successes, we have earned a solid reputation. . . *individually, as a team, and as an entire OE program.*

Teamwork

It takes more than five individually skilled OECs to perform a monumental task like covering an entire Division and Installation. It takes teamwork!

Our shared values help us achieve teamwork. First, we are committed to working as a team. Second, OE is not reserved for just general officers or company-grade officers; it serves all levels. We blend our individual talents to accomplish team goals.

Teamwork starts taking shape with an OE Office Transition Meeting, held as soon as a new consultant comes on board. We actually follow the advice we give incoming Battalion Commanders who need to become rapidly assimilated into their organizational structure. During our day-long meeting, we disclose personal information, air our concerns and set goals. By day's end, participants are already feeling like a team.

With time, of course, working relationships are established and individual players start melding to function as a team. At this point, when we collectively tackle problems, we find out explicitly what kind of mix we have, like right-brain and left-brain thinkers, type-A and type-B personalities.

When we deal with upcoming projects or programs, we capitalize on teamwork. Although our workload may be tasked down to one or two of us by the chief of the OE team, we four OECs routinely initiate brainstorming sessions to provide an inventory of ideas for solving problems or designing programs. This synergy is certainly useful in our business, and it perpetuates the team spirit as well.

We constantly bolster our teamwork approach to OE in several ways. We practice active listening, exchange feedback, and strive to maintain open communication. We have even changed the Division Staff Directory to read *OE Team,* rather than OE Office. The notion of being a team has definitely enhanced our reputation on post. The connotations of *team-work, being on the team,* and *team player* have helped us project a positive image throughout the installation.

Office Leadership

While our consultants are individually talented and function very smoothly as a team, there is obviously a critical need for leadership and direction provided by one source, namely the chief of the OE team.

Although the chief normally wears the rank of Major or Lieutenant Colonel, depending on the activity's location, we can't seem to get those field grade types here. The slot is filled, however, and very dynamically so!

Upon receiving command guidance, the OE team chief orchestrates the direction of the office, planning events proactively, scheduling and allocating resources and events, making timely and appropriate decisions, distributing tasks to the rest of the team, and interfacing with higher headquarters. While these tasks would usually be performed by any OE office, they are *vital* functions for our OE leader. . .and are handled extremely well.

Our chief uses Program Worksheets, categorizing all of our operations as Current, Planned/Projected or Followup. Current means either on-going activities or operations scheduled in the short-term where some preparatory work is required. Planned/Projected operations are one to six months down the road, for which planning is sometimes needed *now*. Followup operations are due for evaluation six months after implementation. Figure 3 shows the first page of a Current Program Worksheet.

As a management tool, the worksheet gets input from all consultants in the office, and it is reviewed and updated weekly by the chief. The worksheet lists the client, type of operation, responsible consultant(s), estimated completion date, and status of the operation. This worksheet which keeps the entire team updated on events also helps the team chief brief the Chief of Staff every week, and the Commanding General biweekly.

Of course, in addition to his office manager responsibilities, the team chief must also maintain individual consultant skills. He does this by keeping current with the concerns of clients, by being an active member of the consulting team, and teaching and coaching other consultants in the office.

Figure 3.
CG's Program Worksheet for Current Operations

DATE: 5 September 1982

CURRENT OPERATIONS   PROGRAM WORKSHEET

	CLIENT	ACTION	RESP	EST. COMP.	STATUS
*	CG	CCWA Survey	CPT Decker	10 Sept. 82	
*	CG	E-3/E-4 Assessment	CPT Nally SSG Ofsanko	10 Sept. 82	
*	CG	Study: Correlation of Grade Fill to Unit Effectiveness	SFC Spence SSG Ofsanko	15 Sept. 82	
	CG	CCWA Follow-up	CPT Nally CPT Decker	15 Oct. 82	
	CG	CTMS Class	CPT Nally	Nov. 82	Need Guidance
	CG	L&MDTC Training	SFC Spence	Nov-Dec 82	Awaiting Decision - 10 Sept. 82
	CG	Battle Staff Training	SFC Spence	Nov-Dec 82	Awaiting Decision - 10 Sept. 82
	Mrs. Galvin	Day with the Junior Wives	CPT Decker	Oct 82	Awaiting Coordination w/Mrs. Galvin
	Mrs. Galvin	Commanders' Wives Seminar	CPT Decker	Nov 82	
	CG	FOCUS III	CPT Decker SFC Spence	19-21 Nov 82	Start Pre-work o/a 1 Oct 82 Coordinating Accommodations
	O-6 CDR	4-step Operation	CPT Nally SSG Ofsanko	Nov 82	Feedback Data: O/A 15 Sept 82
*	MSC CDR	Off-Post Conference	CPT Nally	24-26 Sept 82	
*	MSC CDR	Assessment of S-3 Shop	CPT Nally	1 Oct 82	
*	O-6	Transition Meeting	CPT Nally CPT Decker	6 Oct 82	Planning Meeting: 7 Sept 82
	MSC CDR	DFAC Assessment	CPT Nally	Oct 82	Need to Coord w/ CDR
*	O-6	Briefing on LOGEX D-MAIN Observations	CPT Nally	10 Sept 82	Need to brief G-3
	BN CDR	4-step Operation	CPT Decker	Oct 82	Implementation
	BN CDR	Goal Setting	CPT Decker	Oct 82	
	BN CDR	Unit Transition	CPT Decker	Oct 82	Possible FTX Client
	Div Staff Agency	4-step Operation	CPT Nally	Oct 82	Implementation-need to coord w/PAO

NOTES: * = Current Priority

Without the positive impact of a strong office leader, the total program can easily suffer imbalance. The OE team leader may be the most important element of any OE program.

Command Climate

The Commanding General, MG John R. Galvin, sets the command climate by supporting and becoming personally involved in the OE program. While all OE programs get some type of support, varying from total support to very little, fortunately we fall on the positive end of the spectrum. MG Galvin's personal involvement is easily recognized by the innovative and diverse projects he's given the OE team. This is one commander who knows how to use OE creatively.

We perform many routine OE operations for the Division, and a combination of routine and unique services are rendered the Installation (Figure 4). We believe that our response to the CG's projects, which constitute 25-30% of our workload, is where our OE program takes on a personality all its own. We have a chance not only to conduct innovative studies, assessments and programs, but many times reach the greatest number of people and provide the greatest service to the command.

Some examples will demonstrate the variety and scope of our work for the CG. Job Book Assessment had a short fuse and took only three days to complete. MG Galvin wanted to find out whether units throughout the Installation were using Job Books as they were intended. After surveying 125 NCOs and interviewing 20 key leaders, we gave two briefings and made appropriate recommendations. In contrast, the Company Commander Workload Assessement took 5 months and 356 workhours. A captain on the OE team observed five randomly selected company/battery/troop commanders, each for an entire workweek. The purpose was to determine how a company commander spends his time and what distractions are encountered when dealing with people, training and maintenance. The CG reviewed the voluminous data with an eye to making it easier for a company commander to do his job. Consequently, payoffs for the Division and Installation have been pervasive and longterm.

Because the CG gives OE a high priority within the command, it is not suprising that OE gets widespread use on post, and in a somewhat contagious fashion, at that. This is evidenced by the off-post planning conferences requested by MSC Commanders, the many transition workshops for incoming Battalion Commanders and assistance to the CG's wife and MSC wives.

OE Activities and Operations for a Typical Fiscal Year

Figure 4.

BATTALION & COMPANY LEVEL ACTIVITIES
- Transitions
- 4-Step Operations
- PPBS
- NCO Counseling Training
- Time Management Training
- Goal Setting Workshops
- Socio-Tech (Force Mod)
- Meeting Management
- In-Briefings (All New BN CDRs)

WIVES ACTIVITIES
- BN CDRs/BN XO Wives Workshop w/CGs Wife
- Day With The Junior Wives (CGs Wife)
- Stress Training
- Working Wives Seminar

BRIGADE ACTIVITIES
- Transitions
- 4-Step Operations
- PPBS
- Off-Site Conferences
- In-Briefings

OUTSIDE INSTALLATION ACTIVITIES
- PMC (Savannah Corps District Engineers)
- OECS FTX Team Sponsorship
- LMDTC Sponsorship

DIVISION ACTIVITIES
- Transitions
- 4-Step Operations
- PPBS
- Off-Site Conferences
- Quick Thrust Controller Survey—Analysis
- In-Briefings
- Input To Company CDRs Course

INSTALLATION ACTIVITIES
- Transitions
- ACS Stress Training
- Off-Site Conferences
- Quality Of Life Survey
- Mayor's Program
- Quality of Life Council
- Smart Team
- Federal Women's Program (Leadership & Stress Workshops)
- 4-Step Operations (Dependent School, DENTAC, Staff Chaplain, DPT)

COMMANDING GENERAL'S PROJECTS
- Company Commander's Workload Assessments 1 & 2
- Assessment of Today's "Victory" Letter
- Study Of The Correlation Of Grade Fill To Unit Effectiveness
- Diagnosis/Assessment Of The "E-4 Slump"
- Focus For The Future (Series) Off-Sites (I, II, & III)
- CTMS Class
- Articles For Publication "Balanced OE Program" "Communications In Command"
- Battalion Commander's Day
- Dial-The-Boss Assessment
- External Consultant Workshop LTC(P) Frank Burns "New Patterns Of Influence"
- Job Book Assessment

The good news for us, as OE Consultants, is that this demonstrated use of OE is communicated throughout the chain-of-command, including not only the Chief of Staff, but also the rest of the CG's immediate subordinates. The higher the realm of influence the client has, the greater the payoffs and the more far-reaching the outcomes of OE assistance.

Total Program

I do not suggest that the OE program at Fort Stewart and Hunter Army Airfield is a "glimpse of the promised land!" For although we focus on balancing our program, we are as susceptible to environmental forces as anyone else (Figure 1). The more formal environmental structures are FORSCOM and the Department of the Army; less formal are OECS and Organizational Development activities. The policies, philosophies, and trends of these outside and larger organizations do, in fact, affect how the total program functions.

All four elements of our program—*individual skills, teamwork, office leadership,* and *command climate*— do overlap to produce a comprehensive, flexible approach to OE. Given a particular situation, any of the four elements may dominate. But our goal is to synchronize all the parts of the system. Balancing the elements is, we believe, the key to building and sustaining a successful OE program. □

Captain Bob Decker was commissioned through ROTC in the Field Artillery in 1973. He earned his Bachelor's Degree in Psychology from North Georgia College. He is a graduate of OBCC 2-81. During his career, Bob has commanded Field Artillery Batteries in both the 82nd Airborne Division and the 2nd Infantry Division. He is currently an OE Consultant with the 24th Infantry Division(M), the Victory Division, at Fort Stewart, Georgia.

Quotes

The mind, once expanded to the dimensions of larger ideas, never returns to its original size.
                                                                    —*Oliver W. Holmes*

If you keep too busy learning the tricks of the trade, you may never learn the trade. —*John Wooden*

Success is never final.
          Failure is never fatal.
                    It's courage that counts. —*Winston Churchill*

Setting The Right Command Climate

Lieutenant Colonel(P) R.L. Sloane

As summer comes to West Point, so comes Cadet Basic Training for some 1,400 new cadets every year. Values are instilled and new skills are taught to these cadets who look to their instructors, leaders and commanders in search of an image of themselves. Paramount to the success of this program is establishing the proper climate for training ... a climate that may well serve as protoype for these new soldiers when the future finds them commanding units of their own. LTC Sloane talks about setting the right climate with OEC help during the summer of '82.

The Class of 1986 came 1,420 strong to Cadet Basic Training (CBT). Waiting for them were more than 600 senior cadets, prepared to bring these new soldiers into the Army, to make them members of the U.S. Military Academy's Corps of Cadets. This would be an important time for the new cadets, and for the seniors who will oversee the entire Corps of Cadets during their final year before commissioning.

As the officer Commander of CBT-82, I knew I must run the new cadets through rigorous training and simultaneously develop our emerging upperclass cadet leaders. To get the job done, trainers and trainees alike would have to share an understanding of what was about to be accomplished, and how to do it.

We already had our mission statement and goals (Figure 1). What we needed now was the right command climate!

Developing The Climate

How should it feel to live and work in a unit such as CBT? This is the question that led me, nine months before CBT-82 began, on a vast literature search and into numerous conversations with young officers, coming from and going to line units, and with Delta Force members at the Army War College. The result was a profile of command climate, as shown in Figure 2.

I was looking for something new—a change from the sure precedents that the training cadre had relied on for past CBTs. It was not enough that every officer, NCO and cadet on the cadre had read the climate profile. It was not enough, even, for me as Commander to take an active personal interest in implementing that climate. It would take a process by which the cadre and new cadets could grasp the climate concepts, buy into the climate, and make a commitment to it.

Enter the Organizational Effectiveness Consultant (OEC) assigned to CBT! Working together, the OEC and I developed the process we needed to make this CBT unique. Before CBT began, the cadre would be trained in the skills necessary to implement the command climate. And once we were on course, appropriate monitoring and control procedures would

Figure 1

Mission and Goals for CBT-82

Mission

To Educate, Train, Equip, and Further the Development of each New Cadet to join the United States Corps of Cadets and enhance the Leadership Development of each member of the upperclass cadre.

Goals

- Develop a high sense of Duty, Honor, and Country in all cadets.
- Create a basic military training experience which is challenging and motivates all cadets toward West Point and a career in the Army.
- Introduce the duty concept as a developmental process unique in the military profession.
- Enhance the internalization of an honor ethic by teaching basic tenets of the Honor Code and System.
- Develop high standards of self-discipline, personal appearance, and military courtesy appropriate for the entry level of the Corps of Cadets.
- Facilitate the development of proper senior/subordinate relationships which are appropriate for today's Army.
- Train in basic military and cadet subjects and develop individual soldier skills.
- Develop a high state of physical fitness.
- Equip all new cadets and be sure they have marked all required items and know how to wear, maintain, and secure all individual equipment.
- Instill a high regard for the traditions of West Point in relation to the Academy's mission of educating and training young men and women for exemplary service to the Nation.

keep us there.

I knew what climate and interpersonal relationships we needed to achieve the CBT I had in mind. My OEC knew how to facilitate teambuilding for the cohesion and motivation we sought in the training cadre. And we both knew it was essential to build teams before the *"how we did it in the past"* patterns started repeating themselves.

Figure 2

Profile of Command Climate CBT-82

All New Cadets are good people.
- They have much to offer.
- They have the potential to make it.

Establish a positive environment.
- Insist on high standards, and help New Cadets meet them.
- Recognize effort as well as achievement.
- Discipline positively and firmly, as a learning experience.
- Help all cadets become all they can be.
- Build on teamwork.

Encourage initiative.
- Strive to do the very best you can.
- Learn from mistakes.
- Guide - Observe - Evaluate; guide is the process we should use.
- Let leaders lead. Delegate and give them space to run their units.

Lead by example.
- Competence is an ethical imperative if we are to make a valid moral claim to authority.
- Cadre must set the example.
- Non-chain-of-command cadre validate the example.

Care for your people.
- Listen to them, and respond.
- Keep them informed. Tell them:
    What they are going to do before they do it.
    What the standards are.
    How to meet the standards.
    Why they are doing it.
    How they did it.
- Help them; be approachable.
- Pace them; watch stress.
- Do not tell stories about "When I was a ..."
- Do not insult, degrade or belittle.

Follow established doctrine, policies, procedures, schedules.
- Plan ahead.
- Be performance-oriented; set goals and work to meet them.
- Establish priorities for all activities.
- Use statistics to manage, not lead.

Take pride and believe in your work.

Be professional.

So, three months before the new cadets arrived, our OEC led five teambuilding and transition sessions (Figure 3). The senior cadets, occupying positions from Regimental Commander to Squad Leader, would attend these sessions along with the assisting Army officers and NCOs from the Academy staff and faculty.

I introduced Session 1 with a detailed explanation of what was involved in establishing the right climate for CBT, and what I expected from the audience of officers and NCOs. Session 2 gave us a chance to talk to those in the same audience who had helped produce CBT in past years. For Session 3, we brought in the primary senior cadets—who would actually be working with the new cadets—to develop relationships between cadet commanders and primary staff before they worked with their subordinates. In Session 4, the Cadet Regimental Commanders explained the climate and their expectations to their cadres. Each detail then participated in teambuilding. And after the cadets had formed team relationships, those cadets who had been in past CBT programs provided Session 5 on transition.

A final session was needed for each of the eight companies as they were formed, to help mold each company into a strong, efficient team. Up to this time, my OEC had been the main facilitator for each session, with assistance from several other local OECs who had been brought in to help. With eight company sessions to run simultaneously, however, it was necessary to rely on those officers and NCOs regularly assigned to each company. My OEC assured me that they were aware of what was needed and would accomplish it.

This entire "climatizing" process worked exceptionally well. Although some participants were skeptical about some aspects of the climate that required specific leadership techniques, nearly everybody understood why we were establishing the climate and were willing to give the process a try.

Teaching Leadership

During the weeks preceding CBT, the Cadet Counseling Center had been developing a leadership workshop to provide specific skills that would help cadets implement the command climate. We knew that we could not possibly teach each cadet how to handle every leadership situation that might be encountered. So, several officers were shown how to train their peers to be able, in turn, to train their cadet cadres.

The cadet cadre from previous years was asked to identify situations that required training in order to be handled properly. Presented in Figure 4 are complete scenarios and a guide for handling each of the five most common situations.

As we went into the final intensive training phase immediately preceding CBT, we spent several days taking our officers and NCOs through the entire leadership workshop and ensuring that they could

Five Common Command Climate Situations

SITUATION 1: Introducing the Squad Leader to the Squad
- Establish a receptive atmosphere.
- Provide the squad with some information about your background, or ask squad members to provide information about their background.
- Tell the squad your expectations of them and show your desire to help each one succeed in CBT.
- Make it clear you have confidence that each will do a good job.

SITUATION 2: Improving Poor Performance
- Establish a receptive atmosphere.
- Carefully define the problem, and focus on it and not the person.
- Ask for his/her help and discuss the person's ideas.
- Agree upon actions to be taken by the person and set a specific followup update.

SITUATION 3: Recognizing Satisfactory Performance
- Establish a receptive atmosphere.
- State clearly why you have asked the individual to report to you.
- State specifically what the individual did which deserves recognition and why.
- Express your personal satisfaction with the performance.
- Explain why it is important to continue in this manner.
- Again, express your appreciation of the person's performance.

SITUATION 4: Counseling a Resignee
- Establish a receptive atmosphere.
- Establish the reason why he/she is being counseled. Listen to the person's point of view.
- Talk about options. Focus on one option and work it through.
- Set a specific date to check back for progress.

SITUATION 5: Resolving Conflict With A Peer
- Establish a receptive atmosphere.
- Briefly tell the individual which situation you are concerned about and why. Focus on consequences, not differences.
- Discuss openly possible suggestions for resolving the conflict in a way that reasonably accommodates each of you.
- Express your appreciation to the other person for listening and discussing the information with you.
- If appropriate, set a specific followup date to evaluate progress.

capably do the same for their cadets. In these workshops, participants first saw a TV tape of cadets in one of the five situations, then they role-played each scenario in small groups. Many were so motivated that they continued to practice on their own.

This final workshop exercise went a long way toward developing confidence and ensuring that we could consistently execute some of the skills critical to sustaining the overall climate.

Monitoring The Climate

Once Cadet Basic Training had begun, we monitored how well the command climate was being executed. I kept an especially close eye on this task, and asked my Deputy and Cadet Regimental Commanders to keep in touch with key officers and cadets. However, this ensured feedback from the chain-of-command but not necessarily the staff and special staff.

To get more diverse and representative feedback, I asked my OEC to establish a weekly session, a *tone meeting*. I ran these meetings which were attended by the Chaplain, coaches, counselors, and several randomly selected officer- and cadet-leaders. Established early as *feedback* sessions, not decision sessions, the meetings served the purpose very well. Furthermore, they addressed the question I had asked as I was establishing the climate profile: *How does it feel to live and work in CBT?*

Forecasting Problems

As we looked forward each week, we were able to forecast situations in which it would be exceptionally difficult for the cadre to use the type of leadership we felt necessary. For example, we knew that after a short time, the new cadets would go through a period of pronounced emotional stress. This would affect their reactions to the cadre markedly.

Before this happened, we brought the cadre together, explained what to expect and why, and emphasized the importance of consistently applying the leadership skills they had learned. In this way, we avoided a number of pitfalls, reduced the stress felt by the cadre, and helped them further refine their skills.

Counseling Peers

Sometimes a new cadet reacted in a way that cadet Squad Leaders had not been trained to handle. The high level of stress felt by the new cadets was far more than most had ever been subjected to, and oftentimes they were as inexperienced in dealing with their own responses as was their immediate chain-of-command. We therefore brought in a specially trained cadet *peer-counselor*, a volunteer hand-picked for the ability to understand difficulties experienced by new cadets and to help work through their problems. The cadet counselor was supervised by two qualified officer counselors. They advised the commander on difficult cases and the need for additional cadre briefings.

Upon entering the seven-week Cadet Basic Training, each new cadet agrees to remain for a least four weeks. Allowed to resign before then are only those who the Commander determines must leave for either their own well-being or for the good of the

Figure 4

The Process of Interaction

TEAMBUILDING	TRANSITION
Session #1 CDR ← XO & CBT Staff / D/CDR & TAC OFF / CSM & TAC NCOs → CDR, D/CDR, XO, CSM, TAC OFF/NCOs & CBT Staff	**Session #2** CBT-81 / CBT-82 CDR ← XO & CBT Staff with XO & CBT Staff / D/CDR, CSM & TAC Teams with D/CDR & TAC Teams
Session #3 CDR ← XO & CBT Staff with RXO & Regt'l Staff / D/CDR & TAC OFF with RCO & CO. CDRS / CSM & TAC NCOs with RCSM & CO. 1SGTs	
Session #4 CBT I RCO ← RXO & Regt'l Staff / RCO & CO. CDRS / RCSM & Co. 1SGTs → RCO, RXO, CO. CDRS, Regt'l Staff, RCSM, CO. 1SGTs CDR - - - - - - - - - - CBT II NCO ← RXO & Regt'l Staff / RCO & CO. CDRS / RCSM & CO. 1SGTs → RCO, RXO, CO. CDRS, Regt'l Staff, RCSM, CO. 1SGTs	**Session #5** CBT I-81 / CBT I-82 NCO ← RXO & Regt'l Staff with RXO & Regt'l Staff / RCO & CO. CDRS with RCO & CO. CDRS / RCSM & CO. 1SGT's with RCSM & CO. 1SGTs CDR - - - - - - - - - - CBT II-81 / CBT II-82 NCO RXO & Regt'l Staff with RXO & Regt'l Staff / RCO & CO. CDRS with RCO & CO. CDRS / RCSM & CO. 1SGTs with RCSM & CO. 1SGTs

Notes:

1. Officers & NCOs will attend sessions 1-3.
2. Cadets will attend sessions 3-5.
3. Individuals will report to the Hall noted for that session at the time given.
4. Uniform is duty or class uniform.
5. Absences should be coordinated with the USCC OEC.
6. Company Team Building session will be held during Cadre Preparation and Training with TAC Teams and Company chains-of-command.
7. The three TAC Officers and the TAC NCO in each company are the company TAC Team.

ABBREVIATIONS:

RCO, RXO, RCSM = Cadet Regimental CDR, XO, CSM

CDR, D/CDR, XO = Officer CDR, Deputy CDR, XO

CBT Staff = Officer/NCO Staff

REGT'L Staff = Cadet Staff

TAC OFF/NCOs = Company Tactical Officers/NCOs

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government. Because we wanted to keep these losses to a minimum, the final assessment of the peer counselor's ability to help a new cadet adjust became critical. In fact, only 15 of the 1,420 new cadets were released early—a credit to both those setting the *climate* and those helping to keep it on track.

Appraising the Process

In recent years, one of the most difficult and critical times in a cadet's initial career is during transition from CBT into the Academic Year Company.

On the first day of Reorganization Week, the entire Corps of Cadets minus the new-cadet class reassembles from various summer training sites around the world. The next day, the new fourth class is marched in from a five-day bivouac to join the Corps. For the first time since arriving at the Academy, they are confronted with a ratio of three upperclass cadets to each new cadet. And neither the second nor third class has had the extensive training that the first, senior class has just been through with CBT. Without very careful supervision, the command climate could change dramatically at this point, providing a markedly different leadership for the new fourth class.

The CBT-82 cadre had established an excellent, supportive environment for their new-cadet subordinates. They had also prepared them well for the adjustments necessary during Reorganization Week. And beyond this, they took it upon themselves to monitor the second and third classes carefully, ensuring that they, too, understood how to establish the right climate in their relationships with their subordinates.

As a result of the care shown for the new cadets, the Class of 1986 made this difficult transition into the Academic Year Company far better than previous classes. They continue to impress the upperclass cadre, and those of us who have watched many such classes, by displaying motivation to excell and the desire to keep going no matter how tough the going gets. Their class motto speakes for itself: *Courage Never Quits - 86!*

The Class of '86 achieved the lowest CBT attrition rate in 12 years, while maintaining consistently high standards. In fact, their yearly attrition rate continues to be exceptionally low. The most telling appraisals of these statistics have come from the cadet cadre, who were often afterward exclaiming, "I didn't think that it would work, but it sure did!" And it worked because the cadre was given the skills and opportunity to set the *right command climate* ... then they made it happen! □

LTC R.L. Sloane recently completed three years as a Regimental Tactical Officer at West Point. Graduating from the Military Academy, he has attended the Army War College, holds an M.S. from the University of Wisconsin and an M.B.A. from Fairleigh Dickinson University. Previous troop assignments include service with the 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry; the 6th Cavalry; an exchange Squadron Commander with the British Army, and command of the 4th Squadron, 12th Cavalry. He is currently on the faculty of the Army War College in the Department of Command, Leadership and Management.

Quotes

It is amazing how much can be accomplished if no one cares who gets the credit. —John Wooden

He hath no leisure who useth it not. —George Herbert

One fifth of the people are against everything all the time. —Robert F. Kennedy

The man who makes no mistakes does not usually make anything. —Bishop W.C. Magee

The less one has to do, the less time one finds to do it in. —Lord Chesterfield

Sources and Resources

Lynn Dixon Herrick
Librarian—USA OECS

This section of the *Communique* highlights a representative sample of resources that can potentially contribute to the understanding and pursuit of excellence in the context of OE consulting. The order of progression is from personal to professional orientation, concluding with material that addresses future considerations.

Personal Excellence

Albrecht, Karl
  EXECUTIVE TUNE-UP: PERSONAL EFFECTIVENESS SKILLS FOR BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL PEOPLE. Prentice-Hall, c1981. Provides a competency-based framework for improving personal effectiveness and creating a positive approach to life and career.

Augsburger, David
  CARING ENOUGH TO CONFRONT. Regal Books, c1981, rev. ed. Suggests a humanistic approach to confrontation, emphasizing self-awareness and win/win outcomes.

Bradshaw, Pete
  THE MANAGEMENT OF SELF-ESTEEM. Prentice-Hall, c1981. Packed with theoretical and practical information of use to anyone interested in enhancing self-esteem.

Buzan, Tony
  USE BOTH SIDES OF YOUR BRAIN. Dutton, c1974. A collection of innovative techniques for expanding mental capacity, including mind-mapping, memory systems, and an organic study method.

Chamberlain, Jonathan M.
  ELIMINATE YOUR SDBs. Brigham Young University Press, c1978. An in-depth treatment of self-defeating behaviors (SDBs): their origins, their purposes, and a process by which they can be replaced with self-enhancing behaviors.

Lakein, Alan
  HOW TO GET CONTROL OF YOUR TIME AND YOUR LIFE. New American Library, c1973. Still an excellent resource for minimizing time wasters and maximizing productivity—*the* handbook for working smarter, not harder.

Richardson, Jerry and Margulis, Joel
  THE MAGIC OF RAPPORT: HOW YOU CAN GAIN PERSONAL POWER IN ANY SITUATION. Harbor, c1981. An easy-reading version of influence strategies commonly associated with neurolinguistic programming.

Professional Excellence

Blanchard, Kenneth and Johnson, Spencer
  THE ONE MINUTE MANAGER. Morrow, c1982. A somewhat deceptively simple book which reinforces three somewhat deceptively simple principles of management.

Block, Peter
  FLAWLESS CONSULTING: A GUIDE TO GETTING YOUR EXPERTISE USED. Learning Concepts, c1978. A practical guide focusing on the specifics of effective consultant behavior in dealing with clients at every phase of the consulting process.

Brown, L. David
  MANAGING CONFLICT AT ORGANIZATIONAL INTERFACES. Addison-Wesley, c1983. Useful information for consultants involved in macro-level change efforts where resistance exists at system or subsystem boundaries.

Cooper, Susan and Heenan, Cathy
  PREPARING, DESIGNING, & LEADING WORKSHOPS: A HUMANISTIC APPROACH. CBI Publishing Co., c1980. A concise, comprehensive manual which details the necessary steps in every phase of producing a successful workshop.

Deal, Terrance E. and Kennedy, Allan A.
  CORPORATE CULTURES: THE RITES AND RITUALS OF CORPORATE LIFE. Addison-Wesley, c1982. An in-depth perspective on the inner values, rites, rituals and heroes that influence an organization's operation at every staff level.

Nadler, Leonard and Nadler, Zeace

THE CONFERENCE BOOK. Gulf, c1977. A detailed "how-to" handbook for designing, planning, staffing and running conferences of 25 or more people.

Pascale, Richard Tanner and Athos, Anthony G.

THE ART OF JAPANESE MANAGEMENT: APPLICATION FOR AMERICAN EXECUTIVES. Simon & Schuster, c1981. A refreshing perspective on the universal attributes of excellent companies, showing that business success is not culturally bound, but practiced in both Japanese and American organizations.

Steele, Fritz

THE ROLE OF THE INTERNAL CONSULTANT: EFFECTIVE ROLE-SHAPING FOR STAFF POSITIONS. CBI, c1982. Explores specific challenges and responsibilities of the internal consultant, emphasizing coping with role conflicts and working within the organizational structure.

Wydro, Kenneth

THINK ON YOUR FEET: THE ART OF THINKING AND SPEAKING UNDER PRESSURE. Prentice-Hall, c1981. A book of insights and suggestions for practicing the "Slight Edge Technique" to think creatively, speak confidently and take command in tight situations.

Future Excellence

Birchall, David and Hammond, Valerie

TOMORROW'S OFFICE TODAY: MANAGING TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE. Wiley, c1981. Offers a framework for planning and implementing effective technological changes in the workplace without undermining staff morale and motivation.

Covvey, H. Dominic and McAlister, Neil Harding

COMPUTER CONSCIOUSNESS: SURVIVING THE AUTOMATED 80s. Addison-Wesley, c1980. A layperson's guide to computer literacy, from coping with new jargon to the practical applications of automation.

Hiltz, Starr Roxanne and Turoff, Murray

THE NETWORK NATION: HUMAN COMMUNICATION VIA COMPUTER. Addison-Wesley, c1978. Examines the potential for using computer-based networks in all aspects of communication and information transfer.

Rothchild, William E.

PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER: A GUIDE TO STRATEGIC THINKING. AMACOM, c1976. Approaches the formulation of strategy as a process of logical exploration and retrieval, emphasizing the need to align strategic thinking with reality.

Williams, Trevor

LEARNING TO MANAGE THE FUTURE: THE PARTICIPATIVE REDESIGN OF SOCIETIES IN TURBULENT TRANSITION. Wiley, c1982. Appraises the basic choices that organizations in Western societies must make to adapt to conditions of change and uncertainty that confront them.

Yankelovich, Daniel

NEW RULES: SEARCHING FOR SELF-FULFILLMENT IN A WORLD TURNED UPSIDE DOWN. Random, c1981. A well-researched synthesis of recent trends which have the potential for great future impact. □

ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS UPDATES

HQDA Updates

HQDA
LTC Lew Flanders
AV: 8-227-3700

Performance Management Army (PMA).

PMA continues to evolve as the way HQDA manages its business. During the period January through April, the goal tenders (3-star) reported the progress made on their respective goals, and objectives to the Army Policy Council (APC). These reports provided the content issues attendant to the goals. On 5 May, the APC reviewed the process which HQDA has been using to manage for the past 8 months. DARCOM, FORSCOM, and TRADOC representatives provided their command's perspective. The resulting action plan will be presented to the APC in early June. Recommended fixes and refinements will be decided upon and implementation will begin soon thereafter. The Total Army Goals Integration Center will play a greater role in the implementation, and the Army consulting team continues to advise the goal tenders regarding the process.

Decrement of 100 OE Spaces.

During the FY 85-89 POM process, the Army Staff identified many programmed and existing resources for decrement. Included in these resource reductions was a "fair share" decrement of 100 OE spaces which was subsequently approved by the SELCOM on 30 March 1983.

Recognizing a commitment to minimize the effect on the directed OE space conversions of 1977, it was decided to decrement those manpower spaces provided by DA. Since the NCO program comprises the majority of the provided spaces, a distribution of 75 NCOs and 25 officers was selected as the best alternative. This decision still allows for a viable NCO program to remain in accordance with CSA guidance. Those commands affected by the decrement have already been notified.

This decrement should in no way be construed as a lack of commitment and support for the OE program by the Army leadership. In fact, the OE decrement is a very small portion of the Total Army decrement which cuts heavily into many other programs.

As the POM preparation is a continuing process, the recent SELCOM decisions could vary before implementation in FY 85. However, we in the OE community need to take a hard look at our program now and insure our projected resources are distributed wisely.

Army of Excellence.

Since the Secretary of the Army announced Excellence as a theme for 1983, we have been working with a 3-star steering group, chaired by the Director of the Army Staff, to develop an operating definition and implementation plan. Excellence has been categorized as individual, unit, leadership, and system. Also agreed upon are various "characteristics" and action areas. The Secretary of the Army will be updated on our efforts 27 May and the Army Policy Council will continue to receive updates and provide guidance.

Review and Action Planning Conference (RAPC).

The program management planning meeting will be held on 23-29 August 1983 at Beckley, W. Va. Recheck your travel plans in August since the date is different from the one announced in the world-wide planning calendar. If you have program management concerns and want them addressed—start preparing the information issues and concerns and forward them to your MACOM OE managers.

Hail and Farewell.

Summertime is rotation time Army-wide. DACS-DME takes this opportunity to *welcome* **Mr. Barry Williams,** civilian consultant from HQ, EUSA,

Korea; **LTC Dave Windom,** senior consultant from HQ, USAREUR, Germany; **MAJ Ray Brownfield,** Multinational Force, Egypt and OE Class 2-83. We also want to say *farewell* and good luck to **COL Theodore Voorhees** to the PACOM IG office; **LTC Bill Landgraf** to Director, Delta Force; **LTC Lew Flanders** to HQ 21st SUPCOM; and to **LTC Al Coke** who will retire.

This office gives a special thank-you and farewell to **COL Bill Golden.** We look forward to seeing you again in the O.D. consulting world. We wish you well in retirement.

To **COL Bob Lander,** we welcome you to your new position. COL Lander assumes the role of Chief, OE Office, Management Directorate. He is well known by the OE community at large and particularly by those in this office since he has been a member of the DA Consultant Team. □

MACOM Roundup

FORSCOM
LTC Walter O. Stowell
AV: 588-3537/3538

Development of FORSCOM Goals and Objectives

The concept plan, published in the last *Communique,* continues to be used as the basis for the development of the FORSCOM Goals and Objectives.

An initial draft of goals and supporting objectives was prepared by chiefs of staff and installation commanders from east of the Mississippi during a three-day workshop in Atlanta. Their results were refined by a similar group in San Francisco in late February, anu supporting tasks were added to give more meaning to the objectives. Additional clarity and measurable criteria were provided during a two-day workshop with selected staff experts in each of the functional areas addressed.

The draft product resulted in seven goals and thirty-four objectives, which were briefed to the Commanding General in March. Before forwarding the draft to field commanders for review and comment, the CG added his emphasis in the training area and supporting tasks were added based on an analysis of the Army plan.

Publication of the approved FORSCOM Goals and Objectives is expected in early July 1983. The implementation guidance will require subordinate commanders to analyze them to determine how they apply to their particular organization. Subordinate commands will be directed to develop their own supporting management plans (purpose, missions, goals, objectives, and action plans) that support the FORSCOM Goals and Objectives.

Future related activities involve using the FORSCOM Goals and Objectives as the planning base for a Performance Management System. This system will link the resource allocation process to priorities and to an information management system.

The process used will be provided to field OECs during two-day workshops in the June-July period at various geographically-centered locations throughout the command. They are designed to emphasize the "how to's" used and to provide examples of the resulting products.

Farewells

SFC(P) Lawrence (Larry) G. Oliver was reassigned to Fort Bragg, North Carolina on 30 May 83. Due to his efforts, OE use by post agencies at Fort McPherson increased ten-fold. His marketing among the engineers, communications activities, and headquarters elements was so aggressive at times we felt like we worked for him. His energy and skills will be greatly missed.

LTC Juan M. Mata, our resident USAR consultant, ended his short tour with us on 12 May 83. His reserve background provided invaluable insight into issues regarding reorganization actions among the CONUSA structure, and his skills gave this office much needed depth. We wish him well on his return to Texas.

TRADOC
MAJ(P) Ken Rice
AV: 680-3312/3316

Changes in top leadership throughout TRADOC this spring and summer portend a period of increased activity for OEC throughout the command. The Commanding General has already signaled a desire to use the OE network to perform assessments throughout the command in support of studies on systemic issues. The incoming Commander at CAC and the new Chief of Staff have long records of use of OE. In short, let's role up our sleeves and go to work. The March teleconference went as scheduled and seemed an improvement over its predecessor. I expect we will continue them and are shooting for the next one in July. We'll get out a message on when. We will also be considering teleconferences as a way to process assessment information.

The office lost **MSG Ike Curry** to the Office of the TRADOC IG. Ike was a solid performer who discharged every task with distinction. He will be missed! His replacement is **SGM Bill Rodden** due in September.

The rest of the office stands firm. **CPT(P) Howie Brosseau** will be principal point of contact in program management matters. **MAJ(P) Ken Rice, MAJ Dan Goodman** and I will concentrate in the consulting sphere. **Dottie Buxton** continues to run

the office from the secretary's chair. She is ably assisted by **Kathy Schultz,** our student aide.

Lastly, on a less auspicious note, most of you are aware that the OE program will experience a cut of 100 spaces in FY85. TRADOC's share of this number is 14 officers and 30 NCOs to be distributed between the Command and OECS. We are planning to spread the TRADOC share across the command and OECS in an equitable manner consistent with the varied missions in TRADOC. The negative PDIP will be communicated by DCSRM in late summer.

WESTCOM
Major James E. Prewitt
AV: 438-1958/2419

New WESTCOM OE Chief

We bid "Aloha!" to our new chief **MAJ James E. ("Ed") Prewitt,** OECC 5-82. He joins us from Ft. Benjamin Harrison where he instructed for the AG Officers' Advanced Course.

**Performance Feedback for
WESTCOM OE Office**

Good things are happening here in Hawaii—**Mr. Robert G. Walls** has received two meritorious service awards for his exemplary work as consultant to the Management System Development Team (MSDT) and participation in the Information System Planning Task Force (ISP). For information about these projects, see our last two "Roundups."

MSG John B. Tantlinger graduated *summa cum laude* with a straight-A grade average from the University of Maryland, receiving a B.S. in Business and Management. **MSG Tantlinger** was promoted to his present rank on 1 Apr 83.

Mrs. Jean Shishido, OE Secretary, recently received her well-deserved two-grade promotion to GS-6. This reflects the major increase in Jean's responsibilities since the office became a MACOM staff element.

Performance Management WESTCOM (PMW)

If you have been following the progress of the WESTCOM Management Development System, you will notice we have changed its name to align with the Army wide Performance Management initiatives.

PMW will establish management links between activities at all levels of the MACOM staff and subordinate commands and provide measurements of the contributions of these activities toward accomplishing WESTCOM and Total Army Goals. Measurement of goal-oriented progress will be made available to decision makers at all levels via the Executive Information System (EIS). The EIS is an ADP system that will be brought on board here at HQ WESTCOM as a result of the Information Systems Planning process. POC are **Mr. Bob Walls** and **MSG John Tantlinger.**

Mahalo Nui Loa (Many Thanks) to OECS

Dr. Jerry Eppler conducted Group Facilitation/Meeting Management Training February 22-25, 1983. This training transferred these skills to members of the Family Liaison Action Group (FLAG), Army Community Service (ACS) Volunteers and the 25th Infantry Division's Leadership and Manangement Development Course (LMDC) Section. The two community action groups will benefit from the training by enhanced problem identification/solving capabilities and the LMDC Section will be using their newly acquired skills to augment the 25th's OE efforts. Thanks OECS (especially you, Jerry)!

Tropic Lightning News

The OE Office of the 25th Infantry Division is currently conducting a comprehensive review and update of the Division's Goals and Objectives which were established six months ago. This review will be followed by a major survey involving all Company Commanders and First Sergeants of the Division, to ascertain their workload level and to determine if they are given sufficient support and resources by the chain-of-command. POC are **CPT Greg Flick** and **CPT John DeFede.**

USFK/EUSA
MAJ Edward L. Williams
AV: 293-3895/6534
Yongsan, Seoul Korea

OE utilization throughout Korea has increased significantly over the last twelve months. Satisfied users, along with dedicated, knowledgeable, professional consultants were largely responsible for this increase.

Ongoing Efforts:
- Command Transitions
- Goal and Objective Setting
- Strategic Planning
- Mission and Role Clarification
- GOQ
- Conference Planning and Design
- OE Command Information Seminars
- Command Climate Assessment

Projected Efforts:
- Work Redesign
- External Consulting Assistance for Quality Circle Program
- Force Modernization

Hails and Farewells:

The welcome mat is out for **MAJ Edward L. Williams** as the Chief Consultant for USFK/EUSA. MAJ Williams is replacing MAJ Rita Csonka. Additional newcomers to Korea include **CPT Glenn Davis** and **CPT Lynn Pierce,** the 2nd Infantry Division at Camp Casey, **CPT Claudia Hunter** and **CPT Al Phillips** to the 19th Support Command in

Taegu, **CPT Anthony (Tony) Dixon** in the 1st Signal Brigade, Yongsan, **CPT Charles Frechette** and **SFC Kenneth LeNoir** to the 501st MI Group, Yongsan and **CPT Mike Zar** to the US Army Garrison, Yongsan.

We bid farewell to **MAJ Rita Csonka.** MAJ Csonka departed 5 June joining the staff at the Equal Opportunity Management Institute, Patrick Air Force Base, Florida. **CPT Dave O'Steen** departed for Fort Gordon, Georgia. **CPT Rosemary Salak,** 2nd Infantry Division, is attending Combined Arms Services Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and then to 7th Inf. Div. Fort Ord, Calif. **CPT Mark Levitt,** U.S. Army Garrison, Yongsan is now on the staff at Northern Kentucky University (ROTC Assignment). **CPT William Paul,** 19th Support command, is now assigned to the National Guard Advisory Bureau in Tacoma, Washington. **MSG Richard Chadwick,** 501st MI Group, is now assigned to 522nd MI Bn. Fort Hood, Texas. A special farewell to **MAJ Brian Mickley;** he has recently been reassigned to West Point. MAJ Mickley, while assigned as Deputy AG Combined Forces Command, provided "OE network" reinforcement and OE consulting assistance to the USFK/EUSA effort.

OE Professional Development Conference

A professional development seminar for all in-country OECs is scheduled to be held in the Seoul area in October.

Help Wanted

Eligible and interested in reutilization? USFK/EUSA is looking for seasoned OECs. Please address all inquires to: HQ USFK/EUSA, J-1, ATTN: AJ-OE, APO SF 96301 or telephone Yongsan 293-3895/6534.

National Guard Bureau
LTC Lee Gragg
AV: 289-1041

The National Guard OE Community continues to hone the focus of activities toward systemic issues and bottom line results.

At Bureau, **Cruz Sedillo** attended a four-day training session on Force Modernization/Intergration in preparation for assisting the New Army Guard Force Modernization Office. Cruz and **Wally Davis** are also working with the assistant to the Chief, NGB for Audits and Investigations on organizational issues. And, Cruz continues to balance himself through active participation in the DCSPER Corporate Fitness Program. Yours truly seems to have been caught up in the conference circuit lately, having played a facilitation role at the NG Leadership Conference, the World-wide Maintentance Conference, the NG Aviation Safety Conference and the DA PMA review.

The Western Regional Center is working with three state Adjutants General in a long term project: provide a transition; return a month later and establish a Performance Management Plan (PMP); let that "gel" and return for a problem solving workshop with key players. They cap the effort during the 4th month with a strategic planning workshop.

Other activities in the west include implementing WEIT at the TAG level in one state; doing multilevel work with TAG level recruiting and retention managers and recruiters to provide a single focus and promote coordination to maximize recruiting resources. They are also working with several state TAG primary staff sections to prodive implementations that are focused on specific results in the field. In the field, they continue to work with Bn and Bde roundout units and are starting to be involved in some Division 86 work. They continue to work with a major medical command across state lines and are starting up an operation with an Aviation Support Facility.

The Central Region has welcomed **MAJ Darrell Putnam,** who has been blessed by OECS and is on board for duty in Little Rock and parts central.

Work activities as reported by **LTC Denny Wampler** include:
The activities have been concentrated around on going projects and Capstone. The benefits derived by the units have been outstanding. They are reporting increased planning with gaining and subordinate commands, supportive training schedules, memorandums of understanding and professional credibility in both gaining and subordinate organizations. We have assembled an information packet on Capstone for Commanders who express interest.

The Central Region has been encouraging the National Guard units going ODT to request OE support while overseas; many units are now doing so. We are working to establish a network with the USAREUR OE community for the handoff of client systems. Our goal is to do as much pre-ODT work with an organization as possible Stateside, then hand over the operation to the USAREUR OE when the unit goes CONUS. This can take place in CAPSTONE, ODT, REFORGER, WINTEX or any other exercise. The implications for success are terrific!

The emphasis being placed on Force Modernization (Integration) and Mobilization activities has also become our priority. The approach will be similar to the Capstone project and we anticipate like benefits received.

The Central Region continues to work with 5th Army, ARMRs and Reserve OECs whenever we have the opportunity. Future application is looking bright for increased mission capabilities and readiness. The challenge of Capstone, Force Integration and Mobilization is presenting unbounded opportunities which we are looking forward too.

Last but not least, the Eastern Regional Center continues to do good work in a number of areas. They are involved in strategic planning in two State Headquarters; are providing retention workshops for a multilevel statewide retention team; and are conducting meeting management workshops for retention teams. Work continues with high priority CAPSTONE units as well as with AMEDD recruiters. Several Bde transitions have been provided and a General Officers Conference on the future direction of Organization and career planning was designed and implemented. As if that were not enough, one third of the Eastern team was involved in the World-wide Maintenance Conference and the Instructor Pilot/Aviation Safety Officer Seminar.

In sum, the NG OE Community is well employed and continuing to do good work in the several states. Keep up the fire.

Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC)
CPT Frank Connor
AV: 289-1741/1168

This update, the first installment submitted by MTMC, will address who we are and where our OECs are located. Subsequent submissions in future *Communiques* will address operations and other items of interest to keep you, the OE community, abreast of what is going on in MTMC OE program. Thanks to **LTC Mierau (DARCOM)** and **MAJ Carmack** (OECS) for the invitation extended to MTMC Chief of Staff, **COL Paul C. Hurley,** to OEMC 2-83 as a guest OE manager. COL Hurley shared his experiences with attendees on the ways and techniques that were useful to him in managing OE programs. Additionally, **COL Floyd B. Mayes** and **GM-14 Roy Andrews,** HQ OE managers, were in attendance at OEMC 2-83.

The following are the names and locations of OECs within MTMC:

Dr. (GS-12) Elyce Pike, MTMC Western Area, MT W-OE, Oakland Army Base, Oakland, CA, 94626. Autovon: 859-2242/2252.

Mr. (GS-12) Archie Ackley, MTMC Eastern Area, MTE-OE, Bayonne, NJ, 07002. Autovon: 242-7187.

CPT Frank Conner, MTMC Headquarters, MT-PEM-OE, Washington, D.C., 20316. Autovon: 289-1741/1168.

OECS Updates

Training Directorate
CH(COL) Marion D. Pember
AV: 929-3519/4021

Class 1-83 graduated 49 students on 29 Apr 83. Class 2-83 went on FTX to the Washington, D.C. area, Ft. Bliss, Texas, and the Defense Language Institute. They are scheduled to graduate on 17 Jun 83.

Class 3-83 started on 9 May 83, with 50 students. At the Navy's request, **Dr. Larry Guido** presented five days of training to the Navy Human Resources Detachment at Whidby Island, Oak Harbor, Washington. He also spent nine days with the Navy Human Resource Management School at NAS Millington, Memphis, Tenn., helping them design their new organizational effectiveness consultant course.

A new faculty member has joined the Directorate since the last publication. He is **SFC Alton W. Shackleford,** coming from Ft. Sill, Okla. and a graduate of Class 3-81.

Leadership and Management Development Trainers Course (LMDTC)

Only two LMDTCs remain for FY83. Dates and locations are:

7-83 Ft. Benning, Georgia	8 Jul - 5 Aug 83
8-83 Ft. Ord, California	26 Aug - 23 Sep 83

The OECS POC for the LMDTC is **MSG Warren Green, AV 929-4021/2889.**

Organizational Effectiveness Managers Course (OEMC)

Fifty-three participants attended OEMC 2-83 held in March in Williamsburg, Va. Highlights included the opening address by **MG Blount,** Chief of Staff, TRADOC, and a presentation by **COL Stratton,** Chief of Staff, TCATA, on a Strategic Management Operation being conducted in his organization by ECD Concepts Directorate, OECS. The course continues to prove valuable to OE program managers as well as key Army leaders (senior commanders, deputy commanders, division and installation CSM and senior DAC).

OEMC 3-83, 6-9 Jun 83, was held in the Washington, D.C. area. The site was changed from the West Coast in an effort to reduce overall travel costs for a majority of projected participants and OEMC faculty and to allow participants to conduct organizational business in the D.C. area during the same trip. OEMC 4-83 scheduled for 26-29 Sep 83 will also be held in the Washington, D.C. area.

For information on the OEMC, contact **MAJ Jim Carmack, AV 929-2889/4021.** For attendance, contact your MACOM OE office.

Concepts Development Directorate
LTC Joe Black
AV: 929-7886/7106

External Consulting Division:

The External Consulting Division (ECD) welcomes **MAJ Dave Leslie** and **MAJ Larry Smith** who came on board in May.

LTC Mario Macaluso departed in July for his new assignment as MILPERCEN OE consultant.

Research:

The Army OE Research Management Committee

held a teleconference in May chaired by **LTC Joe Black.** This committee made final recommendations on the committee charter and reviewed a possible research proposal.

CPT Barko will be leaving OECS on 1 July enroute to CAS[3] and then a one-year postgraduate fellowship in community psychology at William Beaumont Army Medical Center.

CPT Barko is working on the completion of a reference book, *Socio-technical System Design (STS) for Army Organizations.* If anyone is interested in the concepts and practices of STS, please feel free to call **MAJ Bubba Hopkins** or **Dr. Ben Roberts** at **Autovon 929-7108/7106.**

Concepts and Studies:

CPT LeRay has completed writing a chapter on the human dimension of the soldier. In December of 1982 the Combined Arms Center asked OECS to assist them on this chapter which may be included in an FM for Corps and Division commanders. The chapter addresses techniques available for the commander to use in such areas as cohesion, stress, communication and group development to name but a few.

Farewell to **MAJ Mark Olson** and **SFC Wayne Reed.** MAJ Olson is heading for Ft. Bliss to become the OEC for the Air Defense Center. SFC Reed will take up drill sergeant duties at Ft. Benning.

Evaluation Directorate
LTC Tom Forsythe
Av: 929-4574/4312

Hail and Farewell:

The Evaluation Directorate welcomed **CPT Julie Dean,** class 1-83, to its ranks; she is being assigned as Chief, External Division. Also joining the directorate recently was **MSG(P) Mike Manley,** NCO class 2-79, who came to us from the Sergeants Major Academy. He will also be working in the External Division. Recent departees from this directorate were **MAJ Mike Murnane,** who was reassigned to the 7th Infantry Division, and **MSG Rob McFarland** who is now at Letterman Army Hospital in San Francisco. They will be sorely missed, both as the professionals that they are and as good friends.

External Evaluation:

The 1983 external evaluation of OE activity currently is being conducted in DARCOM and Health Service Command. Data collection will be completed by July and the report available to the field in August. Due to travel restrictions, many interviews had to be conducted by telephone. This somewhat unorthodox manner of conducting interviews was greatly facilitated through the generous cooperation of the DARCOM and HSC OECs and interviewees. Their assistance was greatly appreciated.

Operations and Support Directorate
MAJ Patrick B. Longan
AV: 929-2775/3549

FY 84 Schedule of Classes
OECC Class Schedule:

1-84	5 Jan	- 27 Apr 84
2-84	8 Mar	- 29 Jun 84
3-84	3 May	- 24 Aug 84
4-84	12 Jul	- 2 Nov 84
5-84	16 Aug	- 7 Dec 84

OE Manager's Course Schedule*:

1-84	23 Jan	- 26 Jan 84
2-84	12 Mar	- 15 Mar 84
3-84	11 May	- 14 May 84
4-84	10 Sep	- 13 Sep 84

Course Locations Will Be Announced By TRADOC MSG.

LMDTC Course Schedule:

1-84	2 Oct - 28 Oct 83	Fort Ord
2-84	23 Oct - 18 Nov 83	Fort Jackson
3-84	8 Jan - 3 Feb 84	Fort Ord
4-84	25 Mar - 20 Apr 84	Fort Benjamin Harrison
5-84	22 Apr - 18 May 84	Fort Ord
6-84	29 Apr - 25 May 84	Fort Gordon
7-84	3 Jun - 29 Jun 84	Camp Robinson
8-84	17 Jun - 13 Jul 84	Fort Ord
9-84	24 Jun - 14 Jul 84	Fort Rucker
*10-84	19 Aug - 14 Sep 84	TBA
*11-84	9 Sep - 5 Oct 84	TBA

Activities Desiring To Hold Either Class 10-84 Or 11-84 Should Contact MAJ Zanow, AV 680-3804.

Training Developments Directorate
Dr. Mel R. Spehn
AV: 929-7058/6014

The Program of Instruction (POI) for the OE Consultant Course (OECC) was approved in April by TRADOC. POC for copies is SFC(P) Dave Smith, AV 929-7058.

A Management Skills Improvement Course was presented by Training Developments for Fort Ord supervisory personnel. Subjects included management theory, planning, communications, and organization.

LTC Joseph W. Galloway departed TD and OECS in April to take command of the 7th S&T Battalion, Fort Ord, California. **MAJ William E. Hink** assumed duties as Chief, Curriculum Development. **MAJ Larry E. Smith** departed for the External Consulting Division in Concepts Development.

Welcome to **CPT Kenneth C. Robertson, Jr.,** and **CPT John W. Oravis.** Both join us from OECC 1-83 and the Naval Postgraduate School. CPT Robertson will head up the Program Design for TD while CPT Oravis is assigned as a project officer in the Analysis Division. ◻

Organizational Effectiveness Consultant Course

CLASS 1-83
Graduation: 29 April 1983

SGM Andrews, Leon A.
USAFAC
Ft. Sill, OK 73503

SFC Apple, Arnold R.
HHC, 9th Inf Div
Ft. Lewis, WA 98433

CPT Armstrong, Ralph D.
Martin USA Com Hosp
Ft. Benning, GA 31905

MSG Bain, Robert W.
USA Intel School
Ft. Huachuca, AZ 85613

CPT Callahan, James D.
USA Readiness Region
Ft. Dix, NJ 08640

MAJ(P) Carr, Stewart D.
HHC, 9th Inf Div
Ft. Lewis, WA 98433

MAJ Chisa, Earl A.
HQ 35th Sig Bde
Ft. Bragg, NC 28307

MSG Clark, Michael M.
HQ Instal Spt Act, USAMDW
Ft. McNair, Wash D.C. 20315

MSG Coalson, Robert H.
USAG
Ft. Campbell, KY 42223

CPT Cress, Paul D.
HHC SETAF
APO NY 09221

CPT Davis, Glenn W.
Reg & Repl Det MILPERS Ctr
APO SF 96301

CPT Dean, Julia A.
USA OECS
Ft. Ord, CA 93941

GS-12 Dickson, Sally E.
Combined Arms Center
Ft. Leavenworth, KS 66027

GS-11 Estep, Jane B.
OE Office
Ft. Detrick, MD 21701

CPT Frechette, Charles M.
USA Fld Station - Korea
APO SF 96271

MAJ(P) Friedl, Raymond J.
Ft. Ben Harrison W/Duty Sta
Ft. Leavenworth, KS 66027

CPT Gasparovic, Andrew T.
HHC USA SETAF
APO NY 09168

CPT Greene, Lapercell B.
HSC
Ft. Sam Houston, TX 78234

CPT Grimes, William C., Sr.
6th Spt Bn
APO NY 09742

CPT Hahn, Edward R., Jr.
HHC, 4th Trans Co
APO NY 09451

GS-9 Herrick, Lynn D.
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LCDR Issi, Dominick F. III
HRMC
Washington, D.C. 20310

SFC Kelel, Lynn A.
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SSG(P) LeNoir, Kenneth, Jr.
501st MI Gp
APO SF 96301

SFC Lewis, James M.
HQ Co, 2d Tng Bde
Ft. Leonard Wood, MO 65473

CPT Malkemes, Robert J.
5th Adj Gen Repl Det
Ft. Polk, LA 71459

MSG Martin, William
172d Inf Bde
Ft. Richardson, AK 99505

SFC Marvin, Brenda S.
4th Trans Bde
APO NY 09451

GS-11 McConnell, James D.
ACofS G-1, 1st Inf Div (Mech)
Ft. Riley, KS 66442

CPT Oravis, John W.
USA OECS
Ft. Ord, CA 93941

CPT Phillips, Alvin K.
RRD, MILPERCEN-K
APO SF 96301

CPT Pierce, Lynn M.
MILPERCEN-K
APO SF 96301

MAJ Putman, Darrell E.
HQ MD ARNG, 5th Reg Armory
Baltimore, MD 21201

MSG Reilly, Francis J., Jr.
USMCA Wiesbaden
APO NY 09457

CPT Robertson, Kenneth C., Jr.
USA OECS
Ft. Ord, CA 93941

SFC(P) Simon, Harold F.M.
USASCFG
Ft. Gordon, GA 30905

MSG Smith, Manuel G.
3d ROTC Region
Ft. Riley, KS 66442

SSG Soto, Frederick E.
USATC and Ft. Dix (W1DCAA)
Ft. Dix, NJ 08640

SFC Stanley, William D.
Co C, USAARMC
Ft. Knox, KY 40121

CPT Stephens, Ivan J. II
USA Artillery Ctr & Ft. Sill
Ft. Sill, OK 73503

CPT Turner, Ed S. III
HQ 4th Inf Div
Ft. Carson, CO 80913

CPT Verde, Leslie H.
HQ USAG
Ft. Meade, MD 20755

SFC Whitaker, Adrion R.
USA Logistics Mgt Ctr
Ft. Lee, VA 23801

CPT Wiley, Willie J.
193d Inf Bde
APO Miami 34006

CPT Williams, Herman K.
502d AG Co, 2d Armored Div
Ft. Hood, TX 76546

SFC Williams, Jemmie
HHC 4th Bde, 4th Inf Div
APO NY 09358

SFC Wilson, Keith G.
2d S&F Co, 2d Bn TS Bde
Ft. Eustis, VA 23604

SFC(P) Young, Richard A.
56th FA Bde
APO NY 09281