Volume 9, Number 1, 1985

ARMY ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS JOURNAL



A MORE EFFECTIVE ARMY

Volume 9, Number 1, 1985 ARMY ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS JOURNAL

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
Organizational Effectiveness Center and School
Fort Ord, California

Army Organizational Effectiveness Journal

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The *Army Organizational Effectiveness Journal* (ISSN 8750-9431) is published quarterly to provide state-of-the-art information on the application of organizational effectiveness in Army units and organizations. Funds for printing of this publication were approved by Headquarters, Department of the Army, on April 4, 1980, in accordance with provisions of AR 310-1. Correspondence can be directed to the Organizational Effectiveness Center and School; ATTN: *Army OE Journal;* Fort Ord, California 93941-7300. Telephone (408) 242-7058/6014, AUTOVON 929-7058/6014. The views and opinions expressed herein do not reflect official policy or endorsement by any agency of the US Army. The use of masculine pronouns in this publication is intended to include both masculine and feminine genders unless otherwise stated.

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From the Editor...

With this, the final edition of the *Army Organizational Effectiveness Journal,* I want to thank the readers and contributors for their interest in and support of the magazine.

The purpose of the magazine has remained steadfast over the years—to provide state-of-the-art information on the application of organizational effectiveness skills and technology in units and organizations throughout the Army.

Although this magazine will no longer be published, there are other periodicals available in local libraries that address topics related to organizational effectiveness. Information about some of these periodicals is described below:

The OD Practitioner (Quarterly)
1011 Park Avenue
Plainfield, N.J. 07060
Tel: 201-561-8677

LOE Journal (Semiannually)
Leadership and Organizational Effectiveness School
Naval Air Station Memphis (96)
Millington, Tenn. 38054-5063
Autovon 966-5211/5155

Organizational Dynamics (Quarterly)
American Management Association (AMA)
135 West 50th Street
New York, N.Y. 10021
Tel: 212-586-8100

Training and Development Journal (Monthly)
American Society for Training and Development (ASTD)
1630 Duke Street, P.O. Box 1443
Alexandria, Va. 22313
Tel: 703-683-8100

Training: The Magazine of Human Resources Development (Monthly)
Lakewood Publications, Inc.
50 South Ninth Street
Minneapolis, Minn. 55402
Tel: 612-333-0471

Again, thank you for your contributions. I hope the *Journal* has helped you perform your jobs in a more effective manner.

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

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

Commandant's Comments

by
Colonel Donald K. Griffin

U.S. ARMY ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS CENTER AND SCHOOL

This is the 27th edition of the *Journal*, and the last. Our first issue was published in December 1977. Since then, our distribution has grown to over 4,000, including all Army general officers; the military services of 14 foreign countries; 3 foreign embassies; about 150 major corporations and colleges; a dozen government agencies, including 4 cabinet members; and the Library of Congress.

In the previous issue of this *Journal*, I wrote on the subject "OE: A Historical Perspective." As I wrote those words, I did not realize how appropriate the topic was. As many of you know, the Army has made a decision to terminate Organizational Effectiveness (OE) as a separately funded program in order to move scarce human resources to other endeavors.

Before the decision to eliminate this program, it was my intent to describe in this issue the maturing of OE as it has been expanding to stay abreast of the leadership demands of our Army. I planned to illustrate how the growth of OE from the interpersonal skills to organizational skills and to systemic skills is congruent with an expanding, modern definition of leadership which recognizes these same three dimensions.

That was my intent. Instead, I will simply let this last issue of the *Army Organizational Effectiveness Journal* be illustrative. It is a representative sampling of the many excellent contributions we receive from people who are committed to the quest of maximizing the performance of the valuable human resources we have in our Army. The variety and the scope of these articles are also an appropriate illustration of how OE has developed over its 10-year history in the Army. You will find here relevance to both our active and reserve components, scholarly academic pieces and down-to-earth applications, ideas that will work in small units and concepts that are important to large human systems, and motivational techniques and ways to solve complex cross-functional problems.

I am confident that you will find this issue intellectually stimulating and useful in the practical issues that confront you each day in our Army. □

Leading—A Commentary

by Army Chief Of Staff General John A. Wickham, Jr.

"Of a great leader...when his work is done...they will all say, we did this ourselves."

(Author: Lao-Tzu, 6th Century B.C.)

Leaders are made, not born. They are made by a life-long study of history, of the influence of leaders on it, and by absorbing the real-life teaching of role model leaders. Leaders are made by the day-to-day practice and fine tuning of leadership talents because leading is an art, as well as a science, and best developed by application. Leaders are made by the steady acquisition of professional knowledge and by the development of 24-karat character during the course of a career. These traits foster inner strength, self-confidence, and the capacity to inspire by examples of professional, as well as personal, excellence. Gen. Maxwell Taylor once wrote:

"Even with the gifts of human understanding and of professional competence arising from careful training, our military leader will not be complete without the third attribute of greatness: namely, character—character which reflects inner strength and justified confidence in oneself."

Our commission as officers reflects the truth that leaders are made rather than born because of the responsibilities and values called for in the commission. The commission says that special

trust and confidence is reposed in each of us. We have an extraordinary responsibility to fulfill when we consider the human and material resources and the security missions which are entrusted to us.

The commission also calls for valor, patriotism, fidelity, and abilities in fulfilling the responsibilities of being an officer. Clearly, ability relates to professional knowledge and the teaching, as well as the training, of our soldiers and officers. Valor, patriotism, and fidelity all are tied to the development of character, leadership by example, and selfless service.

As I travel around the Army, I make a point of speaking with assembled groups of leaders. Also, I make the effort every month to talk with all of the new battalion and brigade commanders going through the pre-command course at Fort Leavenworth, Kan. In addition to covering matters of interest about the Army, I talk with them specifically about leadership because it seems important to teach what I can about leading and try to convey by example the elements of sincerity and conviction. I tell all of these officers that, in my opinion, the most important legacy any of us can leave to the Army lies in the teaching of excellence to those entrusted to our care.

Only by teaching can we truly prepare soldiers to be successful and to survive in combat. Only by teaching can we make the Army better across-the-board. By teaching, I am talking about "footlocker counseling" which means that, for example, battalion commanders should counsel each of their officers individually several times a year. The counseling should cover observations about the officer's performance, but more importantly, it should convey to the younger officer the experience, the values, and the historical knowledge of the senior.

I also believe that such "footlocker" teaching should take place in the Noncommissioned Officers Corps, with the senior NCOs taking a direct hand in the professional and personal upbringing of junior NCOs. Gen. Omar Bradley once said that the greatest leader in the world could never win a battle unless he understood the man he had to lead. Understanding of the men and women we lead is tied up with face-to-face teaching.

The professional knowledge of leaders is essential to sound teaching and to improving the proficiency, as well as readiness, of units. Quality training and maintaining cannot be done without solid professional knowledge of responsible leaders. Professional knowledge, to be sure, comes from day-to-day experience on the job. But a great military historian, Dr. Douglas Southall Freeman, who wrote "Lee's Lieutenants," once said that the difference between a career and a job is the difference between 60 and 40 hours a week. The numbers are not that important, but the difference in terms of extra effort is. The professional knowledge that is required by us must be achieved by self-study over the years and, of course, by schooling. This includes the reading of military history, biographies, and autobiographies of leaders, both military and civilian. It also means self-analysis of personal military experiences so that we can benefit from lessons learned and strive for self-improvement.

The character of leaders is clearly of great importance in inspiring those who follow. Gen. Creighton Abrams used to say that "the higher one goes up the flagpole, the more the tail hangs out for all to see." Gen. George Patton wrote on D day that "officers are on parade 24 hours a day." These quotes suggest that we lead by example and, therefore, the better the example, the better the leadership. Of course, fear of a tyrannical leader does motivate people, but not as much as respect and admiration for an inspirational leader who brings forth the inner strength of men and women who must face great challenges and possible sacrifice. One does not develop character in the heat of battle or a moment of crisis. Character grows out of the steady application of moral values and ethical behavior in one's life.

Units that have quality leaders, both commissioned and noncommissioned, will be units with a strong bonding between leaders and the led. They will be units that sustain readiness and morale. They will be units with a high potential for success in battle and with lower casualties than less well-led units. Experience of wars past demonstrates this truth. Such units will have a command climate where those who are led feel that they can grow because they are part of a learning opportunity and mistakes in learning are tolerated in order to capitalize on the great potential of soldiers.

There is much written about leadership and much for all of us to study and learn. One quote in particular seems to summarize the essence of leadership. After World War II, Gen. Bradley wrote:

> *"Leadership in a democratic Army means firmness, not harshness; understanding, not weakness; justice, not license; humaneness, not intolerance; generosity, not selfishness; pride, not egotism."* □

Implementation of the Leadership Goal: A Summary

This article is an assessment of progress in implementing the Army's Leadership Goal in III Corps at Fort Hood, Texas.



by Colonel (Retired) Dandridge M. Malone

In late 1981, the Army Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Army approved and published the list of the total Army's seven goals. That list is the official "purposing mechanism" of the US Army. The third entry on that list is the Army's Leadership Goal—"a total Army whose leaders at all levels possess the highest ethical and professional standards committed to mission accomplishment and the well-being of subordinates."

In an organization in which the ultimate purpose is to fight and win the land battle, the Leadership Goal will be realized when it produces the type of leadership required by the Army's fundamental fighting doctrine. That fundamental fighting doctrine, represented in its essence by FM 100-5, *Operations*, lays out the criteria for the kind of leadership needed to fight and win the land battle. The criteria are inherent in certain terms and phrases extracted from US Army fighting doctrine:

- "Subordinate leaders are to be given freedom and responsibility..."
- "Initiative..."
- "Independence of action..."
- "Mission-type orders will be required at every echelon of command..."
- "Improvisation..."
- "Risk-taking and an atmosphere that supports it..."
- "Quick-minded and flexible..."
- "Imagination, audacity, and willingness to take the risk..."
- "Resolute and independent..."
- "Refuse to permit the battle to be decided by automatic and guaranteed processes that inevitably work their way to a given conclusion..."
- "As battles become more complex and unpredictable, decision making must become more and more decentralized..."

- "Risks must be taken independently by all leaders..."
- "Commanders must trust their subordinates' ability to make on-the-spot decisions..."



Given the nature of the future battlefield envisioned by Army fighting doctrine, the conditions under which these criteria apply are those of the "distributed battlefield" where 1000 leaders scattered across 1000 hills must be prepared to make critical combat decisions on their own, doing what they think is right and basing that on what they perceive is the *intent* of their commander. These will be the leaders of the air-land battle. They are not generals. On the distributed battlefield, out on those 1000 hills, they are small-unit leaders—captains, lieutenants, and sergeants.

In late spring 1982, the Army Chief of Staff directed the commanding general, III Corps, Fort Hood, Texas, to consider his organization a "leadership test bed"—a real-world, living laboratory for practical implementation of the Leadership Goal in such a way as to produce the kind of leader required by the air-land battle.

Some time after that, the commanding general met for several days with the top handful of III Corps senior leaders to teach, explain, and discuss his command philosophy and the fundamental assumption that would drive not just the implementation of the Leadership Goal, but also "the normal way we will do business" at Fort Hood: "If we build a climate which is rational and supportive, if we clearly state priorities and standards, and if we give authority commensurate with responsibility, the organization will grow in productivity."

In October 1982, the Corps staff and major subordinate commands (about 150 officers, NCOs, and civilians) met at a 3-day conference at North Fort Hood and laid the groundwork for putting the above assumption to work. Within several months and with the increasing involvement of subordinates at all levels and across all functional areas, certain principles governing "how we do things" began to evolve. Initially they were not written down, but they were understood, explained, taught, and applied.

Build a Climate Wherein Leaders Can Lead. In general terms, staffs worked to build a climate directly supportive of the efforts of the chain of command, and the chain of command focused on the development of subordinate leaders, aiming ultimately toward the criteria of the air-land battle leader.

In practical terms, "climate" is the sum total of what an experienced soldier feels or senses when he goes into a new unit, listens and looks around awhile, and then judges whether the unit is worth a damn, can do its job, and will take care of its people. In scientific terms, climate within an organization is determined by the interaction of several scientifically derived and measurable factors that determine "how the organization runs" internally: leadership, motivation, communication, decision making, goals and objectives, and control.

In the simplest sense, development of subordinate leaders who can meet the criteria of the air-land battle depends on teaching them how to *lead* and, at the same time, on making a concerted effort to "get the system off their backs" so they have the opportunity to do what they've been taught and to be what they can be. In essence, the III Corps operational concept for the development of subordinate leaders required the "leader-teacher" to *do* (not talk about) four things:

- Clarify goals and standards.
- Demonstrate trust in his subordinates.
- Instill a sense of responsibility and back it up with matching authority.
- Achieve desired results.

The chain of command called this "power down" leadership—empowering subordinate leaders more and more, over time, to the point where they could demonstrate and the leader-teacher could see things, such as "imagination, audacity, and willingness to take the risk." (A review of the air-land battle leader criteria noted earlier shows that in order to do what they must do and to be what they must be, leaders at the small-unit level must have power, hence the term "power down.")

Work to Ensure Consistency, Congruency, and Simplicity in Communication Flow Throughout III Corps. In essence, this principle required that from the climate and overall environment at Fort Hood there had to come "a thousand messages," all saying that the information flowing downward through the chain of command was *right*. The inspector general, for example, had to carefully align his inspection emphasis with the top priorities (training, maintenance, and leadership) flowing down through the chain of command. Chiefs of staff, staff chiefs, and anyone writing directives, policies, memoranda, or miscellaneous material for subordinate echelons began to test the content, format, and style of the communication against five criteria:

- Is it consistent with "empowering leaders"?
- Is it consistent with "command trust"?
- Are there any reply-by-endorsement threats or implications?
- Does it acknowledge that only commanders will decide what "commanders will do"?
- Is it reasonable and rational?

Integrate "Implementation of the Army's Leadership Goal" Mission into Normal Daily Activities. No special programs, buzzwords, slogans, bumper stickers, study groups, and staff offices were formed. For certain, becoming the Army's leadership test bed and implementing the Army's Leadership Goal required much effort and much energy on the part of many people. However, except perhaps for the initial start-up period, the task required virtually no *extra* effort and energy. Quite surely, the effort and energy required *already existed* within the organization and were "freed up" more and more for *leaders* to use as the first and second principles began to have their effect. They were freed up as more and more leaders began to demonstrate "imagination, audacity, and willingness to take the risk with regard to questioning, challenging, revising, eliminating, and reducing the energy-consuming characteristics of various main components of "the system." These characteristics include the following:

- Regulations
- Rules
- Requirements
- Dictates
- Standing operating procedures
- Precedents
- Traditions
- Practices
- Step-by-step sequences
- Procedures
- Reports
- Replies by endorsement
- Statistical criteria
- Prescriptions
- Proscriptions
- Checklists
- Meetings
- Telephone calls

The application of the three principles (and the derivation of several more) continued over the next two years through follow-on conferences, teaching, tasking, and planned integration of effort, both vertically and horizontally. There was no public relations push or "hype" about implementing the leadership goal. A simple and straightforward report of progress was published in November 1983, and at each major conference, members of the Army leadership community from all over the Army were invited to attend. They were invited, additionally, to go out and look, unannounced, at any aspect of the leadership base implementation effort.

On February 1, 1984, senior leaders and staff from III Corps and major subordinate commands participated in a conference on the concept of measurement, i.e., what we measure and why. That conference was the essence of all the "how to's" of implementing the Army Leadership Goal.

The essence of that conference was a single page (both sides) written by the commanding general, III Corps (Figure 1). It is significant within the context of a 3-year effort by 40,000 people. In one sense, it is the essence of all that effort; it is the formula for mixing leadership and management. It is, on a single page, the "how to" for implementing the Army's Leadership Goal.



Figure 1

Considerations in Measuring Productivity, Efficiency, and Effectiveness in Certain Military Organizations

General

- Measuring things accurately and reliably is both an art and a science.
- Measurement techniques themselves have a powerful influence on operations and are *de facto* promulgators of priority.
- Measurement techniques have enormous impact on the command climate and are closely related to concepts of mutual trust and to expectations regarding competence.
- Measurement techniques and the production of associated statistics can generate both useful insights and dysfunctional side effects.
- The commander's skill in measuring things is a major component of his effectiveness as a manager and his reputation as a credible leader.
- Measurement techniques and systems are closely related to communications within the organization, particularly to feedback concepts.
- Inappropriate or poorly designed measurement systems are major sources of leader frustration and ethical dilemmas in our Army. (This has been true for many years.)
- Measurement techniques can be used to educate, motivate, sensitize, or act as a deterrent.

Basic Purposes of Measurement

- The first step in designing a system to measure something within an organization is to define clearly the purposes of the measurement.
- Purposes vary, but most fall into one of these categories:
  - To evaluate *overall progress* toward one or more organizational goals, for example, an emergency deployment readiness exercise.
  - To evaluate the *efficiency* of a system, for example, late efficiency reports.
  - To evaluate the *effectiveness* of a system, for example, tank gunnery scores.
  - To *compare* the relative efficiency or effectiveness of one segment of an organization with other segments, for example, the standard installation division system's timeliness rates of comparable units.
  - To compare the *behavior of individuals* in the organization with prescribed standards, for example, physical training test scores.
  - To evaluate the adequacy of *systems supporting* the organization, for example, central issue facility lines at zero balance.

Costs Associated with Measurement

- Any decision to measure something should assess thoroughly the associated costs, both short- and long-term, direct and indirect.
- Objective costs include manpower to design, administer, collect, display, and report the data; machine data processing time; and expenses for communicating the data or analysis to interested parties.
- Subjective costs include possible confusion regarding organizational priorities and philosophies; misperceptions regarding trust and decentralization; fears regarding unfair or irrational use of collected data; and inordinate expenditure of energy in collecting, refining, and manipulating the data.

Some Parameters of Measurement

- Interval, for example, daily or quarterly.
- Duration, for example, one year or forever.
- Level at which consolidated, for example, individual, unit, or battalion.
- Obtrusiveness, for example, electronic counter of autos or IG team.
- Source of data, for example, direct, files, or recollection.
- Method of collection, for example, reports, computer, or oral.
- Visibility of data at various levels.
- Confidentiality or exclusivity of data at various levels.
- Costs of collection.

Types of Measurement

- Direct observation of process or system (receipt processing time).
- Direct observation of outcome (M16 score).
- Subjective evaluation by individual (morale of my unit).
- Subjective evaluation by groups (ARTEP evaluation).
- Indirect or inferential messages (graffiti).
- Self-evaluation (OER support form).
- Perception (questionnaire).

Basic Characteristics of Data in Measurement

- Accuracy—short- and long-term.
- Reliability—short- and long-term.
- Misinterpretation potential.
- Threat or misuse potential.
- Bloat (unplanned growth) potential.
- Perishability.
- Relevance or utility to other organizations.
- Improper manipulation potential.

On September 12, 1984, the senior leaders and staff met again for a 1-day conference. The 150 people in the room, however, were not the same "senior leaders and staff" who had begun the effort some two and a half years before. The III Corps commanding general was there, but when he asked for a show of hands of how many had been present when the implementation effort first began, less than one third raised their hands. That was why the conference was held. It was designed specifically to meet the challenge posed by personnel turnover. It was part of a carefully designed transition plan done as part of the regular way of doing business to ensure that the new division commanders, brigade commanders, and staff officers knew why it was that the "feel" of III Corps was *right*. Progress in implementing the leadership goal continued, and, as of this date, the focus is on sustaining the best of what has been done, on transitioning in the new leaders and staff, and on beginning an all-out effort to make those air-land battle leader criteria appear throughout III Corps at the small-unit level.

The final question to be answered relates to assessing the effectiveness of the Fort Hood effort.

Leadership lies in the domain of affect and is thus not as readily "measurable" as specific skills or specific physical things. You can go to Fort Hood and just listen, watch, and get the "feel" of the place, like an old soldier would do. It would feel right. Or you can go and just hang around and listen to talk in the dining facilities or motor pool. If you're listening to leaders, what you will hear pretty soon is "I wish the whole Army were like this." Or you can look at the many different surveys that are used freely and naturally and with no excuses throughout III Corps by the chain of command and the staffs. Or you can round up the branch chiefs from the Military Personnel Center who come quarterly to Fort Hood to talk with their officers and ask them what their folks are telling them about Fort Hood as a place to learn and lead and live. Or combat readiness-wise and whole organization-wise, you can look at the historically best performance by III Corps on the last REFORGER exercise. If these "intangible and intuitive" measures aren't enough to assess whether or not the implementation is effective, then some research and hard data are available.

The fundamental assumption that has driven the implementation effort was stated earlier: "If we can build a climate wherein leaders can lead, the organization will grow in productivity"—climate, leadership, and productivity. There are research findings, not part of the Fort Hood effort and done by "outsiders," which can serve as an objective basis for assessing how well the climate-leadership-productivity hypothesis above has worked.

"If We Can Build a Climate..." In spring 1984, a research team from the US Army War College (USAWC) administered a carefully designed survey to a stratified random sample of about 300 Army officers. The research team was assessing the current state of military professionalism in the Army, operationally defining that term with 35 factors relating to moral/ethical values, professional competence, leadership, decision making, and similar "professionalism" factors. The research project director, knowing of Fort Hood's leadership test-bed mission, had the same survey administered to a 129-man stratified random sample of officers at Fort Hood.

On June 21, 1984, the US Army-Fort Hood comparison rattled out of the USAWC computer. Of the 35 factors of the climate of military professionalism as assessed by Army leaders, Fort Hood stood higher than the US Army average on 33. On 14 of these factors, the difference was statistically significant at the .05 level or higher. A review of these 14 factors indicates the salient characteristics of the climate at Fort Hood built through the integrated effort of the chain of command, NCO support channel, and staffs. These climate factors are the things leaders see happening around them:

- Being loyal to the organization
- Being responsible to the organization
- Keeping superiors and subordinates informed
- Encouraging ideas from subordinates
- Setting moral standards
- Giving explanations
- Being concerned with military appearance
- Subordinating personal interest
- Taking responsibility for one's own actions
- Evaluating subordinates' work
- Assisting subordinates
- Setting good examples
- Applying non-biased judgment
- Assuming responsibility for property and materiel

"Wherein Leaders Can Lead..." Whether the climate just described is one wherein leaders can lead can best be determined logically by leaders who lead within the context of that climate. Again, there is evidence, which is empirical and which was done by "outsiders," that describes what it's like to lead in the climate just discussed.

Figure 2

Attributes of Combat Units of Excellence

Leadership by Example

Command sergeant major: "His style is to be more persuasive, but he can also be directive. He basically tells you what to do and lets you do your job, but he can take charge if the situation necessitates. He spends a lot of time out with the commanders or in the motor pool. He does everything everyone else does in the battalion..."

Company commander: "The lieutenant colonel's style is to give me the mission, then let me go. He is not a micromanager. He is very good at giving us the commander's intent before the operation. He gives us a 'bottom line,' for example, 'My intention is to take the hill.' He keeps it clear and simple for us. He gets up in front of the troops often. 'Esprit' is based upon our excellent performance. We're professional. We're not into the eyewash stuff, but the quality of training..."

Focus on Combat: a Shared Value

First sergeant: "We don't put on dog and pony shows—just realistic, demanding, and innovative training..."

First sergeant: "Both the command and NCO channels of communication work. We give 'power down' to the platoon sergeants, who pass it to the tank commanders, and then to the soldiers. We plan in advance and stick to our training schedules. But most importantly, we practice to go to war and survive..."

Battalion S3: "What we do around here is prepare to go to war. The things that don't really matter take a backseat. We examine requirements when they come down. Is it important? Does it help us go to war? We meet and discuss such things during our training meetings once a week..."

Power Down

Battalion commander: " 'Power down' means decentralization. There are too many tasks for one man. I give subordinates mission orders and resources and let them do it. We have freedom to make mistakes here..."

First sergeant: "There's a whole lot of leadership in this outfit. They let the NCOs do NCO business. They have 'power down' here. They let us do that. I was shocked when I first got here. I thought it was relaxed, but it's really not. It's just that they're not standing over you..."

First sergeant: "I'm the first sergeant and I'm doing the training schedule. That's an example of 'power down.' It works in C Company. There are two views by the NCOs: We don't make enough (money); let the officers do it. The other view is that we want to run the battalion. This one works and it's effective. It works if you've got the consent of everyone above you. We have the confidence and trust of the company commander. There will be mistakes made, but there's no anvil over our heads..."

Strong Unit Identity

Battalion commander: "I don't want personal loyalty. I want loyalty to the battalion..."

Platoon sergeant: "People are begging to come here because we are the best armor battalion in the Army. We spend a lot of time training, but we love it..."

Battalion command sergeant major: "Our command climate surveys came back and we only had 4 questions below the average (out of 51). The attitude around here is to be positive and to be flexible..."

Caring with a Capital C

Tanker: "We get monthly counseling statements that let us know how we're doing. That's a big push around here..."

First sergeant: "We believe in professional development; we send NCOs to schools for the long-term gain..."

First sergeant: "We have a good sponsorship program. For example, the command sergeant major personally met me at the replacement battalion and introduced me to all other first sergeants. He also helped me get my feet on the ground. All first sergeants cooperate—no one cuts another's throat. On REFORGER, C and A Company first sergeants shared fuel trucks because one broke down. That doesn't happen everywhere..."

High Standards of Discipline

Company commander: "The peer pressure is unbelievable around here..."

First sergeant: "We have only average NCOs. It's the 'power down' that's the key. The NCOs either perform or are identified and go away. Now, I can afford to be tough on people. And when the soldiers see the discipline in the company, they see it! The message gets across..."

First sergeant: "He's tough on discipline—hard but fair. He's out a lot; he's visible. He's not a desk commander. He told the commanders he's not getting involved in the annual general inspection (AGI). That makes us more committed to doing well. There's a good command climate here. Commanders can make decisions and act on their own..."

Teamwork, a Way of Life

Company commander: "The colonel stresses teamwork. He doesn't reinforce competition. Company commanders share ideas about key events like the AGI, gunnery, and field problems. We don't have a high company award for gunner. I don't measure platoons against one another..."

Platoon leader: "How do we keep it going? The information network is good. Everybody understands what they're doing. There's a lot of informal communication. Our relationship with the company commanders is that of a team, not commander-subordinate. We work as a team. It's easier to support something once we've had our say in it. The lieutenant colonel's philosophy is to let the soldiers, the people at the lowest level, have a say in how you do things..."

Platoon leader: "There's a great camaraderie and friendship here. It's loose, but not too loose. Somebody really cares. You need to treat people professionally, value their opinions, and you'll get higher quality work..."

Consistent Excellent Performance

Battalion S3: "This really is the best unit I've ever been in, including Germany. We were down for awhile, but we're doing better now. We're getting better all the time. It's fun now..."

Platoon sergeant: "I've been in eight battalions, and this is the best one yet, especially during the last year and a half. What we stress is that what we do in training is what we'll do in combat..."

Figure 3

Justification Statement

Successes within the specific criteria provided for the Commander-in-Chief's Award for Installation Excellence are addressed under Fort Hood's four major goals:

- To prepare soldiers, leaders, and organizations for prompt deployment and successful sustained combat.
- To select, train, and motivate leaders for today and tomorrow.
- To provide a healthy, supportive, friendly, and efficient community for soldiers, their families, and the civilian work force.
- To plan adequately for transition to wartime mobilization and for the effective incorporation of reserve component elements into III Corps and Fort Hood operations.

The first goal, the cornerstone of **mission accomplishment,** includes those specifics, along with efficient management of resources, that produce the climate conducive to the physical, mental, and spiritual readiness of soldiers and leaders to deploy, fight, and win anywhere in the world:

- Fielded successfully 54 new tactical systems at a cost of nearly $1 billion and conducted over 20 percent of all Army and 50 percent of all FORSCOM new equipment field testing, including the M1 tank, remotely piloted vehicle, and the multiple launch rocket system.
- Reduced the number of soldiers performing individual installation support (special duty) missions to 187, the lowest number in Fort Hood history, culminating in 465 soldiers (the equivalent of a combat battalion) returning to their parent units for training.
- Saved $2.4 million in FY 84 by using heavy equipment transports to carry tracked vehicles to training locations.

The second goal, which has attracted Armywide interest because of its success in enhancing **junior leaders' creative participation** in all aspects of training and readiness, led to the institutionalization of many practical techniques necessary for building habits that will produce battlefield success. (National Training Center, REFORGER, Sinai, and Honduran operations are solid indicators of results.) Some of the techniques include the following:

- Provided, through publication of the III Corps Commanders Handbook, an articulation of the rationale that is the bedrock for local leadership practices.
- Enhanced the confidence and "battleproofing" of combat vehicle crews with a program to provide emergency medical training to selected crewmen—identified as "unit lifesavers."
- Attained a level of professional satisfaction among officers significantly higher than the Army average as shown by Army War College study results.

The third goal reflects Fort Hood's commitment to the reality that mission accomplishment is best achieved by soldiers, leaders, and civilian employees working and living in a **healthy, supportive, safe, friendly, and efficient community of families.** This goal encompasses programs and achievements that include the following:

- Expanded the electoral mayoral system for on-post housing areas as an effective method for communications and problem identification and solving. "Helping Hand," "Neighborhood Crime Watch," and other programs created an atmosphere of mutual concern and cooperation among soldiers, their families, and the installation that resulted in a 20 percent reduction in larcenies, a 46 percent reduction in drug-related crimes, and a 29 percent reduction in violent crimes.
- Recognized as a leader in Army safety: Flew 62,918 hours without an accident; received the 1984 Army Aviation Association of America Award for Safety Officer of the Year; won the 1984 Commander's Aviation Accident Prevention Award (Installation Level); achieved a 26 percent reduction in fatalities in FY 84, which included a 32 percent reduction in privately owned vehicle fatalities and a fatality-free brigade-sized REFORGER 1984 exercise; implemented a motorcycle safety training program, which included a hands-on operator skill test; instituted the mandatory wearing of motorcycle helmets, both on and off post; made mandatory the wearing of seat belts on the installation, both in government and in privately owned vehicles; made available to commanders a "seat belt convincer" permitting soldiers to experience safely what it is like to be involved in an accident.
- Enhanced healthy life-styles of soldiers and their families: Made mandatory referral to counseling of individuals involved in spouse or child abuse cases with consideration (under an experimental program) of separation from the Army of soldiers involved in two incidents; prohibited smoking in any government aircraft by crew or passengers with anti-smoking gum available for aviators; used low fat milk in all dining facilities; included one-stop inprocessing 100 percent dental check for all soldiers; swim tested all incoming soldiers; achieved soldier hospitalization rate 35 percent lower than Army average; equipped gyms and many units with state-of-the-art weight training equipment, which may account in part for higher Army Physical Readiness Test scores.

The fourth goal provides the framework for the Fort Hood programs designed for efficient **transition to wartime mobilization** and the integration of all of our activities into the **one-Army concept:**

- Conducted two GOLDEN SABER (command post) exercises with realistic, fully integrated European scenarios—11,000 active Army, Air Force, NATO allied, and reserve component participants. (These are the only regularly scheduled joint and combined command post exercises where divisions from Forts Polk, Riley, and Carson, as well as reserve component major tactical units, interact with US allies using operational-level war plans.)
- Provided response cells to simulate corps and higher headquarters for nine division command post exercises at other posts in CONUS.
- Participated in four major personnel and mobilization exercises during FY 84 in which Fort Hood led Army installations in developing and refining extensive mobilization plans and procedures. These included integrated automated personnel, logistics, billeting, training, and range scheduling systems; establishment and operation of a mobilization and deployment control center for processing deploying reserve components and active units; and identification and preassignment of retirees.

In the fall of 1984, three US Army graduate students in the organizational development curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate School at Monterey, Calif., did their masters' thesis research on "Combat Units of Excellence," focusing their efforts on battalion-size units. Two of the battalions they selected for in-depth research are at Fort Hood. At Figure 2 are extracts from their interviews with approximately 100 leaders at all levels within the two battalions. The comments are organized under eight headings, designated by the researchers as "attributes of excellence in combat units," and developed through non-quantitative analytical procedures. These comments are offered in evidence of what it's like to lead in an organization where the climate is "right."

"...The Organization Will Grow in Productivity." Productivity, from the perspective of the III Corps commanding general, means readiness to deploy and fight. At the second level of detail the meaning of productivity lies in Fort Hood's four major goals, and whether the organization "grows in productivity" can be judged, at least to a degree, by what it achieves in terms of the goals it sets.

Early in spring 1985, a week or so before the deadline for submission of reports and evidence, the staff at Fort Hood decided to compete in the Commander-in-Chief's Award for Installation Excellence. The commanding general approved.

This incident, this "walk-on" late entry, is indicative of the climate and leadership discussed previously. Fort Hood, when the competition was announced a year previously, had not been pointed and "peaked" toward winning a program of inter-installation competition. It had, instead, kept its energy focused on its mission of combat readiness.

In four days around-the-clock (so the story goes), the Fort Hood staff listed the achievements that described Fort Hood's "productivity" with respect to its four goals. Most were expressed in quantitative, management-oriented terms. These achievements, offered in evidence of what happened to Fort Hood's productivity when the leaders began to build a climate wherein leaders could lead, are listed in Figure 3. The staff got the report and evidence in just before the deadline. Fort Hood was selected the US Army Forces Command winner. The Department of the Army Verification Team of the Installation Excellence Committee—outsiders—came to Fort Hood to validate the facts and figures. Fort Hood is a finalist in the Army competition, and whether they win that and the Department of Defense "manage-off" that follows isn't really a big thing. Combat readiness is.

At present, at least from my perspective, the fundamental assumption or hypothesis is supported by the evidence at hand. And only now has all this effort by all those people over these last three years begun to produce the air-land battle leaders at the small-unit level. Power down is just beginning to arrive at company, battery, and troop levels. It is evident in the attitudes and the values underlying the words of the leaders in the comments in Figure 2. Whether this continues to spread, to become *characteristic* of Fort Hood leadership, and then to become characteristic of Army leadership remains to be seen. Only if that occurs will those criteria for the air-land battle leader actually become doctrine.

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Col. Malone, who has written many articles, books, and technical reports, is also a mullet fisherman at Sanibel Island, Fla.

Executive Leadership

by T.O. Jacobs, Lieutenant Colonel Stephen Clement, Carlos Rigby, *and* Elliott Jaques

It is perhaps no accident that the Year of Leadership was announced during a time when the Army is also beginning to take penetrating and far-reaching looks at concepts for doctrine and force development that will be needed as the next century unfolds. As the character of the envisioned future battlefield changes and becomes more complex, the challenges to Army leaders at all levels also become more complex. The central problem is that of developing battle captains who are capable of disciplined initiative on a distributed battlefield, in the absence of conventional command and control means. The challenge presented by that future battlefield is starkly simple. Weapons systems lethality and the pace of events will preclude conventional command and control, even if technology (electronic warfare) does not. We consequently must develop operational concepts that are suited to that battlefield and then in peacetime build a Total Army in which these concepts become second nature to leaders at all levels.

We are now making progress toward understanding those concepts and the kinds of peacetime leader development experiences needed to build our future battle captains. Two lines of thought are coming together to create the total system. One is a set of initiatives by the Center for Army Leadership (CAL) at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., to build a series of doctrinal instruments that link how-to-lead with how-to-fight. These initiatives underscore the fact that leadership requirements are different at different levels and that both the doctrine and the focus for leader development must reflect these differences. The second is an important new set of findings about how to design organizations to be lean, mean, and battle-ready and how to grow leaders within these organizations.

As a part of this work, we have now completed a series of executive level interviews which yield a picture of the competencies required at the executive level. While attainment of general officer grade should not be set as a career objective for all officers, it is both reasonable and desirable to focus the growth of leader capability over time toward those competencies as an ultimate growth goal. This provides a series of targets for those who do achieve that career goal, but more importantly, it also provides understanding of the competencies, particularly thinking skills, required by those who must support the generals by doing the staff work in the senior headquarters, and for the first time it gives us a rational basis for developing a war reserve of mid-grade leaders capable of rapid upward movement in a time of national emergency.

The Army is an extremely complex organization, and it exists in an even more complex world. To do its job without becoming overcome by that complexity, three broadly different types of leadership are needed, as shown in Figure 1. The essence of this concept is that each level of the total organization has some critical tasks which can be performed *only* at that level and which *must* be performed if subordinate levels are to be allowed to perform well. Thus, systems leadership is the umbrella for organizational leadership, and that in turn is the umbrella for direct leadership. At each level, concepts and guidance are generated that are essential to successful functioning at lower levels. When the levels are correctly linked together, the total organization functions well.

The first layer is the battalion, company, and/or platoon/squad. This is the domain of direct leadership. Much of the leading in this domain is face-to-face and deals with immediate, right-now tasks. This is "hands on" leadership, and the skills here are what we have traditionally considered to be *the* leadership skills. Most articles about leadership actually describe experiences at this level. This is the level of confronting the enemy and caring for one's soldiers with a deep and abiding concern. This is the level where soldiers and their personal concerns are known. The small units are built here. The tools are standing operating procedures (SOP), drills, individual and collective training, cohesion building, and example setting by leaders. If SOP, drills, rules, training, and leadership are right, the small units are cohesive and battle ready. Their leaders are aggressive and willing to take calculated risks because they under-



Figure 1
The Leadership System

stand the key concepts. The current FM 22-100, *Military Leadership,* is an excellent doctrinal manual for dealing with leadership and leader development at this level. It is the foundation.

But there is a tall superstructure on that foundation. The next level is *organizational* leadership. CAL is now writing a doctrinal manual for this level. It deals with organizational processes that must be made right if the direct leaders are to be trained, developed, and supported the right way in battle. Figure 1 shows that organizational leadership skills actually are required at all three levels. They are exemplified at battalion by requirements for integrated staff work, for efficient/effective acquisition and use of information, and for planning, e.g., training management—battalion training management system (BTMS), that extends out six months to a year in garrison. Company commanders also need the fundamentals of organizational leadership skills even though they do not have formal staffs. They must know how the higher headquarters operate, where to go for needed resources, and how to *manage* their own time well.

But the main need is at division and brigade. Division commanders, in particular, need to know how to put their organizations together so the parts will work in an integrated fashion. They must have the vision to understand interdependencies. They must create the combined arms teams and integrate them with the logistics and support functions required to sustain the force in battle. And they must understand and teach how to acquire and use intelligence information rapidly and well.

Much organizational leadership is indirect. For example, an understanding of how information must move in a division or brigade headquarters leads to a good headquarters design. Good design, in turn, will support the battalions and the companies with an orderly and meaningful flow of the information needed to understand what is going on. And *that* in turn, all other things being equal, will create *confident* battalions and companies which are much more resilient in battle. This is a *second order effect*—indirect, but powerful nonetheless. Organizational leadership requires understanding and use of second and third order effects; the policies written by organizational leaders at division, for example, determine which *stated* values will become *operating* values and will govern the direction of command climate development at battalion and lower.

At the top is a new concept—systems leadership. While systems leaders must still have the skills of direct and organizational leadership, their critical tasks are more concerned with understanding the complex external world. They must envision a future time frame extending 15-30 years or more

and design the divisions needed to meet the challenges that the future world holds. Current concept development for ARMY 21 is an example. That envisioned future falls in the time frame of 2015 to 2040. The current strong movement toward a better balance of forces—light divisions, as well as heavy divisions—is an example of senior (systems) leadership envisioning and designing the force to meet the challenge in a somewhat closer time frame. As ARMY 21 becomes clearer, the work will begin to lay out what is needed to meet those challenges also.

Key tasks of systems leaders will include the following:

- Envision the desired future system and its overarching goals and objectives. This takes the form of a concept which will be brought into being over a period of 15 to 30 years. An excellent example is the current force modernization initiative. The conceptual foundations for what is happening today were laid during the 1967-68 time frame, and the effort will not be finished before the 1988-90 time frame.
- Communicate the understanding to all who must share the work of making it happen. This is the building of consensus about what needs to be done and a common frame of reference for doing it.
- Envision the pieces that need to be created and made to work together to form the desired new system (or change the old). Systems leaders must understand how to tailor organization structures, such as the light division, and build the policy basis for organizational procedures that will work. More important, they must understand how to formulate policies that will support and sustain the culture and traditional values needed to sustain the long-term health of the force.
- Create the pieces and build interdependencies among them. Systems leaders understand the importance of building information links among the pieces so they can operate as independently as possible. They also understand that only practice can develop such operational skills and know-how to guide the practice so that they do develop. This creates organizations capable of operating in the absence of positive command and control, but nonetheless disciplined within the commander's intent. This is the essence of what is needed for the distributed battlefield. It includes information and control systems that provide the right feedback to each level for the critical tasks each level must perform. Subordinate leaders thus become capable of making the right decisions on their own.
- Manage the interface between the organization and the external environment to ensure the organization has the information and other resources needed to function well and that the environment is "friendly," i.e., presents no surprises. The use of intelligence information from all sources and the fighting of the deep battle to produce the future desired situation for units at the forward line of own troops (FLOT) is an example of this requirement.

Within the total system, there is an interlocking effect from top to bottom in *many* areas. Figure 2 shows how this interlocking works with regard to the culture and values at the top in relation to the combat effectiveness of small combat units at the bottom.



Figure 2

Culture/Values Link to Small-Unit Combat Performance

This figure shows a cascading linkage between culture and values, the domain of the systems leaders; policy and climate, the domain of the organization leaders; procedures, rules, drills, and cohesion, the domain of the direct leader, which combine to form the bottom line, small-unit combat performance.

Looking up the linkage, small-unit combat performance is influenced by how the unit has been trained, the SOP it follows, the rules soldiers follow, and the cohesion of the units. A small-unit leader's ability to take action in the absence of orders and his willingness to take calculated risks are determined to a large extent by the SOP he has learned, the rules he has learned to follow, and the thinking he has had to do in peacetime.

SOP and other factors at the direct level are influenced by policies and climate factors generated at the organizational level and, finally, these organizational factors are more or less governed by the culture and operating values fostered at the systems level. If the culture and values are right, the policies can be right; if the policies and climate are right, the SOPs and rules can be right; and if they are right, small units can become cohesive and excellent.

Though soldiers and small-unit leaders—and small-unit leadership principles—are much the same as in years past, the world is not. The future distributed battlefield requires new skills of distributed decision making. More than ever before, small-unit leaders must read the battle, understand what is going on, and make disciplined, independent decisions that are consistent with the commander's concept of the battle.

Many of our small units and small-unit leaders are not sufficiently proactive because they have not been trained to be innovative and to act with initiative. Our existing culture and operating values have made reaction safer and more comfortable. But safe and comfortable will not win on a "come-as-you-are" battlefield. As our senior leaders are now telling us, it is time to reexamine our culture and values, align our policies and procedures, and work to produce an environment that will encourage our battlefield leaders to learn in peacetime the distributed decision skills they will need in war.

There are strong implications here for leader development, many of which are shown in Figure 3. Our interviews with senior leaders reveal very great ability to deal flexibly with the complexity of their worlds. They think *inductively,* as well as *deductively,* and they are strongly proactive while at the same time they are reflective about their own experience and the experience of others. Many are accomplished military historians, and they use historical lessons as a backdrop for interpreting current experience. Perhaps most significant, our senior generals are capable of *both* abstract and concrete thinking, equally at home with either. It is the capacity for abstract thought that allows concept formation, and that is one of the essential tools for reaching out to grasp and control the future.

- **Time Horizons**—Context for Subordinate Frame of Reference
  - Nested
  - Extend Beyond 20 Years at the Top
- **Thinking Skills**
  - Complex vs. Simple Cognitive Maps
    - More Than One Cause
    - More Than One Way
  - Structuring the Future vs. Reacting to It
    - Analysis—Deduction Good Up To and Including Division
    - Synthesis—Integration Needed Beyond That
  - Seeing Cause and Effect vs. Fixing Problems
  - Reflecting vs. Acting
  - Abstract and Concrete vs. Concrete Only
- **Mentoring to Develop Subordinate Frames of Reference**

Figure 3
Implications for Leader Development

Our senior leaders are *systems leaders,* understanding a complex world and creating the new organizations and weapons systems needed to deal with an even more complex future world. New concepts of systems leadership will develop the context required to encourage the initiative and innovativeness required for distributed decision making. These new concepts are now being developed—appropriately in the Year of Leadership. □

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OE at the Executive Level: A Context for Relevance

by Major David E. Leslie

Over the last eight years, I have had the opportunity to work for, work with, and thus observe several Army general officers and Senior Executive Service DA civilians. My admiration, respect, and at times, even awe, have grown as I have watched these executives and Army leaders set and articulate goals, plan strategy, manage their environments, allocate their resources, and most powerfully, ***make things happen!***

This article will convey those things I've observed and come to believe about Army executives—to suggest some "rites of passage" for those who wish to work in the executive arena. By way of format, the first half will highlight aspects of the world of the Army executive as I have seen them. The second half will describe my thoughts on successful advisors, with the first half of the paper as the context in which advisory performance occurs. Throughout, it is my hope to illuminate observable behavior and to communicate some appropriate touchstones for interaction at the executive level.

These thoughts were developed with internal human resource development (HRD) specialists and organizational effectiveness/organizational development (OE/OD) consultants as the envisioned audience. However, the audience is not or should not be restricted to that group; in my experience, Army executives tend to use the "smart" folks they find. The first challenge is to be "findable," perhaps discovered. The second challenge is to be, and remain, relevant through performance.

THE WORLD OF THE EXECUTIVE

Army executives have, by promotion and title, transcended the functional, parochial, and project-based set of responsibilities in which they have performed, matured, and succeeded. Their point of view has changed; the roles they play have changed. They have become part of a new culture without leaving the old one. The result is that on any given topic their primary focus is the Army within which elements, projects, and resources are subsets to be fit together as parts of the whole. Their charge is to manage the interfaces, guide and sustain thrusts, and ensure resources are allocated against priorities. They become integrators—influencing the points of interface between competing systems, projects, people, issues, and resources to ensure the United States has an Army that can and will perform its assigned missions through time.

They deal in an arena where precedent often does not exist; where there is no "right" answer; where trade-off *must* happen; where virtually everything is negotiable; where there are no guarantees, only results; and where there will always be more topics and people wanting their attention than time and the human capacity will accommodate, for example, "How many divisions should the Army have?" "How many Trident submarines should the Navy buy?" "Why should we have the MX missile?" "What will technology do to the nature of warfare as we know it?" The list goes on. All are hard questions, complex, and defiant of the "easy answer." Moreover, developing a strategy to address any of the questions is, in itself, a difficult challenge.

Satisfactory Performance

More pragmatically, one of the interesting observations I've made is the Army executive perspective on satisfactory performance, i.e., achieving results. Satisfactory performance tends to be defined by executives in terms of movement and momentum contrasted with complete projects or end states achieved. Their concern focuses on ensuring that a project is being worked as desired, that the issues are being solved, and that the entire effort is "on track"! There seems little expectation by the general officers that they may personally ever see the "final" result of their stewardship.

Army executives, better than most of us, seem to understand that it is only change that remains constant. Hence, they work toward goals, rather than objectives; they guide on visions of the future, rather than yesterday's results. All the while, they demand that subordinates analyze data and reach objectives knowing that these are essential to the process of realizing goals. Objectives, both their substance and later their accomplishment, serve the executive as a feedback mechanism to satisfy the momentum and movement orientation of "are we on track?"

Throughout the executive's tenure, there are cultural norms, customs, and rituals which must be followed. This is analogous perhaps to the

owner and pilot of a barge, one in a fleet of very large barges, all on the river at once. Barges are big and slow. Turning one takes great skill and patience under the best of conditions. There is an extraordinary amount of coordination and collaboration among the barge pilots as they move toward their destinations. *It is not acceptable to achieve your destination today if it means wrecking your colleague's barge in the process.* Consensus building is important, and living within consensus is a way of life. Etiquette, rights, and social amenities are critical to survival and success; thus the rituals are adhered to religiously.

Operating Style

The operating style of executives is another area which is imperative to understand. Executives have responsibility for far more than they can personally supervise. Their operating style must ensure maximum impact across a wide range of initiatives with all the efficiency that can be mustered.

While there are many executive operating styles, one stands out as a theme with personal variations. I refer to it as "strategic intervention in events." Two beliefs underpin this style. The first says that in the course of an idea becoming a reality, there are strategic "levers" which when properly identified and worked, net maximum influence on the results of the effort. The second belief is that those levers often take form as committees or councils, and as such, attract key players on a given project or initiative. Using those as forums in which to send messages, give guidance, alter course, or approve plans, the executives are then free to work other areas confident that the desired results will be achieved, thus netting maximum impact at minimum cost. I have occasionally reviewed this process as a spaceship's flight being altered by a "mobile retro-rocket" that flies in, affixes itself to the ship long enough to sense its trajectory and compute desired changes, that fires itself to alter the ship's flight path, and then unhooks and moves to another spaceship to repeat the procedure. It is not unusual for executives to create such strategic levers in situations where they do not already exist. This strategy seems very workable; yet, it does require an executive to do a quick study, be able to grasp essence, have a sharp sense of direction, and be able to clearly and cleanly express his desires.

The Value of Time

This brings me to my final point about executives: they view and use the resources of time and people differently than the rest of us.

The value of time to executives is manifested in their calendars. At this level, "every minute counts." In order to reach goals, execute mission responsibilities, attend to environmental demands, and do homework, their calendars become ever-evolving kaleidoscopes. They will find time for people and topics important to them, and some will never get heard. Regardless, the result is long days, homework way into the night, and busy weekends. To such a person, not much is more frustrating than someone taking his time without being prepared or being unable to communicate effectively or efficiently.

The perception that executives get more out of human sources than most should come as no surprise. What is interesting is to notice how they do it. Through the rank of colonel or its DA civilian equivalent, when leaders or managers take a job, they use the human resources on board or provided through the "pipeline." This relaxes a bit for the brigadier and major general. At three-star level and above, one may bring in his own people. Successful Army executives have catalogued, informally if not formally, those subordinates and other people with particular skills or abilities as they have worked together over the years. Strong personal loyalty to the executive is a common characteristic, and maybe the only common one. The result of a hand-selected team, from the executive's point of view, is efficiency. Far less time is required in communicating what is wanted, why it's important, the political requirements of the process, and the nature of satisfactory progress to those on whose shoulders rests the work. The productivity of these individuals is significantly higher than that of routinely assigned subordinates. This is largely a function of the expertise for which they were hired, their clarity of mission, and their strong aversion to disappointing the "boss."

The people brought by an executive to a new assignment generally form the nucleus of the "inner circle." Some may also be part of the formal structure, others less visibly positioned. These people constitute the personal "think tanks," the "brain trusts," and the "strategic planners." They may have a formal job description, but their real job is to respond to the executive whenever on whatever. The Army executive has complete trust in them. They know the executive well; they understand his values, his goals, and they demonstrate an intense loyalty. It is with this group the executive will think aloud, speak freely, and develop the soon-to-be-public positions. They convene when necessary. Their work is rarely public, but always important.

There is another group of players to note. These are experts in particular fields, trusted by the executive very much like the inner circle. They work for other organizations, even other services (or no service at all); they may be retired colleagues or former mentors. These people are generally known and accepted as legitimate players by the formal structure and the inner circle. They are summoned for particular projects, briefed on the situation, execute their task, and leave.

Using the inner circle, outside experts, and the formal structure, Army executives may have more than one person working on the same question, quite independently of each other. It is an effective technique for surfacing different approaches to a problem. This tack is most frequently used in the strategy formulation period before the guidance and taskings are announced. The "first draft" is a powerful document.

Army executives tend to treat their work as a wonderfully exciting game, but not an unimportant one—certainly not one to be played without values, ethics, and integrity, but a game nonetheless. They accept short-term setbacks as gracefully as they accept victory. They quickly set aside either and get on to the next challenge. They take that which is valuable to them from others, spending little energy in changing or modifying that which is not important to them. They are not prone to "joust with windmills." Out of six points, they'll take two and instantly discard the other four. And as a final and important distinction, successful executives tend to be far more entrepreneurial (or "intrapreneurial") in their approach to their mission than less impactful leaders and managers.

RITES OF PASSAGE TO THE EXECUTIVE LEVEL

Unless one came up "through the system," entering the executive's world is perhaps analogous to walking onto the practice field of a professional football team as an unknown—a "free agent" wanting to play. Drawing on the analogy, the thrusts of this section are getting on the team and staying on the team.

Probably the coach, and certainly most of the players, are products of a nationwide, yet decentralized, system designed to produce the teams in the professional football leagues. The free agent is, by definition, outside of the player factory, and that has implications for getting on the team. Before either of those are relevant, there are some characteristics shared by those who succeed, as free agents or advisors to executives, which merit discussion. They have an evolving collection of beliefs about the situation, a sharp sense of purpose and mission, complementary personality traits, and an appreciation of the uniqueness they bring to the situation. The "situation" to which I have referred is "working in the Army executive's world," and as such, places, issues, initiatives, and problems are subsets of that executive world. I will refer to these people as "advisors" throughout, recognizing that other labels might be equally appropriate.

The successful advisor seems to run an internal logic program like this: "Even executives don't have all the answers. Therefore someone will advise them. And I think I'm as capable as anyone else to do that." Rarely said, yet probably deeply felt, this thought process recognizes the inability of anyone to have "complete information" and thereby defines the need—or from the advisor's perspective, his purpose. Necessary before such thought can ever become conscious is the ability to mentally project one's self into the "executive office suite" and develop mental images of interacting, participating, and influencing the action—all successfully. If a person cannot imagine a situation, he will never bring it to pass. As with successful executives, the ability to envision is a necessary precursor to any achievement.

The Advisor's Mission

From clarity of purpose flows the advisor's mission. Interesting here is that this "mission" is self-defined and is therefore more energizing than any organizationally imposed, less personal one. The latter is usually a subset of the former. The personal mission, at its essence, might be "To use the entire range of my knowledge and experience to further the goal of my 'boss.' " It is to give one's complete service unconditionally to another. This should not be interpreted as a subjugation of self, an altruistic act. It is rather viewing the executive's world as a system. "Unconditionally" refers to the advisor's expectations for reward.

It should be obvious that one who cannot appreciate or adapt to the customs and rituals of the "barge pilots" cannot expect to be allowed "on the bridge" or in the game. An aspirant need only astutely observe the world in which he wants to work to know what's appropriate and what's not.

There is one final element in the mind-set of the advisor that prepares him for successful performance. Earlier I described it as an appreciation of the uniqueness he brings to the situation. Said another way, that means strong confidence in what he "does," what he doesn't do, where lines need to be drawn, and the courage to articulate the

difference should that become necessary. Knowing the uniqueness of one's contribution and adhering to those principles which create it is the depth of understanding which successful advisors seem to share and demonstrate.

Walking onto the practice field, from the point of view of "getting in the game," is only *a* strategy, not necessarily *the* strategy. Since it is the Army executive (the coach) who does the hiring, it is important to understand the criteria for hiring from which strategy can be discovered. Two standards (hiring process) must be satisfied: trustworthiness as a person and potential professional contribution. Individual executives might argue that there's more to it than I've suggested. They'd be correct. Each of these executives has developed criteria that he believes important based upon his preferences, the situation and its requirements, and the range of service available by those who advise him. I do believe the standards I've suggested are common to each.

An important awareness for the aspirant is that satisfying these hiring standards are processes, not events. In fact, you can recognize only with hindsight whether you were hired or not. It is more like the transformation of an acquaintance into friendship than it formally is hiring a replacement for a vacancy. At some point you simply become conscious that it has happened, and behavior confirms it.

The two processes (trustworthiness and contribution potential) do not happen in a linear, sequential fashion. At every dealing with an executive, each process is working. Yet at any moment in time, one of those processes is heightened in its relationship to the other. A telephone conversation, while covering business, may in fact be an opportunity for the aspirant to demonstrate trustworthiness, ethics, political savy, or diplomacy. Since the desired relationship is unique and transcends traditional senior/subordinate boundaries, it cannot develop without contact and interaction.

Opportunity for Contact

Creating opportunity for the contact is the responsibility of the aspirant. Given the "make it happen" orientation of Army executives, the would-be advisor who can't make such opportunity happen probably would not get hired anyway. Such opportunity for contact is sometimes a matter of "seizing the moment"; at other times it is lots of homework, hard work, and trying again and again. During every moment seized, the goals of the aspirant should be to demonstrate understanding of the executive's perspective, to grasp the complexity, to signal insight and appropriateness, and to display the ability to communicate effectively. The subject matter is the vehicle; it is not the journey. The process of becoming part of "the" team, transcending the formal relationships, could easily take years.

Once an aspirant has sufficient experience with an Army executive to look back over the work he has done for that executive, it may be possible to conclude that the original goal of "getting on the team" has been achieved. Such a conclusion should be treated with suspicion for reasons which will emerge shortly.

Compared to "getting on the team," "staying on the team" is a relatively straightforward challenge. There are three primary elements to survival and success:

- Managing life on the boundary
- Continuing to expand one's conceptual abilities
- Sustaining advisory performance (This is the most important element.)

They are separate yet interrelated. The boundary management reinforces the ability to make things happen; the expansion of conceptual abilities drives the futuristic focus necessary to stay on the "boss's" beacon, and sustained performance is an absolute requirement. Managing life on the boundary and expanding conceptual abilities are so situational, complex, and personal that any template I might offer would be inappropriate. Yet, a few observations on each might enrich them as areas for conscious attention.

Managing Life

The life of an advisor to any Army executive can be a tenuous one, even if the advisor occupies a culturally recognized position inside the organization. While an axiom guides us to "work smarter, not harder," life on the margin demands working as smartly as possible—because working harder (much harder) is a given.

There is an ever-present tension created by working more than one "job": responding to the boss and fulfilling traditional job description requirements for other supervisors. The tension is a condition of employment; it is not a problem which can be solved or removed. The boundary straddled by the advisor is between fulfilling the system's expectations and one's own sense of purpose. The reasons why anyone might choose this kind of situation are as diverse as the number of people calling themselves advisors (most don't, by the way). For me, it is simply stated: it is an op-

portunity to contribute my expertise to the Army at a level of impact that might not otherwise be available to me earlier than 20-25 years of service, if ever.

Conceptual Expansion

Conceptual expansion as an advisor's responsibility is more an investment for the future than a requirement for any task presently on hand. Successful executives tend to move up rapidly, and with each move their span of influence increases. Working concepts of responsibilities, the organizations they head, and appropriate leadership strategies are constantly being enriched, expanded, and reframed as they see their own visions unfold. The advisor must continually seed to understand the next higher level as it may be different from all before if the advisor is to remain valuable in succeeding moves. Hence, the advisor's life needs an educational dimension, whether formal or not, to prepare him for effective service in whatever future develops.

Sustaining Performance

Overstated slightly for effect, tomorrow's opportunity is a function of today's performance. The old chestnut "What have you done for me *lately*?" comes to mind. Within increasingly narrow boundaries as the executive's responsibilities grow more complex, the advisor's contribution must always remain relevant, appropriate, and timely. At each "new" level, the cost of errors and the time required to correct them escalate dramatically. Furthermore, attempting to use "yesterday's" approach to "today's" task is dangerous. Each new task must be addressed within its current context if the counsel provided is to be appropriate.

I have already implied that positive performance feedback comes as more work, and conversely, negative feedback as no work. It appears true that advisors whose "batting averages" slip too much seem to move quietly to the minor league. There remain other aspects of that feedback loop. People tend to want recognition, appreciation, and "strokes" for good effort. Advisors must set those aside, at least as they have traditionally perceived them. Advisors must learn to evaluate performance as the executive does: "Are we on track?" and "Did I get the results I wanted?"

I recognize that I have bypassed all opportunities to suggest things to do or say, how to speak or write for executives, and other tricks or techniques. It was a conscious decision based upon the belief that such information is at best misleading without its larger context, and at worst irrelevant in individual circumstances. Each advisor must walk his path virtually alone, just as the successful executive does.

The most certain path to success as an advisor to exectives is to treat each opportunity for contact and influence in exactly the same way as an aspirant. Regardless of past success, at any moment each only aspires to the next opportunity.

Then, after all is said and you've done your best, you must recognize that you may never get another call, for reasons you may never know... and be okay with that. □

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

The Evolution and Management of Change in Large Organizations

by Bob Goodfellow

During the past few years a growing number of organizational effectiveness staff officers (OESO) have become involved in the development of organizational strategy. Using the performance management conference (PMC), strategic management process, open systems planning, or some other basic design as a starting point, the OESO leads the top team of the organization through a planning process which ultimately produces a list of goals and objectives applicable to the organization for a prescribed period of time. Participants to the planning session usually feel good about the product they have developed and go back to their regular duty assignment confident that their work will be the guiding force for the organization for days and months to come.

Oftentimes, however, the carefully developed plan winds up as just another paper in the planning file and has little impact on the day-to-day activities of the organization. Regardless of who comprised the group that developed the plan, other factors, sometimes difficult to identify, seem to guide the direction of the organization. Major changes occur, but it is difficult to tell just how they came about or when they were initiated. Certainly they were not part of a formal plan. To some, it may seem as if the changes "just happened."

What is it that impedes the implementation of the strategy developed at the annual planning conference? How does a major change, which seems to come from nowhere, take hold and become infused throughout the organization?

Part of the answer may lie in examining the style and behavior of organizational leaders. It seems that the greater the size and complexity of an organization, the less inclined the senior executives are to sit down with their subordinates and participate in a formal, step-by-step process to develop a strategic or long-range plan for the future. Rather, they combine an intuitive awareness of what is required, an ability to acquire good information appropriate to decision making, and political astuteness which allows them to mobilize the support of key organizational leaders and avoid resistance by the rank and file.

Sensing the Networks

Most senior executives maintain a variety of different networks, each based on a particular need or activity. One of these tends to be a "sounding board" network which they use to try out new ideas. Members of this network may consist of individuals both inside and outside the organization. They are all respected and trusted by the executive and familiar with his thought process and orientation. Yet they represent a variety of personal philosophies and "views of the world" and thus provide the executive with different perspectives of an issue.

Ideas which may result in new strategic initiatives are often first introduced to the "sounding board" network. Almost casually, as part of another conversation, the executive may begin discussing an idea or two "that I've been thinking about lately." Because network members are familiar with the business and environment of the organization and know that they are expected to be candid in their response, they tend to provide clear, specific feedback and reactions to the executive's ideas. They may also suggest alternatives or ramifications, ask questions which result in greater clarity, or provide amplifying data which help to focus the issue.

Expanding the Audience

As the idea(s) begin to crystalize, the executive begins to expand his discussions to a broader, cross-sectional range of organizational members, paying careful attention to their reactions. Still not wanting to send a message that change is on the way, the executive continues to speak of thoughts and ideas as he continues to explore reactions, suggestions, ramifications, and alternatives.

Continued discussion throughout the organization results in greater clarity around the issue, key subordinates begin to talk of the idea in terms of reality, and support begins to grow. Organizational members become increasingly aware that something new is going to be introduced, that things are going to get better, that a recurring problem is going to be solved, or that something is

going to be different—but there are few if any specifics to complete the picture.

Broadening the Support Base

As the executive acquires greater clarity about the direction he wants to pursue, aided in part by the reaction he has received during discussions with his expanding "network," he may begin to commission studies of particular courses of action. By setting the agenda of various study groups, timing the sequence of the studies, and selecting the chairman and membership of each group, the executive maintains influence over the process, thus retaining the ability to educate, generate cohesion, build momentum, etc. Such committees are used to gain the support of key "stakeholders" of the organization, an important consideration when new ideas will result in new ways of doing business. At this stage it is important to avoid sending messages that the old way was wrong. Oftentimes a new strategy will replace one which was developed by individuals who continue to occupy key organizational positions. Unless they are brought on board and made to realize that the old strategy which they helped to develop was appropriate at the time, but that times have changed, serious opposition may arise which will slow or even block the implementation of new initiatives.

As a result of their activities, study groups cause organizational involvement and build commitment to their area of exploration, thus building pockets of support throughout the organization. Although influencing the timing, activities, and composition of the study groups, the executive is able to maintain a low profile while they conduct their work and thus remain flexible as to his eventual course of action. Although he ultimately reviews the results of each study group and specifies when and how these results are communicated to the organization, agreements and consensus reached as the result of committee activity often give the appearance that new strategy is the result of participatory decision making across a broad spectrum of the organization. In the event that committee activity results in recommendations which the executive opposes, he is usually able to establish hurdles or tests to block such ideas without openly opposing them. Alternatively, he uses his information networks to disseminate throughout the organization the results which he supports.

Gathering the Power Base

As support for various actions grows, the executive begins to pay greater attention to power figures throughout the organization, knowing that he must have the support of powerful people in order to successfully introduce new thrusts. Individual and collective discussions generate give-and-take activity regarding specific proposals until a broad consensus is reached which has the support of the key executive and the major organizational stakeholders.

Making It Happen

As consensus at the top is reached, the executive may begin to describe his emerging vision, in specific terms, to the organization as a whole. For the first time he publicly affixes his stamp of approval to the new thrusts or initiatives. His public announcement usually includes the appointment of some key member of the organization charged to transform the idea into reality. Depending upon the size and nature of the change, this individual may be assigned to transition the organization from the old to the new state, or he may be an individual who clearly supports and is committed to the idea which led to the change and who will, to a large part, determine his future in the organization as a result of how well he accomplishes this task. Regardless, it is imperative that the person orchestrating the implementation of the change be a credible member of the organization who has the respect of key power figures, that he is given the power to make things happen, and that he is provided the resources required to get the job done.

Analyzing the Process

The above scenario suggests a process which successful executives often follow to initiate new thrusts or strategies which they themselves may admit surprise them in the way they turned out. New strategies often begin as little more than a vague idea formulated to respond to a concern or need. Rather than trying to force this new idea down the throat of the organization, the smart executive initially tests it on trusted associates. When convinced that it has merit, either as originally conceived or as modified as a result of feedback, he begins sending trial balloons around the organization, again paying close attention to arguments pro and con. Further refinement provides the foundation for staffing and tasking study groups to examine specific aspects of the evolving strategy. Study groups are used both to accomplish their assigned tasks and to spread the word, muster support, and build commitment. As key information begins to come together and the emerging vision of the future direction takes on greater clarity, the executive begins working the key power bases necessary to get the change implemented. And finally a "champion" is appointed

to shepherd the change—a person who identifies with the thrust or strategy and whose future may be highly dependent upon how successfully he is able to transform the original seedling idea into organizational reality.

The Other Side of the Coin

Unfortunately, change does not happen as easily as described above. Most successful executives intuitively cover all of the bases required to obtain top-level support for new initiatives. Normally, political requirements are well attended to and needed top-level support is obtained. But, while concentrating on the top, senior executives often ignore those further down in the organization, possibly under the assumption that "when the boss says 'do it,' everyone will respond." Such a notion may be true in small-sized organizations. However, in larger and more complex organizations, the ability of one person to influence an entire organization through a "telling" (this is what to do, when to do it, and how to do it) style of leadership becomes increasingly remote.

Resistance to Change

All who have belonged to an organization will readily acknowledge that even small, unexpected change frequently results in decreased organizational effectiveness. To the employee, change suggests letting go of old habits, roles, and procedures—uncertainty about new requirements and excessive concern about the future. All of this results in anxiety, stress, and conflict. The outward manifestation is employee resistance to the proposed change. If small change generates dysfunctional employee resistance, potential disaster accompanies an organization's attempt to implement big changes. And failure by senior executives desiring to introduce new strategies, policies, or procedures to understand the causes for and potential results of employee resistance often leads to unnecessary delay or even failure.

Causes for Resistance

Most of us want to feel in control of events around us. Loss of control results in a feeling of powerlessness which in turn leads to a need to hold on. Holding on to what we have is accompanied by strong resistance to new ideas proposed by others. One way to increase employees' acceptance and support for new ideas is to allow them to participate in decisions which affect them. The wise executive always provides for choices within the overall change decision. Participation in decisions which pertain to a person's job gives the employee a feeling of involvement and thus enhances the gaining of his commitment to the change.

Associated with the notions of loss of control and powerlessness is fear of the unknown. Frequently, as an organization faces an impending change, the rumor mill runs rampant as the hierarchy resists providing any information to employees "until all details of the plan are complete." Because people tend to expect the worst, they will see the dark side of every cloud and actively dig in their heels to resist the change once it is announced. Smart executives keep their employees apprised of what is going on. They share as much information as possible about the impending change, providing whatever details are available of the new future state of the organization. Particularly important is letting people know what definitely will not change. This in itself is often enough to reduce employee anxiety as it helps to slow down the "what if" process. The greater the retention of old habits and routines in the work area, the more comfortable the individual employee is likely to be with the change. Periodic information briefings which describe the current status of the change project, scheduled activities, next steps, possibilities, what will and won't change, etc. help to reduce anxiety caused by uncertainty and foster individual commitment.

The Unexpected

One way to guarantee resistance is to announce an immediate, unexpected change in an organization. As indicated above, employees are comfortable with the known and familiar. Consistency and predictability in the workplace add to that comfort. Unexpected change usually produces a shock wave in employee thinking. Threat overcomes clear thought and resistance results. Again, information is key and timing is important. When the organizational leadership provides the work force with advance information about impending changes, they also provide time for individuals to understand how the change may affect them, to ask questions, and to adjust their thinking. Additionally, the notion that "management is trying to keep something from us" is avoided. Advance information provides time to adjust to the new ways and to understand how the change may actually be beneficial.

Individual Competence

As pointed out earlier, the introduction of change must be accomplished with a view toward how the change will impact on previous strategies,

thrusts, or behavioral norms. Frequently, newly appointed managers will attempt to introduce new policies or activities which conflict with "the way things are." Many who will be affected by the change may have been instrumental in designing the current state and thus receive the message that what they have been doing is wrong. Embarrassment and loss of face lead to resistance. This situation may be coupled with a concern that the impending change may threaten individual competence because individuals will have to learn new skills. Comfort levels will be taxed as people learn to operate new equipment and follow new procedures. Those previously regarded as highly competent may feel foolish and embarrassed as they make the normal mistakes of a beginner.

It is important that management pay attention to individual feelings as change is implemented. By acknowledging the relevance of past strategies, thrusts, and procedures to the then-current situation, management can more easily gain the attention of those who designed and implemented the previous state in order to demonstrate how changing situations require the implementation of new ways. When the fear of losing face is overcome, individuals are more ready to listen and to demonstrate their flexibility by committing to what is required for the good of the organization. As people demonstrate their support of the change, they must be provided the education and training required by the change. When new skills must be learned, individuals must be given time to practice, to gain confidence, and to become comfortable with new routines or new ways of operating. And this education, training, and practice time must be provided during the normal workday.

The transition from old to new must be scheduled so that the employee is not required to continue to fulfill all the requirements of the old way while, at the same time, learning the new. The transition from old to new requires careful timing and planning. It is a time of extra effort, frustration, and stress. During this time managers need to remain attentive to individuals and to provide reinforcement and support. Rewards must be provided for accomplishment. Frequent "atta-boys" are a means of gaining added commitment from the individual.

Putting It All Together

In the organizational setting, change comes from a variety of directions. Technology, the law, education, new communications systems and techniques, planning teams, and outside change agents are all powerful vehicles for introducing change in organizations. The specific change to be introduced to a particular organization normally evolves from a top team strategy planning session or from an idea or vision of the top executive. However the change is conceived and implemented, it will fall by the wayside unless it is embodied into the organization's policies, procedures, and reward systems.

Alerting the Organization

Regardless of how the change is conceived, it is imperative that word of the impending change be circulated throughout the organization as soon as possible. Even sketchy information is better than none. People in organizations want to know what is going on that might affect them. Not only is it important that employees be alerted to the fact that change is going to occur, but they also need to hear the reasons behind the proposed change. The earlier that employees understand how new circumstances, events, or requirements dictate the necessity for a new way of doing business, the easier it will be to gain their commitment.

As the rank and file of the organization is alerted to the change, particular attention must be given to the organization's stakeholders, those key individuals who possess the power either to help or hinder the implementation of change. The support of these individuals must be gained early in order to expedite the process.

As pointed out earlier, almost any change is bound to encounter resistance. One of the best ways to overcome resistance is to provide accurate information about what is going on. Resistance is primarily the result of fear—fear of loss, fear of the unknown, fear of not being able to cope, etc. Information which lessens or eliminates fear helps to gain the support of individuals when the new way poses no threat to them personally.

Support From the Top

Another critical factor in the successful implementation of change is the visible support of the change by the chief executive and the top management team. It is important that they demonstrate their commitment by providing employees the time to disengage from the present to learn new skills and procedures required in the future, by rewarding individual achievement, and by embodying the new way into the organization's policies, procedures, and reward systems.

Another key mark of executive commitment surrounds the assignment and support provided to the individual selected to champion the imple-

mentation of the change. Whether this individual is designated the transition manager or some other title, it is important that he have direct access to the boss, authority to speak for the organization, and access to the resources required to implement the change. This is particularly important because, in most cases, once the final change decision is made, the executive will turn his attention to other matters. He will expect his change manager to get the job done and, because he has confidence in the individual selected to accomplish the implementation, will only check periodically to assure that progress is being made.

Summary

Change is prevasive in our society and a fact of life in today's organizations. Whether change originates in the corporate planning room or from a seedling idea in the mind of the chief executive, a number of predictable events occur, each of which impacts on the successful implementation and sustainment of the change. Leaders are trained to make things happen in organizations, but often fail to recognize the importance of the link between change and human behavior. It is the human element which helps or hinders the successful implementation of change. And it is the consultant who has been trained to understand human behavior and the reasons why individuals resist change that can help our senior leaders keep our organizations pointed in the right direction to accomplish the tasks which lie before them.

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

Organization Development: A Management Function

by Lieutenant Colonel Michael R. Perrault

The demands for a manager's time are increasing. To deny this is to deny a reality of the workplace. The very computers that were to provide the manager more control over decisions and time have frequently expanded the demand for time and often complicated the decision-making process through the creation of vast amounts of previously unavailable information.

In addition to the increasing competition for time, organizations and their leaders face an ever-quickening rate of change in the general society. Many would suggest that our institutions have not kept pace with that rate of change and would offer that organizations which do not change from within, at the same rate and direction as the larger society within which they operate, are doomed to failure. General Donn A. Starry concludes in a recent article: "The need to change will ever be with us. We may have analyzed the process, framed in its essential parameters, and made some considerable progress toward arming ourselves with systemic mechanisms to permit change to take place. But that in no way ensures either that change will occur or that it will be an easy, orderly process."[1]

New Technology

Our Army is not insulated from the society within which it functions. New technology alone continues to force changes on organizational structure and style. If we are to learn from history, then we should heed another quote from the same Starry article. The general illustrates the natural reluctance to change through a discussion of the development of the tank in the 1920s and 1930s and refers to the Edward Katzenbach paper "The Horse Cavalry in the 20th Century" as follows:

> "The Army of the most mechanized nation on earth came to the threshold of World War II firmly wedded to strategy, operational art, and tactics deeply rooted in the 19th century."[2]

Can we deny that the Army is becoming increasingly more dependent on advanced technology? One only has to review the substantial number of new weapons systems scheduled to be integrated in the mainstream Army in the coming years to recognize the pressures commanders will endure. Experience tells us that in many fields that depend on advanced technology, the manager often lacks the knowledge to monitor, let alone direct, the flow of work. In the not-too-distant future, commanders will have a substantial number of subordinates who are far more technically qualified than the commander to operate the systems now being introduced.

Not only is technology expanding at an increasingly rapid rate, but we are also experiencing a simultaneous dramatic change in the basic psychological wants and needs of the individuals in our society—the same individuals who join our armed forces.

An examination of the individual is necessary because the worker in the civilian workplace is the soldier in the company, battalion, or division. The challenge to lead him is substantial and increasing as his needs, wants, and demands are clear—he wants more participation in the decisions that affect him. Numerous studies conducted in the US in the late 1970s and early 1980s not only confirmed that a majority of American workers felt that it was their right to participate in the decisions affecting them, but when they did so participate they worked harder and were more productive.[3] What available data suggests the soldier is somehow inherently different, driven by differing motivations, and inspired by differing leadership styles than his civilian counterpart? His counterpart who graduated from high school the same year was molded by the same TV programs, influenced by the same news stories, and cheered the same heroes. We, like it or not, are faced with making serious, long-term decisions regarding how we can most effectively lead and manage our soldiers and their organizations. The single most unique and critical difficulty underlying this issue is that we expect of our soldier the same as what has been expected of soldiers throughout history: to be willing to sacrifice all that he holds dear for some cause or reason far removed from his personal experience. His willingness to do so depends, to some great degree, on the competencies of his leaders. Our problem, therefore, is more complex than that experienced by our forbearers. Are we properly prepared, organized, and motivated to control, manage, and lead our Army through this period of tumult?

The social reforms won in the 1960s have affected legal interference within business and government. Fordyce and Weil suggest the power and influence of various citizens and political action groups have shaped the character of leadership and management of America's institutions.[4] The values as suggested earlier of the new worker who grew up following these reforms are different than those who built the institutions of the country. Doyle and Straus define the eroding of the traditional foundation of the manager as "the lateralization of power."[5] In *The Change Masters*, Rosabeth Moss Kanter refers to this ongoing sociological phenomena and discusses transforming management's role as follows:

> "The changing corporate environment...is also reflected in the critical management tasks inside organizations, the context in which people do their work. The infallibility of management...and the predictability of management careers have declined, but the potential of the rest of the work force for contributing...has increased...the past is an increasingly less appropriate guide to the future...the unquestioned authority of managers in the corporation of the past has been replaced by the need for negotiations and...by the need for managers to persuade rather than order, and by the need to acknowledge the expertise of those below. In short...managers must learn, in this new environment, how both to acquire and to share power."[6]

The changes Kanter refers to, coupled with those brought about by an expanding technological base, will converge on the Army leader/manager. They will demand a leader/manager with considerable more skill than that traditionally required. A proactive, creative response to the pressures identified above must address the whole organizational network and must focus management on helping the organization to be efficient, effective, and healthy when coping with change.

Henri Fayol[7] and Luther Gulick[8] provide the most frequently referenced and traditional descriptors of management functions: planning, directing, organizing, controlling, coordinating, and resourcing. To help Army leaders and managers become more adept at handling these previously identified challenges, this list of functions needs to be expanded to include organization development (OD), or as we in the Army refer to it, organizational effectiveness (OE).

Understanding Organizational Effectiveness

To attempt to understand OE by a shorthand definition, focusing myopically on a single selected purpose or process, is to deny its essential comprehensive character. Simplicity is appealing, but can be misleading. Too broad a perspective means OD encompasses everything a manager does and that is equally inaccurate. OD may be thought of as a normative process.[9] In all the discussions of OD, there appears a set of related thoughts which seem to encompass the character of the discipline. It suggests attaining and maintaining optimum levels of performance, efficiency, effectiveness, and organizational health. It speaks to a relationship between the individual and the organization—an integration of the two—a climate which stimulates both individual and organizational growth and in which climate and problem-solving capacities are maximized. Managers in an OD-conscious environment recognize they are equally as responsible for the organization as they are for developing the organization. They have a sense of self and a sense of the organization and they understand the relationship between the two.

For years OD/OE consultants have referred to themselves as change agents. Westcott and Gelinas clearly refute this when they state that the agent of change is the manager.[10] Another manner of stating the same thing is to say OD/OE doesn't work—managers do! (A much less clear message is the OD/OE insistence that the OD/OE intervention cannot effectively be conducted without the direct and obvious involvement and support of the top executive/manager.) Westcott and Gelinas go on to say that the consultant provides the manager (change agent) only with assistance in clarifying what changes are needed and how to bring them about.[11]

Management by wandering around (MBWA), process management, quality circles, and getting down with the troops are all labels that define a particular management style. They all seem to imply some form of collaboration between management and worker. This style of management, performed intuitively by many, appears to be a goal of the OD consultant and seems to meet the demands of the new worker. As suggested earlier, it appears that now may be the time to make OD/OE a line management function that is not only taught to all prospective managers but upon which their evaluations are based. The ability to view an organization from a systems perspective, the knowledge and skills associated with facilitating a group of people, and the awareness of self and how that affects relations with others cannot but help a manager be more successful. Because of

the frequent crises with which managers are faced, they often seek the assistance of a third party to resolve the immediate issue and often overlook the long-term implications of the problem and its solutions. A fundamental grounding in OD/OE and prior experience as a consultant should serve the manager faced with such a crisis to think and react more systemically, and such long-term thinking and planning might keep the problem from ever reaching the crisis stage. American management needs to rethink its approach to problem solving. The current approach rewards quick fixes, short-term payoffs, and decisive action. Organization development/organizational effectiveness are discouraged because of the investment of time and energy required, particularly by those managers at the top and middle level.

Integrating Organization Development

An interesting managerial experiment initiated several years ago at a San Francisco Bay area hospital serves as a potential approach to integrating OD skills into the manager's repertoire. Each of the five department directors is required to devote between one third and one half of his annual time to OD consulting in a department other than his own. Interviews with one of the directors indicate a very positive response to the practice. All of the incumbent directors were polled, and although there was some reluctance to attempt the plan, there was general agreement to go forward. The preliminary consultant training was limited and was provided by the resident chief of human resource management and internal OD consultant. All requests for OD consultant operations were to remain voluntary, but there was a strong emphasis to use fellow directors to help work through organizational issues. As might be expected, the number of requests was low at first, but as the affected individuals gained increased familiarity, both with being a consultant and using a consultant, the work load rose substantially. The natural reluctance to share problems and concerns with other managers decreased as each learned they all shared common fears, problems, and issues. Concurrently, they also were quick to benefit from learning, on an intimate basis, what was going on in other departments. By studying the effect of management style on the organization, they intensified their own sense of self-awareness, and some found themselves changing their own leadership style. Their frequent absence from the office had a spin-off effect of developing the managerial skills and experiences of their immediate subordinates. There was also considerably enhanced communication between all the directors and throughout the entire hospital.[12]

The lessons learned from this experiment need not be duplicated, but do warrant further analysis to determine if those managers with more fully integrated OD knowledge and skills are more successful, as managers, over the long term. Making OD part of the manager's job forces the line manager to involve himself directly in making the organization more effective. It also may reduce the tendency of some managers to turn over to the consultant the responsibility to make changes happen in the organization. It pinpoints that responsibility where it properly belongs and may more clearly define the role of the consultant as the person who only helps plan and program the changes. It remains the manager's responsibility to develop the organization. There is an obvious difficulty in adding OD as a line management function because so few managers are skilled and knowledgeable in OD to a sufficient degree to perform adequately. This lack of experience in collaborative problem-solving processes, facilitating skills, general organization processes, and systemic thinking, to name only a few, can be overcome through training and consulting experience. Organizations may also be encouraged to hire or assign individuals with OD consulting backgrounds to key managerial positions.

Practicing OD consultants, both internal and external, may be concerned that making OD a line management function will decrease the demand for their services. Limited experience with Army organizational effectiveness staff officers (OESO) who have been assigned to traditional management positions following their tour as OESOs suggests an increased propensity on their part to use consultants. Their previous experience as consultants appears to have taught them the merit of the third-party role.

If the benefit and potential of integrating OD/OE into a line manager's functions and responsibilities can be realized, the future for managers, consultants, and, ultimately, organizations can be particularly hopeful. □

Notes

[1] Starry, Gen. Donn A., "To Change an Army," *Military Review*, March 1983, p. 27.

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[9] McGill, Michael E., *Organization Development for Operating Managers*, New York: AMACOM, 1977.

[10] Gelinas and Westcott.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Notes from the American Society Training Development Conference, San Antonio, Texas, 1982.

A 1977 graduate of OECS, **Lt. Col. Michael R. Perrault** is currently serving there as director of the school secretary. He has a B.S. degree in business administration from Norwich University at Northfield, Vt., and an M.S. degree in psychological counseling from Indiana State University at Terre Haute. Lt. Col. Perrault has had two previous organizational effectiveness assignments.

Are You Prepared for Success?

by Major James C. Sandefer

Everyone talks about success, but relatively few ever strategically plan for its attainment. This is due in part to a misconception that you either make it or you don't. . .whatever will be will be. . . and nothing could be further from the truth.

The problem is that effective planning for success is just plain hard work. Planning in the detail required for quantifiable, day-to-day success requires far more effort than most are willing to expend. There are a few, however, who are willing to pay the price to reach the crest of the hill.

Preparing for success requires *intuitive thinking, imagination,* and *persistence.* First, to be an intuitive thinker you must have mastered all the basic skills at your present occupational level. Seat-of-the-pants success is short lived and won't bluff those seasoned superiors who evaluate and select potential leaders within the organization. But knowing your job isn't enough. You must also practice placing yourself one or two levels above your current position. For example, view your job from the perspective of the supervisor. By evaluating your organizational contributions from a higher level, you will begin to see the "big picture," and that is an essential requirement for moving up the ladder to success.

Next, your imagination must be developed and exercised frequently. Don't restrain your thoughts and ideas to only those held by your predecessors or peers. Let your imagination cultivate ideas limitlessly; then analytically sift through this wealth of information for the appropriate mixture of old and new solutions and innovations. Gain a reputation as a problem solver, not a problem seeker. Leave the latter responsibility to the mediocre muddlers.

Finally, you must be persistent. Success is attained by those who generate constant activity. Gain your experience and know-how from actual problem confrontation and resolution. Welcome obstacles as learning opportunities but contemplate only successful outcomes. Enhance your self-confidence by competing against your self and your goals, not those imposed upon you by someone else.

In summary, preparing for success requires more than luck. It requires intuitive thinking, imagination, and persistence. Master these three fundamentals and you will be prepared for success. □

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He has a B.A. in public administration from Upper Iowa University at Fayette; an M.A. in personnel management from the University of Oklahoma at Norman; and a Ph.D. in personnel management from Columbia University, New York.

His military schools include Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kan.; Military Police Officer Basic and Advanced Courses at Fort Gordon, Ga., and Fort McClellan, Ala., respectively; Transportation Officer Basic Course at Fort Eustis, Va.; and Infantry Officer Basic Course at Fort Benning, Ga.

Organizational Effectiveness and the National Guard

An Interview with Major General Raymond A. Matera

by **Major Teddy W. Pylant**

(Maj. Gen. Matera is the Adjutant General of Wisconsin. Recently elected president of the National Guard Association of the United States, he became Adjutant General in July 1979.)



The National Guard Bureau (NGB) Organizational Effectiveness (OE) Program was established in 1980 to assist the 54 states and territories and field commanders to improve readiness.

The National Guard has three OE regional centers: The Eastern Center (Edgewood, Md.); the Central Center (Little Rock, Ark.); and the Western Center (Portland, Ore.). Eleven OE staff officers are assigned to these centers and travel extensively serving their respective areas.

OE is a voluntary, non-compliance program wherein specially trained National Guard officers provide the requesting commander or manager with outside, objective views of the organization. By definition, OE is the systematic military application of selected management, behavioral, and systems science skills and methods to improve how the total organization functions to accomplish assigned missions and increase combat readiness.

Maj. Pylant: In what ways has the National Guard OE team been of assistance to you and to the Wisconsin National Guard?

Maj. Gen. Matera: Soon after I became Adjutant General, your people came up from Little Rock at my request and did an assessment of our state headquarters. They identified some areas of concern that I had sensed—they were in line with my perceptions. I still have that data book the team prepared for me. I refer to it occasionally to ensure we are staying on the right track.

Following that assessment, the team helped plan and facilitate a conference with all the key headquarters director staff of the Wisconsin Guard. We gained some very important benefits from that conference. We experienced improved communications both internally in the headquarters and out to the units in the field. I believe that helped develop an atmosphere of openness in our headquarters that resulted in improved morale and effectiveness.

We identified the need for better communications between our headquarters and our field units, the National Guard Bureau, and the regular Army readiness groups. Our directors started traveling a good deal more in order to personally meet with their counterparts and to determine ways they could be of assistance. In the process, we developed more cordial working relationships and improved readiness.

I became the Adjutant General after having been national sales manager of a manufacturing firm. Our company was a successful, growing company which regularly employed civilian organizational development (OD) consultants to give it an outside perspective in order to improve effectiveness and profits. After the OD consultants first came in, our company experienced dramatic increases in business because of improved communications, additional product lines, and a restructuring of our staff. I was totally sold on the value of outside consultants.

You people on the National Guard Bureau OE team do things a little different than civilian consultants, but the results are equally good in my opinion. Your team has done an excellent job for the Wisconsin National Guard.

Maj. Pylant: What are some measurable benefits that you attribute to the various OE operations conducted here in Wisconsin?

Maj. Gen. Matera: The number of units with a higher "C" rating (readiness status) has increased; unit strength has increased from 82 to 94 percent; turnover has been reduced; and complaints among the recruiting and retention force have been reduced. Less measurable, but real just the same, is increased credibility of our headquarters among our units, at the National Guard Bureau, and with the readiness groups. Our units respond more rapidly. The NGB and the readiness groups respond more rapidly to our requests than they used to. I believe this improvement can be attributed to a greatly increased travel schedule on the part of our directorate staff—the need for which was identified by that original OE assessment.

We have also revamped our reward system and revitalized our recognition and education programs as a result of the recent OE survey you did this year.

Following that survey, we developed a professional briefing to show each new employee here at state headquarters as a part of their orientation. The employees indicated that they wanted to know more about the Wisconsin National Guard and that if they did, they would be able to help explain the Guard story to their friends and neighbors and the people they interact with in other branches of state government. When you consider the number of civilian employees we have, the additional public awareness generated can be significant.

Maj. Pylant: What do you see as the role of the OE team in the future of the Wisconsin National Guard?

Maj. Gen. Matera: With the manpower pool shrinking and the economy improving, you can continue assisting me and the various unit commanders to find better ways to identify problem areas and help generate fresh ideas from our people to deal with them. Several of my major command commanders have used your OE services and, I understand, are pleased with the results. We have encouraged the use of your expertise and will continue to do so in the future. Just get up here to Wisconsin and see us more.

Maj. Pylant: Thank you, sir, we look forward to that opportunity. □

Maj. Gen. Raymond A. Matera joined the Air National Guard in 1954. Since that time, he has served as fighter pilot, air operations officer, squadron commander, and group operations officer. He also was director of operations for the 128th Air Defense Wing at Truax Field, Madison, Wis.; chief of staff for Headquarters, Air National Guard; and chairman of the Air Reserve Forces Policy Board. His military schools include the Air University and the Air War College, both at Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala. Maj. Gen. Matera is currently serving as Adjutant General for Wisconsin.

Maj. Teddy W. Pylant is an OESO in the National Guard Bureau's Central Regional Office at Little Rock, Ark. A graduate of the OECS, Maj. Pylant has a B.S. degree in journalism and history from Arkansas State University at Jonesboro and is working on a master's degree from Webster University at St. Louis, Mo. Maj. Pylant was an Arkansas National Guardsman for 22 years; an engineer advisor, platoon leader, and acting company commander in Vietnam; and an account executive for a television station prior to his present active duty tour.

Life is no brief candle to me. It is a sort of splendid torch which I have got hold of for the moment, and I want to make it burn as brightly as possible before handing it on to future generations. **—George Bernard Shaw**

No man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the continent, a part of the main. **—John Donne**

The finest eloquence is that which gets things done. **—David Lloyd George**

Retaining the Future: Retention in High-Performance National Guard Units

by Lieutenant Colonel Darry D. Eggleston

Thomas Berry said, "The earth has six basic qualities: It is self-energizing, self-nourishing, self-educating, self-governing, self-healing, and self-fulfilling. To be successful, all professions must see that their own organizational models work according to this larger ecological pattern."[1]

High-performing units in the National Guard have high retention rates because they incorporate these six qualities into their operational behavior.

A *high-performance organization* consistently accomplishes missions, has a high retention rate, and is recognized by other peer-level organizations as being a pacesetter.

A *high performer* is recognized by superiors, peers, and subordinates as being innovative, dynamic, and consistently successful in duty performance. This individual has high personal standards of conduct and appearance, a clear vision of a created future, and the personal power to motivate others to emulate such performance.

This article is based on observations and surveys while providing organizational effectiveness consulting services in 39 companies, 20 battalions, 4 brigades, and 7 state headquarters in the majority of East Coast states during the last three years. These National Guard units included combat arms, combat support, and combat service support. High-performance units composed 32 percent of that number.

Organizational Model

In Training Circular 26-1, *Commander's Guide to Organizational Effectiveness,* the US Army uses an organizational model with five categories: unit climate, supervisory leadership, work group process, co-worker interaction, and effects upon personnel (Figure 1). That model will be used to demonstrate how high-performance units are achieving such high retention of quality personnel.

Unit climate includes the general atmosphere, motivation, communication flow, decision making, integration of members, and identification with the unit. Herein the unit will *energize* itself.

Supervisory leadership includes goal emphasis, work facilitation, influence, and support of



Figure 1
Organizational Indices

the chain of command. It also measures how well the chain of command operates as a team. It is the responsibility of the chain of command to *govern* and to *educate* unit members.

The **work group process** measures coordination, readiness, discipline, communication, and cooperation within work groups. "Work group" refers to section, squad, or whatever element the soldier normally operates within (not necessarily the one to which he is assigned). Here the *healing* process occurs.

Co-worker interaction measures teamwork, support, work facilitation, and peer influence within a work group. This is the element that provides *fulfilling* qualities.

Finally, **effects upon personnel** measures attitudes. It is within this element that *nourishing* succeeds.

Unit Climate: Energizing

High-performance National Guard units focus upon *purpose* and *people*. There is a recognition that the mission comes before the people, but acceptance that without people, the mission can never be accomplished. One organization refers to "mission first; people always."

Commanders in these units ensure they and their chain of command understand and support the purpose of the organization. This does not mean that an infantry unit's purpose is to "kill, capture, or destroy the enemy, his equipment, etc.," that is, unless it is currently doing so.

A unit's purpose is that which it must do to accomplish its "reason for being." For example, one brigade headquarters decided its purpose was "assigned and attached National Guard units prepared for state or federal mobilization." Note that the purpose statement is an end state, not an activity. Missions are activities to accomplish the purpose of organizations.

Once the purpose is understood, it is published, focused upon, and reinforced in all organizational endeavors. It is a norm in high-performance units to see the purpose statement on the unit bulletin board or, more frequently, on the wall above the drill hall.

When receiving missions that do not appear to be purpose oriented, these commanders provide feedback to the next higher headquarters. Commanders of the next higher headquarters encourage such feedback. (More about feedback later.)

High-performance units reward *people* and *performance*. More and more units are welcoming new members through induction exercises. As you may know, a new recruit is recruited by a full-time recruiter, sworn in by a unit officer, sent to initial training, and returned to his unit where, for the first time, he meets the soldiers with whom he will serve.

Some units hold a special ceremony. Unlike most military formations, the inductee (not the commander) faces the troops. The soldier then takes the oath, facing the members with whom he

will serve. This *bonding* creates a special feeling of mutual support between the current members and the new member. Both feel an allegiance to support one another.

Whatever the ceremony, in these units spouses are normally invited and encouraged to attend. More and more units are photographing ceremonies with one copy of the photo going to the unit activity board and one copy given to members by their immediate supervisors. (This increases the bonding process.)

The *unit activity board rewards performance.* High-performing units display photographs of recent assemblies, not of obscure activities from yesteryear. The majority of photographs are simply regular 35mm or 110mm. The important thing is that I found unit members viewing and discussing the "war stories" behind each picture.

One Special Forces unit has a special board. Across the top is " 'Ask not what your country can do for you but what you can do for your country.' ...John F. Kennedy." Photos of unit members on this board recognize those who make a special contribution to the unit.

High-performing commanders recognize the need to reward both the *individual* and the *team.* Individual reward systems include feedback on good performance, placing responsibility upon individuals based upon capability (not rank), and displaying photos on activity boards.

Probably the most effective reward system I ever saw was instituted by Maj. Darrell Putman, a recruiting and retention manager with the Maryland National Guard.[2] After visiting his recruiters and retainers at their offices, he devised a most effective system to reward performance. Those who had many photos of themselves involved in military events were rewarded with a photograph of them involved in a military event. Those who took great effort to wear military ribbons were rewarded with military awards and decorations. Those who had plaques of accomplished feats were rewarded with plaques. The secret to his success was that he rewarded each performer with a reward that meant something to that person. The increased performance of his recruiting and retention team demonstrated that this management method, among others he used, works.

In high-performance organizations, team rewards include wearing team T-shirts during physical training (PT), recognizing and using team nicknames, and assigning missions by teams, not individuals.

Units perform PT as team-building exercises. Teams are encouraged to compete in the three exercises of the new test. The winners are determined by the total team score. On a team, it is not enough to be a superstar if you cannot aid your teammates in improving their performances.

Other activities that are physically demanding are created for some competitive games. But the main thing is that the training has a team, not just an individual, focus.

Finally, these commanders provide feedback to the next higher headquarters. They let their boss know what effect the behavior of his headquarters is having upon the unit. A direct cause-effect description is usually given.

When these commanders question the correlation between assigned missions and the purpose of the unit, commanders at higher levels are quick to explain or, in many cases, rescind the requirement. It appears such feedback is more beneficial to the higher commander than to the unit itself. By getting such open and honest feedback, senior commanders can make better, more informed decisions and better utilize the scarce resources at their disposal.

Of the trends requiring attention by higher headquarters, two are most overwhelming. Neither is a problem; they are both symptoms of the problem. (More about that later.)

The first is the need to minimize inspections. The inspection that takes two hours to conduct frequently takes up to three times that amount of time for preparation. By combining inspections, higher elements discover just as much, but they free subordinate units to pursue their primary purpose.

High-performing commanders insist upon coordination with the unit to be inspected, rather than arbitrarily picking a date, to ensure inspections do not interfere with activities that might not show on the training schedule but which are important to the unit.

I include the Army training and evaluation program (ARTEP) in the list of inspections. Very few organizations in either the Active or the Reserve Components are really using the ARTEP to sharpen skills; too many experience it being used like the old Army training test (ATT). Failure of an ARTEP is tantamount to failure of command.

In response to this "ATT attitude," commanders are less willing to be innovative in tactical problem solving, but rather rely upon the same old, overly-used tactics that the bored troops have experienced for the last five exercises.



Figure 2
Winner's Wheel

High-performance commanders *make it safe to fail.* Their emphasis is upon learning: entering and staying within the wheel of success. Success breeds a better self-image. A better self-image builds self-confidence. Self-confidence generates enthusiasm. Enthusiasm creates the resulting success. And thus the wheel rolls on. A high performer enjoys success and works harder to ensure others experience and enjoy it too (Figure 2).

One commander even told his subordinate commanders that they had already passed their ARTEP so they were able to relax and try new techniques. Their resulting performance was markedly better than any previous performances.

The second concern I found is the need to *reduce the paperwork* required to accomplish unit missions. Many reactive headquarters rely upon directives, followed by memos of clarification, superseded by changes, followed by new directives ad infinitum. Conferences, where face-to-face communication might occur, are cancelled to save money. That money can then be spent on the volumes required to clarify that which could have been concluded in a short, two-way conversation.

The amount of paper does not equal the degree of success.

Some commanders require first-line supervisors to carry "pocket lesson plans" with them at all times. Unfortunately, these plans are created by someone else and mean little to the leaders themselves. I found the vast majority never use them but do carry them around. (This is similar to the requirement to carry 13 cards in our pocket in Vietnam. We were to carry them at all times. They were supposed to help. We did; they didn't.)

High-performance leaders recognize that words have no meaning; only people do. Lesson plans written by anyone other than the person who is to use them are useless. It looks good if "looking" good rather than performance is the planned outcome. A plan is useless until it is turned into action.

Many of these high-performance units are able to substantially reduce their paperwork through the use of organizational effectiveness services provided by the three National Guard regional centers. Because these services provide unit-specific data only to the commander of that unit, it removes fear of retribution.

Neither the amount of inspections nor the dimensions of the paper glacier are the problem. They are both symptoms of the problem.

A command that must rely upon unannounced, sneak inspections and wallpapering in- and out-baskets has a serious problem with unit climate. Somewhere the trust that must exist between teammates is lacking between the senior and the subordinate. If they cannot trust each other, how can they ever trust anyone else?

Lack of trust can permeate a command like a cancer. And just like a cancer, it will grow. Reports become more and more unbelievable. Successes become inflated and failures become overly hidden. Staffs lose touch with the line. Even the bosses begin to rely upon rumor and gossip rather than face-to-face, open and honest feedback to each other.

To convert a troubled command into a high-performance organization, the first event must be a meeting. The new commander must conduct a transition conference, the purpose of which is to meet his s aff and subordinate commanders and allow them to meet each other.

I mean **meet**ing. When I say "meet," I mean getting to know the individual behind the name tags, the walls, and the facades so many hide behind. I have facilitated transition conferences where state headquarters members who have worked "together" for over ten years met for the first time.

To trust people, you must understand their value systems, what the history of their relationships has taught them, and what is the basis for their motivation. Their value system is the sum of their history, their family, their organization, their military occupational specialty, and their job. Their relationships with others has taught each of them different things. It has taught some to trust, some to distrust. But if the causes for those

decisions are never revealed, they will continue to be hidden within their behavior.

The motivation of an individual causes him to excel at something he finds rewarding. A high-performance individual seeks the motivational devices to encourage excellence in others.

A team is built upon a climate of trust. You can never trust someone with whom you do not feel secure.

In reactive, embattled units, the symptoms are excessive paperwork and destructive inspections. The problem is lack of trust.

Supervisory Leadership: Governing and Educating

The main function of the chain of command is to *govern* and to *educate*. To govern, it sets, maintains, and rewards standards. Standards, to be successful, must be necessary, clearly understood, and enforceable. Once established, the leaders must set the example. They must provide rewards and feedback to one another on their own maintenance of standards. Finally, they must reward troops who meet those standards.

We must concentrate upon finding our people doing things right. Rewards *encourage* behavior; punishment *stops* behavior—with limited success.

In high-performance units, leaders can articulate the standards. Their troops laud the leaders' standards and attempt to emulate them. These leaders spend very little time having to correct soldiers' bearing and dress; peers correct each other. Team members build upon each other.

The chain of command must understand the purpose of the organizations and establish priorities to reach it. Then the leadership must organize itself and its resources to accomplish those priorities.

The chain of command must educate itself and its followers. This is the strength of units with high retention. Great care is taken to ensure that information is shared. Leaders emphasize mission accomplishment through teamwork and striving to give one's best effort. Their time is divided among teaching technical knowledge, supervising leadership development of their followers, and assisting team members in planning for the future.

High-performance leaders recognize that personnel retention is not a problem; it is a symptom of a problem. That problem lies within the organization; it cannot be solved by the full-time retention force (although that force can assist). For example, a combat arms brigade was having a morale "problem" that threatened to create a retention "problem." (Both were really symptoms of the problem.) This brigade had a history of excelling, but had in the last few months experienced difficulties and a lower retention rate that were both attributed to poor morale.

The brigade commander was a robust, gung ho warrior who delighted in telling his troops and anyone else who would listen how this brigade could win in a European battle scenario. His troops always got motivated by his speeches, comments, and asides. And yet there was this retention problem. All of a sudden, low ranking troops were talking about getting out of the brigade headquarters.

The state recruiting and retention manager was aware of both the morale and the retention problem, but had not been able to offer much aid to the brigade.

An organizational effectiveness team was called. It conducted interviews of all unit personnel during one of the unit's typical winter assemblies. While interviewing the unit's E1-E4 troops, I asked, "What is not going well in this headquarters?"

The soldiers immediately responded, "We don't go to the field in winter!!! The Old Man (the brigade commander) always talks about a war in Europe. We are always training for a war in Europe, but never in the winter. *Everybody knows* about the winters in Europe! We don't go to the field 'cause they're afraid of hurting the vehicles. How come we can't go to the field in the winter and train like the Old Man promises?"

The same comments came from lower-ranked NCOs.

It turned out that the staff had recommended and the colonel had decided to stay in the armory during winter to "give the troops a break." His speeches talked of suffering and surviving, but then winning. His decision prevented them from training in the weather "*everybody knows*" exists in Europe. They felt confused, alienated, and rated second to a bunch of trucks. (Anytime there is conflict between what is said and what is being done, there are confusion and turmoil.) Every issue creating low retention stemmed from this one decision.

The colonel, a true high performer, changed his policy. Retention rebounded. (The next time you are doing the troops a "favor," check to find out what "*everybody knows*" first.)

High-performance leaders encourage lower-ranking personnel to give formal instruction. Each is assigned an assistant instructor (normally his team leader) to aid in development. During classes, all leaders are used to assist in hands-on, experiential training.

(I would grant that an ego can be injured by having an E3 giving the instruction and an E7 assisting. NCOs discover it allows them more interpersonal communicating with the team members and frees them to focus on leadership, not mechanics.)

Unit training must be experiential. The old Chinese proverb holds true:

"Tell me, I will forget.
Show me, I will remember.
Involve me and I will understand."

The education process in these units is such that members take great pride in their unit. They know what their unit crests symbolize and can recite major aspects of the unit history. I did not find this knowledge among lower-ranked personnel in units having problems with retention. If a member cannot identify with a team, he will not remain a member of that team for long.

Needless to say, it is the NCO Corps that moves these high-performing teams. They do it through self-governing and self-educating their teams.

Work Group Process: Healing

Role clarity and *mutual support* exist in high-performance units. By role clarity, I mean knowing what others expect of the individual, understanding what he expects of himself, and fulfilling those expectations that are possible. Team members know what to expect of each other.

These team members encourage each other to perform to the maximum extent possible, to give their best effort. Their uniforms, equipment, appearance, and bearing seem markedly better than those of soldiers in other units. Most of this is accomplished through actively listening to each other and providing feedback—both positive and negative.

Herein lies the power to self-heal. No matter how hard one tries, there will be times when the pressures build or when the capabilities one brings to bear are just not sufficient to overcome the difficulties of the task. It is at these times that the high-performance individuals come to the rescue of their troubled comrades and offer the necessary comfort to heal the wounds of defeat, rekindle the spark of motivation, and aid the partner to begin again to maximize his contributions to the team.

Due to the amount of leadership potential that their leaders tap within each of them, they seem more able to lead each other to higher performance.

Co-worker Interaction: Fulfilling

The one significant thing about these troops is *they know the missions they are trying to accomplish.* They know what is expected of them and the rewards for doing it. (They do not refer to the punishments for not doing what is expected, only the rewards for doing it. This is definitely different from the reactive units I visited.)

Supplies and equipment, within the capability of the units, are made available. The members seem particularly adept at obtaining supplies not available. They seem to delight in improvising replacements for those items they cannot get, as if it is just another challenge to ingenuity.

The predominant concern of these troops is team building. It is recognized that if they have a strong team, each can magnify his strengths and count upon his partners to overcome his weaknesses. When missions are not carried out in the manner to which team members are accustomed, they discuss what went well, what did not go well, and what changes are necessary to improve performance.

The performance of these teams and their retention rate of quality members are far superior to those of other units. The members of these teams form friendships that grow between, as well as during, assemblies. I consider this nourishing relationships.

Effects On Personnel: Nourishing

The team focus of these units is greatly aided by their *socializing*. Units which have and use enlisted clubs tend to be much more bonded together as people (more than just soldiers). Many of these units include spouses among those welcomed into the clubs after assembly hours.

The conduct of a "unit day" seems to have much appeal to the team members. Although I initially thought it would be very disruptive to training, I found that such days fostered greater efforts to contribute.

Challenges, such as competing by teams in the physical fitness test, timed establishment of defensive perimeters, and timed setting up and simulated firing of artillery pieces, give the crews valuable training and impress their families. These teams give 100 percent effort. Their rewards go far beyond the small trophies the units can afford to give them.

In these organizations, unit trophies are out where the troops can view and show them off, not in some supply room or worse, in a unit commander's private office. Trophies to be appreciated must be shared.

One service support unit found that the unit jogging through the local community, rather than just around the armory, has two immediate gains. First, the troops quit falling out of the runs; their pride does not let them. Second, local home owners begin to become more interested and to brag about "their" National Guard unit. Additionally, the chants and cadences associated with unit runs act as team-building mechanisms.

Parties and picnics held by unit members tend to include many of their friends from the unit. When asked if their friends encourage them to stay in the Guard, they reply, "Yes." Since their circle of friends is largely drawn from members of their National Guard unit, they naturally encourage them to extend to remain with the team.

These units tap the "larger whole." They include, not exclude, the families in as many events as possible. The families become a supportive auxiliary to the recognized military tables of organization and equipment (MTOE) unit.

In several units, I found bulletin boards where members could post items for sale, non-unit activities they thought others might be interested in, and just about any other item one could imagine.

The emphasis in this socialization process is on inclusion of all members who want to participate. Each makes his own choice, but all belong to the greater whole. *Choices are the basis for team membership; contributing one's best effort to the team is a choice.*

The Role of Organizational Effectiveness

Organizational effectiveness staff officers from the National Guard Bureau's regional centers assist the commanders of these high-performance units. While the role varies, it essentially follows a four-step process: assessment, planning, implementation, and evaluation.

The ***assessment*** includes interviews and, often, a computer-assisted survey. The commander, not the consultant, determines what areas will be studied.

The ***planning*** phase permits the commander to hear and to see the analysis of his unit. No comparison of units or elements within units is made. All information gathered is given to the organization's commander and not to any higher headquarters.

The ***implementation*** phase includes changes being instituted. The commanders and staffs carefully monitor the effects of these actions.

The ***evaluation*** of the operation is made by the commander. He determines what is or is not success.

The key is that the organizational effectiveness staff officer works for the commander. He offers systematic military application of selected management and behavioral science skills and methods to improve the total organization and to accomplish assigned missions and increase readiness.

Summary

High-performance begins with an attitude. It is a philosophy. Simply stated, it is the belief that excellence is achievable in a created future. High performers do not wait and react to what tomorrow brings—they create the events and the rewards of their tomorrows.

A high-performing organization is a team. It is composed of and recognizes unique individuals. It has the capability of using synergy to produce

that which no single member can do alone. It transforms the individual's reference from "I" to "we." It rewards the thinking of the many, not just the few.

These organizations exist in the new National Guard—a National Guard far more ready and better equipped than ever in its history—a National Guard ready to be called and to act in times of emergency.

If you and your organization are not described in this article, now is the time to change. High performers choose to excel. The choice is yours. Make it happen for you. □

Notes

[1] Thomas Berry, "The Spirituality of the Earth," *Tarrytown Letter*, June/July 1984, p. 14.

[2] Major Putman is currently an OESO with the National Guard Bureau, Eastern Regional Center, Edgewood Area, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md.

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A graduate of the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., Lt. Col. Eggleston received a B.A. and an M.A. in business management from the University of Alabama at Birmingham and Central Michigan University at Mount Pleasant respectively.

While conducting surveys upon which his article is based, he was assigned to the National Guard Bureau (NGB) Organizational Effectiveness Eastern Regional Center at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md. He currently is chief of the incentive management team at the NGB at Washington, D.C.

He has 19 years of experience as a trainer and consultant and is the author of several articles on leadership, organizational behavior, and management.



A Management Challenge: The Introduction of Technology Into the Workplace

by Colonel Raymond J. Zugel



In 1980 Alvin Toffler heralded the oncoming "Third Wave" as the "Information Age."[1] In the Army, computers were found only behind the doors of the management information systems office (MISO) or buried in the bowels of some higher headquarters building. There, automatic data processing (ADP) types responded to our requests with voluminous printouts. Our "in boxes" were piled high and staff officers were being overwhelmed with information. In 1982, John Naisbitt listed "...the megashift from an industrial to an information society" as the "more subtle, yet more explosive" transformation of the 10 major transformations taking place in our society.[2] The "in boxes" were piled even higher and the MISO was sending out more paper all the time. By 1983 computers and computer systems were showing up on the desks of action officers at higher head-

quarters, people in the field were talking about tracking tactical unit training on personal computers, and division commanders were asking the Army for more automation.[3]

Now microprocessors are embedded in our equipment and computers are on our desks. On one hand we are being overwhelmed with information and searching for solutions to deal with it. On the other hand the market place is full of relatively cheap, powerful technology. These two trends are coming together with tremendous impact. The answer to our problems seems to be at hand! It is clear that Toffler's "Third Wave" is washing over us; there is change, massive change taking place in the Army.

It is management's responsibility to ensure that technology serves the organization properly.

As this wave has gained momentum, many managers and leaders have been avoiding involvement with automation in any but the most necessary forms, leaving the automation business to those who know it best, the technologist. But experience now shows that the introduction of technology to the workplace is not only the responsibility of technologists. It is a challenge for and the responsibility of management. It is management's responsibility to ensure that technology serves the organization properly. If management does not become properly involved, the consequences to the organization, its processes, and its people can be disastrous and wasteful. A recent study by the Hay Group, a human resource consulting group, indicated that the major problems with automation efforts were lack of proper management, unforeseen organizational disruption, and worker-related problems.[4] Interestingly, the future plans in the organizations surveyed indicated a major emphasis on new technology rather than the management problems discovered. This study and others show that there is a need for someone to be involved who can put the introduction of technology in a proper organizational perspective. That person should be the one responsible for the impact of change on the productivity of the organization—the manager.

This article will provide the responsible manager or staff officer the means to determine when and why to become involved and the methods to use to ensure successful automation efforts.

To understand when it is appropriate to become involved, it is useful to look at each project on two variables: the amount of change expected in how the organization does business and the amount of change expected on the part of the individual worker.



Figure 1
Change Impact Matrix

These variables are shown graphically in Figure 1. The organizational change is represented by the vertical axis and the individual change by the horizontal axis. The descriptors of the quadrants in the matrix indicate how the change should be handled. If a project involves significant change in both axes, it is a strategic change and must get the attention of management. If the project falls in either the lower right or upper left quadrant, management should be involved but may be able to delegate most responsibility to a subordinate while monitoring the change process. If the change is minimal, falling into the lower left corner, there is probably little need for significant management involvement. Once the decision to become involved is made, the question then becomes "How?" The answer can be obtained by using a clear, simple model which is understandable to the manager and the people in the organization. Such a model is described below.

The Change Model

The introduction of technology involves three primary players: the sponsor, the change agent, and the end user.[5]

The sponsor is the person or group that approves the project and provides the resources.

The change agent is the person or group that is charged with the responsibility to design and implement the project.

The end user is the person or group that will use the end product of the project.

The responsibilities of each player are listed below with some of the major problems that each could expect to encounter, along with some suggested techniques for dealing with the problems.

The Sponsor's Role

- Understand and communicate desired results of project.
- Ensure that planning is done to manage the transition state.
- Understand the impact and cost of the change being undertaken.
- Adequately resource the effort.
- Be committed, both publicly and privately.
- Reward desired behavior and deal with resistance.

Potential Problems

- Failure to define desired results in mission-related terms.
- Inadequate involvement in planning.
- Failure to recognize the need for a transition from old to new procedures.
- Failure to understand the impact of change on the organization and the individual employees.
- Applying inadequate personnel to the project.
- Lack of firm commitment as demonstrated by lack of personal involvement in the implementation.
- Unwillingness to recognize and reward proper use of the technology in a systematic and purposeful way.
- Failure to deal directly with subordinates who either resist the implementation or do not actively support it.

Key to the sponsor's role is ensuring that the project has a clear relationship to the organization's mission. Too often the sponsor merely says to "go ahead" with no clear purpose stated other than "We are just getting into the 21st century, trying to improve our productivity." Without a clear statement of how the venture relates to mission accomplishment, employees will be less than willing to use new technology.

The next most important key is the realization of the need to plan the transition. Too frequently, as with the recent Internal Revenue Service difficulties with a new computer system, sponsors

Without a clear statement of *how the venture relates to mission accomplishment, employees will be less than willing to use new technology.*

are anxious to get people "on-line" as quickly as possible.[6] They frequently do not allow or plan for a period of transition during which people are adequately trained, procedures are developed and tested, and technology is checked out to see that it operates as expected. Surprisingly, virtual overnight changes from one system to another are not uncommon. What is not surprising is that most of those changes produce disastrous results when the people, the organization, and the technology are not ready. Following is a list of some of the actions that can be taken by the sponsor to eliminate or reduce the impact of some of the problem:

Positive Actions

- Conduct strategic planning which includes tying the organization's information resource planning and automation initiatives to the mission of the organization.
- Conduct an information systems planning (ISP) or similar study as required by regulations to identify the actual needs and assist in tying the automation initiatives to actual mission requirements.
- Designate a steering committee to monitor progress and make decisions on issues relating to policy and concept of operation.
- Become involved with users and subordinates who supervise using organizations to hear their concerns and ideas.
- Commit to support of the project through behavior, as well as through written and spoken words, and be consistent in that support.
- Ensure that subordinates provide similar behavioral support.
- Ensure that pertinent organizational procedures are altered appropriately and implemented on the new system. (Simple things like weekly status reports or other routine reports are a good starting point.)

The Change Agent

The next player, the person or group that carries out the plan, is the change agent. Major elements of his role are listed below:

The Change Agent's Role

- Understand desired results of the project and direct effort to attain them.
- Use resources effectively.
- Provide feedback to sponsor.
- Help prepare users for the coming change.
- Build support for change among users.
- Involve users in planning and implementation of the change.

Potential Problems

- Failure to understand the relationship of the automation effort to the organization's mission.
- A focus only on technology.
- Unwillingness or inability to provide feedback to the sponsor about anything other than technical issues.
- Lack of willingness to involve users in any but the most superficial way. (What do they know? They do not understand the technology.)
- Inability to speak to users or sponsor without using jargon.
- Internal conflict with traditional ADP departments and their people.

The central problem here is the changing role of ADP personnel. Automation has become more end-user oriented and the focus of automation efforts has shifted from the technologists working their brand of "magic" behind the walls of the data processing center to the relatively unsophisticated end user who has little technical knowledge and even less patience with technologists. To counter this, some organizations have put non-technologists in charge of major automation projects. While this is frequently helpful, the problem still remains because the front-line workers must, of necessity, be technologists, and they are the ones who routinely contact the end-user. The immediate challenge then becomes the need for the supervisor to facilitate the change of the technologist's role. This move can also complicate matters because traditional ADP people may resent the intrusion of non-professionals into their area. Certainly, not all technologists will resist the move to a user orientation or the assignment of a non-technologist as a supervisor, but if they do resist, that resistance can cause serious problems.

The project sponsor should realize this possibility and plan to deal with it. Some specific actions to address the potential problems are listed below.

Positive Actions

- Provide time and resources to build a project team at the beginning of the project.
- Focus the team on gaining an understanding of the desired results from the project: how it will contribute to mission accomplishment.
- Assess the level of potential conflict with traditional ADP departments and personnel and act to resolve conflicts early.
- Provide training for project team members, focusing on customer service and support.
- Require project team involvement with end users as the process goes from needs assessment through project design and implementation.
- Require discussions with end users and organizations on a periodic basis to discover human and organizational issues.
- Require feedback to the sponsor on human and organizational issues that arise during the project.
- Establish, monitor, and assist user groups, focusing on major system software, such as word processing or statistical analysis.



The End User

The next player on the automation stage is the end user. This is clearly the most important player, for no matter how well the project is conceived and implemented, if the end user does not in fact use it, the project is a failure. The responsibilities of the user are more passive than the roles discussed so far, but are as important to the ultimate success.

The End User's Role

- Define the need.
- Understand the change desired.
- Support the change.
- Provide feedback.
- Adapt (learn and change appropriately).

Potential Problems

- Failure to be appropriately involved in the needs assessment or information systems planning effort.
- Failure to understand the need for change or how the change relates to the mission of the organization and the individual worker.
- Fear of technology.
- Fear of the impact of technology. (Will I lose my job? Will my job change? Will I lose power?)
- Fear of failure. (Will I be able to learn how to use the technology? What happens if I can't learn? How is this going to affect my performance evaluation?)
- Concern about the amount and type of training.

The central theme of user concerns is ambiguity. The solution for such problems is information and communication. It is almost trite to say that involvement in a project builds support, but it is true for automation efforts. When the user is involved in defining the need, consulted in the design of the system, and involved in planning for implementation, he is much more likely to support the change. Management's responsibility is therefore to ensure that this happens effectively. The following items suggest some specific actions to help involve the user appropriately.

Positive Actions

- Users contribute to the needs assessment or ISP effort.
- Users meet periodically with the change agents to learn about the status of the project and input ideas and suggestions for the change agent's consideration.
- Supervisors meet periodically with users to learn about their concerns and to develop their ideas about use of the technology in the workplace.
- Management and the change agent continually evaluate the adequacy of training provided.
- Supervisors structure some time during the normal weekly staff meeting or commander's call to get feedback on the project and discuss progress.
- Supervisors initiate "good news meetings" to ensure that good ideas and applications developed by end users are shared and made available to others in the organization.
- After the project has been in operation for a period of time, assess the need for restructuring individual jobs and procedures with active involvement of the end users.

A Potential Fourth Player

Taken together, the roles of the three players combine to cover the major responsibilities that must be fulfilled in any automation project. However, in large, hierarchical organizations, such as the Army, there is a fourth group, the using organization, that combines the characteristics of both the sponsor and the user. This group plays a major role in ensuring that the end user understands the commitment of the sponsor to the project and passing on that commitment as his own. This is common practice in Army units. When the boss wants something done, it gets done through subordinate supervisors. It would be unthinkable for a division commander to make a decision to institute a new policy or procedure that had a major impact on the individual soldier without involving the intermediate brigade, battalion, and company commanders. Those intermediate commanders, not some staff element, would normally be held responsible for implementation of the policy or procedure. And, it should be the same for major automation efforts. The intermediate commander, leader, or manager should be held responsible. The automation management officer or the automation task force leader has clear responsibilities, but the ultimate success is dependent most on whether the end user in fact uses what is provided. And, the individual manager has the greatest influence over the organization and the individuals who make up the organization.

Summary

For the introduction of technology into the workplace to be done successfully, each player must

understand his role, as well as the roles of the other players. While these roles will change in intensity and specific activity as a project moves through its cycle from inception to completion, it will be the alert and competent manager who will give the right cue at the right time to ensure that all players work in concert. Using the two models presented here, the alert manager will be able to guide successfully the introduction of technology into the workplace.

Notes

[1] Toffler, Alvin, *The Third Wave*, New York, N.Y.: William Morrow and Co., 1980.

[2] Naisbitt, John, *Megatrends, Ten New Directions Transforming Our Lives*. New York, N.Y.: Warner Books, 1982.

[3] Personal notes from the US Army Division Commander's Conference, February 1984.

[4] Personal notes from the new York City Office Automation Roundtable Meeting, March 1984.

[5] O'Conner, Daryl R. and Lauderback, Rita T., *Managing Organizational Change*, Atlanta: Thompson Mitchell and Associates, 1983.

[6] "Disciplinary Action Expected in IRS Foul-up," *The Washington Post*, 17 June 1985, No. 104, p.1.

Col. Raymond (Ray) J. Zugel is a graduate of OECS, the University Associates Laboratory Experience Intern Program, and the Columbia University Executive Program for Organizational Development and Human Resources Development. He has served in a variety of staff and command assignments, including battalion command. As an OESO he has served in the Combat Developments Experimentation Command at Fort Ord, Calif., and on the Department of the Army staff in the office of the chief of staff. He has been a frequent presenter to OECS classes and professional development workshops. He is currently serving as management informations systems division chief in the US Army Operational Test and Evaluation Agency.

I find that a great part of the information I have was acquired by looking up something and finding something else on the way. **—Franklin P. Adams**

Repair shops have been built for motors, but we scrap men. **—Heywood Broun**

I always avoid prophesying beforehand, because it is much better policy to prophesy after the event has already taken place. **—Winston Churchill**

I realize that advice is worth what it cost—that is nothing. **—Douglas MacArthur**

If you have an important point to make, don't try to be subtle or clever. Use a pile driver. Hit the point once. Then come back and hit it a second time—a tremendous whack. **—Winston Churchill, advice to the young Prince of Wales on speechmaking.**

Guidelines for Determining the Suitability of an Organization for a Sociotechnical Systems Analysis and Intervention

by **Paul van Rijn, Ph.D.**

The following guidelines were prepared at the suggestion of Maj. Gen. Henry H. Harper, commander of the Depot Systems Command, the immediate sponsor and supporter of a major- and macro-level organizational intervention at the Corpus Christi (Texas) Army Depot (CCAD). The sociotechnical systems approach used was the first time that a participative management effort of this scope was attempted in any Army organization. The process was guided by outside experts and was successfully implemented by the managers and employees at all levels of the CCAD organization. As with all major productivity and quality of work life initiatives, there are no quick fixes and there are disappointments, as well as triumphs.

These guidelines are designed to assist managers in deciding where organizational enhancement efforts might best be applied to ensure optimal returns on the investment. These guidelines specifically focus on the optimal preconditions for sociotechnical systems design, but are likely to be applicable to a wide variety of organizational interventions.

These guidelines derive directly from experiences with a sociotechnical intervention at the Corpus Christi Army Depot but are consistent with the general literature on organizational research. It is important to note that the preconditions described must not be considered necessary prerequisites for a successful intervention. If managers waited for all preconditions to be optimal, few innovations would ever occur and motivations to experiment would soon dissipate. Rather, managers are encouraged to experiment but to do so in a manner that reduces risk and maximizes payoff.

The preconditions that are most desirable for the application of a sociotechnical intervention follow:

- Strong management support for the intervention.
- Involvement and understanding of those most likely to be affected by the intervention and those most responsible for its implementation.
- A perceived need for change.
- Positive labor-management relations.
- Adequate resources in terms of finances, personnel, and time.
- The availability and likely acceptance of an outside change agent and consultant.
- A stable leadership environment.
- Clearly quantifiable inputs and outputs.
- A meaningful performance measurement system.
- A high likelihood of implementing an intervention where there are some early successes.

Although the initial preconditions carry the greatest weight, the total picture must be evaluated. Each organization is unique and its strengths and weaknesses must be balanced against each other in determining its suitability for a major intervention. Further, the manager must weigh the impact that technical and social changes are likely to have on the organization. This is clearly not an easy task and requires considerable insight and judgment on the part of the manager making the decision. Correspondingly, change interventions that are not similarly multidimensional are high risk in terms of ultimate success, even though such approaches may be easier and less costly to apply.

The ten optimal conditions listed above are detailed further:

Strong Management Support. This support, more than anything else, is a prerequisite. Without this support the necessary resources for the intervention would not become available. Ideally, the support is in the form of a personal commitment to the intervention and direct involvement in the change process.

When an entire organization is the target of the intervention, this support must extend to all management levels, being most critical at those levels most likely to be impacted by the intervention. If such broad-based support is not immediately evident, there must then be some likelihood that the top management can create ways to make it happen.

Involvement and Understanding. When those most affected by the intervention or those required to implement it are not involved in the decision-making process and do not fully understand the recommended changes, the intervention is not likely to succeed. The organizational membership must be educated about the change effort. The larger the organization and the more complex the change, the costlier and more time-consuming this aspect will be. To the extent that the work force is technically and socially mature, this precondition will be easier to achieve.

Perceived Need for Change. The greater the perceived need for change, the greater the motivation will be to change. Merely having the need is not enough. The need must be recognized. Also, the extent to which the intervention is perceived to coincide with the values of the organization will affect the success of the change effort, particularly if the change outcomes can be identified and are mutually valued by management and labor.

Positive Labor-Management Relations. This relates closely to the earlier preconditions about management support and involvement of all those affected by the changes. If relations between management and the rank and file or union are strained or characterized by mutual distrust, the cooperation required to implement and sustain an intervention successfully would be difficult to attain. Again, mutual interest in the change will significantly contribute to the success of the intervention effort.

Adequate Resources. The presence or absence of financial resources certainly places constraints on what can be accomplished, but perhaps most important is the availability of the personnel resources required for a major intervention. To what extent can an organization afford to release its personnel from work time to participate in the process of analyzing the organization and developing the recommendations for improvement? To what extent will an organization involve and educate those employees and managers most likely to be affected by the intervention?

Most importantly, to what extent does an organization make the time? Major change is generally considered to have a time frame of five to ten years. To what extent can or will an organization forego some of its immediate gains in order to optimize its long-term gains?

Acceptance of Outside Consultant. Few organizations have the internal change agents who have the expertise required to implement a major change effort. If they do, these agents are not likely to be perceived to have the necessary objectivity required to effect a change effort. Consequently the use of a consultant from outside the organization must be seriously considered before beginning an intervention. This consultant must be experienced in the organizational change process, must be credible, and must be able to work closely with all levels of the organization to facilitate cooperation and to elicit maximum support and involvement of all concerned. Perhaps most importantly, the change agent must be able to train and prepare the organization to perpetuate the change process after the consultant leaves the organization.

Stable Leadership Environment. Because top management support for a major organizational change effort is so critical, it is important that top managers remain in place long enough to effect the changes and to ensure survival of the program beyond their tenure. This makes major organizational change in a military setting particularly difficult since tours of duty are typically shorter than the time frame required to institutionalize a major change. Unless the new leadership can be persuaded to "buy into" an existing initiative, it is likely to fade away.

Quantifiable Inputs and Outputs. An organizational system that has clearly defined inputs and outputs more readily lends itself to analysis and is more likely to generate perceivable changes. The analysis is facilitated because the concepts are more readily understood. This

increases the likelihood of widespread support and participation. Similarly, when recommended changes are concrete, they can be more easily comprehended and are more likely to be accepted for implementation.

Meaningful Performance Measurement. This refers to the existence of a system that permits an assessment of how the organization is doing. It does not refer to an employee performance appraisal system. An organizational performance measurement system is important because without one it is difficult to determine how the organization is doing. To the extent that this system is meaningful and truly reflects performance in terms of the mission and goals of the organization, it becomes easier to assess the health of an organization and its changes. Blind assessment of the numbers associated with single indicators is not recommended. Rather, the various indicators must be evaluated as a whole, paying particular attention to the judgments and interpretations of those most directly involved.

Early Success. It is not always easy to implement and sustain a major change, particularly when the change requires extensive and continual people involvement. An early success, properly recognized and credited to those most responsible for it, can give a significant boost to a change effort. Consequently, change efforts should deliberately design-in subcomponents that are likely to yield early and positive results. This, of course, requires the early existence of a measurement system that can reflect and demonstrate the success.

Summary

Clearly, the ten preconditions outlined for a successful organizational intervention are not mutually exclusive. They are optimal or desirable preconditions that will seldom be found in all organizations, and particular strengths in one area can often compensate for a weakness in another.

In the end, the people considerations are the most important. The people are the ones who make things happen. Because of this, the target organization must already be reasonably healthy in terms of its key personnel. Unless pre-existing personnel difficulties can be resolved first, meaningful organizational analysis and change are not likely to occur.

Finally, although managers are encouraged to experiment and to take the risks associated with a participative management procedure, such as sociotechnical systems design, they must not succumb to false hopes. In the words of Dr. John Campbell,* "There are no quick fixes, and nothing will substitute for careful problem analysis and long-term commitment to painstakingly worked out solutions."

*John P. Campbell, "I/O Psychology and the Enhancement of Productivity," *The Industrial-Organizational Psychologist (TIP)*, May 1983, p. 10.

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I don't know why it is that we are in such a hurry to get up when we fall down. You might think we would lie there and rest awhile. —**Max Eastman**

If you are scared to go the brink, you are lost. —**John Foster Dulles**



by Lieutenant Colonel Theodore R. Blasche

The integration of new weapons, equipment, and organizational structure into the force is a monumental task. The process begins during the development of the mission area analysis and continues through the life cycle of modification until 20 or 30 years later when the last remaining relic is filed as an archive or turned into a museum piece. During this lengthy process, many different organizations and specialists take a hand at turning an idea into useful hardware. While the role of the force developer, engineering designer, and user may seem clear, we have occasionally developed systems which have not clearly hit the mark for which they were intended.

The purpose of this article is not to identify successes and failures, for many other forums can accomplish those endeavors. Rather, the aim is to relate the role of human factors in force integration. This work will identify the key elements of human factors work and how it can be applied to improve the quality of the force.

The Human Factors Concept

Early man created tools to cope with his environment. Initially they were cheap and, at that particular time in history, provided a competitive edge. The basic law of selectivity prevailed. If the tools worked, they became fixed with minor modifications over generations. Such tools were clubs, knives, and wheels. Others no doubt were less successful and they or the primitive using them died out. This hit-or-miss process worked adequately for slow, change-resistant periods of history. The industrial revolution put the trial and error system on notice but World War II put it to rest forever. The economic and human risk involved in using a hit-or-miss approach to develop complicated systems, particularly for war, was too great to accept. The study of ways to reduce the risk of failure, improve efficiency, and increase survival resulted in the emergence of human engineering as an area of legitimate concern.

In "The Human Engineering Guide to Equipment Design" sponsored by The Joint Army-Navy-Air Force Steering Committee,[1] it was noted that human engineering has two functions. "During the design and development of a system the human engineer not only represents man as a user but provides information about him as a system component. As part of total system analysis, human engineering analysis consists of methods whereby decisions can be made concerning the design of the system and particularly the safety, effectiveness, role, and integration of man in the system."

The human engineering approach has broadened over the years as it has become more widely accepted across disciplinary boundaries. As the base became more diverse, the function has become more clearly defined. "Human engineering, also known as human factors, human factors engineering, engineering psychology, or ergonomics, is based upon the assumption that the design of man-made devices, systems, and environments can enhance or degrade their use by people. This scientific applied discipline emphasizes the human as one component of the system or environment. Human engineering is a young, developing discipline cutting across such areas as engineering, physiology, medicine, anthropology, and psychology."[2]

Simply put, human-factors work studies or makes use of the way we look at ourselves and the tools we use to cope with the world around us. To put this simplification into its broader perspective, Pew and Green have adapted the previous work of L.J. Fogel to show the relationship of the various related areas of human factors study.[3] The importance of the model lies in the overlap and interrelationship between the sciences as they relate to the man-machine system. Their model (Figure 1) clearly demonstrates the diversity of the field.[4]

The similarity between organizational effectiveness areas of interest and human factors engineering is perhaps best illustrated in the self-paced text published by the Army Human Factors Engineering Laboratory in 1981:[5] "...The man-machine system is composed of men, machines, training, tools, technical manuals, and the environment in which they interact. Each subcomponent in the system...in turn can be considered a system..."[6] It takes little imagination to place this description on the Kast and Rosenzweig Systems Model (Figure 2) which has served the OE community as an operational tool for several years.[7]

A Direction and a Two-Sided Dilemma

In comparing the topics of articles in recent issues of the *Army Organizational Effectiveness Journal* with the areas of the man-machine system in Figure 1, two observations are immediately obvious. First, the range of areas covered in these articles is significant, and second, we are only scratching the surface. This superficiality is primarily because we are still dealing with only the phases of the life-cycle management system which concern making-do-without, or how to use it once it's here. Sometimes these approaches have great importance; they are the foundation on which to build, but they are only the foundation. Total involvement in the process would tie together the integration process from concept to implementation.

We have all heard the statement "I don't know what I want, but I'll recognize it when I see it." It would be self-defeating for the Army's force integration community to apply this type of aimless approach. We must have a clear idea of what success is going to look like before we begin. That clarity of purpose evolves from a clear set of goals to which all efforts can be applied. Here again the goals of human factors work as defined by Pew and Green in Figure 3 can easily be adapted to Army force integration goals.[8]

What each force integration officer knows about some of the human factors areas probably is best described as working knowledge. For example, few Army officers will know much about the measurement techniques used in anthropometry



Figure 1

One Structuring of the Areas Relating to Human Factors Engineering

to determine muscle strength, but we as users know how to apply the age and sex standards on the physical training (PT) test. The problem with working knowledge, however, is that it's limited to direct, practical application. While we know how to apply PT test scores, inputting information as to their Armywide effects under varied conditions is another matter. A case in fact involved the fielding of a new weapons system. During a recent briefing, an NCO responsible for a new weapons system stated that he had formally submitted over 120 recommended improvements based on his working experience with the system, but had received no feedback as to the effect or the status of those recommendations. The problem is one of communication, true, but only secondarily to a



Figure 2

The Organization System

A. Increased efficiency or productivity

1. Time - cut the extended production cycle
2. Accuracy - maximum quality, minimum modification work orders

B. Increased dependability or reliability

1. Minimum instances of human or system malfunction
2. Ease of inspection, repair, and calibration
3. Ease of logistic support
4. Dependability under stress, overload, wear, etc.
5. Minimum maintenance cost for both parts and personnel

C. Minimum training and manpower costs of personnel subsystems

1. Minimum special training requirements
2. Reduce training time
3. Minimum requirements for unusual skills or unique abilities
4. Ease of maintaining proficiency

D. Improved safety and habitability

1. Infrequent incidents of personal injury
2. Optimum levels of operator load or stress
3. Minimal occupational hazards
4. Increased soldier confidence

E. Increased operator and consumer acceptance

1. Enhancement of job satisfaction, soldier morale, and unit cohesion
2. Provision of intrinsic satisfactions
3. Aesthetic considerations (user acceptance of product appearance)
4. Meeting the consumer needs
5. Design for individual differences within user population

F. Flexibility and adaptability to change

1. Ease of modifiability to meet changing output requirements
2. Adaptability to technological change
3. Adaptability to use in new environments
4. Ease of reprogramming
5. Reduce unit turbulence

(Modified from Richard W. Pew and Paul Green, *Human Factors Engineering Short Course Notes* (25th ed.) (Ann Arbor, Mich.: The University of Michigan, 1984).)

Figure 3

Force Integration Goals

problem of knowledge. The underlying difficulty is that so few persons in the Army would know how to obtain the information needed to satisfy that NCO's concern through normal channels. It would require a monumental effort to locate the individuals who are "responsible" for action on those 120+ recommendations. The system is much greater than the grasp of its individual components. *Why?* The Army introduces new equipment and systems continually, but each branch or specialty (i.e., armor, infantry, and engineers) experiences those infusions perhaps only once in a 10-year cycle. The standard 10-year life cycle management process will see virtually three complete changes in military personnel before the system is fielded. It is no small wonder that the actual user of the new equipment sometimes feels confused and frustrated by the process.

Returning to the proposed goals in Figure 3, these goals serve as a springboard to a proposal for an action plan to address the development cycle. The methods and means available depend on which type of development program is chosen. The three major categories of programs are the formal life cycle management model (LCMM), fast track programs, and non-developmental items (NDI). While each program (Figure 4) has slightly different phasing, many of the actions are similar.

For the purpose of clarification, the phases outlined in Figure 4 have been expanded in Figure 5. Here, the major feedback loops are established. For example, the products of the systems requirement phase are goals and objectives. Traditional organizational effectiveness approaches can be used to assist in establishing those goals and objectives. Taken a step further, the role of the force integration community should be to use organizational effectiveness techniques to ensure that the major feedback loops are functioning. Fort Hood or the 2d Armor Division has little impact on decisions and feedback loops at AMC, TRADOC, or the Armor Center, but force integration offices can and should provide timely and accurate feedback.

The compounding problem, or the confounding problem, depending on your position in the organization, is that new equipment is only one side of the force integration issue. The "other" side is the impact of organizational changes which may or may not be the result of new equipment. The conversion to a Division 86 structure has an equally significant impact on M60 equipped armor battalions and M113 equipped mechanized infantry battalions; therefore, issues of force integration span the entire force. The net result is a staggering work load for a force integration/force modernization office in any operational division.



("Material Acquisition and Life Cycle Management Concepts, Principles, and Policies," ALM-35-3224 (C), Army-Fort Lee, Va., 220-83 L65M 5.)

Figure 4
Program Phases

Major Feedback Loops	Phase	Products	Major Decision	Responsibility: Primary (P) Secondary (S) Joint (J)
B,C,G,*H	A- System Requirements	Goals; objectives (Response to a need.)	Does need justify action feasibility of responding to this need at this time?	Customer (P) Producer (S)
E,G	B- Concept Formulation	Feasibility report. Advantages and disadvantages of alternatives. Development plan.	Adopt none, one, or more concepts.	Producer (J) Customer (J)
D,E,G	C- System Definition	System specification.	Proceed or not to engineering design.	Producer
E,F,G	D- Engineering Design	Design of prototype. Produce test quantity.	Release to production. Produce test quantity.	Producer
G	E- Design Verification (Test)	Data regarding operability, maintainability, safety, and supportability. Test and evaluation report.	Produce or not in quantity.	Producer DT** Customer OT**
G,H	F- Production and Installation	Operationally qualified systems.	Deploy or not—final decision.	Producer (P) Customer (S)
A (next cycle)	G- Operations	Improved use. Improvement modifications. New concepts.	Changes in utilization; equipment modifications; retirement.	Customer (P) Producer (S)
A,B (next cycle)	H- Retirement	Reusable materials.	Where and how.	Customer (P) Producer (S)

* This "G," for example, suggests major feedback from operation of the systems to the establishment of new requirements, i.e., from G to A.
** Developmental testing and operational testing.

Figure 5

The Systems Development Process

Modified from Julian Christianson's "The Nature of System Development"

(Richard W. Pew and Paul Green, *Human Factors Engineering Short Course Notes,* (25th ed.) (Ann Arbor, Mich: The University of Michigan, 1984), p. 3.13.)

A Recommendation

The age of each force integration/force modernization office doing its job in relative isolation is long since past. There is a need for a force integration network. To make the network efficient, each force integration office must be equipped with a microcomputer, modem, and printer. The processor should be portable and secure so that classified material could be processed at a secure facility.

Once the equipment was in place, an electronic bulletin board similar to that run on commercial computer nets could be established. The computer disk method of retaining information on force integration issues would provide a measure of confidentiality while providing an archive to retain data over a full-life cycle of the issues in question. These files could also form a basis for future lessons learned documentation. In addition, electronic bulletin boards are faster, cheaper, and more efficient than manual methods. Other uses for the computer in statistical analysis and electronic mail would be spin-off benefits. It would seem that such a system would be of great value in addressing force integration issues.

Summary

Human factors need to be considered in Army force integration efforts. To derive the greatest possible benefit from human factors work in force integration efforts, the Army needs a network of information-sharing offices. The force integration offices need the tools to accomplish networking. The future success of Army force integration may well depend on how well the force integration community addresses human factors in its work and adapts to becoming one operational unit—a diffuse whole greater than the sum of its parts.

Notes

[1] Van Cott, Harold and Kinkade, Robert G. (Eds) *Human Engineering Guide to Equipment Design*, US Government Printing Office, 1972, p. 1.

[2] Hendricks, D., Kilduff, P., Brooks, P., Marshak, R., and Doyle, B. *Human Engineering Guidelines for Management Information Systems*, Management Information Systems Directorate-Human Engineering Laboratory, 1 June 1983, p. 1-1.

[3] Pew, Richard W. and Green, Paul *Human Factors Engineering Short Course Notes*, (25th ed), Ann Arbor, Michigan, The University of Michigan, Chrysler Center for Continuing Education 1984, p. 1.10.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Brogan, R., Hedge, J., McElroy, K., and Kalznetson, J. *Human Factors Engineering A Self Paced Text*. USA Human Engineering Laboratory Pacific Missile Test Center. Aug 1981 DTIC Report Number ADA 132-556 (*Note*: This self paced instruction can be ordered through DTIC).

[6] Ibid.

[7] Kast, Fremont E. and Rosenzweig, James E. *Organization and Management: A Systems Approach* Third Edition, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1980.

[8] Pew and Green, p. 1.10.

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Sixty years ago I knew everything; now I know nothing; education is a progressive discovery of our own ignorance. —**Will Durant**

It is easier to fight for one's principles than to live up to them. —**Alfred Adler**

No grand idea was ever born in a conference, but a lot of foolish ideas have died there. —**F. Scott Fitzgerald**

Establishing a Mission-Oriented Command and Control System

by Captain Charles D. Marashian



Establishing a mission-oriented command and control system to inculcate Army leadership could greatly enhance combat readiness.

Vital to the successful implementation of air-land battle doctrine is developing a command and control system that operates using mission orders. The use of mission orders does not depend upon the many technological breakthroughs that are occurring in command and control hardware. Rather, mission orders are rooted in flexible leadership and sound organizational practices.

Mission Orders

FM 100-5, *Operations*, describes mission orders as a tactical plan that promotes unity of effort of all available forces. There are three basic components to mission orders:

- "They should clearly state the commander's objective, what he wants done, and why he wants it done."
- "They should establish limits or controls necessary for coordination."
- "They should delineate the available resources and support from outside sources."[1]

Mission orders facilitate initiative and unity of thinking only if the commander's *intent*—"What he wants to happen to the enemy"—is clearly articulated and understood. FM 100-5 states:

> "The subordinate commander must fully understand his commander's intent and the overall mission of the force. If the battle develops so that previously issued orders no longer fit the new circumstances, the subordinate must inform his commander and propose appropriate alternatives. If this is not possible, he must act as he knows his commander would and make a report as soon as possible."[2]

The commanders and staff process information and evaluate situations within the context of the commander's intent. The degree of success in which an organization executes its mission orders greatly depends on how well its members understand the commander's way of thinking; think systematically; exhibit initiative; and act decisively.

Mission-Oriented Command and Control

The West German Army has operationalized mission orders into mission-oriented command and control which is defined as:

"A command and control procedure within which the subordinate is given extensive latitude, within the framework of the intention of the individual giving the order, in carrying out his mission. The missions are to include only those restraints which are indispensible for being able to interact with others, and it must be possible to accomplish them by making use of subordinate forces, resources, and the authority delegated to him. Mission-oriented command and control require uniformity in the way of thinking, sound judgment and initiative, as well as responsible actions at all levels."[3]

The essence of mission-oriented command and control is to develop an environment where subordinates can maximize freedom of action. This, in turn, increases the ability of the whole organization to freely maneuver and defeat the enemy. Mission-oriented command and control become particularly critical when communications are lost, when time dictates that decisions be made at lower levels, and when extensive information overload slows decision making at higher levels.

To develop a mission-oriented command and control system that is proficient during war, organizations must continually train and reinforce the systems principles. A mission-oriented command and control system presupposes both uniformity in thinking and reliability of leaders to display initiative. The inculcation of a command and control system based on mission orders can only be accomplished with an extensive and continual educational and training process for all levels of leadership.[4]

An organization must emphasize distributed decision making, that is, develop a system where all leaders throughout the command make smart decisions, consonant with the intent of the commander, without relying on his explicit directions. This skill is based on the understanding by leaders at all levels of battlefield doctrine and principles within a frame of reference that will allow rapid and wise decision making at the lowest levels possible. The leader's task is to build these frames of reference with subordinate leaders and to give enough practice in using them to ensure they become effective decision tools. By teaching this understanding, the leader spreads much of his own decision-making processes to his leaders on the battlefield. Thus he ensures that purpose and momentum will be maintained even in his absence.[5]

Achieving a Mission-Oriented Command and Control System

A system to develop mission-oriented command and control begins when the commander takes command of his organization (Figure 1). The or-

Figure 1

Establishing a System for Mission-Oriented Command and Control



ganization goes through a series of steps—articulating the commander's philosophy, teaching Army tactical doctrine, developing a tactical SOP, and developing and training the battle team—in order to establish a combat-ready, mission-oriented command and control system.

Articulating the Commander's Philosophy

The commander's philosophy tells subordinates how he thinks and operates. It is the foundation for building a strong system. It is important that the commander describe in detail what an effective, combat-ready command and control system will be.

Organizational values and ethics are aligned with traditional Army values. Priorities are clearly defined with training being the number one priority. The mission's objectives, tasks, and standards of performance are completely outlined. The commander delineates the role and relationships of the staff, the authority and responsibilities of the staff, and the functional grouping of the staff sections. Additionally, the staff and the commander ensure that they know the subordinate units of command, their situations, their operating techniques, their capabilities, and their character.[6]

There are different methods that can be used to express the commander's philosophy. Probably the most common is the commander's initial briefing to his officers. Other methods, such as the transition meeting and the performance management conference, provide an opportunity for in-depth analysis of missions, objectives, tasks, and concerns of subordinates.

Army Tactical Doctrine

"Strategy and tactics do not change, only the means of applying them differ. A sound and profound historical education should have as its end an absolute grounding in the immutable principles of war... But the study... must continue after entry in the service and last until the day of retirement..." General George S. Patton, Jr.[7]

The commander is responsible for training subordinates on Army tactical doctrine. He sees to it that leaders are familiar with FM 100-5, how-to-fight doctrine at their particular level, and ARTEP tasks. The organization must internalize doctrinal concepts and principles so that application during battle is automatic. The primary vehicle to teach doctrine is a sound, continual professional development program. The next step is to operationalize doctrine by developing a specific organizational tactical SOP.

Tactical SOP

The tactical SOP is a standing order. It lists procedures that are unique to the organization and is used for accomplishing recurring operations. It expedites operations by reducing the number, length, and frequency of orders. A sound, tactical SOP based on doctrine and followed throughout the command will promote teamwork among commanders, staff, and troops; simplify training; and reduce confusion and errors.[8]

A tactical SOP that provides detailed guidance on all types of operations will facilitate units to operate with greater flexibility within the context of the whole mission plan. All conceivable missions should be covered with specific focus on giving guidance to units to fight effectively during times of poor communications and minimal command and control capability.

Leaders need to participate in developing the tactical SOP. This step begins the team-building process among the commanders and staff. Total organizational participation facilitates unity of effort and clearly defines individual and joint responsibilities. It is the commander's responsibility to ensure that the tactical SOP is completely aligned with Army doctrine.

Developing the Team

Establishing individual competence in mastering and operationalizing doctrine is one part of the equation. The commander must now combine the individual efforts of his leaders and form a cohesive battle team. The organization strives to become a system. The relationships of this team are based on "reciprocal interdependence"—that is, all elements must properly interact with each other in order to maximize the effectiveness of the command as a whole.[9]

It is during this time that the battle team begins to inherit the characteristics of a high-performing system. There is a clear understanding and internalization of organizational goals and values. The tactical SOP actually becomes the modus operandi. Strong bonds form among the leaders. There is a sense of pride in what they do and have accomplished. The organization must now implement a training strategy in order to become a more profound, high-performing system.

Training the Team

An effective and survivable battle team on the battlefield can only be accomplished by intense preparation during peacetime. A sound training program allows commanders and staffs to fight

battles in diverse command post configurations under realistic combat conditions as smoothly functioning teams. This training is vital to the command and control of units. It further develops the competency of individual staff members and molds them into trained teams that can effectively manage and coordinate all systems to support the command's missions. Thus, commanders must be proficient in their command and control task and battle staffs must excel in executing staff-planning responsibilities to achieve full integration of the combined arms team.[10]

The measure for success for the battle team should be based on the theory of the observation-orientation-decision-action (OODA) loop developed by retired Air Force Col. John Boyd.[11]

Col. Boyd observed that in conflict situations, opposing forces go through repeated cycles of observation-orientation-decision-action. During the observation phase, the commander makes a rapid determination of the situation from the best available information from subordinate and higher commands. Based on the observation, he determines what opportunities exist. The commander then orients his forces to this opportunity with respect to the overall situation. He must take into account the intentions of all forces and the second and third order effects of different courses of action. The commander is now ready to decide on a course of action. The success of the action phase is dependent upon subordinate units being able to execute the decision. The potentially successful force is the one that can consistently complete the OODA loop faster than its opponent. Because the opponent has a longer observation to action time, his own countermeasures are overcome by the rapidly unfolding events and cannot effectively cope with each new situation. Thus, the more quickly a commander can interpret changes on the battlefield and subsequently interject adjustments to the OODA loop, the greater the probability for success.

The time factor in processing OODA loops can be sharply decreased if an organization can fight using a mission-oriented command and control system. This would allow the commander to think and act faster than his opponent. Using mission orders, subordinate units are expected to process more OODA loops themselves as a response to their own specific situation. Since communication time is decreased and information is more readily available, subordinate units can process an OODA loop faster than if the requirement were passed on to a higher headquarters. Invariably, this allows the battle team to act faster than the enemy, thus increasing its ability to maneuver.

Battle teams need to continually train for war. Attention should be centered on the command and control processes. Interactions and procedures among the key players during CPXs, FTXs, ARTEPs, etc. should be closely analyzed, documented, and developed into trends. Sufficient information should be gathered on doctrinal knowledge of each individual member, tactical SOP applicability, tactical operations center structure, information flow, and staff interface. Additionally, the quality of mission orders should be examined to determine if they are too vague or detailed to allow subordinate organizations to oper-

ate effectively. Weaknesses within the command and control system are rectified by reinforcing the principles of operating under mission orders and fixing the "broken" part of the system, such as rewriting the tactical SOP or providing more training on doctrine.

Assessing the Organization

Successful completion of ARTEPs or emergency deployment readiness exercises does not necessarily mean that a unit has established a combat-ready, mission-oriented command and control system. Time restraints and limited resources prevent a completely accurate simulation of wartime conditions that would test the effectiveness of this type of system. The National Training Center is an excellent vehicle to assess the organization's ability to command and control. However, this opportunity occurs normally only once every few years.

Probably the best approach to assess the command and control system of an organization is using "outside" observers. They could help observe and assess areas such as "sitrep" (situation report) processing and staff interfacing, assess the first and second iterative effects of mission orders, and help develop systems that will prepare an organization to operate using mission orders.

Conclusion

Fighting the next battle using a mission-oriented command and control system at all levels of command will provide us an unparalleled edge over a potential foe. Organizations must make a conscious effort to integrate this system into the way they do business. The mission-oriented command and control system can only work in wartime if it is established, trained, and internalized during peacetime. □

Notes

[1] FM 100-5, *Operations*, p. 2-7.

[2] Ibid., p. 2-7.

[3] Presentation by a representative of the Federal Ministry of Defense, Army Staff (FUE H III2) at the 17th German/US Army General Staff Meeting, "Mission-Oriented Command and Control," *Armor*, January-February 1981, p. 12.

[4] Ibid., p. 14.

[5] Draft FM 22-999, *Senior-Level Leadership*, Department of the Army, Washington, DC, May 1984, p. 1-3.

[6] FM 101-5, *Staff Organizations and Operations*, p. 1-2, 1-6.

[7] Blumenson, Martin, *The Patton Papers*, Vol II., Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, 1972, p. 739.

[8] FM 101-5, p. 1-3.

[9] Malone, D.M., "An Army of Excellence," Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Leadership and Management Technical Area, Working Paper 83-1, p. 86-87.

[10] FM 25-4, "How to Conduct Training Exercises," Department of the Army, Washington, DC, September 1984, p. 3.

[11] Boyd, John, *Patterns of Conflict*, Unpublished, Washington, DC, June 1982.

[12] OECS Pamphlet, "When Your Resources are on the Line...," 1984.

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To escape criticism—do nothing, say nothing, be nothing. —**Elbert Hubbard**

Freedom lies in being bold. —**Robert Frost**

All progress has resulted from people who took unpopular positions.
—**Adlai E. Stevenson**

Team Spirit:
Lessons Learned

by **Major Mitchel L. Kotula**

In the fall of 1984 the Organizational Effectiveness Center and School (OECS) began a new effort to develop a doctrinal concept for the use of organizational effectiveness (OE) techniques in war. As part of the concept development process, OECS wanted to participate in major military exercises to experiment with the application of OE techniques in wartime scenarios and to learn from the experience.

At about the same time, the Eighth United States Army (EUSA) organizational effectiveness staff officers (OESO) completed a major assessment of the command post exercise ULCHI FOCUS LENS. As a result of their work, the command wanted further assessments in the areas of critical information flow and command and control operations.

To accomplish their new tasks, the EUSA OESOs determined they needed additional OESOs to participate in TEAM SPIRIT '85, the next field training exercise scheduled for EUSA. As a result of this determination, OECS was to coordinate additional OESO support for TEAM SPIRIT '85 and EUSA would permit OECS to informally test the application of OE techniques during the exercise.

This article summarizes the planning and execution of the operation undertaken to meet the needs of both EUSA and OECS during TEAM SPIRIT '85. The lessons learned may be helpful to commanders at various levels within a large, complex organization, such as EUSA—particularly those commanders interested in having a task-organized team address major systemic issues within their commands.

Preliminary Actions

OECS and EUSA developed the following potential missions for the team:

- To identify critical information related to decision making and war planning and recommend processes to enhance the quality of information and its flow.
- To assess the operation of the combined battle staff and recommend improvements.
- To study the processes for the use of close air support.
- To assess the overall TEAM SPIRIT '85 exercise.
- To conduct studies and actions in support of specific commanders and organizations.

The commander in chief and the operations officer of the Combined Forces Command (Korea) and the commanding general, 2nd Infantry Division, agreed to host OE operations during TEAM SPIRIT '85. Later in planning, commanders/directors of four other organizations within the command joined as clients in the OE activities. They were the Combined Aviation Force (CAF), 2nd Engineer Group, 8th Personnel Command (PERSCOM), and the Operations Analysis Group.

Execution

The scope of activities for the commander in chief, Combined Forces Command, included the coordination and facilitation of efforts by the information flow consortium to identify critical information, to identify the flow of that information, and to assess the resulting impacts on decision making. The information flow consortium consisted of Army, Navy, Air Force, and contractor (Mitre Corporation) representatives. The consortium made recommendations for improving the flow of critical information and outlined actions to institutionalize the recommended changes.

The scope of activities for the operations officer of the Combined Forces Command included an assessment of the flow of critical information and its relation to decision making at the combined and joint levels and an assessment of the interfaces between Republic of Korea (ROK) and

United States (US) ground, air, naval, and unconventional warfare components.

The commanding general, 2nd Infantry Division, had the OE team assess the procedures for attaching and detaching units and individual replacements to and from the division and identify critical information, how it flows, and its impact on decision making at the division level.

The scope of activities in support of the commander, CAF, included an assessment of the impact of current automation efforts on the CAF, an analysis of mission requests and their flow in order to make systems more responsive, and an overall assessment of the effectiveness of the two-year-old CAF organization and its systems.

The commander, 2nd Engineer Group, requested an assessment of how US support, operational policies, and procedures impacted on the integration of Korean augmentation to the United States Army (KATUSA) forces within the 2nd Engineer Group.

The commander, 8th PERSCOM, requested an assessment of procedures and policies for in- and out-processing individual augmentees in the theater of operations.

The director, Operations Analysis Group, requested a functional analysis within the group to determine if a recent, major structural reorganization was effective in meeting external requirements.

Lessons Learned

The lessons learned discussed below are for the benefit of commanders and other leaders who are contemplating hosting an external team to assess and improve the effectiveness of their organization:

- The command and external team need to meet and plan the outcome, the methods, and the resources (O-M-R) for the pending operation.
- Control issues must be addressed and resolved during initial planning. Confidentiality, reporting practices, who is in charge, the exchange of information, and conflict resolution procedures are among the issues that must be discussed and resolved.
- The command culture, to include the political environment, must be articulated to the external team members. The earlier the external team members feel comfortable with the norms, rituals, practices, and procedures of the command, the more effective they will be in assessing and recommending changes to improve the organization.
- Trust issues must be addressed and resolved. Open communication between the hosting command and the external team must be maintained throughout the operation, thus encouraging mutual trust. Periodic in progress reviews are recommended to share information, keep efforts focused on the mutually agreed upon outcomes, and to accommodate organizational needs.
- The hosting command must prepare its people for the visiting team members. The command needs to tell its people who the team members are, why they were invited, and what they plan to accomplish. A pre-visit is an excellent opportunity to introduce team members to members of the command.
- The command group needs to make it clear to members of the command that the organization is not in trouble, that it is not incapable of solving its own problems, and that its people are fully capable of performing their jobs. A suggested approach is to explain that the command can be even better if it supplements its efforts by using external teams working under the control of the command to assess systemic issues that may cross command boundaries.
- Memoranda of understanding (MOU) should be used during the initial planning and coordination for an operation. They capture the agreed-upon outcomes, methods, and resources. They can be modified and ultimately put aside once trust issues are resolved.

Conclusion

External teams that are task organized to address major systemic issues at various levels within a command can yield positive results for the command. TEAM SPIRIT '85 in Korea provided an opportunity for the EUSA and several of its subordinate commands to use OE teams to assess and recommend improvements in their operations during a wartime scenario.

OESO team members who participated in TEAM SPIRIT '85 included Maj. Chris Russo and Jim Donaghy (EUSA); Capts. Liz Brooks and John Lopez (2nd Infantry Division); Majs. Mitchel Kotula, Daniel Braun, and Julie Dean and Dr. Larry Guido (OECS); Maj. Mark Olsen (Department of the Army Organizational Effectiveness Office); Capt. Shaun Luckett (III Corps Artillery, Ft. Sill, Okla.); and Maj. Frank Cushing and Capt. John Barnes (Readiness Group, Oakdale, Pa.).

— Editor

Reorganizing a Division

by **Major Rusty Bussert *and* Lieutenant Colonel John E. Sullivan**

"Why me? I've never been to the Organizational Effectiveness Center and School (OECS). What do I know about reorganizing a division?" Those were my exact thoughts in November 1983 at Fort Ord, Calif., when I was one of six persons directed to report to the division chief of staff for duty on the 7th Infantry Division's light infantry division task force. The task force, under the tutelage of the division/installation inspector general (IG), was established to begin planning to convert the division from the H-series table of organization and equipment (TOE) into the newly developed J-series light infantry configuration. The task force consisted of representatives from the division G1 through G4, adjutant general, and installation. Only one had any background in organizational effectiveness (OE), but as Lt. Gen. James E. Moore, Jr., then division commander, said, "The IG knows everything there is to know about how the Army works."

I can vividly recall asking myself, "Where do I go from here?" (After all, we had all of 2½ weeks to formulate, coordinate, and write a plan and then brief it to the US Army Forces Command deputy commanding general.) I found out later that I wasn't alone! After the initial shock wore off, I began to use logic and common sense in place of any formalized training to develop my portion of the plan.

In consonance with the Army Chief of Staff's guidance, the Army has moved rather rapidly to design and field the prototype light infantry division. "Ultra-light" probably best portrays the shape and character of the new 7th Infantry Division (Light). The division's vehicle density has been reduced by almost 50 percent, the engineer battalion's armored combat earthmover (ACE) is the only tracked vehicle, the infantry company has no organic vehicles—it is truly foot mobile, and all the division's vehicles and equipment can be transported in C-141B aircraft.

The light infantry division was designed to operate in a low-intensity conflict. It was to do this while retaining the capability to operate in a mid- to high-intensity environment with augmentation from corps as required.

Lt. Gen. Moore's general planning guidance to the task force was fourfold:

- The task that lay ahead of us was a Fort Ord and not just a 7th Infantry Division mission.
- The division's go-to-war readiness had to be maintained to the maximum extent possible throughout the restructure process.
- A prototype infantry battalion had to be put on the ground as early as practical in order to flush out our restructure procedures.
- The light infantry concept was continuing to evolve even as we began our planning efforts.

This guidance provided us, the people on the ground, a unique opportunity to "influence the battle" through proactive thinking and planning. I still recall what the IG wrote on the blackboard soon after we met for the first time: "The commanding general knows he has given us an impossible task, but then he also knows we are capable of accomplishing it."

An analysis of our mission and planning guidance led us to formulate four implied tasks:

We had to develop a plan that considered the division's "hard commitments"—commitments that we could not or did not want to change, e.g., summer reserve component support for both 1984 and 1985, Los Angeles' Olympics effort, the deployment of a brigade task force to Japan, and the deployment of a brigade task force to Korea for exercise TEAM SPIRIT.

Lacking any definitive guidance at the time, we felt that **the downsizing/deactivation of divisional units should coincide with anticipated activation/restructure of non divisional units to effect maximum utilization of available personnel and equipment.**

The combat service support units and division headquarters needed to be inserted into the tail end of the transition schedule. This would allow the logistics/division command and control organizations to support the transition of other division units at their current manning levels before actually transitioning themselves. (The Division Support Command decreases by over 900 spaces, of which 527 are in the maintenance battalion.) Conversely, the infantry and artillery battalions, which substantially downsized, should be the first units to restructure.

Finally, we needed to be cognizant of issues developed as a result of our planning actions that required resolution at a headquarters higher than the 7th Infantry Division and Fort Ord. These issues needed to be addressed early in order to minimize any potential war stoppers. One question we continually asked ourselves and each other was, "Are we doing something dumb?"

The formulation and integration of the event-oriented transition milestone schedule was truly an evolutionary process. Utilizing backward planning, we initially developed individual and detailed time lines in our respective functional areas: structure, operations and training; personnel; logistics; and installation. Because a formal announcement had not yet been made about the division's actual conversion, our initial effort was directed toward identifying and sequencing events. The designations M, M+1, M+2, etc. were used to establish a time relationship. As it turned out, M was February 1984.

Three room dividers were placed end-to-end and vertically arranged masking tape was used to form 21 sequential planning/execution months. Each of the four functional areas was identified by a different color. We then extracted what were felt to be critical events/decisions from our detailed time lines and placed 3x5 cards sequentially on the boards. In effect, we identified four quasi-critical paths. At the same time, though, we had to ensure that the time lines were mutually supporting. Our initial inclination was to place too many events onto the boards; it took several attempts before we felt that the true critical paths had been defined. The detailed time lines were then included into the overall plan as supporting documents.

The planning for and subsequent execution of the 7th Infantry Division's conversion has been, by necessity, both dynamic and flexible. The original plan called for restructuring the aviation community in the second quarter of fiscal year 1985; however, delayed availability of the UH-60 helicopters (Blackhawk) caused us to move their restructure windows to the fourth quarter of that fiscal year. Fort Ord was a stationing option for part of the 17th Active Component Division, now the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry). It



was not until late summer 1984 that the Army Chief of Staff announced his preferred option of Fort Drum, N.Y., but until that announcement was made, we kept that potential stationing requirement as a planning factor in all local decisions.

It has been nearly two years since that day in November 1983 when the task force was organized. The task force was followed in January 1984 by the infantry division (light) transition office, a 2-person cell, again working for the IG. As the division transitioned from the detailed planning to the implementation phase, it became apparent that a larger organization was required to coordinate the total force integration effort. As a result, the 11-person office of the assistant chief of staff (ACofS), G6, was formed in July 1984 using the 2-person cell as its nucleus. Today, the ACofS, G6, (Figure 1) is actively involved in monitoring and facilitating the division's transition while coordinating actions with external agencies. We are also looking beyond the division's transition window and actively participating in planning actions under way for the fiscal year 1986 light infantry division certification process.

In retrospect, it may have been better for the division to have bitten the bullet in January 1984 and to have staffed the transition office with the requisite number of personnel who could have been involved in both the detailed planning and the execution. It was not necessary for everyone to have been OE-trained, but it was absolutely imperative for them to have been capable of seeing the big picture and recognizing the systemic implications of complex change. This, again, was one of the primary reasons that the IG was placed in charge of the transition planning phase.



Figure 1

Functional Breakout of Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G6

Continuity in the transition management office was essential and should have been pursued by all available means, to include stabilization/extension. The light infantry division train had moved so fast and in such a short period of time that personnel assigned to the expanding ACofS, G6, in the summer/fall of 1984 found it difficult and sometimes frustrating to grasp all that was happening in action officer detail. This situation occurred despite the wealth of information in office files and the continuity provided by the two members of the original task force. But it was overcome, in time, through personal perseverance and numerous one-on-one conversations with these same carryover task force members.

The perception that a reorganization of the magnitude described can be managed in a "business as usual" manner must, by necessity, undergo radical surgery. Division and installation staff planners were and are consumed by the day-to-day and week-to-week actions leading up to that next field training exercise or next CONUS/OCONUS deployment. Long-range planning inevitably plays second fiddle. If time is not taken to plan in the necessary detail, then complete implementation/execution of that plan will never occur; however, if detailed planning across time is accomplished, then total implementation/execution will be the natural outcome.

If you can't find time to do it right the first time, where are you going to find the time to do it right the second time?

Maj. Rusty Bussert is presently assigned to the office of the assistant chief of staff, G6, 7th Infantry Division (Light), Fort Ord, Calif. He was a charter member of that division's initial task force. He has a B.S. degree in education from the University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana and is a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kan. He has had numerous command and staff assignments in the retail and wholesale logistics systems and has served as a supply specialist in the Saudi Arabian National Guard modernization program.

Lt. Col. John E. Sullivan is assistant chief of staff, G6, 7th Infantry Division (Light) transition office. He previously was assigned as director of training, OECS. He has a B.S. degree in sociology/psychology from Seattle (Wash.) University, an M.S. in education degree from the University of Kansas at Lawrence, and is a Command and General Staff College graduate. His command and staff assignments have been with the field artillery in combat and peacetime.



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 5TH INFANTRY DIVISION (MECHANIZED) AND FORT POLK
FORT POLK, LOUISIANA 71459-5000

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

24 January 1985

AFZX-CG

SUBJECT: **REFORGER 84**

1. Enclosed is a study which I commissioned the Organizational Effectiveness Center and School (OECS) to do covering the various phases of REFORGER 84.

2. This OE report makes clear that we must consider the effectiveness of our entire system for deployment, the relationships of our major commands and allied agencies, and the performance of our communications if we are to be ready to deter war. This report makes it clear that we are not exercising many of the procedures or organizations we plan to use in crisis and that the ad hoc measures we use have great inefficiencies. Determination and hard work by men and women of all services accomplished the mission in REFORGER 84, but this report suggests that we can do things much better by training to do in peace what we expect to do in time of crisis.

3. I provide this study for your consideration of the portions which address your operations. It is a hard-hitting report with many salient points and solid recommendations. It does not address the overall system for deployment but suggests several organizational role changes. Consequently, many will find some recommendations in the report controversial. Nonetheless, I believe it provides a point of departure for organizational reform and refinement of the deployment process. I urge you to read the body of the report and take action where appropriate.

DALE A. VESSER
Major General, USA
Commanding

Maj. Gen. Vesser's letter was sent to 37 commanders and staff directors who were involved in various phases of REFORGER 84.

Maj. Gen. Vesser recently was nominated for promotion to lieutenant general and assignment as director, J-5, Plans and Policy Directorate, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

*The following article by Maj. Braun explains OE methods he used during REFORGER 84 and summarizes several of his findings.—**Editor***

REFORGER '84: Learning from Our Experience

by Major Daniel G. Braun

The author acknowledges Gen. William E. DePuy for his concept in "Toward a Balanced Doctrine" in the November 1984 issue of *Army* magazine which assisted in the articulation of this article, Maj. Gen. Dale A. Vesser for providing the opportunity to experience REFORGER '84, and Brig. Gen. Wilson A. Shoffner and Col. Huba Wass de Czege for conceptual ideas regarding command and control.

Expanded organizational effectiveness (OE) techniques were put to the test during the recent REFORGER '84 exercise.

Return of Forces to Germany (REFORGER), one of the NATO Autumn Forge exercises, demonstrates US resolve and exercises its ability to meet its NATO commitments. US active and reserve component forces from the US Army Forces

Command (FORSCOM) are deployed to the Federal Republic of Germany for the exercise and then returned to CONUS.

Prior to the exercise, OECS was asked by Maj. Gen. Dale A. Vesser, the Army Readiness action agent and Commander, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) and Fort Polk, La., to conduct an independent assessment of the exercise's planning, preparation, and execution. It was hoped that what was to be learned could be implemented into future exercises. Specifically, OECS was asked to focus on:

- The interrelatedness of all organizations which were involved in or had an impact on the exercise.
- The cause of situations which adversely impacted upon the welfare of the soldiers.
- The achievement of the ultimate purpose of the exercise: improved readiness.

This article will focus on the flow of information as an indicator of effectiveness during the exercise.

Assessment Methodology

Several methods of data collection were employed during this assessment; however, the interviewing of various personnel at all levels of command was the most predominant method of assessment during all phases of the exercise.

During the planning phase, documents, such as after-action reports and operations plans, were reviewed and in-process reviews and planning conferences were observed.

The preparation phase was assessed primarily through directly observing activities at division and lower levels.

Assessing the deployment involved directly observing the following:

- Operations at aerial ports and seaports.
- Movement of personnel and equipment by rail and convoy.
- Issuance of pre-positioned operational material configured to unit sets (POMCUS).
- Operation of staging and marshalling areas.
- USAREUR's war room and its movement control center's monitoring of the deployment.

During the field training exercises (FTX), the exercise control center/umpire control center, the operations centers of the corps cells and divisions, and soldiers in the field were observed.

Data for the redeployment phase were collected in the same manner as during the deployment, except that observations were also made at redeployment assembly areas and that questionnaires were administered to unit commanders at the redeployment aerial port of embarkation immediately prior to their redeployment.

Indicators of Effectiveness

The effective execution of an operation requires information flow within and between organizations in three dimensions: vertical, horizontal, and hidden. This perspective was applied during all phases of the assessment as a means for identifying effectiveness.

Vertical Information Flow

Information flow vertically (up and down the chain of command) provided the basis for aligning effort toward the achievement of common objectives.

In vertical information flow a clear chain of command and lines of authority must exist. During the exercise, some units received requirements (sometimes conflicting) from two sources, both having legitimate authority. Commanders of such units had difficulty aligning the efforts of their units on a single, unchanging objective and subordinates perceived that their day-to-day tasks were focused on one inconsistent priority after another.

The alignment of effort requires consistent organizational policies, procedures, and objectives. Without this consistency, organizational efforts would not complement each other, resulting in less effectiveness than potentially could be achieved. This applies between organizations, as well as within them. The following examples illustrate the need for consistency:

During the exercise, reserve component unit objectives were focused on training requirements of the FORSCOM Overseas Deployment Training Program; transportation agencies focused their objectives on exercising their transportation system under a heavy load during deployment; USAF Military Airlift Command policies focused on the efficiency of transporting personnel and filling seats; deploying units were concerned with the welfare of their troops, the quality of service provided, and the units' ability to perform their mission after deployment; USAREUR headquarters focused on the validation of plans for theater defense; and several units tested new pieces of high technology equipment or new operational concepts and doctrine which caused them to alter their normal organizational procedures.

When viewed independently, these examples seem sensible and logical. However, while the efforts of these organizations did not directly conflict, they were not necessarily aligned to achieve

the commander's intent. For information in the vertical flow to be most effective within organizations, it must consistently focus on one common purpose. Effort then must emanate from this purpose and be aligned by appropriate policies, procedures, and objectives.

The vertical flow of information was essential during the FTXs at all levels: tactical, operational, and strategic. The strategy of the higher level command provided the common focus for the alignment of effort which was critical to mission accomplishment. The commander's strategy had to specify "what" was to be accomplished and "why," while allowing each subordinate level to determine "how" to contribute to the concept of the operation. A commander's simple concept, which permitted decentralized execution and that was personally explained, generated the agility and initiative necessary for success during the FTXs.

Horizontal Information Flow

Vertical flow of information does not in itself produce optimal effectiveness. Horizontal information flow, e.g., between team members, is also required. This information flow is found within an organization, such as between contemporaries or principles of a staff, as well as between like offices of lateral organizations.

During the FTXs, the synchronization of combat power was essential to battlefield success, and the horizontal flow of information was critical to this synchronization. Commanders were assisted in this effort by personnel, such as fire support coordinators, liaison officers, and coordinating staffs. Coordinating points also were established to ensure that subordinate units synchronized their efforts on the battlefield.

Sustainment of combat power would not have been possible without synchronizing combat, combat support, and combat service support units. Similarly, the horizontal flow of information was required to integrate efforts in the deep, close-in, and rear battle areas.

Synchronization and integration of effort were required, not only at the tactical and operational levels during an FTX, but at all levels and at all times. Staffing procedures within organizations and sharing of planning information between organizations were other means by which a team atmosphere and synchronization were established. This was illustrated at the strategic level when REFORGER '84 plans were jointly developed and shared during several conferences by personnel of participating headquarters and agencies.

Information Flow in a Hidden Dimension

To be effective, organizational effort needs to be aligned and integrated. This can be achieved by horizontal and vertical information flow (explicit command and control) or by information flow that is neither visible nor measurable. This is information flow in its most abstract form: the hidden dimension.

During the assessment of REFORGER '84, several implicit means of command and control were identified. They included a common set of values, professionalism, motivation, leadership techniques, trust and confidence, common experience, and learning. Commanders who elicited these implicit qualities from their personnel achieved aligned and synchronized effort more frequently than commanders who relied mainly upon the explicit flow of information (vertical and horizontal).

Implications

Information is an impetus to action in any organization. Therefore, an assessment of the flow of information within and between organizations provides a useful predictor of effectiveness and operational capability. This applies in tactical, operational, and strategic organizations whether they are or are not involved in field exercises.

What are the implications for the application of this approach on the air-land battlefield of the future? If problems are identified in the flow of information, will the changing of organizational processes to solve them produce enhanced combat power? Can what was learned be of benefit to the command and control of units and organizations in a dynamic, lethal, and complex air-land battle environment?

Difficult questions all—with implications abounding—and only the future holds the answers. But, if we can capitalize on what was learned from REFORGER '84, we will be better able to contribute to readiness—the essence of the Army's purpose in war and peace. □

Maj. Daniel G. Braun is a project officer in the Directorate of Concepts Development at OECS. He has a B.S. degree in applied science and engineering from the US Military Academy. He has had a variety of command and staff positions in Germany, Korea, and the CONUS. Maj. Braun has an M.S. degree in management from the Naval Postgraduate School at Monterey, Calif., and is a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College.

Neurolinguistic Programming—Mystique or Mistake?

by **Carol Johnson, Ph.D.**

Cure phobias in less than an hour! Help children overcome reading problems! Eliminate smoking and drinking habits!

These are but some of the claims of advocates of neurolinguistic programming (NLP)[1]—a model of interpersonal communication.

This model was developed in the early 1970s by observing the strategies that successful therapists, particularly Milton Erikson and Virginia Satir, used to effect behavioral changes in clients. Richard Bandler and John Grinder extracted and systematized the model and extended its application to other settings, e.g., training and marketing.

Scientific Validation of Models

When a new model or theory is proposed in behavioral science, as in other sciences, it is subjected to the scientific method to establish its validity (Figure 1). The scientific method consists of (1) observation of phenomena in the real world, (2) the formulation of explanations for such phenomena as in the NLP model, (3) the generation of predictions about phenomena in the real world based on the model, i.e., the formulation of research hypotheses, and (4) the verification of these predictions through systematic, controlled observation.

This process is a continual one with constant refining of the original theory or model. Erroneous beliefs are modified when research data fail to support them.

Since NLP is a relatively new model, research results have only recently begun to be published in the literature. This article will review the studies that have been conducted to date to determine the extent to which the NLP model has been supported.

NLP and the Primary Representational System

The NLP model refers to each sense as a representational system and claims that people tend to develop preferences for processing information primarily through one or another representational system. In our culture, the visual, auditory, and kinesthetic senses are preferred. This preference is labeled as the primary representational system (PRS). According to the NLP model, people will understand best and be most sensitive to information that is presented to them in the same modality as their PRS.

Figure 1

The Scientific Method



Adapted from E. Stone, *Research Methods in Organizational Behavior*, Santa Monica, Goodyear Publishing Co., 1978.

Determining an individual's PRS is, therefore, an important aspect of NLP. Two principal techniques are used to determine someone's PRS. One of these is to attend to the predicates* that a person uses to describe his experience. This method suggests that people unconsciously choose certain words to describe their reality. People who are "visual" tend to "see" what you are saying. Ideas "look" interesting to them. They need a "clear picture" of the problem.

People who are "auditory" "tune in" to you. Things "sound" right to them. Things suddenly "click" for them. "Kinesthetic" people "feel" like they're "reaching" for an answer. They have a "feeling" about something they need to get in "touch" with.

This method suggests that people unconsciously choose certain words to describe their reality.

Another method of determining the PRS is through observing eye movement cues. During a conversation, when someone needs to access information to answer a question, the direction in which he moves his eyes corresponds to the representational system he is accessing. For the normally organized right-handed person, looking up indicates that he is accessing information that is stored visually, looking horizontally accesses auditorily stored information, and looking down is either kinesthetic or an indication that the person is having an internal dialogue.

Identification of and the effectiveness of matching the PRS, basic tenets of NLP, have stimulated the largest number of research studies. These will be reviewed first. A smaller number of studies, concerned with the therapeutic effectiveness of NLP, will then be reviewed.

Agreement Among Methods of Identifying the PRS

One of the earliest research studies investigated whether there would be agreement when the PRS was identified through eye movements, predicates, and self-report (what the subject believes to be his PRS). Owens[2] presented stimuli to 128 undergraduate psychology students. The three methods of identifying the PRS were independently used to classify students as visual, auditory, or kinesthetic. There was no significant agreement among the methods.

Predicates are words used to describe portions of a person's experience which correspond to the process and relationships in that experience. Predicates appears as verbs, adjectives, and adverbs in the sentence used to describe an experience.

A similar study assessed the PRS of 50 right-handed females through eye movements, an analysis of their verbal language, and a self-report. Again, contrary to the predictions of NLP, the three methods of determining the PRS did not agree. Each method was shown to be biased toward a particular representational modality and the authors questioned the application of certain NLP principles.[3]

Dorn[4] focused on three methods of identifying the PRS from predicate usage. One hundred and twenty students were interviewed and their verbal descriptions analyzed by three raters. There was a high degree of agreement among the raters in determining the PRS. The students were also given word lists and asked to select the predicates they preferred. After an explanation of the concept of predicate usage, each participant was also asked to indicate what he believed to be his own PRS. The relationships among the three methods of determining the PRS were weak.

Lack of agreement among various methods of determining the PRS does not mean that the PRS does not exist. It suggests, however, that one or more of the methods is not accurate. Therefore, other studies have separately investigated eye movements and predicate use.

Eye Movements as an Indicator of PRS

Beale[5] videotaped 40 students' eye movements in response to sensory-specific stimulus items. He found that eye movements tended to be upward, regardless of the sensory content of the stimulus. Thomason, Arbuckle, and Cady[6] asked 40 right-handed female students a series of questions intended to require them to mentally see an image, hear a sound, or feel a tactile sensation. Again, most eye movements were upward, thus failing to validate the NLP expectation that the movements would be in the direction the questions were intended to elicit.

Hernandez[7] examined eye movements in response to statements coded as visual, kinesthetic, auditory, or nonspecific. While visual statements elicited upward eye movements, only half of the auditory statements resulted in auditory eye movements and none of the kinesthetic statements were related to kinesthetic eye movements. Radosta[8] also investigated eye accessing cues as evidence of the PRS. He found significantly fewer eye movements in the predicted directions than were expected. The pattern of eye movements suggested that people are able to activate mental processes without regard for the cognitive demands made by the stimulus questions.

Cody[9] dealt with the proposition that representational preferences can be reliably determined through eye movements. During structured interviews conducted a week apart, he found no more than a moderate degree of stability. In another attempt to determine the reliability of identifying the PRS through eye movements, a group of researchers at Texas A&M University interviewed 26 right-handed females. The women were asked to signal when they experienced an internal response to any of the questions, and their eye movements just prior to the signal were recorded. Their findings did not support NLP assertions that eye movements can be reliably used to identify primary sense systems.[10]

There is, therefore, no evidence to date that supports eye movements as an indicator of the PRS. Other studies have looked at the effect of matching predicates as an indicator of the PRS.

Matching Predicates to Enhance Rapport

Grinder and Bandler[11] suggest that trust and rapport are enhanced by matching the predicates someone uses. Alienation is expected to result from deliberate mismatching of predicates.[12] None of the studies in which predicates were deliberately mismatched indicated that alienation had occurred.[13-19] There were mixed results regarding the effect of matching predicates.

Falzett[20] used eye movements to determine the PRS and had counselors match or mismatch predicates. Those whose predicates had been matched rated the counselors significantly more trustworthy than clients whose predicates had been mismatched. Ellickson[21] also used eye movements to determine the PRS of 36 men and 36 women who were randomly assigned to a matching or mismatching condition. The females showed no effects due to matching/mismatching, but the males reported being more comfortable in the matching condition. However, since the reliability and validity of the eye movement technique have been seriously questioned,[22-24] these results may have been caused by extraneous variables.

Paxton[25] determined the PRS of her subjects through their predicates and then randomly assigned them to a PRS matching, mismatching, or nonmatching condition. She found that the matching and mismatching groups both were significantly superior to the nonmatching group in terms of their perception of the counseling relationship, but they did not differ significantly from each other. She concluded the counselors who frequently use predicates reflecting a specific representational system will more positively influence perceptions of the relationship than will counselors who infrequently use predicates.

Michael Yapko[26] tested the assumption that using similar predicates when interacting with others increases rapport and influence. He exposed 30 people to three different taped hypnotic relaxation inductions which varied only in the predicates they contained. He determined each person's PRS through his response to open-ended questions and concluded that identifying and matching PRS language appeared to result in deeper relaxation.

Other studies used ongoing matching of predicates rather than attempting to predetermine the PRS. This isolates the issue of predicate matching from that of accurately identifying the PRS.

Frieden[27] looked at the effect of predicate matching on trust and communicative behaviors. Eight therapy sessions in which the therapist systematically matched or mismatched the predicates used by two clients were videotaped. Both clients reported increased trust in the counselor and decreased symptoms. There was also an increase in the amount of eye contact which would indicate increased rapport. However, paradoxically, there was also an increase in the amount of distance between the heads of the counselor and clients which usually indicates a decrease in rapport. Frieden suggested that the data provided "no unequivocal support" for NLP.

Dowd and Pety[28] had students listen to audiotapes of counselors who deliberately matched or mismatched clients' predicates. The students were then asked to rate the counselor on a number of scales. Therapists who consistently matched predicates were not rated significantly more expert, attractive, or trustworthy than those who mismatched predicates.

In a similar study, Cody[29] examined whether perceptions of therapists as trustworthy and effective are enhanced when the therapist's language matches the clients' representational preferences. Cody's subjects listened to audiotapes of staged interactions. In contrast to the predicted outcome, therapists who matched clients' language were evaluated as less trustworthy and effective. This was also true when the therapists' predicates matched those of the evaluating subjects. Cody concludes, "The results illustrate the problems posed for psychotherapy when models proliferate in the absence of empirical evaluation."

Dowd and Hingst[30] evaluated the effect of predicate matching on clients who were also subjects. Again, instead of predetermining the subjects' PRS, therapists were instructed to either match, mismatch, or work in their usual fashion. There was no significant difference among the three conditions. They concluded, "...the effects of predicate matching in an actual interview situation are small and limited, at least for minimally trained therapists interviewing normal students."

Hammer[31] also trained therapists to match or mismatch the ongoing predicates of clients. Clients in the matching predicates group rated their counselors higher on perceived empathy than those in the mismatching group. However, Hammer states that this "...does not necessarily argue for the existence of the higher order concept of representational system." He suggests that responding to any word that signifies an inner process, such as thinking, feeling, or knowing, or, perhaps, to any concrete words related to sensory experience could prove to be important as cues for matching. He states, "It is also possible that consistently and effectively matching any behavior, regardless of the specific cue used, is the important variable."

...there is no consistent support that predicate matching enhances rapport.

Mercier and Johnson[32] analyzed the transcripts of the film series "Three Approaches to Psychotherapy" for counselor and client representational system predicate use. The film series demonstrates how three therapists worked with the same client. Different patterns of predicate use emerged for the three therapists in the film, but only limited support for NLP theory was found. However, when the verbal interactions were studied from a transactional perspective, a pattern of mutual accommodation was found for each of the three therapists. The authors point out, however, that many studies of counselor behavior have found similar results with such things as sentence length, the ratio of I/you frequencies, the types of verb phrases, and other verbal behavior. It appears that a pattern of coordinated speech is sought for many variables other than predicates. In addition, it may be difficult to determine whose verbal behavior plays the major influence as there appears to be a reciprocal influence.

It is clear that there is no consistent support that predicate matching enhances rapport. The research evidence regarding the validity of using eye movements as an indicator of the PRS calls into question the positive results reported by Ellickson[33] and Falzett.[34] Tracking predicates during an interview resulted in some support for NLP predictions, but these results are not consistent and there appears to be evidence that other factors that influence what occurs in a counseling relationship have not been clearly identified.

In classifying people by their predicates,...the majority of the samples were kinesthetic.

Validity and Reliability of Identifying the PRS Through Predicates

The validation of a construct requires that it be independent from the method used to measure it.[35] That is, if a method of measuring a construct (i.e., the PRS) consistently gives the same results, the consistency may be due to the method used to measure it, rather than to the construct. In classifying people by their predicates, most studies have reported that the majority of the samples were kinesthetic.

In an attempt to validate the implications of predicates, Johannsen[36] questioned individuals regarding their mental imagery during a standard interview. He concluded that "neither predicates nor mental imagery appear to make the distinctions necessary for a valid sense mode typology. Predicates would have classified most subjects as the kinesthetic type, while mental imagery would have classified most subjects as the mixed sense type."

Laura Birholtz[37] examined verbal predicates to determine whether people differ in their preferences and whether their preference is stable over time and over reports of past, present, and future experiences. She found that people do have a preference for words that reflect one sensory category more than another. However, the 27 people in her study were all identified as preferring a kinesthetic mode. This was stable over a one-week time interval and over reports of positive and negative experiences and of past, present, and future experiences.

Owens[38] also had a majority of kinesthetics when he used predicates to identify the PRS as did Gumm et al.[39] It may be that most people are

kinesthetic, but there needs to be a verification of this through determining the PRS through another method. Eye movements tend to classify most people as visual[40 41] and NLP theory has not yet suggested another method of identifying the PRS. Until that can be done, there is evidence that identification of the PRS through predicates can be done reliably,[42] but no evidence regarding whether this identification is valid.

In a review of the literature, Dorn, Brunson, and Atwater[43] point out that it is imperative that the PRS be accurately identified if NLP is to be employed as an effective therapeutic strategy. Based on existing research, they did not believe that this could be done.

Sharpley[44] reviewed 15 studies investigating the use of the PRS in NLP. He summarizes the data collected and evaluates aspects of design, methodology, population, and dependent measures. He found that there is little supportive evidence for the use of the PRS in NLP in these studies, with much data to the contrary.

Anchoring

According to the NLP model, when two events occur in close sequence, they will be perceived to be associated. The association formed will occur in one trial when a desired emotional state is associated with a specific stimulus. The association is called an anchor relationship and each event is referred to as an anchor. After the relationship is formed, each time one of the anchors occurs, the other will be automatically evoked. The NLP model asserts that anchor relationships are best formed and learning is best achieved when anchors correspond to a person's PRS.

To empirically test these assertions, Hill[45] identified subjects with auditory and visual PRSs. He presented them with word lists to memorize which contained anchor cues either matched or mismatched to subjects' PRS. He predicted that recall performance would be better when anchors were PRS-matched than when they were mismatched. The results did not support the prediction. As possible reasons, he states that the NLP model may not be valid or that due to poor identification of the PRS, anchor cues were never correctly matched to the PRS.

Cody[46] evaluated the proposition that experience congruent with representational preference would have special impact. Predicates were varied to describe common pleasant experiences in visually-oriented, auditorially-oriented, and kinesthetically-oriented versions. No relationship was found between representational preferences and people's preferences among versions.

NLP in Counseling and Training

Other studies have looked at the effectiveness of NLP in counseling and training. Haynie[47] hypothesized that adding NLP concepts and materials to human relations training would increase the skills of participants. Half of the participants received the NLP material and half used a traditional format. NLP did not add or detract from skills gained, but participants who received the NLP material perceived the training as significantly less helpful to them as prospective teachers than students who did not receive this material.

NLP practitioners have claimed to be able to cure a person of a phobia in a single therapy session.[48] Keith Allen[49] identified 36 people with snake phobia. He randomly assigned them to three groups: a control group that received no treatment, an NLP treatment group, and a single treatment of massed systematic desensitization. There were no significant differences between the groups receiving treatment and the group that did not. He concluded that neither treatment had an effect on subjects' fear of snakes as measured by the number of subjects who were able to pick up a snake after treatment and the amount of fear reported when they did so. However, NLP treatment subjects more frequently reported that they thought they were over their fear of snakes.

No research evidence exists that NLP adds a revolutionary new tool to the therapeutic environment; however, the number of studies conducted is still relatively small.

Ehrmantraut[50] compared counselors given eight hours of training in NLP with counselors given eight hours of training in a more traditional model. The counselors were rated on their initial counseling practicum. The NLP trained group did not differ from the group trained in the more established model. He concluded that "since NLP techniques produced results that approximated those of the Carkhuff model that some NLP techniques can usefully be integrated into the training of counselors." However, he also pointed out that "since NLP trained therapists were not rated higher at significant levels than Carkhuff trained counselors, that some of the claims of NLP proponents need to be further evaluated."

A recent series of dissertations compared the effectiveness of counselors trained in NLP to those

who were not. Bacon[51] found that both NLP reframing and relaxation therapy helped clients reduce incidents of headaches, but that there was no difference between the two techniques. Atwater's[52] subjects were randomly assigned to initial counseling sessions that used either the NLP meta-model or verbal interactions from the General Systems Approach. Again, both groups improved, but there was no difference between groups. Thomason,[53] on the other hand, found that counselors trained in NLP were more expert compared to non-NLP trained counselors.

No research evidence exists that NLP adds a revolutionary new tool to the therapeutic environment. However, the number of studies conducted is still relatively small. Further research certainly needs to be done. Sharpley[54] states, "A series of controlled studies using reliable indicators of change in clients' behavior (rather than their perceptions of counselors, which may not be correlated with problem dissolution by clients) is called for."

...there is no evidence that NLP is more effective than traditional therapeutic techniques.

Summary

Based on the research conducted thus far, (1) the three methods of identifying the PRS do not agree; (2) there is evidence that the eye movement procedure for identifying the PRS is worthless; (3) matching predicates in an ongoing conversation may enhance rapport; (4) identifying the PRS through predicates can be done reliably, but there is no evidence regarding the validity of the PRS concept; and (5) there is no evidence that NLP is more effective than traditional therapeutic techniques. □

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

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Dr. Carol Johnson, a staff member at OECS since 1983, is chief, Analysis Division, Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization. Prior to joining OECS, she was a consultant to a variety of organizations in areas such as employee selection, supervisory training, compensation systems, and program evaluation. Her projects included development of management systems within the Army to improve effectiveness through more efficient administration and training. She also helped develop a model of combat unit effectiveness, specifically, issues and problems that impact on effectiveness. Dr. Johnson has a Ph.D. in industrial/organizational psychology from Illinois Institute of Technology at Chicago.



When Teamwork Is Needed, Try Sports!

by **John Frye**

A few years ago I was serving as an internal consultant to the commander of a large Army base. He was the epitome of an entrepreneur: hard-charging, dynamic, a workaholic who could generate an idea a minute. The installation he commanded had previously been run in a somewhat "laid-back" manner, and when I joined the team, our new commander was well into the process of "getting things back in order."

Needless to say, his staff officers and subordinate commanders were feeling a great deal of heat. He not only generated many ideas in a day, he remembered them all—and quite often checked on their status. Working for such a man became an intolerable burden for most of his subordinates. Things would get even more frustrating when he would comment, "Why is it that I have to think of everything? Can't you guys ever come up with some ideas?" He seemed blind to the fact that they were inundated with implementation of his ideas and correcting the issues he wanted corrected. If they had found a moment in which to be reflective enough to generate a "new" idea, they would be averse to offer it. Suggesting an idea would only have brought them more work—something they truly did not need.

My partner and I discussed this situation with the commander. Although it appeared he understood the impact he was having, he refused to change his style. We worked closely with the deputy commander and the chief of staff, attempting to accommodate the commander's wishes and yet maintain a cohesive work force, but our efforts were marginal. The long, frustrating hours everyone was putting in to their work began to take their toll. Conflict raised its head in more and more divergent instances: in the club, in the office, and even in some homes. Staff meetings turned into miniature battlefields where one-upsmanship and back-stabbing became more and more prevalent. Everyone was complaining—not about the content of the commander's ideas (for they were all quite meritorious), but about their overwhelming number.

Something clearly had to be done, but we didn't know what. All our efforts had failed. We had hesitatingly contacted other organizational effectiveness staff officers seeking advice, but where it was received, it too failed. I clearly remember the evening I left my office, frustrated, en route to an intramural racquetball match, muttering to myself how I wished it were the commander I was playing that night so I could show him something about getting along with his fellow man.

As the evening progressed, that thought stayed with me. I watched the camaraderie and esprit evident on the courts that night as my teammates and opponents cheered on our own players. When the end of the match came, we had a formal winner, but the notion that someone had lost seemed to disappear, swept away somehow by the physical (and mental) rewards of the pure struggle. I began wondering if there were a way those kinds of feelings could be generated in our day-to-day operational efforts. By morning, I had formulated a rough plan that just might turn things around for the commander and his staff.



We designed and dispatched individual "sign-up" sheets to the commander, deputy commander, chief of staff, each principal staff officer, and each subordinate commander, soliciting them to join an "over 29" racquetball league. Each was asked to indicate his preference to play singles or doubles and the best time for them to play. In some cases gentle goading was needed, but all eventually responded. They were paired according to their estimated playing ability. Eventually, a continuing schedule of doubles racquetball matches involving the top leadership was announced.

Changes were noticeable at the first staff meeting following the schedules "hitting the streets." Instead of the normal cold, abrupt pre-conference comments, the staff officers were quite jovial, discussing the upcoming matches, who would domineer, whether or not the commander would really take part, whether he was any good, etc. The meeting itself also seemed more congenial with business taken care of with dispatch and an absence of the cutting remarks that had previously prevailed.

As the matches took place, we had winners and losers. These results were recorded and standings were published, showing games won/lost and winning percentage. The commander had always had a habit of being late (to meetings, briefings, tours, etc.) and accordingly did not show up in time to play several of his matches. He and his partner (the provost marshal) wound up in the cellar. When the published standings reached his desk, he called to say that he believed he could win if he got to the court and asked that I be a little more flexible in the scheduling (he didn't want to be in the cellar anymore). I took that opportunity to point out to him his tendency to always make people wait—sometimes cancelling activities after people had worked long and hard for his personal review. I didn't have to ask him if he saw the connection—he saw it and stated it. He told me that although the life of a commander was very demanding, he was going to try very hard to be on time in the future.

As the weeks went by, the participants became better at the game, developing more stamina, better coordination, and better teamwork. Wins once easy were no longer as easy to capture. The staff seemed to be working much better with one another off the courts, as well as on. Staff meetings were really going smoothly. Racquetball analogies, as well as other sports analogies, were often evident, leading to increased teamwork and "win-win" solutions. The entire group now had a common ground upon which to build a solid relationship and a base from which it could view the commander's approaches with keener perspectives. Several of the staff members had introduced *their own ideas* and were busily implementing them!

Membership of the teams was rotated periodically. This demonstrated to the players that all of them were capable of working together as a team. The team members' spirit became very high and they joined with the commander to raise the base to standards of achievement not previously thought attainable.

Teamwork is an inherent component of sports. So is better health, physical fitness, positive self-esteem, camaraderie, esprit de corps, morale, and a better understanding of your fellow man. If you want teamwork on the job, consider using sports to get you there. □

John Frye is an OESO at Hq, 32nd Army Air Defense Command, Darmstadt, Germany. He previously served as an OESO at Fort Devens, Mass., and as OE program manager at MILPERCEN. He received a B.S. degree in business management from the University of Maryland at College Park and an M.B.A. from Rivier College, Nashua, N.H. He was in the US Army for over 23 years.

Sources and Resources

by Lynn Dixon Herrick



The 1980s are hailed in some quarters as the dawn of the Information Age, which probably doesn't come as news to any Army leader. You know the power of information, as well as the negative consequences of misguided or misunderstood information. Many of you are also acutely aware of another phenomenon which accompanies the Information Age: an almost exponential growth in the volume of information, accompanied by a decrease in the effectiveness with which the information is applied.

In simplistic terms, we seem to have another case of content advancing faster than process. There is more than enough information available; yet in many organizations it doesn't truly *inform* planning and decision making. More is not necessarily better!

The resources listed below present a variety of approaches to information synthesis and control. In researching this subject and compiling the results, I experienced firsthand some of the frustrations that go hand-in-hand with information proliferation: titles or introductions promised far more than the item actually provided; more emphasis was placed on setting the gap than on how to close it; or the scenario was so specific that success couldn't easily be replicated. I rejected those items and still came up with something less than satisfying. The subject is so complex, crosses so many functional lines, and can be approached from such diverse perspectives that it readily lends itself to another factor of the Information Age: specialization. No single source wraps it up neatly.

Information in Organizations

Introductory Information

Wofford, Jerry C., and others

ORGANIZATIONAL COMMUNICATION: THE KEYSTONE TO MANAGERIAL EFFECTIVENESS. McGraw-Hill, c1977. No, this college text *isn't* about the information explosion or the microcomputer revolution. Reference to it is included here as a reminder that the traditional exchange of organizational information via human communication is not likely to be totally eliminated in the near future. Problems existing at this level may well be intensified in the Information Age.

Witt, William W.

"Information Engineering." Task Force Delta Concept Paper, no date. This paper explores the concept of "increasing our Army's force readiness through the improvement in efficiency and effectiveness of how our Army organizations handle information flow." Further, it emphasizes that information flow is a function of the *people* who get, adapt, store, share, guard, distort, and otherwise process information. (Paper also includes the author's treatise on high-performing units.)

Meltzer, Morton R.

INFORMATION: THE ULTIMATE MANAGEMENT RESOURCE. AMACOM, c1981. Here's a good place to start getting a handle on the implications of the Age of Information to management. Not only is information vital to the success of anyone in a managerial position, it is also a bona fide organizational resource. This book is a basic guide to finding, using, and managing that resource.

Zand, Dale E.

INFORMATION, ORGANIZATION AND POWER: EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY. McGraw-Hill, c1981. This is another basic overview of the impact of information on the management of organizations in the '80s. While Meltzer (above) addresses individual managers, Zand looks at the organization as a whole, with emphasis on organizational processes, such as decision and policy making.

Computer-Based Communications

Hiltz, Starr Roxanne and Turoff, Murray

THE NETWORK NATION: HUMAN COMMUNICATION VIA COMPUTER. Addison-Wesley, c1978. This book is probably most useful for anyone involved in or planning for involvement in a computerized conferencing system. It

provides suggestions for overcoming some of the potential disadvantages of "dehumanizing" communication and for utilizing systems in advanced ways, such as data gathering, polling, and problem solving.

Gengle, Dean
THE NETWEAVER'S SOURCEBOOK: A GUIDE TO MICRO NETWORKING AND COMMUNICATIONS. Addison-Wesley, c1984. The term "sourcebook" is accurately used; this is a comprehensive collection of information about micro communications. The information is concise, expressed in standard English, and addresses both technical and human concerns of developing and using microcomputer-based telecommunications networks. This book has a greater potential for direct application to users of networks which emphasize information sharing than to more formal networks designed for data-base management.

Kerr, Elaine B. and Hiltz, Starr Roxanne
COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS. Academic Press, c1982. This is the graduate level version of Dean Gengle's book (above) and utilizes a research approach to synthesize information about 18 projects and to document lessons learned.

Computer-Based Information Management

Brinbert, Herbert R.
"Effective Management of Information: How to Meet the Needs of All Users." *Management Review*, Feb. 1984, pp. 8-13. This brief article puts the concept of information management in an OMR (outcomes, methods, resources) framework. Rather than impose the capability of computer technology on an organization, the author urges that the needs of the end users first be defined and then be consistently used as the guide for implementing change.

Mertes, Louis H.
"Doing Your Office Over—Electronically." *Harvard Business Review*, Mar/Apr 1981, pp. 127-135. Using existing technology (a network of interactive small-scale computers and a large central processing unit), a major US bank has succeeded in making the "office of the future" a reality. This article provides an excellent overview of the practical applications of computer technology to the systematic management of information in organizations.

Ramsgard, William C.
MAKING SYSTEMS WORK: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF BUSINESS SYSTEMS. Wiley, c1977. The primary subject covered in this volume is the role of various individuals and departments in designing and implementing management information systems. Its main message is that the roles (to include that of user) are "intricately interdependent."

Birchall, D.W. and Hammond, V.J.
TOMORROW'S OFFICE TODAY: MANAGING TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE. Wiley, c1981. The target audience for this book is office managers, the people directly responsible for the transformation from manual to automated office operations. Rather than providing equipment specs and functions, it concentrates on the manager's role in preparing the work force to accept and utilize emerging office technology.

Pava, Calvin
MANAGING NEW OFFICE TECHNOLOGY: AN ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGY. Free Press, c1983. This book treats the "electronic office" at the strategic level and offers a sociotechnical design for changing the office's organization in response to new technology. The author recommends redesign at all levels, not simply at that of clerical support, and provides detailed case studies of the entire design process.

Freiling, Michael J.
UNDERSTANDING DATA BASE MANAGEMENT. Alfred Publishing Co., c1982. "A data-base system is a combination of software and hardware that makes it possible and convenient to perform one or more tasks that involve handling large amounts of information." That's an example of the straightforward approach of this little book, which should prove useful in understanding the basics of data-base management.

Keen, Peter G.W. and Morton, Michael S. Scott
DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS: AN ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVE. Addison-Wesley, c1978. Decision support systems go beyond the realm of data-base management to focus on the decision-making processes of leaders and the use of computer-based technology to support and extend those processes. As such, the topic is a blend of behavioral and management sciences and is increasingly significant to the overall picture of information use in organizations.

Project Management

Archibald, Russell D.

MANAGING HIGH TECHNOLOGY PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS. Wiley, c1976. This is a nuts-and-bolts, how-to-do-it handbook for the project manager. Its potential use would be in assisting the action officer or project manager who is responsible for large-scale technological change.

Kerzner, Harold

PROJECT MANAGEMENT FOR EXECUTIVES. Van Nostrand Reinhold, c1982. While thoroughly exploring the ramifications of project management as a general organizational function, this book focuses on involvement in the project at the organizational level. It would be particularly useful prior to the start of a complex project by virtue of its emphasis on considerations that must be addressed and decisions that must be made in advance. □

Contributing Reviews

*Our intent here is not to review books in the "critical" sense; rather it is to give information about the books' content and organization and to summarize what the authors/editors have to say about them.—**Editor***

The following books were reviewed by Don Van Eynde, Ph.D., editor, OD Practitioner, and assistant professor of management at Trinity University, San Antonio.* From 1978-1979, he was a member of the OECS faculty.

Bradford, David L. and Allan R. Cohen. *Managing for Excellence: The Guide to Developing High Performance in Contemporary Organizations.* New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1984.

Managing for Excellence explains why the traditional concept of "manager as hero" is outmoded and introduces a new model of leadership called "manager as developer." Bradford and Cohen write that a whole new array of options opens up for managers who are able to "...drop their heroic mind-sets of total personal responsibility" and adopt instead an orientation of "How can each problem be solved in a way that further develops my subordinates' commitment and capabilities?" Major subjects addressed in this book are the development of goals that tie employee interests to the needs of the department; an interpersonal communication technique labelled "Supportive Confrontation"; the building of shared-responsibility teams; the use of manageable conflict to spur team performance; and some practical advice on how to lead and motivate subordinates.

The strengths of this book are its emphasis on practical and usable ideas, the generous use of example and testimony to support concepts, and the authors' writing style which makes for easy and interesting reading.

Tichy, Noel M. *Managing Strategic Change: Technical, Political and Cultural Dynamics.* New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1983.

This book is the culmination of 14 years of work by Noel Tichy on the subject of change management in organizations. Introducing the concept of TPC (technical, political, cultural) theory, the author presents a conceptual framework for helping managers solve the *technical* design problem—how to organize capital, people, and technology to efficiently and effectively produce outputs, the *political* allocation problem—how to manage who gets what rewards from the organization, and the *cultural* problem—what norms and values are expected of members of the organization.

This is a book for managers and consultants who are serious about the subject of strategic change. Although laced with examples, case studies, and action guidelines, much of the content is conceptual, and thus not what one would label "light reading." Nonetheless, it is a superb treatment of a complex subject. □

* Reprinted from the *OD Practitioner*, December 1984.



Training OESOs:
A View of the Curriculum

by **Major Douglas C. Hayden**

The curriculum for the organizational effectiveness staff officer (OESO) basic course was in many respects the most salient feature of the organizational effectiveness (OE) program. As the numerous graduates will attest, it was a unique course in its design, execution, and outcome. Unlike most training officers receive which is focused in knowledge and comprehension of concepts or principles, the OESO basic course was focused on the application-level skills a graduate must use to be a successful OESO.

As the OE program and the Organizational Effectiveness Center and School come to a close, it is important to document the content of the basic OESO course as a reflection of the direction and thrust of the entire program. As most are aware, the basic course was significantly altered in the past year. Most of the changes were the direct result of shifts in organizational effectiveness program objectives, external evaluations of the training needs of field OESOs, and adapting new technology and training methodologies. Initially the course was expanded to 19.6 weeks to incorporate these changes. Recently, however, the course was reduced to 16 weeks, largely by eliminating redundant material and implementing more efficient teaching methodologies.

The objectives and sequencing of the final course are summarized as follows:

Scope

The OESO course was a 16-week program of instruction which prepared selected officers and civilians to function as specially trained staff officers (OESOs). They were trained to view an organization as a composite of interdependent parts (a system approach) and thereby assist commanders in identifying and resolving complex

issues and problems. The course emphasized the complex nature of change and its dynamic impact on individuals, groups, and leaders in an organization. Therefore it enabled an OESO to apply an integrated blend of knowledge and skills drawn from behavioral, management, and systems sciences specifically tailored to meet the changing needs of the Army.

Course Goals

Upon completion of the course, the graduate was able to perform the following tasks:

- Educate commanders on the OE program.
- Identify and analyze systemic problems that cut across functional and command boundaries.
- Provide recommendations for improved mission accomplishment.
- Assist with integrating systems in areas, such as force modernization, major unit reorganizations, information flow process, long-range planning, organizational improvements, systems interfacing, and human resources development.
- Evaluate OE efforts conducted and follow up with appropriate actions.
- Assist the commander and his soldiers in performing in an organization trained to fight and win.

Content

The course was organized into the following eight subcourses:

The Army: A Complex System (TA:ACS) (8 days). This subcourse provided an OESO with basic understanding and comprehension of the major functional systems and interrelationship involved in budgeting, developing, manning, and equipping the force. Basic systems models were used to categorize, explain, and synthesize the numerous interrelationships an OESO had to understand to operate at different levels throughout the Army.

This subcourse was taught primarily by lecture with the use of small group practical exercises to reinforce key learning objectives.

Organizational Communications (9 days). This subcourse developed individual and group communication skills an OESO had to have to assist leaders in attaining sustained human performance in organizations. The focus was on the impact of interpersonal and group dynamics within the Army organizational context. This was developed through small group interaction which relied heavily on the professional experiences of the student. Participation in the seminar group provided the student a solid understanding of the dynamics of group development, effective communication techniques, perceptual objectivity, and conflict resolution. During each phase of the subcourse, emphasis was placed on the application of communication skills that an OESO would use to gain and maintain the trust and confidence of the leaders and organizations with which they had to interact to be effective.

This subcourse was taught in the seminar mode with emphasis on direct student involvement through practical exercise, role plays, discussion groups, and diagnostic instruments.

Organizational Management (2.5 days). This subcourse provided knowledge and comprehension of the major organizational management functions and practices upon which an OESO relied to assess complex organizations. Using a systems perspective, the instruction focused on general management principles and their relationship with the formal and informal organizational processes with which an OESO had to contend in today's Army.

This subcourse was taught using a combination of lecture to convey basic concepts and seminar groups to synthesize key objectives.

OE Management Skills (2 days). This subcourse provided specific staff officer and OE-related skills required to manage and execute the OE program. The scope included reinforcement of the presentation and writing skills critical to the success of the OESO. The focus was on preparing an OESO to manage and market the OE program. The purpose of the OE program, its relationship to the key Army issues, and the strategies to accomplish the program objectives formed the basis for the student's clear understanding of the role of the OESO in the Army.

This subcourse was taught primarily by lecture with some small-group guided discussions of key objectives.

Information Systems Management (6 days). This subcourse provided knowledge of automated information systems and application of these systems. The scope included three functional areas: operation of a microcomputer and use of off-the-shelf software; techniques using microcomputers to aid in the numeric analysis of complex data sets and in project planning and control; and knowledge of Army management

information systems and the design process of management information systems.

This subcourse was taught using a combination of lecture, self-paced texts, and practical exercises. Individual work to demonstrate mastery of the computer and of analytical skills was required.

OESO Skills (18 days). This subcourse provided critical skills necessary to solve complex problems. The scope included application level instruction on the entry, assessment, planning, implementation, and evaluation activities which an OESO had to use in an organizational context. A conceptual framework or model was demonstrated as a process for effective operations. The focus was on practical techniques an OESO could use to resolve complex and systemic problems and develop an organization-sustained problem-solving capability in the face of change.

This subcourse was taught using a combination of lecture and seminar methodology. Practical exercises in a small-group configuration were used extensively to reinforce concepts and demonstrate application level skills.

Organizational Systems (5.5 days). This subcourse provided the conceptual framework and requisite skills required to apply a systems perspective to complex organizational issues. The scope included use of a variety of systems models to implement change in complex systems, a method for OESOs to develop a generic systems model, and a technique for helping an organization conduct long-range strategic planning. The focus was on applying a systems perspective to complex Army organizations and on those issues which impacted on the organization's ability to achieve its mission.

This subcourse was taught primarily by lecture/conference. A case study was used to reinforce key objectives.

Field Training Exercise (FTX) (4 weeks). The FTX provided the student the opportunity to demonstrate, in a realistic environment, his ability to apply the skills and knowledge acquired during the course. The student was required to assess, plan for, conduct, and evaluate an OE operation designed to assist an Army organization in solving a complex problem. The execution and documentation of each student's effort were directly supervised by a trained faculty member. This process served as a final exam of the student's ability to apply and synthesize the key concepts and abilities the OESO had to demonstrate.

The students were normally divided into pairs, with eight pairs comprising each FTX team. Two supervisors for each team facilitated the process and evaluated the students' abilities. A limited amount of small-group instruction to reinforce key concepts or principles was provided as required. The emphasis was on the application of skills and attainment of objectives by the pairs of students and the FTX team.

Closing

Throughout its history, the basic OESO course was a dynamic learning event. The curriculum evolved as the needs of the Army changed and the core academic disciplines on which OE was based emerged. Despite numerous program changes, the basic OESO course remained the single most important training strategy for the Organizational Effectiveness Center and School to execute in support of OE program objectives. The graduates and faculty can be justifiably proud of the long tradition of academic excellence associated with the basic OESO course. □

Maj. Douglas C. Hayden is chief, curriculum development division, Training and Doctrine Directorate, OECS. He is an intelligence officer with an additional specialty of personnel management. Maj. Hayden was graduated from the University of Santa Clara, Calif., with a B.S. in political science. He received an M.S. in management degree from Naval Postgraduate School at Monterey, Calif. He is a graduate of the infantry officers basic course, military intelligence (MI) officers basic course, the MI advanced officers course, and the resident Command and General Staff College course. Previous jobs include intelligence assignments with the 2nd and 7th Infantry Divisions, strategic intelligence operations, and Department of the Army staff experience with the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

US Army Organizational Effectiveness Center and School
Fort Ord, California

Organizational Effectiveness Staff Officer Course

Class 3-84
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February 21, 1985

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Address by Colonel Donald K. Griffin to Graduating OESO Class No. 2-85

I want to start, if you will permit me, class, by saying just a couple of words to the staff and faculty. This is an important day—the last day of graduating students from this institution. I would like for the staff and faculty that is present to stand up, please. I would like you to stand up good and tall and be proud of yourselves for what you have produced. I salute you for that and say that you have done an excellent job. You should be proud of the products that you have produced, including these students. And I'm sure the students will join me in recognizing the excellent job you have done by saying, "Thank you very much."

With you, this last class, we will have graduated over 1600 students from OECS. I think the good news is that you have managed to be graduated before OECS closed. I'm going to tell you about that good news. A minute ago, the chaplain prayed to God for the opportunity to put to use in life the skills that you now possess. Life is in session, in case you haven't noticed. It's in session now and you are about to go through a looking glass into another piece of life. And like the walrus said in the Lewis Carroll book ("Alice In Wonderland") about going through that looking glass, "...the time has come to talk of many things, of shoes and ships and sealing wax and cabbages and kings, and why the sea is boiling hot and whether pigs have wings." They don't. What I want to talk about is not those things, but about what you do with your life that is in session, specifically about three issues: what you need as you go forth *to be*, what you need *to know*, and what you need *to do*. I will propose to you some fairly simple answers to those questions. Now some of the comments several of you students have made to me or that I have overheard recently have been words like, "I sure hope I have the opportunity to be an OESO before this OE thing all grinds to a halt." That comment bothers me because it tells me that we failed in a piece of your education—failed to convey to you a very important piece of information. And that piece of information is that, in my estimation, the best graduates of this institution are not OESOs. From personal experience, I know that. The best graduate of this institution that I ever saw was my former battalion executive officer, and he's now about to take command of another battalion. I think we have failed to convey to you that the skills we have given you are not unique to some particular job called "OESO," but are very relevant to something very important to the Army. The thing you need to be more than anything else when you leave here is what you were when you came, and that is a *leader*. That's the job that you are in and I do not care what that job is or how menial you happen to think your particular position is to which you are going—you are a leader. And that is why we are paying you—to be leaders. Now I'm going to tell you about that.

Seeker of Truth

First, there are some things you need to do about that. One is that as an Army leader you need to be one who's in the business of seeking truth. There are a couple of pitfalls in that. One is people who are naysayers and are always pointing out what is wrong with the organization and what's wrong with the Army. But I've got to tell you that there is more right in this Army, and right with most organizations, and more right with this country than there is wrong, and it's not helpful to be a naysayer. And on the other side of that are some of those who tell the boss what he wants to hear and who always bear good tidings, and that's not helpful either. Your job as a leader is to call the tough ones.

Exerciser of Initiative

As a leader you need to be one who exercises initiative. Now that's something I don't think we can teach—initiative. It comes from within you; it springs from within your breast. It's a choice that you have to make. Now you can choose to consider yourself a stone on the bottom of the stream, tossed and polished by the water as it goes by, hunkering down to the best of your ability trying not to be dislodged, keeping that low profile. Or you can choose to believe that you *are* the stream—the living, flowing, moving force that carves events into the future. That's what leaders are about when they exercise initiative.

Team Player

To be an effective leader you need to be a team player. I think that's particularly critical for this group as graduates of the last class from OECS.

You will go forth with, at least in your own eyes, some stigma attached to you that the Army has said that somehow what you are now is not OK. So you need to work particularly hard at fitting. And that fit means that you need to be "green"—you need to fit the Army image. It also means that you need to be very careful that you do not develop an unjustified self-perception that you are different, or better, or more knowledgeable. That's not a helpful perception for you to convey to others.

And as a team player and a leader, you need to be involved. Some of you may have garnered the perception here that you have been trained to be consultants, observers of process. That's not a leader. Leaders are engaged with the machinery. They get involved; they're not afraid of risk and they create things. That's where you need to BE as a leader.

The things you need to know, well happily, those line up fairly well with those things we have taught you. We have taught you some things about organizations—how you take groups of people and how you get them all essentially heading in the same direction toward the accomplishment of a worthy outcome. That's what we taught you. Another name for that, incidently, is leadership. You just completed about a 3-month course in leadership. You know, you can't get that anyplace else in the Army. You can get an hour here and an hour there of leadership traits or something of that nature, but you've had *three months* of leadership and you just can't get that at any other place. I don't even think you can get that outside of the Army. And that is invaluable. You just got one very large shot in the arm on how you lead organizations.

Leadership Literature

The time in America certainly is right for that. The business community is crying for leadership. You see it everyplace. Go to bookstores and see what you see on the bookshelves. You see "In Search of Excellence" and the follow-on to that, "Passion for Excellence." And you see among the best sellers Lee Iacocca's book. And you see that even Paul Hersey has republished his "Situational Leadership." (It's not new information; he just recognizes the market is rich for that.) For years the business community has relegated leadership to the Director of Human Resource Development, assuming that the job of chief executive officer (CEO) is just management, but that's not the situation today. Leadership is something that people are searching for and with good reason. It's also something that is causing a great deal of confusion.

What is leadership? That confuses us very much, in my opinion. I hear words that say, "Well, I'll know it when I see it." Well I want to tell you, that's not a very good answer, you see, because things that are obscure we eventually figure out, but the obvious things take a little longer. And just plain, good, obvious leadership is very tough to find in any organization. There's nothing simple about just plain, good leadership—it's tough. Leadership confuses us. When we say "leadership," Army leaders think back to the 1-hour class they got on leadership principles about "know your men" and "know yourself" and "be technically and tactically competent" and so forth and so on and it was a very boring class and you slept through most of that. There was a little piece in there that said, "Leaders are made, not born." And then we all went off and proceeded to act in this business as if leaders are born and not made because we have empirical evidence of at least one case, our own, where the leader was born. So we fail to be mentors. That's not helpful behavior.

Interpersonal Leadership

If you go and look at works on leadership that have been published or at current theories, I think you can learn something interesting. If, for example, you look at Hershey and Blanchard on "Situational Leadership," or you look at what Maslow has to say, or you look at wandering around management in "In Search of Excellence," or you look at FM 22-100, the Army's book on leadership, and you look at the white paper published on leadership, I think you will find those works have to do with interpersonal leadership styles. Just that. And that's all it has to do with. Now I think there's a problem with that. It goes like this, to quote General John A. Wickham, Jr., the Chief of Staff of the Army: "History has proven that leadership is the crucial element of combat power and the key to battlefield success."

The "crucial element of combat power"—not tanks, not guns, not any of that—is **leadership**. Do we believe that? Who is in charge of leadership in the United States Army? The person in charge is the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. Isn't that strange? If we think that this is the crucial element for success on the battlefield and it's an operational necessity that we have good leadership, why is the Personnel Chief in charge of that? Well, I want to suggest to you that it is for the same reason that when you review what's published on the subject of leadership, you find it has to do with interpersonal leadership almost exclusively. And I think that is a serious flaw. I think that is an impoverished view of leadership, and fortunately,

it is not one that you share if you think about it and about what this school has been telling you about leadership. You know that leadership has got at least three critical dimensions to it, and the interpersonal leadership style is certainly one of those. It is very important, and it's one the Army has studied up and down and sideways and backwards, and we know all kinds of things about it. But frankly, we don't know a great deal about the other two dimensions, nor do we pay them much attention. One of those is organizational leadership. It has to do with the processes within the organization and whether or not the organization is competent. And the third dimension is systemic leadership, and that has to do with how the organization fits within its environment, how it fits in relation with other organizations, and how it fits with the future, i.e., is it relevant? Now those three dimensions of interpersonal leadership, organizational processes, and systemic fit are present in all organizations. It's not true that interpersonal relationships have to do only with small organizations like squads and that systemic leadership has to do only with very large organizations like armies. That simply is not true. You see, all three are present in all organizations, and I don't care if it is a squad, there are systemic ramifications. And interpersonal skills are important for the Chief of Staff of the Army, as well as for you and me. But the mix of those three is different in different organizations. In large organizations, the predominant dimension is systemic leadership if you're going to be successful. And in very small organizations, the predominant dimension is interpersonal leadership style if you're going to be successful. We have an impoverished view of that. We tend to think that when you go up in organizations, to larger organizations, such as those to which you will go, that leadership at higher levels is just "growed-up" leadership as squad leaders. That's not true. High-level leadership is fundamentally different—fundamentally different in the increased importance of organizational processes and systemic fit. Now we've all seen organizations that break down. If any of those legs come off that chair, it falls down. The organization where the interpersonal processes are sick is one that can be very competent and very relevant, but there is no will whatsoever to perform. I've been in those, even led some. An organization where everybody is happy as can be with leadership styles, but the organization is incompetent because the processes are sick, fails. And there are organizations that are extremely competent and people are happy. You know, this country had some of the finest, happiest, most efficient passenger railroads in the world, but they stopped being relevant, they failed to understand what business they were in, and they went out of business. So any of those three dimensions of leadership can cause the organization to fall apart. The systemic dimension, the one that we know least about, is the one that causes the most trouble in my opinion. And that happens because there is a natural propensity for that to cause us problems. It has to do with the fit of the organization and the future, and the future is changing. That's the nature of "future," and there are two things that happen in the future to us. One is that we fail to change when we should. Laurence Peter said that "bureaucracies defend the status quo long after the quo has lost its status." The other is that we change unnecessarily. If you don't have a good reason for doing something, you have your first good reason for not doing that thing.

Dimensions of Leadership

So, I want to encourage you to grab this particular thought: leadership, when correctly viewed, has those three critical dimensions, and I'll restate them but in a different way. Leadership, when it is effective, assures three things: first, appropriate interpersonal leadership styles; second, competent organizational processes; third, a systemic fit with other organizations, with the environment, and with the future—the organization is visioned, knows where it is going, and is relevant. So much for what you need to know.

What are you going to DO? You're going to *lead,* that's what leaders do. You are going to lead. It's time to get on with that. How are you going to do that? You're going to an organization. How are you going to lead? Well, it's pretty straightforward. I don't care what organization you go to, your job as a leader is to do four things: first, assess what is going on in that organization. What are you going to assess? I just told you what you're going to assess. The most important thing that is going on in the organization to which you go is leadership, and if the leadership is good, the organization will be. If it isn't, it doesn't matter what you do. So you will assess leadership, specifically you will assess three things. I just told you what they were. You look around and you say, "What are the leadership styles that are being applied in this organization? Are they appropriate?" And then you look around and say, "Let's look at the processes in this organization and see if they are competent." (Those primarily have to do with information flow in the organization.) And then you look and you say, "What are we trying to do here? What's the purpose of this organization,

stated or unstated?" (If it is unstated, it had better get stated.) "Is the organization relevant to the future?" The second thing you're going to do as a leader is to change the organization, to be a catalyst for change. That's what leaders do. Now, I'm not suggesting that you change for change sake. I am suggesting that you change for survival. When you find an organization that is not changing, you've found one that's dead or dying. There *are* unnecessary changes, but it is *never* true that change is unnecessary. In any organization at any point in its existence, change is essential. The issue is to find the correct change and to get on with it, and we've given you the skills on how to change organizations. You can do that. As a leader, your third task is to integrate the pieces of that organization and make sure they're all talking to each other and working together. Integration is a critical leadership function. Finally, you have the skills as a leader to focus an organization. How do you gather together all the power of that organization (and the power, incidently, resides only in people, *only* in people) and bring that power to bear on what the boss is trying to achieve? How do you gather the energies and the spirit and the will of the people in that organization to accomplish a worthy, relevant objective? Now we've given you those skills, leaders, so let's get on with it.

Leadership Opportunities

And so I come back to the comment that says, "I sure hope I have an opportunity to be an OESO before all that goes away." Well, that might be nice, but one thing is certain. You have the opportunity to be a leader and that's what you are and these skills are relevant to that, absolutely critical to the Army. Let me talk about that just a second. Naisbitt in his book "Megatrends" talks about businesses that failed. He says that in businesses that failed, you will frequently find that they failed to ask the critical question, "What business are we in?" Railroads were not in the business of railroads. The railroads were in business of moving goods, and they didn't recognize that. They thought they were in the railroad business. What business is the Army in? Defending the nation? Well, that's a little broad. Training soldiers? Well, that's nice, but do you realize soldier turnover is 20 percent every three months? I want to suggest to you that the business of the United States Army is the production and development of competent leaders, and if the United States Army does that, all else follows. I don't think that viewpoint is widely shared, incidently. But I think that's the job of the United States Army. I think it's critical, absolutely critical, in order to produce the leaders who are going to be required on a terrible, violent, changing, disruptive, decentralized battlefield that none of us want to go to. Leader development is critical because of something that I'll call the complexity paradox. As things get more complex, which clearly they are doing, the natural human tendency is to increase the complexity of control, to gather more information to some central location, learn more about the situation, and make some centralized decision. And so we gather all control up to us as things become more complex. And that's a nice, simple, easy answer—nice, simple, easy, and wrong. The correct response is to develop leaders and to decentralize, to rely on the leaders in the organization who are below you. Unless you do that, the organization will fail. Only competent, dispersed decision making can deal with complexity.

Focus on Leadership

Well, can you have an Army where you're really focusing on the business of production of leaders? Absolutely, you can. And how will it be when we do that? I think it is absolutely possible to have organizations in which the organization views as a central life-giving theme in the organization the production of leaders. I don't see many organizations like that. In the one you are going to, that thought may not cross anybody's mind. So please take that with you. I think it's possible to have organizations where it's clear that organizational responsibility is the production of leaders. You see, that can't happen in the school; it has got to happen in organizations. I think it's possible to have Army organizations that always have two outcomes, no matter what they do. One is the mission, the other is doing that mission in a way that develops leaders within the organization. I think it's possible to have organizations where end results achieved by the heavy hand of the boss are unacceptable and where he frequently risks accepting less-than-outstanding performance in the collective task for which he is responsible in order to assume some risk and develop the talents of subordinates.

Well, school's out. School's a place where we pause and discover what we already knew. You knew all this. It just needed to get chunked different ways in your mind so that you understood you knew it. Within the leadership of this Army are the seeds of our own destruction. Now you can also find there the greatest hope we have for leveraging the value of the scarce human resources in our organizations and soldiers' blood to create an effective force to defend this nation. You're leaders, each of you, and life's in session. Are you present? □

A Chronicle of the Organizational Effectiveness Center and School

The following narrative depicts a history of significant events impacting on the organizational effectiveness program:

July 1969: The commanding general of the US Army Training Center, Infantry and Fort Ord, Calif.,created the training management evaluation committee (TMEC) with the mission to "study basic combat training and advanced individualized training, (and to) determine the weaknesses and the means of correcting these weaknesses, first within its own resources, and second, beyond Fort Ord's resources."

September 1969: The TMEC recommended specific objectives for the improvement of training and reduction of training costs at Fort Ord. From one recommendation a series of questionnaires was developed to measure trainee and cadre satisfaction with the quality of life at Fort Ord.

Fall 1971: The new commanding general at Fort Ord directed his staff to study the possibility of establishing an awareness training course for middle- and senior-level officers and civilian supervisors.

December 1971: A concurrent series of events occurred at the Department of the Army (DA) when the Chief of Staff of the Army established a study group to determine how the Army could expand its use of behavioral science knowledge to improve its organizations.

January 1972: Fort Ord began 1-week long awareness training classes. The training was directed toward the development of self-awareness, group problem solving, recognition of hidden goals and motivations, and improved interpersonal communication.

April 1972: The Fort Ord commanding general outlined plans for an organizational development program for the post to be supported by the Human Resources Research Office. The program was aimed at achieving better organizational communication and flexibility, greater commitment by individuals to the Army's goals, and improved personal motivation and job satisfaction.

During the month, the chairman of the DA behavioral science study group visited Fort Ord as part of his group's research effort.

June 1972: The chairman of the DA study group and chief of Fort Ord's training evaluation group briefed the Army Chief of Staff on the study group's findings. Based upon the findings that the Army was not making the best use of the behavioral sciences, the Chief of Staff established five DA-funded pilot projects. They were survey feedback conducted in the US Army, Europe; organizational development (OD) in a staff environment conducted at the Army Military Personnel Center at Washington, D.C.; an assessment center at Fort Benning, Ga.; skills in management (SKIM) conducted by the Army Research Institute at Fort Bliss, Texas; and OD at an installation conducted at Fort Ord.

July 1972: The "Motivational Development Program," the initial title of the pilot test of OD at Fort Ord, was officially begun based upon a tasking directive from DA.

August 1972: The OD staff branched off from Fort Ord's training evaluation group to establish an office for the two-year pilot program.

September 1972: The Organizational Development Directorate (changing its title from Motivational Development Program) was formed and an acting director named.

Fall 1972: The OD Directorate published a plan designed to determine the minimum staffing required to conduct OD activities at other Army installations, refine OD techniques and procedures for application in the Army, measure the effects of OD in typical Army organizations, determine how behavioral science instruction in OD techniques and procedures could best be incorporated into the officer and noncommissioned officer (NCO) educational system, and develop educational materials for that purpose. The plan called for OD interventions to progress from smaller to larger, more complex organizations. The plan called for phase I (development) to last from January through June 1973, phase II (testing) to run from July through December 1973, phase III (execution) from January through December 1974, and phase IV (evaluation) from January through June 1975.

November 1972: A director of the OD Directorate was named. At that time the directorate had 19 people authorized (7 personnel assigned) and a fiscal year budget of $254,000.

January-June 1973 (Phase I, Development): The OD Directorate staff was learning its trade and started its first OD type intervention with the Office of the Provost Marshal. Surveys were developed, interviews conducted, and team building workshops given. As an offshoot, the confinement facility began an OD four-step process (assessment, planning, implementation, and evaluation) for both staff and prisoners. The commander of the confinement facility implemented a number of changes with the help of the OD Directorate staff.

March 1973: The Fort Ord leadership course became the responsibility of the OD Directorate and the course title became Leadership and Management Development Course (L&MDC). The course emphasized experiential learning, self-awareness, group development, the dynamics of interaction, communication, management performance techniques, and an introduction to OD concepts. It was used to "seed" Fort Ord with leaders who were indoctrinated in selected OD-related skills.

July-December 1973 (Phase II, Testing): Two major efforts occurred during this "test" period. One involved an OD operation in a training battalion which became a study project lasting nine months—well into phase III. The other OD operation involved the Fort Ord Comptroller Directorate.

August 1973: A new commanding general assumed command of Fort Ord. He expressed his commitment to the OD pilot test.

January-December 1974 (Phase III, Execution): L&MDC was tried in a unit and compared with a usual OD team-building effort. The major effort during the execution phase was a pre- and post-test research project using four different battalions at Fort Ord.

November 1974: Planning and reorientation of the OD Directorate began after representatives from HQ DA proposed continuing the directorate beyond June 1975.

January-June 1975 (Phase IV, Evaluation): The original goal of the evaluation phase was realigned. Instead, OD in a combat division was tested at Fort Carson, Colo., and Fort Riley, Kan., through various exercises. At Fort Ord the OD operations were directed toward the reorientation of Fort Ord from a basic training installation to the home of a combat division.

January 1975: A new commanding general assumed command of Fort Ord and the 7th Infantry Division.

March 1975: HQ DA convened a working conference at Fort Ord where a DA tasking directive for a new and continuing mission for the OD Directorate was coordinated with representatives from HQ DA, the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Forces Command (FORSCOM), the Army Administration Center (ADMINCEN), 7th Infantry Division, Fort Ord staff directorates, and the OD Directorate.

June 1975: The pilot programs formally ended. Many aspects of the other pilot programs, e.g., SKIM and survey feedback, were incorporated into the Fort Ord OD activity.

July 1975: The OD Directorate was renamed the US Army Human Resource Management Training Activity (HRMTA) and a new commander arrived. Supervision of the new activity was transferred from TRADOC to the ADMINCEN. A table of distribution and allowances (TDA) was approved. The mission of HRMTA was to train

Col. Porcher L. Taylor

selected Army personnel in the military application of OD technology with emphasis on human resource development (HRD) activities. Supporting missions included providing support to the ADMINCEN in the test, evaluation, and refinement of OD technology to support personnel management functions, including HRD doctrine, policy, and operations; applying and refining evaluation methodologies to monitor the long-term effects of HRD operations; and providing limited consultation service to the field and the human resource management officer (HRMO).

September 1975: HRMTA had an assigned strength of 19 officers, 6 enlisted personnel, and 21 DA civilians. The 16-week prototype course began on Sept. 8 with 32 students. Half of the students were assigned to the faculty upon graduation and the other half to FORSCOM as consultants, at the request of the FORSCOM commander.

November 1975: Students in the prototype course participated in a 4-week practicum with an infantry battalion at Fort Ord.

December 1975: The prototype course students graduated on Dec. 17. The staff and faculty critiqued the prototype course and planned for the first standard course in January 1976. Questions about the amount of experiential training to conduct the use of L&MDC, the practicum field training exercise (FTX), the use of surveys, the amount of theory to teach, and other topics that surfaced during the prototype course were discussed.

The title of HRMTA was changed to the United States Army Organizational Effectiveness Training Center (USAOETC) on Dec. 1 with an effective date of Sept. 2, 1975. The term organizational development was changed to organizational effectiveness for Army application.

Complications developed in the relationship between the OETC and the ADMINCEN.

January 1976: Organizational Effectiveness Staff Officer (OESO) Class 1-76, the first standard OESO course, began on Jan. 8 with 35 students in the class. Their FTXs were conducted at Fort Ord and at Fort Lewis, Wash.

February 1976: A new commandant assumed command of OETC.

April 1976: OESO Class 1-76 graduated. OESO Class 2-76 began with 40 students attending.

May 1976: An organizational effectiveness executive course (OEEC) was held in Heidelberg, Germany, to acquaint commanders with the concept of OE and the role of the OESO. Another OEEC was held in Monterey, Calif., for TRADOC service school representatives to report on the use of sample OE service school programs of instruction developed for officer and NCO training.

Col. Phillip B. Merrick

August 1976: OESO Class 2-76 graduated. OESO Class 3-76 began with 40 students attending, 3 of them NCOs, the first enlisted soldiers to attend the course.

October 1976: The continuing debate over whether to move the OETC from Fort Ord to Fort Benjamin Harrison, Ind., was settled when the commander, ADMINCEN, notified OETC it would remain at Fort Ord—at least for the foreseeable future.

December 1976: OESO Class 3-76 graduated. A change of command occurred at OETC.

January 1977: Class 1-77 began with 49 students. The first issue of the ADMINCEN Bulletin was produced. Its purpose was to provide OESOs and OETC staff with current information about OE.

March 1977: OETC began reporting directly to TRADOC instead of through the ADMINCEN. With this change, the OETC TDA was increased to a total of 77 spaces (39 officers, 8 enlisted, 30 civilian). School quotas and policy coordination remained a responsibility of the Army deputy chief of staff for personnel (DCSPER).

May 1977: Class 1-77 graduated. Class 2-77 began with 52 students.

Col. George E. Palmer

August 1977: DA approved a major change to position and classification guidance for the OESO additional skill identifier (ASI) 5Z. The change permitted the commander of the OETC to award ASI 5Z to any officer graduate, without regard to the officer's speciality. Previously only officers who possessed a primary or alternate speciality code of 41 (personnel management) could be awarded the ASI 5Z. Additionally with the change, any officer position could be coded ASI 5Z instead of only 41-coded positions.

Class 2-77 graduated.

September 1977: Class 3-77 began with 46 students attending. The cost of training an OESO student was computed at the request of TRADOC. Total cost per student was computed as $14,775. Excluding the student's military pay cost, the figure was $7,879.

October 1977: The General Officer Steering Committee (GOSC) for OE approved the role of OE in the Reserve Components, a role for NCOs in OE, and the use of DA civilians in OE.

The first issue of the *OE Communique* was published and distributed Armywide.

December 1977: Class 3-77 graduated. The commandant, OETC, in a letter response to the commander, TRADOC, stated that the OETC could be relocated at either Fort McClellan, Ala., or Fort Monmouth, N.J.

January 1978: Class 1-78 began with 45 students. OETC began conducting a portion of the pre-command course, an executive version of the L&MDC was designed and taught in 1978, and 150 drill sergeants received L&MDC training at Fort Jackson, S.C.

March 1978: Class 2-78 began with 32 students.

April 1978: The American Council on Education (ACE) evaluated the OESO course and recommended that up to 16 hours of graduate credit be granted to students attending the course—the highest number of graduate credits recommended for any course in the Army school system by ACE.

Class 1-78 graduated.

May 1978: Class 3-78 began with 33 students.

June 1978: Class 2-78 graduated. An assessment of the OETC was conducted at the request of OETC and funded by the Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. A synopsis of the assessment findings found that OETC was

accomplishing its mission to graduate "a highly motivated group of OESOs who have been successful in implementing organizational development operations in the Army. There is evidence that instruction at OETC continues to improve."

The GOSC met and recommended that OE operations be documented in order to determine the cost effectiveness of the program.

A working conference on OE in war was conducted at OETC with participation from an Israeli Army officer who had dealt with OD issues during battle.

July 1978: Class 4-78 began with 39 students.

August 1978: Class 3-78 graduated and Class 5-78 began with 30 students. A service school module revision conference was held at OETC to review the basic and advanced officer course and NCO course service school modules on OE. Numerous changes were made to the modules, primarily to reflect current OE doctrine.

September 1978: An acting commandant assumed command of the OETC.

Lt. Col. Ancil L. Denzler

November 1978: Class 4-78 graduated.

December 1978: Class 5-78 graduated. A new commandant assumed command of the OETC. The TRADOC commander, in a message to DA, recommended that the OETC not be relocated to Fort Benjamin Harrison as proposed earlier in the year.

1979: The name of the school was changed from OETC to the Organizational Effectiveness Center and School (OECS), which brought additional responsibilities for both a center and school. Outside consulting activities increased for the OECS staff, more literature was produced for the field, and video productions were started.

Brig. Gen. Joseph C. Lutz

January 1979: Class 1-79 began with 44 students. The class graduated in April. The first OENCO course (pilot) 1-79 began with 48 NCOs. The NCOs graduated in March.

March 1979: Class 2-79 began with 30 students and graduated in June.

May 1979: The commandant of OECS was promoted to brigadier general. The second OENCO course (pilot) 2-79 began with 51 NCOs who graduated in July.

June 1979: Class 3-79 began with 18 students, including the first Naval officer and first Army reserve officer. The class graduated in September. A new commandant assumed command of OECS.

August 1979: Class 4-79 began with 31 officers graduating in December, including the first officer from the National Guard.

Col. William L. Golden

Winter 1979: The 3-10 year OE plan was presented during a working conference, with DA and major commands in attendance. The plan opted for a total systems focus, movement into large and complex systems, and called for more "expert" consulting.

1980: Four OESO courses were conducted in 1980. OECS participated in a pre-command course at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., and conducted a course for key managers of OESOs attended by 36 generals and colonels. By 1980 the stated mission of OECS was to "develop, train, and evaluate the systemic military application of OE and related advanced management and behavioral science skills in the Army." OECS identified and adapted OD techniques from within industry, academia, the other services, and other federal agencies for application in the Army.

July 1980: HQ DA OE program responsibility was shifted from the office of the DCSPER to the office of the Chief of Staff, Army, with the Director of Management given DA staff proponency for OE. The change was made to emphasize that OE had evolved to a broader systems approach and away from a primarily human relations perspective.

August 1980: An OE review and planning conference (RAPC) was hosted by the Army Chief of Staff's office (OE) at Alexandria, Va. The purpose of the RAPC was to update the current and future status of OE in each major command and to refine the OE 3-10 year plan in order to chart the future direction of OE.

1981: The titles "OESO" and "OENCO" were merged into the title "OE consultant (OEC)" to better reflect the nature of the work of the officers, NCOs, and DA civilians. The OE NCO course and OESO course were merged into a 16-week OEC course. Graduate NCOs were awarded skill qualification identifier (SQI) 3 which was comparable to ASI 5Z awarded to officer graduates.

Five OEC L&MDCs were conducted by OECS in 1981. Four OE managers' courses were taught. A special training conference titled "Management of Change" was held for field consultants and their clients.

The Concepts Development Directorate efforts in 1981 focused on strategic management, goal setting, organizational redesign, and quality circle technologies, as well as continued work on battlefield OE and force modernization issues.

Two TV tapes were produced—"OE Planning" and "OE Evaluation and Follow-up." Two reference books were produced—*Performance Management/Appraisal Conference* and *Management of Stress In Organizations.* The *OE Communique* was expanded to a 72-page format and distribution increased to 3,500 copies.

OEC competency-based instruction was initiated in Class 4-81 and the OEC course was modified based upon the competency-based training technology and internal and external course evaluation data.

1982: OECS efforts focused on training students, revising its training materials, and developing further OE technologies to implement the guidance of the CSA to have OECs work at the highest levels on the Army's significant problems. During the year, five OEC courses were conducted with 176 students graduated. There were four OE managers' courses (OEMC) offered with 154 participants from major commands attending. The Leadership Management Development Trainer's Course (LMDTC) was conducted 10 times during the year, 7 of them at locations away from Fort Ord. There were 125 LMDTC graduates.

The Concepts Development Directorate continued developing technologies to deal with emerging Army issues. In February a specialty conference was conducted titled "The Approach to Organizational Design/Redesign." Representatives from major commands throughout the Army attended, including nine general officers. Other efforts included continued development of the battlefield OE concept; development and testing of materials for the work environment improvement team (WEIT); the preparation of a resource book for commanders to assist them in dealing with force integration issues; continued development and testing of the strategic management consulting model (designed to assist commanders of large, complex organizations develop long-term plans); and development and testing of high performance 1 (a dynamic leadership training program for intact groups of officer cadre).

The Training Developments Directorate produced two videotapes—"Transition Meeting: Change of Command" and "Systems Approach to OE." OECS received the Vincent F. DeRose Award for excellence in educational television for the videotape produced in 1981, "Organizational Effectiveness Planning." Two interactive computer-assisted instructional systems were made operational to provide students and faculty training in competencies of successful OE consultants. Military qualification standards (MQS) packages on OE and OE correspondence courses were distributed throughout the year.

Col. William W. Witt

1983: OECS experienced a major transition during the year caused by a change in focus of the OE program and numerous key personnel changes. A new commandant assumed command of OECS in July and new directors of training, evaluation, and concepts development assumed their duties during the year. A systems integration futures team was formed in August to develop a new course curriculum and to determine the future direction for OE in the Army. The title organizational effectiveness consultant was changed back to organizational effectiveness staff officer. The newly designed course was expanded from 16 to 19 weeks and retitled the OESO course, with an implementation date of January 1984.

In 1983, five OEC courses were conducted with a total of 153 graduates. The OEMC was given three times with 130 participants. The LMDTC was conducted eight times with 98 graduates.

Proponency for the LMDTC, LMDC, and high performance 1 was transferred to the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth toward the end of the year.

The OEMC was revised late in 1983. Beginning in 1984, it was retitled the organizational effectiveness executive seminar and reduced from a 3½-day course to a 2-day course.

In January 1983 the TRADOC OE service school instructors conference was held in Monterey. Eighteen service schools were represented at the conference, as were HQ DA and TRADOC. It was the last such conference hosted by OECS.

Two issues of the *OE Communique* were issued, in March and in June. The periodical was retitled *Army Organizational Effectiveness Journal* and the first issue published in December. The guidelines, style, and focus of the periodical were changed.

Two reference books were published—"Commander's Guide to Force Integration" and "Organizational Surveys: Development and Application."

The Concepts Development Directorate continued work on innovation and creativity in organizations, complex change methodologies, transition management through strategic planning, and systems integration studies.

1984: In June a new commandant assumed command of OECS. Three OESO courses were conducted with 130 graduates. An OE advanced training course was conducted with 39 OESOs attending. Two staff and faculty development workshops were presented with 35 attending.

Col. Donald K. Griffin

The 19-week OESO course objective was to train selected personnel as OESOs who were generally assigned to division or higher level headquarters as special staff officers working directly for the command group. Subjects taught included topics from the behavioral, management, and systems sciences. The focus of the course was on the application of skills drawn from these disciplines in order to enhance the effectiveness of organizations. Students were taught how to apply the practices and principles of these disciplines to attain goals, such as greater organizational competence, organizational improvement, and human resource development. The curriculum was divided into ten academic subcourses: The Army: A Complex System; Organizational Communication; Organizational Behavior/Management;

Quantitative Analysis/Decision Techniques; Computer Literacy and Micro-computer Applications; OESO Skills; Applied Problem Solving; Systems Theory; Field Training Exercise/Case Presentations; and Mentoring Program.

The 2-week OE advanced training course was held in September to update field OESOs on changes to the OESO course curriculum since their graduation. Topics of instruction included Computer Literacy/Analytical Process; Computer Technology; Telecommunications; Microcomputer Familiarization; The Role of the OESO in Automation; The Army: A Complex System; Systems Perspectives; Negotiation/Mediation Skills; Problem Soving; and Planning and Managing an Organizational Strategy.

The Training and Doctrine Directorate worked on the revision of the OESO courses to be taught in 1985. Course objectives were redefined, the design and scope of the course were changed, and the course length reduced from 19 to 15 weeks. Guidance from the OE GOSC to transfer OE skills to the Army resulted in the identification of eight new courses. Analysis and design of the new courses were scheduled for FY86 with implementation to take place in FY87-88.

There was an increased emphasis on producing doctrine that addressed the new strategy for OE. A doctrinal development process was established and doctrinal publications were planned to support Army needs at various levels. Manuals were identified for development to assist OESOs in managing complex systems, force integration, information technology, and complex problem solving. A series of "how to..." manuals was planned, which would allow commanders to use OE techniques with little or no OESO involvement. The manuals were to address typical people oriented issues, e.g., team building, performance management, and conflict resolution. Finally, a field manual was planned that would follow the approval of a concept paper of OE in war.

Four training circulars were produced by OECS in 1984—"Effective Planning," "Conducting Effective Meetings," "Conflict Management," and "Problem Solving."

The Concepts Development Directorate developed a revised OE executive seminar, assessed the REFORGER exercise, reinitiated the development of a doctrinal concept for OE in war, planned the OE community network (a telecommunications subnet of the US Army FORUM Net), and taught the strategic management process at the Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pa.

1985: Two OESO courses were conducted with 81 graduates. The TRADOC service school evaluation team conducted a training evaluation at OECS in February. OECS received a satisfactory rating in all areas evaluated. Work continued on the development of a concept for OE in war. A group of OESOs participated in the TEAM SPIRIT exercise in Korea, in part to use OE techniques in a wartime scenario. Doctrine development and course development work continued during the first part of the year.

March 1985: OECS received unofficial notice that OESO spaces would be deleted from the Army effective FY87 and that OECS would close.

June 1985: OECS received official notification that the school and center would be closed effective Oct. 1, 1985.

OECS Accomplishments

OESO/OEC courses taught - 42
OESO/OEC student graduates - 1,702
Army officer graduates - 1,232
Army NCO graduates - 348
International graduates - 8
Other US service graduates - 13
DA civilian graduates - 101
Smallest OESO/OEC class size - 18
Largest OESO/OEC class size - 61
OE Advanced Courses taught - 3
Leadership and Management Development Trainer's Courses - 6-12 per year through 1983
Number of *OE Communiques/Army OE Journals* published - 27
Other OE publications produced - 22

Commandants

Col. Porcher L. Taylor - July 1975-January 1976
Col. Phillip B. Merrick - February-December 1976
Col. George E. Palmer - December 1976-August 1978
Lt. Col. Ancil L. Denzler - September-December 1978
Col. Joseph C. Lutz (now a major general)- December 1978-June 1979
Col. William L. Golden - June 1979-July 1983
Col. William W. Witt - July 1983-June 1984
Col. Donald K. Griffin - June 1984-October 1985

Staff and Faculty 1972:
6 officers, 9 civilians, 9 enlisted

Staff and Faculty 1985:
34 officers, 33 civilians, 16 enlisted

Organizational Effectiveness Literature

Two new training circulars (TC) and one new field circular (FC) have been added to the list of organizational effectiveness materials available to commanders and other Army leaders and managers.

OECS is proponent agency for the TCs that can be obtained through the Standard Army Publications System (STARPUBS), DA 12-series forms. The FC can be ordered (until Oct. 1, 1985) by writing to the Commandant; OECS; Attn: ATXW-RMA-TD; Fort Ord, CA 93941-7300, or by calling Autovon 929-7058/7059. When FC 26-10 is converted to TC 26-10 within the next six months, it also will be available through STARPUBS.



FC 26-10, The Change of Command Transition (Mar 85), is a "do-it-yourself" guide that provides both general concepts of the transition and specific techniques for conducting a change of command transition meeting.

TC 26-4, Conflict Management (Dec 84), helps the reader identify the nature and sources of personal, interpersonal, and organizational conflict and to understand the techniques for managing conflict.

TC 26-5, Problem Solving (Dec 84), provides the reader with basic techniques for solving problems systematically and logically.

TRADOC Approves OE Proponency Transfer

As the *Army Organizational Effectiveness Journal* went to press, the following proposals regarding retention of organizational effectiveness (OE) skills within the Army had been approved by the TRADOC commander:

- Proponency for OE training, training development, and doctrine is assigned to the Soldier Support Center at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Ind., effective Oct. 1, 1985. Specifically, SSC will perform the following functions:
  - — Integrate application-level skills into the S1 and DPCA/G1 courses.
  - — Prepare military qualification standard (MQS) material to imbed OE subject matter in both officer and noncommissioned officer common core curricula and in courses at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., and the Sergeants Major Academy at Fort Bliss, Texas.
  - — Prepare training support packages addressing key OE skills for resident and nonresident instruction.
  - — Develop and write doctrine to include field manuals and training circulars and produce audiovisual materials.
  - — Prepare correspondence courses.
- A one-term elective course teaching OE skills will be offered at CGSC during the 1986-87 academic year.

In order to implement these actions, subject matter expert positions will be transferred from OECS to SSC and CGSC (3 officers and 1 civilian to SSC and 1 officer to CGSC). The OECS Library will also be transferred to SSC. While the above transfer of positions will be effective Oct. 1, 1985, the personnel and the library will remain at Fort Ord, Calif., until the summer of 1986.

Acting commandant at OECS until Oct. 1, 1985, is Lt. Col. Frank Quinn, former director of Concepts Development.

U.S. Army
Training and Doctrine Command

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